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ABSTRACT 
In this study I empirically examine the valuation and value relevance 
characteristics of specific consolidated and segment-disaggregated corporate financial 
information. 
On the consolidated level, I investigate the relationships (in terms of value 
relevance and pricing) between the UK firms' equity market values and the firm-level 
contemporaneous equity book values, earnings and dividends. The objective here is to 
identify and explore factors and contexts that impact on the value relevance and pricing 
of consolidated financial statement information reported by UK publicly traded firms 
over the period from 1987 to 2002. 
On the segmental level, the study capitalises on the insights gained from the 
consolidated level findings and investigates (i) whether financial information, on 
specific geographic and line-of-business segments' operations of a cross-section of UK 
multi-segment firms, is associated with the equity market value of the entire firm (i. e., 
value relevant); (ii) whether such operations are being differentially priced (by the stock 
market) into the equity market value of the firm; and (iii) how the factors/contexts 
affecting value relevance and pricing of the firm-level accounting fundamentals impact 
on the value relevance and pricing of the segment-level results. Additionally, this study 
provides further empirical evidence on the adequacy of the UK segment reporting 
accounting standard SSAP 25, and the quality of segment disclosures in the UK. 
The employed valuation model represents a fusion of valuation frameworks 
developed in earlier studies [e. g., Edwards and Bell (1961), Peasnell (1981,1982), 
Ohlson (1989,1995), Rees (1997), Garrod and Rees (1998), Wysocki (1998)]. On the 
consolidated-level, the model expresses the size-deflated equity market value of the firm 
as a linear function of size-deflated equity book value, earnings for ordinary, dividends 
for ordinary shareholders and additional control/dummy variables. In the segment-level 
analysis, the earnings variable is further disaggregated into its segment-level elements. 
With regard to the firm-level analysis, the study uncovers a range of contexts 
and factors that affect the value relevance and pricing of specific accounting value 
drivers. Among these are: the sign of reported earnings and book values; whether the 
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firm trades at a premium/discount to its book value; the economic periods; the dividend 
status of the firm; diversification profile of the firm; and the industrial affiliation of the 
firm. In addition, the firm-level analysis indicates that the industrially diversified firms 
have lower valuation than the focused firms, while the geographically diversified firms 
have higher valuation than the domestic firms. 
The segment-level accounting data is found to communicate value relevant 
information, which is often incremental to the consolidated-level data. In particular, 
segment disclosures have incremental information content in situations where on the 
consolidated level the firm reports losses (which are not priced), while on the 
disaggregated level profits are reported for some of the disclosed segments. 
Nevertheless, geographic segment reports are, on average, relatively more informative 
(value relevant) than the business segment reports. This, perhaps, reflects the relatively 
lower precision, implied in SSAP 25, with which firms are allowed to identify, group 
and report the line-of-business operations. 
It is also found that neither value relevance nor relative pricing of different 
segments remains constant throughout the sample period. For example, during the early 
economic periods (pre-1994 or pre-1996) segmental profits reported from the America 
segment had the highest capitalisation, while in the period from 1994 to 1997 the UK 
segment was associated with the highest relative contribution to firm value. In the most 
recent economic period (1998-2002) none of the foreign segments are value-relevant. 
There is considerable variation of the value relevance of segmental earnings among 
business segments operating in different industries. Segments operating in the Hi-Tech 
and knowledge-intensive sectors (e. g., IT, Telecommunication services, etc. ), and 
services sectors have the highest pricing and relevance to the value of the firm. In 
contrast, the `traditional' sector segments, such as Agriculture, Mining, Basic Industries 
and Utilities, are associated with the lowest relative contribution to the equity market 
value of the firm. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The growing importance of financial markets in recent decades has led to a 
continuous increase in the demand by the investment community for more 
comprehensive and timely financial information to be reported by companies. In 
response to these needs, accounting regulators have amended existing and/or produced 
new financial reporting standards which invariably require companies to disclose more 
comprehensive and detailed corporate information in their financial statements. One 
such development in the UK has been the adoption of the SSAP 25 standard, in June 
1990, where companies are required to disclose specific financial information about 
their geographic or business segments, subject to materiality thresholds (10% rule) in 
respect of the identification of reportable segments. This standard reflects the 
increasingly global-orientation and multi-industry versatility of UK listed companies 
and recognises the need for informative segment-level financial information to be 
disclosed to the general investment public in assessing the future of the company. 
It is recognised in both the academic and professional literature that the disclosure 
of segment-disaggregated information is (or should be) of some value or relevance to 
investors. As is mentioned in SSAP 25, the reporting of segment disaggregated 
information should be more beneficial to the consumers of this information to the extent 
that firm's operations in particular segments are associated with different expected risk, 
return and growth characteristics'. According to Herrmann and Thomas (2000), 
financial analysts worldwide consistently identify segment information as vital to their 
1A narrow definition of `consumers of information' is implied here: principal parties, investors, - e. g., 
market analysts and informed investors - who actively contribute to the formation of the market value of 
the firm's equity. 
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work. In a survey of sell-side analysts, Brown (1997) finds that segment reporting is 
ranked as one of the three most useful corporate financial data items along with the 
statement of income and the statement of cash flows. The extant literature, reviewed in 
Chapter 2, identifies and tests conditions under which reporting disaggregated data 
would be more informative in terms of its usefulness for: 
(i) the assessment of the firm's expected future performance, or 
(ii) the valuation of the equity market value of the firm. 
The current research builds, in part, on this literature, though the focus is 
different. The fact that multi-segment firms are required to report segmental data 
enables an investigation into the value association of specific disclosed segments. I 
investigate whether the operations of a cross-section of UK multi-segment firms, 
reported from specific geographic or industrial segments are perceived by investors to 
have differential relative contributions to (and associations with) the equity market 
value of the entire firm. Stated differently, the research questions are: whether 
consistent valuation patterns (e. g., differences) can be identified for segments that have 
specific geographic or line-of-business profiles, and what contextual factors impact 
upon the identified differentials. This should not be confused with the firm's 
performance on the segmental level per se. This is an empirical investigation of the 
market's assessment of the average (cross-sectional) value contributions associated with 
distinct geographic locations or business lines of a generic UK multi-segment firm. 
Among the questions that this study seeks to answer is, for example, whether investors 
value operations reported by UK firms from the `America' geographic region 
higher/lower, on average, than those from the `Continental Europe' region, and what 
context-specific factors affect the observed valuation differential. 
In addition to the segment-related analyses and results, this study also provides 
further empirical evidence in relation to a number of broader issues, including: the value 
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relevance of financial statement information in the UK settings over the period from 
1987 to 2002; the adequacy of the segment reporting accounting standard SSAP 25; and 
the quality of segment disclosures in the UK. 
The empirical findings might contribute to our knowledge and understanding of 
the complex relationships existing between the market's perception of equity value and 
the specific accounting fundamentals. In addition to the contribution to the academic 
literature, the findings of this study may also be of interest to corporate and regulatory 
policy makers such as accounting standards setting bodies, investors and corporate 
finance directors, who remain largely responsible for decisions regarding the content 
and detail of segment disclosures. 
The following methodological considerations underpin the empirical analysis of 
the study. By considering the multi-segment firm as being the sum-total of its reported 
constituent parts (geographic or, on the other dimension, industrial segments), the value 
of the entire firm should then reflect values contributed by or associated with each of its 
specific segments. I acknowledge that the equity value of the firm might reflect more 
than a simple sum-total of its separate segments. In addition to the simple sum-total of 
values contributed by each segment individually, the entire firm value could also reflect 
positive/negative synergies resulting from combining different operations (segments). 
Although in some empirical sections I test the relative valuation of diversified vs. non- 
diversified firms, the direct investigation of synergies associated with geographic or 
industrial diversification is, however, outside the scope of this study. 
The premise that the value of the multi-segment firm should reflect the sum of 
values contributed by the segments constituting the firm, allows the use of a rigorous 
accounting-based valuation model. The empirical analysis consists of a decomposition 
of this accounting-based valuation model to assess the relative value contributions 
associated with specific segments. 
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Empirical research into the valuation contributions associated with geographical 
segments is limited, and has largely been restricted to US data [e. g., Bodnar and 
Weintrop (1997)]. To the best of my knowledge there have only been two studies, 
Garrod and Rees (1998) and Bodnar et al. (2003), that have investigated the value 
association of foreign operations reported by UK multi-segment firms. Furthermore, I 
am unaware of any empirical work that uses UK firms to investigate the value 
contributions associated with specific business segments (i. e., relating to specific 
economic sectors or industries). 
This study extends the mentioned above studies in several respects. First of all, I 
investigate both dimensions of the corporate segment disclosures: geographic and line- 
of-business. Secondly, in addition to testing the differential valuation of `domestic' vs. 
`foreign' operations, I investigate the relative pair-wise valuations across all geographic 
segment locations (i. e., UK, Europe, America, Asia, and Middle East & Africa). A 
similar pair-wise approach is used to assess the differential value contributions 
associated with segments operating in specific industries. Finally, this study uses a 
longer time period and a wider range of valuation-affecting contexts than has been 
applied in prior studies. 
1.2 IS IT DIVERSIFICATION OR DISCLOSURE? 
Although such terms as `geographic/industrial diversification' and 
`geographic/business segment-disclosure' are used in this study as synonyms, it is 
important to note that strictly speaking this study concerns more the segment-disclosure 
side of the story. On a technical level, there is an important distinction between these 
two terms. A firm might operate in more than one geographic area or economic 
sector/industry, yet choose not to report segmental information. Or, for disclosure 
purposes, it might report segmental data using highly firm-specific (i. e., idiosyncratic) 
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amalgamation and classification criteria and methods. This might happen, for instance, 
when in the opinion of the firm's directors the disclosure of any information required by 
SSAP 25 would be seriously prejudicial to the interests of the reporting entity. Non- 
reporting is also likely when none of the segments of a diversified firm surpasses the 
standard's 10% materiality threshold. Furthermore, as pointed out in SSAP 25, there can 
be considerable heterogeneity, within the cross-section of the UK multi-segment firms, 
in how segments are classified, both in geographic and line-of-business terms. In other 
words, segmental identification and break-down for reporting purposes would not 
necessarily mirror the patterns of the actual operating segments, i. e. the firm's 
diversification characteristics. It would, therefore, be fallacious to equate segment 
disclosures with the actual diversification profile of the firm. Therefore, in strict terms, 
this study is not an investigation into the valuation properties of `real' operational 
components of diversified firms. However, because the literature in the area of 
corporate diversification, nevertheless, relies on the segmental disclosures as the 
primary source of data, the suggestion that these terms are synonyms is difficult to 
avoid in relation to discussions of the existing empirical literature. 
1.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
To investigate the differences in valuation across specific geographic or industry 
segment operations and estimate the valuation differentials between the diversified and 
domestic firms, an augmented version of the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson residual income 
model is employed. While the detailed derivation of the empirical estimation model is 
the subject of Chapter 3, it suffices to mention here that the model is designed to explain 
the cross-sectional variation of the scale-deflated equity market value through the scale- 
deflated contemporaneous earnings, book value, dividends and a set of control 
variables. For the segment-level analysis, the model's firm-level accounting data is then 
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disaggregated into (or, alternatively, appended with) the segmental components. The 
valuation differentials associated with segments, operating in diverse geographic 
regions or lines-of-business, are inferred by analysing the differences between the 
estimated segment earnings multipliers. 
The sample consists of pooled over time observations that belong to a cross- 
section of the UK multi-segment non-financial publicly limited companies covering the 
period from 1987 to 2002. This data is collected from the Extel Financial Company 
Analysis database. 
1.4 HYPOTHESES AND FINDINGS 
It is not the objective of this study to test hypotheses that would have been 
specifically formulated at the outset, based on the prior literature. The investigation here 
is more of a general exploratory nature, with the objective being to tap into one of the 
weakly researched areas of market-based accounting research, and to uncover empirical 
evidence on specific relationships. Some testable propositions, however, do arise in the 
process of analysis, leading to the subsequent formulation and testing of hypotheses. 
The main findings of this study relate to (i) the firm-level valuation, and (ii) 
geographic and line-of-business segment valuation. With regard to the firm-level 
analysis, the study uncovers a range of factors and contexts that influence the value 
relevance and pricing of such firm-level financial statement variables, as book value, 
earnings and dividends. These relationships are found to be affected significantly by: 
the sign of reported earnings and book values; whether the firm trades at a 
premium/discount to its book value; the economic periods; the dividend paying status of 
the firm; diversification profile of the firm; industrial affiliation of the firm. 
Findings on the segmental level provide an insight into how the market 
perceives and prices, into the equity market value of the firm, operations that the UK 
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firms might carry out in specific geographic locations or industries. In addition, the 
study provides further evidence on how the international and/or industrial 
diversification profile of UK firms reflects upon the market's valuation of the firms. 
Finally, the study provides new evidence on the de facto quality of corporate segmental 
reporting and the adequacy of the requirements of the UK segment disclosure standard. 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Chapter 2 presents the literature review classified into four sections relevant to 
the study. The first section reviews segment disclosure requirements in the UK and 
some debate in the literature on its relevance to financial statement users. In the second 
section I review literature on usefulness and value relevance of line of business and 
geographic segment information. The third section examines previous studies on 
valuation of geographical and industrial diversification. Section four discusses some of 
the studies in the area of accounting-based valuation models. 
Chapter 3 consists of seven sections and deals with methodology used to conduct 
the study. Following the introduction section, the second section justifies the selection 
of a rigorous accounting based valuation model, which is used in the subsequent 
empirical analysis chapters. Section 3 presents alternative approaches to the formal 
derivation of the model, the underlying assumptions and further adjustments used for 
operationalising the theoretical model. Section 4 discusses the issues of scale and scale 
effects, and measures that can mitigate this problem in the context of market based 
accounting research in general, and in the employed test design in particular. Section 5 
augments the model for the purpose of segment-level analysis. Section 6 discusses the 
hypothesised economic (and, where relevant, econometric) role of the intercept, 
additional valuation factors, and instrumental variables included in the model. Section 
seven concludes the chapter. 
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Chapter 4 analyses empirically the properties of the empirical valuation model 
for the firm-level data and consists of five sections. Following the introduction section, 
Section 2 explains the data selection and collection procedures, defines variables, 
examines some primary characteristics of the entire sample, and reports and analyses 
the variables' descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents the results of empirical tests for 
alternatively partitioned samples, in order to identify influential contexts that need to be 
controlled for during the segment-level analysis. Section 4 discusses the issue of 
sensitivity of the results to alternative definitions of outliers and performs additional 
robustness checks. Section 5 discusses major finding of the firm-level analysis in light 
of their implications to segment-level analysis. 
Chapter 5 consists of four sections and is devoted to the analysis of value 
contributions associated with operations reported from specific geographical locations. 
Section 2 follows the introduction section, and provides details on data collection 
procedure, variables description and the analysis of data descriptive statistics. Section 3 
is the core of the chapter and presents the regression results and subsequent analysis of 
findings. In section 4I perform additional checks for the robustness of the previous 
findings, by using alternative deflators, and conclude the chapter. 
Chapter 6 is methodologically and structurally similar to Chapter 5, but 
concentrates on the analysis of value contributions associated with specific line-of- 
business segments. 
Chapter 7 concludes the study, by providing the summary of results, their 
importance and implications, outlines the limitations of the study and directions for the 
future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I examine the literature in specific areas of such disciplines as 
accounting, market based accounting, and finance, that contextualise the objectives of 
this research and set up the background for the research questions addressed in this 
study. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 outlines and discusses the 
segment disclosure requirements in the UK. Section 2.3 reviews three main strands of 
the literature in the general area of usefulness of segmental information, i. e., (i) 
predictive ability of segmental data, (ii) market's reaction to segment information, and 
(iii) differential valuation of different business and geographic segments. Section 2.4 
examines some of the empirical works in the area of valuation of corporate industrial 
and/or geographic diversification. Section 2.5 discusses accounting-based valuation 
models in light of their application to this study. 
2.2 BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION OF SEGMENT DISCLOSURE 
REQUIREMENTS IN THE UK 
The introduction chapter stresses that the primary issues of my research are the 
investigation of value contributions, as perceived by the stock market, of specific 
geographic and industrial segments of UK multi-segment companies, as well as the 
equity value implication of such corporate characteristics as industrial and/or 
geographic diversification. In this study, the very fact of whether the firm is diversified 
or not and, if so, whether it is diversified into specific geographic regions and/or lines of 
business, is inferred from the firm's disclosure or non-disclosures of segment-level 
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information in its financial reports. It is, therefore, of vital importance to understand 
how and what segment information might be reported by UK companies. For this 
purpose, it is necessary to review the rules, set by the accounting standard setting 
bodies, which guide segment reporting in the UK. In the section that follows I present a 
summary of current UK segment disclosure rules, along with some literature on the 
quality of segment disclosure rules and segment disclosures per se. 
In the UK the requirements to provide segmental information come from two 
sources: the Companies Act 1985, and a more recent segment reporting standard, the 
Statement of Standard Accounting Practice No. 25, adopted in June 1990. 
2.2.1 Companies Act 1985 
Until the adoption of SSAP 25, the UK segment disclosure requirements, 
stipulated by the Companies Act, were generally considered less onerous. According to 
the Companies Act, UK companies were only required to disclose turnovers by (a) 
Class of business and (b) Geographical market, including the destination (i. e., 
geographic locations where products/services were marketed) and the origin (i. e., 
geographic locations where products/services were produced)2. The Act requires that 
where a company has operated in classes of business or supplied markets, which, in the 
opinion of the directors, differ substantially from each other, the notes to the accounts 
should disclose turnover attributable to classes of business and to markets [GAAP 
2004]. Only those classes of business or markets which contribute materially need be 
disclosed. The amounts which are not material may be included in amounts stated in 
respect of another class or market, or combined together and shown as `other'. 
The Act gives little guidance for determining classes of business, but suggests that 
the directors should have regard to the manner in which the company's activities are 
2 The requirements in the US where more extensive, with FAS 14 calling for disclosure of line of business 
and geographical information on sales, intra-group transfers, profits and identifiable assets (FASB, 
December 1976). 
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organised. It is suggested that this term might reasonably be regarded as equivalent to 
the `principal activities' of the company which should be disclosed in the directors' 
report. Similarly, for markets, it states that a market means a geographical market, but it 
gives no further criteria for determining when markets differ substantially from each 
other [GAAP 2004]. 
The requirements of the Act are subject to the proviso that when, in the opinion of 
the directors, disclosure of this information would be seriously prejudicial to the 
interests of the company, it need not be given, but the fact that the information has not 
been disclosed must be stated [GAAP 2004]. 
2.2.2 Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 25 (SSAP 25) 
SSAP 25 recognises the fact that segment information is becoming increasingly 
important as more and more companies trade globally and carry out numerous classes of 
business or operate in several geographical areas, with different rates of profitability, 
different opportunities for growth and different degrees of risk. The standard notes that 
it is not usually possible for the user of the financial statements of such an entity to 
make judgements about either the nature of the entity's different activities or their 
contribution to the entity's overall financial results unless the financial statements 
provide some segmental analysis of the information they contain. As mentioned in 
SSAP 25, the purpose of segmental information is to provide information to assist the 
users of financial statements: 
(a) to appreciate more thoroughly the results and financial position of the entity by 
permitting a better understanding of the entity's past performance and thus a better 
assessment of its future prospects; and 
(b) to be aware of the impact that changes in significant components of a business 
may have on the business as a whole. 
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SSAP 25 repeats the statutory disclosures of the Companies Act and then adds the 
requirement to disclose both profit/loss before tax and net assets by class of business 
and geographical market. These disclosures are required to be given by certain 
companies and are encouraged to be given by all other entities. It does not seek to 
change the requirement of the Act to report segments which differ substantially from 
each other, but rather seeks to provide guidance to assist the directors in determining 
what is `substantially different'. It is the directors who make the decisions as to what 
defines a reportable segment [GAAP 2004]. 
Those definitions, once made, should be reviewed annually and redefined as 
appropriate. If a change is made to the definitions of the segments or to the accounting 
policies that are adopted for reporting segment information, the nature, reason for and 
effect of the change should be disclosed. Comparatives should be restated in accordance 
with the newly defined segments [SSAP 25]. 
SSAP 25 is meant to ensure that the segmental information reported by an entity is 
disclosed on a consistent basis, year by year. The fundamental objective of this standard 
is to achieve, as far as possible, consistency and comparability between years. However, 
the standard emphasises that caution should be exercised in comparing similar segments 
in different entities, because, in addition to any differences in accounting policies 
adopted, the basis of accounting for inter-segment sales or the treatment of common 
costs may not be consistent between entities. 
Under SSAP 25 an operating segment is likely to be determined in substantially 
the same way information is reported internally and used by the enterprise's chief 
operating decision maker to evaluate performance and make operating decisions. This 
means operating segments could include components of an enterprise that sell products 
to others in the consolidated group (vertically integrated operations) as well as start-up 
operations. The measures and amounts of assets and operating results of these segments 
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reported to the chief decision maker are likely to be those the company would be 
disclosing in its financial statements. The financial statements are also required to report 
reconciliations of segmental amounts to consolidated totals, and often include the 
nature/characteristics of reconciliation differences. 
In identifying a reportable segment, the SSAP 25 requires that directors have 
regard to the overall purpose of giving segmental disclosure, which is to provide 
information that will allow a more thorough understanding of the results and financial 
position of a reporting entity and highlight the impact of changes on significant 
components of the business. SSAP 25 cites paragraph 55 of Schedule 4 of The 
Companies Act 1985, where it is stated that it is for the directors to determine whether 
the company has carried on business of two or more classes or has supplied markets that 
differ substantially from each other. Similarly, where, in the opinion of the directors, the 
classes of business or the markets do not differ substantially from each other they may 
be treated as one. 
Because SSAP 25 emphasises a management approach in reporting segments, its 
primary benefits to financial statement users are (as noted in GAAP 2004) expected to 
include: 
(a) the ability to see an enterprise through management's eyes, thereby making it 
easier for the user to predict management actions or reactions that can have a 
significant effect on the enterprise's prospects for future cash flows; and 
(b) reporting that is more consistent with discussions about the enterprise's 
components elsewhere in the annual report and in company press releases. 
Classes of business or geographical segments should be identified if they are significant 
to the entity as a whole. A segment is normally considered significant if it accounts for 
10 per cent or more of the total turnover, results or net assets [SSAP25]. 
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In SSAP 25 a class of business is defined as being a distinguishable component of 
an entity that provides a separate product or service or a separate group of related 
products or services and accounts for 10 per cent or more of the total turnover, results or 
net assets. The determination of classes of business depends on the judgement of the 
directors and there is no single set of characteristics that can be universally applied to 
differentiate classes of business, but the following factors should be taken into account: 
(a) The nature of the product or services; 
(b) The nature of the production process; 
(c) The markets in which the products or services are sold; 
(d) The distribution channels for the products; 
(e) The manner in which the entity's activities are organised; and 
(f) Any separate legislative framework relating to part of the business. 
A geographical segment is defined by SSAP 25 as a geographic area comprising 
an individual country or a group of countries in which an entity operates, or to which it 
supplies products or services. A geographical analysis should help the user to assess the 
extent to which an entity's operations are subject to such factors as: 
(a) Expansionist or restrictive economic climates; 
(b) Stable of unstable political regimes; 
(c) Exchange control regulations; 
(d) Exchange rate fluctuations. 
Where an entity has carried on business in two or more different business classes 
or geographical areas the SSAP 25 requires the following disclosures for each segment: 
(a) Turnover by location of operations; 
(b) Results, before accounting for taxation, minority interests and extraordinary items, 
normally by location of operations; and 
(c) Net Assets by location of operations. 
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SSAP 25 provides some further guidance on segmental results. As interest is 
normally a result of the company's financial policy rather than individual segments' 
policy, it is usually excluded from the segments' results as it would lead to a 
meaningless allocation between segments. Where interest income or expense is central 
to the business, interest should normally be included in arriving at the segment result. A 
problem arises where costs are incurred which are common to more than one segment. 
The SSAP gives some guidance on this and suggests that entities may apportion 
common costs to segments in a way that the directors deem appropriate, as long as the 
apportionment would not be misleading. Any common costs not apportioned should be 
deducted from the total of the segment result. 
Regarding segmental Net Assets, SSAP 25 notes that in most cases the net assets 
of each reportable segment will be the non-interest bearing operating assets less the 
non-interest bearing operating liabilities. Interest bearing assets and liabilities will only 
be included if the segmental results include interest because the entity's business is to 
earn and incur interest. Where assets or liabilities do not relate exclusively to one 
segment (i. e., common assets), they should be allocated to segments on a reasonable 
basis. The total of any assets or liabilities not allocated to segments should be shown as 
an item reconciling the segment net assets to the total balance sheet net assets. 
In general, the importance of segment-level information is well recognised not 
only in the UK, but across the international investment community. In the United States 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB), financial analysts and investors have all stressed the 
important role which segment reports have in the financial reporting arena. For 
example, the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) concluded 
in its paper (AIMR 1993, pp. 59-60) that industry-level segment reports are "vital, 
essential, fundamental, indispensable and integral to the investment analysis process... 
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Different segments will generate dissimilar streams of cash flows to which are attached 
disparate risks and which bring about unique values. Thus, without disaggregation, 
there is no sensible way to predict the overall amounts, timing, or risks of a complete 
enterprise's future cash flows. There is little dispute over the analytic usefulness of 
disaggregated financial data. " 
In response to calls from the investment community for more desaggregated 
information, standard setters and regulators worldwide have made considerable efforts 
to expand segment disclosure requirements (e. g., Statement of Standard Accounting 
Practice 25 in the UK; SFAS No. 131 in the US; and International Accounting Standard 
No. 14R). 
One of the main rationales for a segment disclosure standard is to provide 
investors with improved predictive ability regarding corporate prospects. SSAP 25 
provides a wide range of factors which may be taken into account when determining 
reportable segments. However, the list is so diverse that various approaches might be 
consistent with this standard, allowing companies to define segments in the way they 
find suitable. Therefore, the level and the mode of aggregation of transactions reported 
in corporate financial statements and, connected with this, the quality of disclosures is a 
central debate in financial accounting (both in the UK and abroad). 
There is a large body of US and UK literature on quality of segment disclosures. 
In the UK, some studies address the issue of quality of segment disclosures [Emmanuel 
and Garrod (1999,2002)] and, in particular, changes in disclosure quality associated 
with the adoption of new segment disclosure standards [Emmanuel et al., (1999)]. 
Emmanuel et al., (1999) address the issue of the initial impact of SSAP 25 on 
segment disclosure, the ways in which managers have interpreted the standard and its 
materiality guideline, and whether these have changed as company directors have 
become more familiar with the disclosure requirements. Their findings suggest that 
25 
although the introduction of the standard has increased the volume of disclosure, 
notably net asset data, the growing familiarity with the standard led to a subsequent 
decline in the detail of disclosure3, particularly the number of reported geographic 
segment operations. They also find that, contrary to the intention of the standard, the 
rule is used to identify fewer and larger segments and, overall, the 10% rule has induced 
a disclosure pattern which confounds the original intention of the standard. 
Additionally, they analyse the issue of ambiguity associated with possible 
interpretations of SSAP 25 disclosure requirements. Their critique of SSAP 25 includes 
the following arguments: (i) directors might select one criterion - turnover, result or net 
asset - to identify reportable segments; (ii) the 10% rule might be applied 
individually 
on any of the criteria; (iii) the guidance rule might be interpreted as meaning that 
segments are to be individually identified if they exceed 10% of turnover, result and net 
asset. Based on a hypothetical example, Emmanuel et al., (1999) also demonstrate that 
under these alternative interpretations, different numbers of segments will be reported. 
They conclude that the 10% materiality rule is flawed by not stating maximum 
materiality criteria for reportable segments, by failing to recognise negative assets and 
by failing to state whether that rule is to be applied separately or in combination. 
The interpretation of segment disclosure rules by firms' managers is believed to be 
influenced by their perceptions of advantages/disadvantages associated with the 
provision of segmental information. Some US literature, for example, suggests that 
because of the considerable laxity of segment disclosure requirements, firms will 
increase disclosure when the valuation benefits from disclosure exceed the cost of 
disclosure [Verrechia (1983), Dye (1986), Healy and Palepu (1993), Hayes and 
Lundholm (1996)]. That is, managers of firms with `good news' about the value of the 
entire firm will disclose the additional information, thereby receiving a valuation greater 
3 This conforms with findings from an earlier study by Emmanuel and Garrod (1992) which suggested 
that companies were particularly sensitive to providing return information for small segments, as this 
might provide return information on single investment projects. 
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than the current non-disclosure price. On the other hand, Choi and Levich (1991) infer 
that US firms believe that disclosure of geographic operations results in a competitive 
disadvantage by providing privileged information to competitors. Therefore, to 
minimise US multinationals' competitive disadvantage, management might report 
ambiguous measures, which can be done easily considering the discretion allowed 
management in complying with disclosure requirements. The authors conclude that 
market participants may find geographic disclosures of limited value because the 
disclosing firm is attempting to provide limited information to its competitors. 
A counterargument to the competitive disadvantage hypothesis is that 
management wants to disclose useful information to market participants to reflect the 
profitability, growth, and risk associated with each significant geographic component of 
cash flow [Lev (1988)]. Management may be motivated to reduce excess price 
variability. The author suggests that one means of accomplishing this goal is to reduce 
information asymmetry by disclosing useful geographic disaggregation. To the extent 
that management desires to provide useful information to the market, market 
participants may perceive geographic segment disclosures as providing useful 
information. 
The above review of the segment reporting standards and some of the literature on 
disclosure requirements exposes the problematic character of segment information and 
the controversy regarding its adequacy to the intended objectives of disclosure 
standards. The implications of SSAP 25 for the segment-level empirical results of my 
study are discussed in relevant sections of Chapters 5 and 6. 
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2.3 LITERATURE ON USEFULNESS OF LINE OF BUSINESS AND 
GEOGRAPHIC SEGMENT REPORTING 
In the previous section I reviewed the past and present segment disclosure 
requirements in the UK and briefly touched on some of the literature concerned with the 
effectiveness of the segment disclosure standards and disclosure quality. This was 
necessary for a better understanding of the nature and attributes of segmental 
information which constitutes an input for the subsequent empirical analyses of this 
study. 
In the current section, I review and analyse the literature which focuses on the 
valuation-related aspects of the segment-level information and, therefore, constitutes the 
theoretical and methodological background for this study. Depending on the research 
objectives, these studies could be categorised into three strands of research4: 
1. Predictive ability of segmental data. 
This strand of research investigates: 
" whether geographic or line of business data disclosed by companies contains 
additional information that can be used to improve forecasts (of earnings or the 
firm's market value) that outperform forecasts based on past consolidated data 
only; and 
" whether segment disclosures help improve the accuracy of forecasts made by 
financial analysts. 
2. Market's reaction to segment information. 
This strand of research investigates: 
4 It shall be noted that the boundaries between these categories might not always be distinct. 
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" whether the stock market reacts to segment disclosures and 
contemporaneously discounts this information into the share price; 
" whether the equity returns react to segment disclosures; 
" whether the segment disclosures affect the market's perception of the 
equity's risk. 
3. Differential valuation of segments. 
This strand of research investigates: 
" whether segmental disclosures might provide evidence of differential valuation 
of operations from specific geographic locations or lines of business. 
In the following sections I will review the literature related to each of these 
categories. 
2.3.1 Predictive ability of segmental data 
The research on the usefulness of segment data to the predictive ability of decision 
makers is the most extensive and includes numerous studies. Overall, earlier research 
finds that forecasts using segment information are more accurate than forecasts using 
only aggregated information [e. g., Barnea and Lakonishok (1980)]. Studies by Kinney 
(1971), Collins (1976), and Silhan (1982) using model based research methods show 
that disclosure accompanies improved earnings predictions. Market-based research by 
Kochanek (1974), Collins (1975), and Foster (1975) find evidence of an association 
between segment disclosure and improved accuracy of earnings estimates, as well as a 
positive predictive relationship between release of segment data and market returns. The 
results presented by Kochanek support the position that external financial reports, which 
contain segmental data, do provide a useful source of information to investors 
appraising the investment potential of a diversified firm. Collins (1976) also supports 
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this conclusion in a finding that market prices do not fully reflect the non-public- 
segment data. 
More recent research, by and large, reconfirms earlier research findings. 
Emmanuel and Pick (1980) investigate whether industrial segmental disclosures by 39 
UK firms improve the ability to forecast corporate sales and profit. Using several 
alternative prediction models (that use line of business data vs. consolidated data to 
generate forecasts of earnings) they test the hypothesis that industrial segment sales and 
profit disclosure, together with industry sales projections, provide significantly more 
accurate estimates of future total-entity sales and earnings than do those procedures that 
rely totally on consolidated data. Their results strongly support the hypothesis. 
Silhan (1983) conducts a similar study in the US settings and comes to similar 
conclusions. These findings of improved forecasts when line of business data is used 
has also been found by Baldwin (1984) who considers the forecasts of financial 
analysts. However, there is evidence that the relative superiority of line of business 
based forecasts depends upon the specific characteristics of the individual company, in 
particular the degree of diversification of the company and the correlation of the 
performance of specific industries with the overall economy [Garrod and Emmanuel 
(1987)] as well as the size of company and number of segments reported [Silhan 
(1984)]. 
Roberts (1989) examines whether the geographical segment data disclosed by 
some 78 UK multinationals over the period of 1981-1982 can be used to generate 
forecasts of earnings that outperform forecasts based upon past consolidated data. By 
using modifications of the random walk model and alternative methods of segment- 
based multiples, she finds that the segment sales and segment earnings based models 
generally outperform the consolidated random walk model. Roberts (1989) also finds 
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that there is no significant additional advantage in terms of forecast accuracy in using 
segmental earnings vs. segmental sales data. 
Investigation of geographic segment disclosure more recently have included work 
by several researchers. Using both random walk and growth adjusted models for a 
sample of 89 US multinational companies over the period from 1979 to 1985, 
Balakrishnan, Harris and Sen (1990) examine whether geographic segment revenues 
and earnings provide more accurate predictions of future consolidated revenues and 
earnings, respectively, than do consolidated data. To control for errors in forecasting 
Gross National Product (GNP) and exchange rates, the authors assume perfect foresight 
using the actual year-ahead changes in these economic factors. The perfect foresight 
assumption is then relaxed so that forecasts of these variables can be examined. The 
results are not conclusive. In the case of perfect foresight, the segment model 
outperforms the consolidated model for both revenues and earnings. However, the 
results using forecasts of GNP and exchange rates find no significant differences in the 
predictive ability of the segment and consolidated forecast models. The authors attribute 
the insignificant results when using forecasts of GNP and exchange rates to the lack of 
detailed geographic segment disclosures (i. e., insufficient disaggregation), which reduce 
the ability to utilise certain country-specific macroeconomic forecast variables. A 
caveat, they suggest, is that inaccuracy in forecasting country-specific growth and 
exchange rates restricts the potential usefulness of the geographic segment data. 
Overall, their results suggest that geographic area disclosures can enhance the 
information set used to predict annual income and sales. Balakrishnan et al., (1990) also 
discuss a formal mathematical proof demonstrating theat the use of disaggregated 
geographical information can result in less accurate forecasts. 
Herrmann (1996) examines whether geographic information disclosed at an 
increasingly disaggregated level (i. e., consolidated vs. continent vs. country) results in 
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increased predictive ability of operating results. Fifty-five multinational companies were 
simulated by combining the annual operating results of six individual companies, one 
from each of six countries, in order to compare the forecasting accuracy of data 
disclosed at the country, continent, and consolidated level. The study finds that, 
consistent with the fineness theorem, the accuracy of forecasts increases as sales and 
gross profit are disclosed at a more disaggregated geographic level. Forecast accuracy is 
significantly greater at the country level in comparison to the continent level. 
Hussain (1997) investigates the impact of finer segment definitions on the 
accuracy (errors) of UK analysts' corporate earnings forecasts, generated 22 months 
prior to the announcement dates. His results provide evidence of predictive gains to 
both line-of-business data and geographic data, although these gains appear to be 
concentrated within a sub-sample of firms for which analysts appear to have specific 
difficulty in forecasting earnings, i. e., those experiencing negative changes in earnings. 
In their theoretical paper Herrmann and Thomas (2000) point out that the most 
common approach used by analysts in estimating future earnings is to disaggregate the 
company into individual segments and develop forecasts of the performance for each 
segment. The forecasts are then aggregated to form an overall forecast of company 
performances. The authors suggest an analytical model of the usefulness of segment 
information in forecasting earnings. The model derives four conditions under which 
segment information is expected to increase earnings forecast precision. According to 
their analytical framework, forecast precision should increase with (1) greater 
differentiation across segment forecasts factors (i. e., expected segment growth, expected 
inflation, political risk), (2) greater disaggregation of earnings, (3) greater predictive 
accuracy of segment forecast factors, and (4) greater accuracy in measuring the segment 
S Surveys of UK analysts' forecasts procedures by Arnold and Moizer (1984) also show that many use a 
break-down and build-up approach to forecasting earnings. They find that segmental data is used in 
conjunction with specialist industrial and economic forecasts, to predict future consolidated earnings. 
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weights. They also outline conditions when forecasts using consolidated information 
would outperform forecasts using segment information. 
Herrmann, Inoue and Thomas (2001) question the market's efficiency with respect 
to accounting information, yet it is of relevance to my study, particularly with respect to 
possible interpretations of my empirical findings and suggestions for future research. 
They investigate the extent to which parent-only earnings and subsidiary earnings in the 
current year persist into consolidated earnings in the next year. They also examine 
whether the market understands these time-series behaviors of earnings components, 
and hypothesise that if subsidiary earnings are important in predicting next year's 
consolidated earnings and market participants do not fully understand this, then stock 
prices will lag reported subsidiary earnings. 
Their sample consists of 8490 firm-year observations, drawn from Japanese listed 
firms, over the period 1985-1997. 
Their results indicate that the Japanese stock market adjusts correctly for the 
persistence of parent-only earnings, but the market appears to underestimate the 
persistence of subsidiary earnings in current stock prices. Consequently, stock prices 
correct in a predictable manner in the subsequent year, resulting in a significant, 
positive relation between stock returns in year t+1 and subsidiary earnings in year t. In 
other words, subsidiary earnings provide information beyond parent-only earnings in 
forecasting next period's consolidated earnings and prices do not fully reflect the 
persistence of incremental subsidiary earnings in the current period. The authors note 
that this anomaly is more likely attributable to market mispricing than failure to control 
for cross-sectional differences in risk. 
Overall, regardless of the empirical test designs or models employed in different 
studies, their general findings appear to be in consensus. That is, forecasts developed by 
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using the segment information are more accurate than those that totally rely on the firm- 
level aggregated data. 
2.3.2. Market's reaction to segment information 
Early research into stock market reactions to line of business information tends to 
suggest that the disclosure of this data, in general, conveys useful information to 
investors, with the average effect being a significant downward shift in their assessment 
of a firm's market riskiness (i. e., the company's beta) [Simonds and Collins (1978), 
Collins and Simonds (1979), Ajinkya (1981)]. 
Dhaliwal (1978) found a decrease in the cost of capital for US firms affected by 
the Security Exchange Commission disclosure requirement, suggesting that the market 
values such disclosures positively. In addition, there appears to be a higher correlation 
in the risk-equalised returns on portfolios of companies that did and did not voluntarily 
produce industrial data after industrial disclosures were made compulsory [Ajinkya 
(1980)]. 
Prodhan (1986) investigates the association between geographic segment 
disclosures and the time-series behaviour of equity security return systematic risk 
(betas) for a group of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange and affected by the 
UK geographic area disclosure requirements. Using an uninterrupted time series 
analysis, he finds an abrupt decrease in the equity security systematic risk for sample 
firms (i. e., the disclosure of geographic segment data results in a significant shift in 
these firms' betas). These results imply that geographic segment disclosures have 
information content to market participants in the UK. 
In related work, Prodhan and Harris (1989) conducted a beta shift study after the 
enactment of FASB Statement No. 14 (in December 1976) using 82 US multinationals 
and found that disclosing geographic information for the first time decreases the 
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systematic risk and the cost of capital to disclosing firms when compared to 
nondisclosing firms. 
More recent papers have generally supported earlier research findings. Senteney 
(1991) investigates whether the onset of geographic area disclosure results in decreased 
systematic risk for US firms. He estimates the market model for each of 121 US 
multinational companies for the five-year period before and the five-year period after 
implementation of SFAS 14. If geographical segment disclosures are useful to investors, 
then such disclosures should reduce investor uncertainty and prompt an informationally 
induced shift in the parameters of the market model. The study finds a significant 
change in the market model parameters after implementation of SFAS 14. Both the 
intercept and slope coefficients for the market model decrease for the majority of 
companies. Consistent with the expectations of portfolio theory, risk appears to decrease 
after the initial disclosure of geographic segment information. However, the overall 
results do not provide conclusive evidence that disclosure results in a decrease in 
systematic risk. 
Senteney and Bazaz (1992) investigates potential improvement of investor's 
earnings expectations and find a reduction in the unexpected security price revision for 
US-based multinationals to their consolidated earnings releases. Their results suggest 
that the SFAS 14 geographic segment disclosures result in improved expectations 
regarding consolidated earnings releases and provide investors with important 
information. Among the more recent studies is the one by Conover and Wallace (1995). 
They empirically explore the equity market effects of releasing geographic segment 
information by US firms and show that as firms disclose more geographic segment 
information, their equity market returns increase. 
Doupnik and Robert (1990) conduct a field experiment to investigate the relevance 
of data on less aggregated geographic areas. Chartered Financial Analysts, assigned to 
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six different treatment groups, were presented with financial statement data, including 
geographic area disclosures, and asked to assess the riskiness of investing in the 
hypothetical multinational corporation depicted. The cases varied only by the level of 
geographic segment disaggregation by the multinational company. Relevance was 
measured as the difference in risk assessment between groups receiving different levels 
of aggregated geographic area data. The results indicated that the level of aggregation 
significantly affects financial statement users' assessments of the risk of investing in a 
company with foreign operations. Consistent with the expectations of signalling theory, 
the study finds that individuals' assessments of risk generally decline as the level of 
disaggregation increase. Another finding of this study, which is of direct relevance to 
my research, is that disaggregation by itself does not automatically provide useful 
information. Thus, decomposing a hemispheral level of aggregation into two 
components can significantly affect risk assessment. The disaggregation of the Eastern 
hemisphere category into 'Europe/Middle East/Africa' and `Far East/Pacific' did not 
significantly affect the subjects' perception of risk6, while disaggregation of 
'Europe/Middle East/Africa' into two components can significantly affect risk 
assessments. With regards to information content of disaggregation, they conclude that 
disaggregation by itself does not automatically provide useful information unless 
geographic areas are disaggregated into groups that better reflect differences in 
investment risk. 
Conover, Conover and Karafiath (1994) observe the equity market performance of 
US multinationals surrounding the closure of the Mexican peso foreign exchange 
market on August 12,1982. The closure caused the risk of Mexican operations to 
greatly increase and should therefore have caused a reduction in security prices for 
companies with operations in Mexico. The authors find that companies disclosing a 
6 They suggest that this might be due to the amount of variability that exists in each of the categories. 
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specific `Mexico' geographical segment experienced a significant drop in share prices 
following the crisis. Companies consolidating Mexican affiliates' results with other 
geographical regions, companies using the equity method of accounting for Mexico 
affiliates, and companies with export sales to Mexico also experienced a decline in 
share prices. The authors conclude that investors used geographic segment information 
to determine risk characteristics and revalued shares accordingly. 
Herrmann and Thomas (1997) present two theoretical frameworks that establish a 
link between disaggregation and the risk assessment. First, in the spirit of signalling 
theory, they argue that by disaggregating geographical operations into specific 
segments, the company can change (reduce) its overall perceived risk. Greater 
disaggregation of geographic segments should decrease investor uncertainty and should, 
in most cases, decrease investors' overall assessment of risk. An exception is a situation 
in which finer disaggregation results in the disclosure of an especially high-risk 
segment, increasing investors' overall risk assessment. 
The second framework relates to portfolio theory. According to the portfolio 
theory, the benefits of portfolio diversification increase as the correlation among the 
assets' returns decline. Herrman and Thomas (1997) suggest that a single company may 
be thought of as a portfolio of assets with its geographic segments representing the 
different assets. As such, the expected return of the company (i. e., the portfolio) is 
simply the weighted average expected return of each segment where the weights are the 
proportions of returns generated from each geographic area. If the returns of each 
segment are less than perfectly positively correlated, then the overall risk level of the 
company is reduced through diversification. In the absence of sufficiently fine levels of 
disaggregation, investors may be unable to determine the extent to which the returns of 
the individual geographic segments correlate. If only consolidated data are disclosed, 
then it will be difficult for investors to determine the extent to which the company's 
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diversification into different geographic areas results in portfolio diversification 
benefits. As the level of disaggregation increases, the diversification benefit becomes 
more apparent to investors and should, in general, decrease the overall perceived risk of 
the company. 
Piotroski (1999) investigates whether a discretionary increase in the number of 
segments reported communicates value-relevant information to investors and, given the 
decision to improve disclosure, yields positive valuation revisions. He employs the 
return-based analysis as a main test design and further complements it with price- 
earnings regressions. The sample includes 423 U. S. firms that choose to increase the 
number of reported segments between 1989 and 1995. His findings show that firms who 
choose to expand their segment reporting practices experience positive earnings forecast 
revisions and market-adjusted stock returns in the period surrounding the reported 
change. These revisions and returns are positively related to the new segments' 
information, yet do not coincide with an improvement in actual short-term consolidated 
operating performance. Piotroski's analysis also suggests that the reporting changes 
were opportunistically motivated, that is, managers choose to report a new segment to 
disseminate good news about the preponderance of firm operations. 
Of particular relevance to my study is his finding of a long-term shift in the 
association between equity prices and expected earnings. This shift is reflected by larger 
cross-section earnings multiples after the reporting change, highlighting the fact that not 
only did expectations about future earnings improve, but a dollar of expected earnings 
after reporting the change is being capitalised at a higher valuation multiple. This 
increase is consistent with a lower average cost of capital and greater expected 
persistence of future earnings. 
Basu, Douthett and Lim (2000) investigate what segment characteristics help 
make industry segment reporting more useful in equity valuation. They identify three 
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factors that influence the usefulness of segment earnings: growth potential (or 
persistence), the relative size of segments, and the correlation in segments' earnings. 
They measure the valuation usefulness by comparing the explanatory power of 
disaggregate segment earnings to aggregate company earnings in a regression of 
cumulative abnormal return (over 12 month period) on earnings changes. 
Their empirical tests are designed under a two industrial segments structure, that 
is, primary segment (the one with higher sales growth rate) and secondary segment (the 
one with lower sales growth rate). Their data sample of 7653 U. S. companies covers the 
period of 1987-1993 and comprises 42780 firm-year observations. 
They found that R2 increases (due to segment reports) when: (i) the degree of 
differential growth rates in segments' sales is high, (ii) the segment size is equivalent or 
comparable between the two segments and, (iii) the two segments' earnings have higher 
absolute correlation. 
Bens and Monahan (2002) examine the valuation implications of differences in 
firm's disclosure practices for a set of firms that are diversified by line of business. In 
particular, they investigate if there is a positive association between the excess value 
attributable to diversification and the quality of firm's voluntary disclosures. They 
estimate pooled time-series and Fama-MacBeth regressions, where AIMR industry- 
adjusted disclosure ratings serve as a disclosure quality proxy, and Berger and Ofek's 
measure of excess value serves as a proxy for the valuation effect attributable to 
diversification. They use multivariate regression, where they regress the excess value 
proxy on the disclosure quality proxy and other potentially influential factors, for a 
sample of about 1200 firm-years, drawn from U. S. multi-segment firms over the period 
of 1980-1996. Their results reveal positive association between excess values and 
disclosure quality in multi-segment firms. They, in part, attribute their results to the 
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monitoring effect of disclosure -a situation where commitments to higher disclosures 
potentially reduce management's proclivity for investing in assets that destroy value. 
Overall, despite some variance of findings in different studies, the general 
conclusion from this literature is that the disclosure of segmental data conveys useful 
information to the market, in that it impacts upon the market's valuation of equities and 
investors' perception of risks associated with segment-disclosing firms. 
2.3.3. Differential valuation of industrial and geographic segments 
The area of research into the valuation of diversification into specific geographical 
locations or lines of business has been substantially less extensively addressed than the 
issues of. (i) the valuation of international and/or industrial diversification, and (ii) the 
predictive quality of (or market's reaction to) industrial and geographic segmental 
information. It is the issue of differential valuation of industrial and geographic 
segments which is the primary focus of my current research. 
Among the studies that directly link to my research are those by Boatsman et al., 
(1993), Prather-Stewart (1995), Thomas (1996,2000), Bodnar and Weintrop (1997), 
and Wysocki (1998) who focussed on US multisegment firms, and Garrod and Rees 
(1998) who conduct their study in the UK settings. Of these studies, Garrod and Rees's 
(1998) paper has, perhaps, the closest relation to my research both methodologically 
and data-wise. Below I review these studies in greater detail. 
Among the earliest studies to investigate the market's valuation of geographic 
segment earnings is Boatsman, Behn, and Patz (1993). They examine the relationship 
between unexpected security returns and unexpected geographic segment earnings, 
where unexpected security returns are regressed on unexpected geographic segment 
earnings for the period 1985-1989. Unexpected returns are measured over a 16-day 
period surrounding the release of the annual report for a sample of 970 firm-year 
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observations using data from SFAS No. 14. Unexpected geographic segment earnings 
are measured as the annual change in earnings for that geographic segment, adjusted for 
exchange rate movements for the year unless it is not possible to identify the specific 
source of geographic segment earnings. They find that the use of geographic segment 
earnings by market participants is highly contextual and that, in general, the market 
does not appear to value geographic segment earnings differently. Evidence that 
geographic segment earnings are used to price securities is found if the market reaction 
to unexpected geographic segment earnings varies across geographic segments. 
Specifically, they find that geographic segment earnings are used to value securities 
only when there is an unusually large change in the geographic segment's earnings. 
When outlying observations are eliminated, there is no evidence of differential valuation 
of geographic segment earnings. This evidence might suggest that the market does not 
value geographic segment earnings differently because risk and growth characteristics 
do not vary across geographical areas. Alternatively, the finding might suggest that 
firms do net disclose geographic segment earnings in such way that would provide 
value-relevant information to the market. 
In his study Thomas (2000) notes several methodological issues which may have 
caused the lack of significant results in Boatsman et al., (1993). Firstly, Thomas (2000) 
argue against their use of a 16-day return window surrounding the filing of the Form 10- 
K to measure the association between unexpected returns and unexpected geographic 
segment earnings. The assumption is that this is the first time the information is made 
available to the market and could therefore be incorporated into security prices. 
However, some firms may have voluntarily released this information in quarterly 
reports or press releases so that the change in annual geographic earnings is largely 
known before the Form 10-K is filed. Secondly, consolidated earnings have already 
been released before the 16-day window and the market may be able to reasonably infer 
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the changes in current geographic segment earnings based on the change in total current 
earnings. In this case, geographic information may be impounded well before the filing 
of the Form 10-K. 
Prather-Stewart (1995) tests the impact of geographic segment disclosures on 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), as a measure of market reaction, around the date of 
release of the 1984 and 1985 financial reports. She is primarily interested in the 
usefulness (information content) of the accounting disclosures to the stock market by 
looking at segment sales rather than profits, and incorporates a country risk adjustment 
to the sales figures. Prather-Stewart (1995) tests the relationship between the CAR and 
(1) the number of foreign geographic segments disclosed, (2) unexpected risk-adjusted 
foreign segment sales, and (3) unexpected risk-adjusted US segment sales. The two 
measures of geographic segment disclosures, used in her study, are risk-adjusted 
geographic sales and the number of foreign geographic segments disclosed. She 
concludes that geographic segment information is reflected in equity market returns and 
that unexpected sales from different geographic regions are valued at different rates. 
Overall, her study suggests that foreign operations are valued less highly than domestic 
ones. 
Thomas (1996) investigates the association between security returns and 
geographic segment earnings over long return intervals varying from one to five years. 
When returns and geographic segment earnings are measured over long windows (at 
least a three-year period), the market differentially values geographic segment earnings 
consistent with the segment's risk and growth characteristics, and the predictions of the 
earnings capitalisation model. However, when returns and geographic segment earnings 
are measured over one or two-year intervals, no evidence is found that the market 
valued geographic segment earnings differently. That is, geographic segment 
disclosures do not appear to be a timely source of information in the securities markets, 
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because there is little or no association between current returns and current geographic 
segment earnings [Boatsman et al., (1993), Thomas (1996)]. 
Bodnar and Weintrop (1997) investigate the valuation of foreign and domestic 
income for US based multinationals. Using 2570 US firm-year observations between 
1985 and 1993 they utilise the segmental data on the breakdown of earnings into 
domestic and foreign components and consider two questions: (1) are changes in the 
domestic and foreign components of earnings significantly associated with changes in 
the market value of the firm?, and (2) are the domestic and foreign components of 
earnings capitalised by the market at a similar rate? Their results show that both foreign 
and domestic earnings changes have significant positive associations with annual excess 
return measures. However, the association coefficient on foreign income is significantly 
larger than the association coefficient on domestic income, suggesting that the market 
views foreign and domestic income changes differently for the purposes of firm 
valuation. They interpret this as an indication that changes of foreign earnings are more 
persistent than those for domestic earnings, possibly due to the unpredictable impact of 
exchange rate change. They also demonstrate that a larger association coefficient for 
foreign income is consistent with differences in growth opportunities between domestic 
and foreign operations. For those firms where domestic sales growth is higher than 
foreign sales growth, the earnings response coefficient is greater for domestic earnings. 
Their analysis also suggest that the results are not driven by exchange rate effects, 
decisions concerning the length of the event window, negative earnings, nor special 
charges to earnings. Unlike event studies that examine short windows around earnings 
announcements (or other events), their study is interested in the relation between 
earnings changes and price changes over the reporting periods. This approach is 
commonly referred to as an association study. 
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Garrod and Rees (1998) investigate two value-related issues associated with 
corporate international diversification of UK firms, over the period of 1991-1996. 
Firstly, they address the valuation association of international operations of UK 
multisegment firms and estimate whether or not foreign earnings and net assets are 
more highly valued by investors than their domestic equivalents. By using segment 
disclosure of profits and net assets, which has been required of UK companies since the 
enactment of SSAP 25, they examine the relative value of specific foreign operations, 
according to broad geographical classifications: UK, Europe, America, and the rest of 
the world. They find that for multinational firms, there is no clear difference between 
the valuation of domestic and foreign earnings and net assets. However, the US appears 
to be an anomaly and is more highly valued than other areas of operations. They explain 
this finding with the fact that during that period (1991-1996) the American economy 
was going through a golden period. 
Secondly, they contrast multinational and domestic UK firms to identify relative 
valuation of these two groups of firms. They find that earnings and net assets are more 
highly valued (capitalised) for multinational firms than for domestic firms, even though 
UK GAAP should have been applied to the computation of the accounting numbers 
across both sets of firms. Their results also indicate that the valuation differences 
between multinationals and domestic firms applies equally to all the operations of the 
multinationals. That is, UK based operations themselves are more highly valued for 
multinationals than for their domestic counterparts. 
Methodologically, Garrod and Rees (1998) operationalise their empirical analysis 
by using a modified version of the Edward-Bell-Ohlson's residual income valuation 
model, which explicitly models the security price and expresses it through 
contemporaneous equity book value and earnings. This levels model allows 
disaggregating firm-level earnings and book value into their geographical components 
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and conducting the direct comparisons of the valuation of specific, geographical 
operations. The model is applicable to both domestic and multinational firms, so that 
direct comparison of the valuation of these two groups of firms can be made. 
Garrod and Rees (1998) argue that in comparison to return-earnings models used 
in similar studies, where results are sensitive to the window over which returns are 
cumulated, their model is theoretically valid at any point in time, assuming a timely 
incorporation of information into prices, and captures long run relationships whereas a 
returns-earnings model can only identify short run associations. Furthermore, they 
argue, the parameters estimated using valuation models are reasonably close to those 
theoretically expected, and the explanatory power of such models is much higher than in 
returns-earnings models. 
They note that levels models are also able to illuminate long run relationships, 
which are hidden from models of differences. Thus, an event study can say little about 
the value of multinationalism for a firm if the firm's degree of diversification is stable. 
Of direct relevance to my research, both in terms of research question and the 
methodology employed, is the work by Wysocki (1998). He examines the 
informativeness of segment disclosures using a real-option framework. He hypothesises 
that segment disclosures are useful because they contain information about managerial 
options to adapt under-performing segments and expand segments with investment 
opportunities. Wysocki (1998) hypothesises and empirically validates that the 
existence of these real options implies: (1) that segment earnings association 
coefficients and the incremental explanatory power of segment earnings for stock prices 
are lower for loss-making segments compared to profitable segments8; (2) segment 
earnings association coefficients are higher for segments with higher relative growth 
7 Adaptation encompasses any real operating decision that changes the current use of an asset to a 
superior alternate use. 
8 This prediction generalises the firm-level adaptation and abandonment option results discussed in Hayn 
(1995). 
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options; and (3) the incremental explanatory power of book value of equity for stock 
prices is increasing in the number of loss segments. He tests these hypotheses by using a 
simple value association model where per share stock prices are regressed on firm-level 
per share book value and firm-level (or segment-level) earnings per share, for a sample 
of 3,150 U. S. firms (covering the period 1990-1996) that disclose two business 
segments. 
He finds that there is association between stock prices and segment profits and 
that the incremental explanatory power of segment earnings is higher for profitable 
segments compared to loss-making segments, suggesting that investors view segment 
losses as transitory. Furthermore, the incremental explanatory power of book value of 
equity for stock prices is increasing in the number of loss-making segments, consistent 
with the hypothesis that book value of equity is more relevant to investors as adaptation 
of segments becomes more likely than their continued use. 
His regression results also demonstrate that earnings association coefficients are 
higher for segments with higher relative growth options as measured by industry 
market-to-book ratios, and that earnings association coefficients are reliably lower for 
negative firm-level and segmental earnings. His results also suggest that investors 
utilise industry information in valuing segments within multi-division firms. Although 
Wysocki's tests are all performed for business-disaggregated segments, his hypotheses, 
the model and testing methods would also be directly applicable for researching the 
valuation of geographically disaggregated segments. 
Thomas (2000) examines whether geographic segment earnings reported by US 
firms over the years 1984-1995 provide value-relevant information. The author 
estimates earnings coefficients for specific geographic locations by (i) regressing 
unexpected security returns on unexpected geographic segment earnings and (ii) 
regressing leading-period returns on current geographic segment earnings. Evidence of 
46 
the value-relevance of geographic segment earnings is found if earnings coefficients 
differ across geographic segments, but if the coefficients do not differ, then total 
earnings is sufficient for examining security returns. The results of the unexpected 
returns/earnings model show a significant difference in the valuation of unexpected 
earnings across geographic segments. Specifically, the results suggest that unexpected 
earnings from Canada and Asia/Pacific regions are not significant, while earnings from 
the Domestic (i. e., U. S. ) and South America/Mexico segments are generally valued less 
than the earnings from other areas, whereas earnings from the U. K., Europe and Other 
Foreign segments are generally valued more highly. For the leading-period returns 
model, little significant evidence is found for the market's differential valuation of 
geographic segment earnings coefficients for one- and two-year return intervals. When 
the return intervals extend to three years or more, significant evidence is found that the 
market values geographic segment earnings differently, which suggests that such 
disclosures reflect information used by market participants in setting security prices. 
Chen and Zhang (2003) apply a real-option-based valuation approach to develop 
and test a model that addresses the incremental value relevance of segment data beyond 
firm-level accounting data. Their question is: given aggregate data that firms are already 
required to report, how is equity value related to the information conveyed 
incrementally by segment data? They note that in a multiple-segment firm, different 
segments generally face different investment opportunities (due to different external 
market conditions), and have different investment opportunities (due to different 
abilities to manage business). They establish that the cross-sectional variation in 
usefulness of segment data beyond aggregate data relates to heterogeneity of investment 
opportunities across segments, caused by divergences of segment profitability and 
growth potential. More generally, when a firm's segments operate in industries or 
markets that have different growth opportunities, equity value depend not only on the 
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divergence of profitability, but also on the distribution of growth opportunities across 
segments. 
Their model decomposes equity value into (1) the part explained by aggregate 
firm-level accounting data, and (2) an incremental component attributable to differences 
across segments in operating profitability and investment opportunities as conveyed by 
segment-level data. 
They estimate their regressions of scaled market values on scaled segmental 
profits and other option-related parameters for a sample that includes 13463 firm-years 
of U. S. quoted multi-segment firms over the period 1986-1997. 
Their empirical findings indicate that: (1) controlling for firm-level accounting 
information, divergence of segments' profitability (DOP) exhibits a significantly 
positive effect on equity value; (2) the incremental value effect of a given DOP varies 
with firm overall profitability and growth opportunity; and (3) the distribution of 
segment growth opportunities within a firm is important in determining the value effect 
of DOP. That is, the incremental value effect of DOP is positive if growth opportunities 
are more highly concentrated in segments that are relatively profitable, and is negative if 
the opposite is the case. Their results suggest that segments can be aggregated without 
loss of information when they have similar profitability and growth opportunities. 
By and large, in this strand of literature there is little or no consensus across the 
findings reported in different studies. The empirical evidence on the differential pricing 
and value association of specific geographic or business operations, and contexts 
affecting the pricing and value relevance of segments, remain inconclusive. The further 
thorough examination of these issues constitutes the primary objective of my study. 
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2.4 LITERATURE ON VALUATION OF GEOGRAPHICAL AND INDUSTRIAL 
DIVERSIFICATION 
In chapters 5 and 6I provide some empirical evidence on the relative valuation of 
firms which are diversified geographically or industrially. To put these results into 
perspective they need to be related to previous findings from other studies. Most 
research on this subject has focused on the negative impact on firm value of 
diversification across different lines of business. These studies tend to conclude that, on 
average, industrially diversified firms are notably less valuable than combinations of 
comparable single industry firms. In contrast to the negative value impact of industrial 
diversification, the majority of the theoretical predictions and empirical studies 
regarding geographic diversification suggest that there is a positive value impact on the 
firm. Below I review some of these studies in more details. 
2.4.1 Industrial diversification 
The impact of industrial diversification on firms' value has been more thoroughly 
examined (both theoretically and empirically) than that of geographic diversification. 
Overall, studies concerned with valuation effect of product or industrial diversification 
find that related diversifiers outperform unrelated diversifiers, and that multisegment 
firms are valued at a discount compared to focused firms [e. g., Bettis (1981), Rumelt 
(1982), Palepu (1985), Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Comment and 
Jarrell (1995)]. 
Lang and Stulz (1994) investigate whether the market's valuation of a firm, 
proxied by Tobin's q, is correlated with its degree of diversification. By studying the 
relation between q and the degree of diversification at a point in time, they investigate 
the relative efficiency of diversified firms even if these firms do not change their degree 
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of diversification. This yields important insights into the interpretation of studies of 
stock returns around changes in firms' degree of diversification. 
By comparing the Tobin's q of diversified US firms, over the period of 1978- 
1990, to the Tobin's q of specialised firms, they find that through the late 1970s and the 
1980s, single-industry firms are valued more highly by the capital markets than 
diversified firms. 
Further, highly diversified firms (defined as those firms that report sales for five 
segments or more) have both a mean and a median Tobin's q below the sample average 
for each year in their sample. 
They also check whether this relation reflects industry effects (i. e., whether 
diversified firms are concentrated in industries with fewer growth opportunities) yet 
results remain qualitatively unchanged. They also find that shareholder wealth would 
increase on average if diversified firms could be dismantled in such a way that each 
division would have the average q of specialised firms in its industry. 
Berger and Ofek (1995) use segment-level data to estimate whether diversification 
enhances or decreases corporate value and to examine the potential sources of value 
gains or losses. They do so by comparing the sum of the imputed stand-alone values 
(using the industry multiplier approach) of the segments of diversified companies to the 
actual values of these companies. 
In their sample of US firms (5233 multisegment firm-year observations covering 
the period from 1986 to 1991) they document that diversified firms have values that are 
13-15% below the sum of the imputed values of their segments. They also show that 
loss in value is considerably less for related diversification, and the value loss increases 
with the number of segments. 
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They also examine the potential sources of these value losses. Among sources 
include (1) the greater propensity of multi-segment firms to overinvest, and (2) the 
cross-subsidisation of poorly performing segments. 
Comment and Jarrell (1995) investigate valuation consequences of 
increases/decreases in focus of the firm. Their formal analysis correlates fiscal-year 
changes in focus with both same-year stock returns and prior-year returns, using a 
multivariate, pooled, time-series cross-sectional regression covering about two thousand 
exchange-listed firms per year, over the period from 1978 to 1989. They control for the 
size effect and find that focused firms are significantly less frequently involved in 
acquisitions and divestitures. Their main result was to find that during the 1978-89 
period there was an increase in focus, which is consistent with shareholder wealth 
maximisation, implying that focus increased in part because economies of scope were 
negative on balance. 
Sambharya (1995) examines the individual and joint effects of product and 
international diversification on firm performance by using multiple measures of both 
international and product diversification, and accounting measures of performance. He 
also examines the interaction between product diversification and international 
diversification. 
The study finds that firms that were more internationally diversified according to 
four different measures were no more successful than less diversified ones. In large 
firms there exists an inverse relationship between product and international 
diversification, that is, multinationals in single businesses are the most diversified 
internationally and vice-versa. The author also finds that both international and product 
diversification strategies are not profitable by themselves, that is, neither type of 
diversification leads to better firm performance. Among the limitations of the study is 
that it does not use market measures of performance and it only include data from 53 
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U. S. -based multinationals for the year 1985, which restricts the generalisability of 
findings for longer time periods, and wider cross-section of firms. 
Servaes (1996) focuses on the issue of whether industrial diversification leads to 
higher market values during the period of the conglomerate merger wave, examining 
whether the benefits of diversification outweigh the costs. He examines samples of U. S 
firms in three year intervals over the 1961-1976 period to gauge how diversification was 
perceived by capital markets. ' 
He finds that diversified firms are valued at a discount compared to single 
segment firms in the 1960s and early 1970s, but the discount declines to a zero level in 
later years. These results hold after controlling for industry effects and for differences 
between diversified and undiversified firms in profitability, leverage and investment 
policy. The author concludes that what causes the diversification discount to change 
over time remains a puzzle. 
Lins and Servaes (1999) examine the valuation effects of industrial diversification 
for 174 (227) German, 808 (118) Japanese and 391 (341) UK firms for years 1992 
(1994) using Berger and Ofek's (1995) excess value-based approach. Their results 
suggest that diversification is differently reflected in the firm value across different 
countries. Thus for German firms, diversification does not reduce shareholder wealth, 
yet the Japanese and UK firms are valued at a discount of 10 and 15 percent 
respectively. The valuation discount of UK firms is very similar to the discount reported 
by Berger and Ofek (1995) for the US firms. The major factor that the authors find to be 
contributing to the differential valuation of industrial diversification across these 
countries is the cross-country differences in corporate governance. 
Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) provide evidence on whether the fact of 
corporate diversification destroys value, or whether the divisions that make up 
conglomerates would trade at a discount, even if they operated as stand-alone firms. The 
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papers holds that the diversification discount calculation can be misleading if there are 
systematic differences between the divisions of conglomerates and the stand-alone firms 
to which they are benchmarked. By using a sample of 356 acquisitions of U. S. firms, 
over the period of 1980-1995, they find that the units that are combined into other firms 
are systematically different to stand-alone firms, and suggest that methodologies that 
benchmark divisions of conglomerates to stand-alone firms might overstate the 
magnitude of diversification discount. That is, a main point of their paper is that value 
measurement methodology destroys value, but not the fact of diversification. What is 
particularly relevant to my study is their finding that firms, which increase their 
reported number of segments due to pure reporting changes, do not experience a decline 
in excess value at the time of reporting new segments. 
The three studies reviewed below have attempted to investigate valuation effects 
when firms are simultaneously diversified across the geographical and industrial 
dimension. 
In their studies, Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999,2003) suggest that the failure 
to simultaneously consider geographic diversification as a potential source of value for 
corporations affects the interpretation of existing studies on the effect of industrial 
diversification on firm value. They examine the joint effect of geographic and industrial 
diversification on firm value for a sample of 31,000 firm year observations of US firms 
from 1984-1997. They use such measures of firm valuation as (i) excess market value of 
equity-to-sales ratio, (ii) asset-to-book value of asset ratio, and (iii) a technique similar 
to that used by Berger and Ofek (1995). Their results indicate that the value of a firm 
with international operations is 2.7% higher than a comparable single-activity domestic 
firm, while the value of a multiactivity firm is 6% lower than a comparable portfolio of 
single-activity domestic firms. They also find that the value of geographic 
diversification is increasing in the degree of diversification, but that the industrial 
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diversification effect is not related to the number of the firm's different activities. They 
also show that the international diversification premium is negatively related to the 
value of the US dollar, but positively related to the breadth of international 
diversification as well as corporate characteristics consistent with growth opportunities. 
Senteney and Bazaz (2002) consider geographic and business diversification 
simultaneously and investigate how investors perceive the impact of US based firms' 
diversification on the association between the firms' cumulative abnormal equity 
returns and annual changes in earnings. Using pooled cross-sectional annual earnings 
response regressions for the years 1993-1997 they find that firms with higher 
geographic diversification have greater association between magnitudes of annual 
earnings changes and equity security returns than multinationals with lower geographic 
segment diversification, especially when the companies have low business 
diversification. Furthermore, multinationals with greater industrial diversification have 
comparatively similar association between magnitude of annual earnings changes and 
equity security returns at both high and low levels of geographic segment 
diversification. 
2.4.2 Geographic diversification 
Studies that focus on the value implications of international/geographic 
diversification tend to find that internationally diversified firms perform better than 
domestic firms. For example, studies by Leftwich (1974), Buhner (1987), Grant (1987) 
find that multinationals are more likely to have higher profitability and profit stability. 
These firms also tend to have higher valuation than their domestic counterparts. 
Most research in this area has been concerned with the performance of 
multinationals, which may be viewed as portfolios of internationally diversified assets, 
relative to the performance of pure domestic firms. The empirical findings, however, are 
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both inconclusive and unable to document whether the value of the firm is enhanced by 
incremental value embedded in the firm's multinational dimensions. Below I outline 
just a few of the studies in this area in greater detail and summarise the findings for 
other studies in the area. 
Errunza and Senbet (1981) investigate the existence of monopoly rents (excess 
valuation) associated with international operations of UK firms due to such factors as 
differential international taxation and imperfections in the product, factor and financial 
markets. This study involves empirical assessment of the effects of international 
operations in the market value-theoretic framework. Their empirical results cover the 
period of 1968-1977 and are based on the analysis of multipartial correlations between 
the regression coefficients of excess market value and measures of diversification. Their 
main finding is that firms' excess values are positively related to (the degree of) 
international involvement. They also find some evidence that this relationship is 
dynamic, as it was stronger during the earlier period characterised by stronger barriers 
to capital flows. 
They note that the full value of the special opportunities that a multinational firm 
possesses should be reflected in the current price of its stock. Consequently, an 
empirical analysis based on a risk-return trade-off cannot capture these special 
opportunities. In other words, since the diversification services provided by 
multinationals are already `priced out', attempts to verify these services through 
traditional performance evaluation techniques as well as through risk-return generating 
processes are unwarranted. They note, however, that benefits of direct foreign 
investment can be detected by an empirical investigation based on market valuation. 
9 Errunza and Senbet (1984) continue this investigation over a different time frame. By holding constant 
firm's capitalised equity value and using various measures of the degree of international involvement, 
they find a robust and positive association between firms' share value and degree of international 
involvement. 
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Among other points of relevance of their research to mine is their theoretical 
analysis of factors that might contribute to differential excess valuation of 
miltinationals. My measures of diversification are similar to those referred to by 
Errunza and Senbet (1981), that is, foreign operations' net earnings, net assets or sales. 
They use group sales as a regression deflator. They theoretically specify the conditions 
under which differential international taxes contribute to differential market valuation 
for the domestic and multinational firms. 
Fatemi (1984) investigates the rates of return realised by the shareholders of the 
internationally diversified relative to those of domestic firms. He also provides some 
evidence on the effect of the event of corporate international diversification on 
shareholders' returns. His sample covered the period of 1976-1980 and included 84 
multinational and 52 domestic firms. His results indicate that the rates of return on the 
two types of firms are identical, yet the rates on multinationals fluctuate less than those 
on domestic firms, suggesting that corporate diversification reduces the degree of 
systematic risk. Results also indicate that the relative degree of riskiness declines as the 
degree of international involvement increases. 
Fatemi (1984) also touches on some other aspects that are of relevance to my 
research. Among those is his analysis that to the extent that economic activity in foreign 
countries is less than perfectly correlated with domestic economic activity, foreign 
operations should provide the stockholders of multinationals with risk-return 
opportunities superior to those available to the stockholders of purely domestic firms. 
The author suggests that if the markets are rational and efficient, any net advantage 
associated with corporate international diversification will be discounted and reflected 
in the price of the multinational's shares around the time of such diversification. This 
will bring the subsequent returns to the `normal' level. 
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Doukas and Travlos (1988) presents evidence on the impact of the event of 
international diversification on the stock market values of US firms, in an attempt to 
provide evidence on whether direct foreign investment is a wealth-increasing corporate 
action. Their data cover the period of 1975 through 1983 and include 301 foreign- 
acquisition announcements. Their results indicate that shareholders of the firm not 
operating in the target firm's country experience significant positive returns at the 
announcement of acquisitions10. Shareholders of the multinational firms already 
operating in the target firm's country experience insignificant negative abnormal 
returns. 
Agmon and Lessard (1977), regressing the returns of 217 US multinationals on the 
US stock market index and an international factor, found the coefficient of the world 
factor to be correlated with a sales measure of multinationals' international 
involvement. They suggested that the international diversification objective of the 
investor can be achieved by holding a portfolio of multinational stocks. Jacquillat and 
Solnik (1978), using a sample of forty European and twenty-three US firms, concluded 
that investing in multinationals is a poor substitute to international portfolio 
diversification. Senchack and Beedles (1980) arrived at the same conclusion. Hughes, 
Logue and Sweeney (1975) showed that the results obtained in all these studies are 
sensitive to the market index used to compute the betas. Mickhail and Shawky (1979) 
reported that multinationals earn excess returns. However, Brewer (1981), using a 
different research design, reported no difference between multinationals and pure 
domestic firms in terms of the security market line. Michel and Shaked (1986) found 
that domestic corporations have significantly superior risk-adjusted market-based 
performance, are significantly less capitalised, and have higher total risk as well as 
higher systematic risk relative to multinationals. 
10 Another finding is that shareholders of multinationals benefit the most when their firms' expansion is 
taking place in less developed countries, that is geographical areas that are less related and developed 
relative to the US economy. 
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Morck and Yeung (1991) examine the value impact of various measures of 
geographic diversification for 1644 US domestic and multinational firms for the year 
1978. They show that geographic diversification is positively related to Tobin's q and 
that even upon controlling for other sources of intangible assets such as R&D and 
advertising expenditure, q is positively correlated with the number of foreign 
subsidiaries or countries in which the firm operates. Their results suggest that each 
foreign subsidiary increases q by 0.33% and that operations in an additional foreign 
country increases q by 0.55%. 
In brief, the existing literature emphasises the risk-reduction aspects of 
international diversification, but it does not provide conclusive evidence regarding the 
effect of international corporate expansion on shareholders' wealth. 
2.5 LITERATURE ON ACCOUNTING-BASED VALUATION MODELS 
2.5.1 On valuation models 
Conducting research within a particular area of empirical accounting requires the 
articulation of a research design which can `best' operationalise the testing of 
relationships or phenomena in question. Empirical research into value relevance, 
valuation or predictive ability of accounting information must often choose between 
return-earnings type of models, in which returns are regressed (typically) on scaled 
earnings, earnings changes and other financial statement variables, and price-levels 
models, in which equity market values are regressed on earnings and other accounting 
variables. 
Both price and return models begin with a standard valuation model in which 
price is the discounted present value of expected net cash flows or dividends. Both 
models also rely on the hypothesis that current earnings contain information about 
expected future net cash flows [Kothari and Zimmerman (1995)]. Although both types 
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of models are similar in essence, they are often used in the literature to address 
somewhat different research questions. Furthermore, both model types are not free of 
econometric problems and the importance of the avoidance of the specific econometric 
problem(s) in the context of a given research question often determines the choice of 
model type. Below I briefly review some of these issues, as referred to in the literature. 
The vast majority of market based accounting research studies tend to choose to 
model returns rather than value. Return-earnings models have been extensively 
employed by event studies investigating the information content of accounting numbers. 
Using short returns windows (usually several days) these studies are designed to 
investigate whether an earnings announcement, per se, contains information which 
causes investors to revise their cash flow expectations, whilst studies using returns over 
much longer periods address the slightly different question of whether the earnings 
figure, or any other accounting data, captures relevant information for the market 
[Collins and Kothari (1989)]. 
In contrast to return-earnings models, price-levels or valuation models are 
increasingly more often used to gauge the link (association) between the market's 
valuation of the firm and its accounting fundamentals. Walker (1997) points out that 
researchers adopting an association perspective tend to turn to valuation rather than 
returns models, and this change in emphasis is partially due to the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson 
(EBO) model. In the literature this model is often referred to as Edwards-Bell-Ohlson, 
residual value or residual income valuation model. 
EBO provides a solid theoretical framework for a simple accounting based 
valuation model, which is equivalent to the traditional dividend discounting model. The 
EBO (or RI) makes no assumptions not already incorporated in the dividend 
discounting model and expresses the market value of the equity of the firm as the sum 
of the book value of the firm plus the present value of future residual incomes. A 
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theoretical link between current market value of the firm and current book value and 
future residual incomes is established, in one way or another, by Preinreich (1936), 
Edwards and Bell (1961), Peasnell (1981,1982), Ohlson (1989) and others. A recent 
straightforward derivation is provided by Ohlson (1995), and Feltham and Ohlson 
(1995). They establish how the clean surplus relation transforms the classical valuation 
model based on discounted future dividends into an accounting model, based on two 
fundamental accounting variables: book value and earnings. 
Despite its appeal to the empirical accounting research literature which deals with 
valuation issues, this model, however, includes expectations of abnormal income. This 
does not make it practically more applicable than, say, the dividend or cash flow 
discounting models. The literature has dealt with this problem in different ways. 
On an empirical level, for instance, Frankel and Lee (1998) incorporate analysts' 
forecasts into the model. On a theoretical level, the studies of Ohlson (1995) and 
Feltham and Ohison (1995) establish how the clean surplus relation, in conjunction with 
linear information dynamics of abnormal accounting earnings, transforms the EBO or 
classical dividend discount valuation model into an accounting model. This model is 
based on two fundamental accounting variables: book value and earnings. In his study 
Rees (1997) suggests an alternative avenue for re-expressing the EBO into a simple 
accounting model. Here, the firm value is expressed in terms of the current book value 
and earnings. This is achieved by imposing a structure for expectations: expected 
earnings and book values are increasing functions of current earnings and book values. 
It shall be noted, however, that there is still little consensus regarding the appropriate 
specification of these models, and many of these studies have taken an ad hoc approach 
to model building. The Chapter on Methodology and Test Design provides more 
detailed review of how EBO is usually operationalised. 
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Despite the disadvantages associated with the need to deal with expectations, the 
use of such accounting based valuation models resolves the problems associated with 
the length of returns windows and the definition of unexpected earnings. The latter is 
not required and the valuation model is theoretically valid at any point in time as long as 
all publicly available accounting information is reflected in security prices [Rees 
(1997)]. Thus, even if prices lead earnings the information contained in accounting data 
will be incorporated into security prices at any point in time. 
Valuation models have the additional desirable property, especially for the 
research questions addressed in this study, of lending themselves to explanatory 
variable decomposition. 
In this study, a price-levels accounting valuation model is chosen as the research 
tool as it is more adequate for addressing the research question. 
Below I present some arguments, drawn from the literature, highlighting the 
shortcomings of returns-models in comparison with value-based modelling. 
1. A substantial number of studies in this area indicates that the forecasting focus of 
event studies, used since the work of Ball and Brown (1968), is misplaced and that 
returns relationships are only fully revealed when prices are allowed to lead earnings 
[Kothari (1992), Kothari and Sloan (1992), Kothari and Zimmerman (1995), 
Donnely and Walker (1995), Basu (1997), and Rees (1999)] 11. Rees (1999) notes 
that because prices are likely to anticipate the accounting variables used as 
regressors (i. e., prices lead earnings), the changes in price for one period may well 
relate to the change in the regressors for a subsequent period, giving rise to potential 
`errors in variables' problems. This problem does not occur when using levels, as all 
11 Collins and Kothari (1989) demonstrate that a twelve month period concluding shortly after the 
announcement of the years financial results, is not necessarily the period that gives the highest 
explanatory power. This is because share prices incorporate expected changes in earnings somewhat 
before the conventional event window starts and hence the normal formulation of the returns-earnings 
model is misspecified. Easton et al., (1992) provide supporting evidence showing that modelling long run 
returns by long run earnings mitigates the above problem and results in higher explanatory power. In 
general the window should often be extended backwards to capture the share price reaction to changes in 
expectations which only appear in accounting numbers sometime later. 
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price reactions to available information are included in the current price [Rees 
(1997)] 12. 
2. Estimated regression coefficients on earnings, in the returns model, tend to be 
biased [Collins and Kothari (1989), Kothari and Zimmerman (1995)]. Bartov et al., 
(2001) point out that one of the most persistent features of the return-earnings based 
research is the finding of implausibly small earnings response coefficients. They 
name two sets of factors that likely contribute to the small earnings response 
coefficients: measurement error (e. g., choice of the earnings expectations proxy, 
noise in reported earnings, etc. ); and model misspecification (e. g., failing to model 
nonlinearities, etc). Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) and Rees (1997) note that 
empirically, unlike the parameters estimated in returns-earnings models, the 
parameters estimated using valuation models are closer to those expected from 
theory. Furthermore, Ohlson (1995) and Collins, Pincus and Xie (1999) conclude 
that price-level models provide a clearer theoretical interpretation with respect to 
valuation coefficients than return models. 
3. Collins and Kothari (1989) and Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) demonstrate that 
the performance of returns models is sensitive to the window over which returns are 
cumulated. Also the conclusions reached by return-earnings studies are heavily 
influenced by their sample period and the width of the event-windows, resulting in 
difficulty of interpretation of a finding of poor/good performance. 
4. Return-earnings models are also associated with the difficulty of separating (or 
controlling for) the value effect of other value relevant events that coincide with the 
event of interest [Lang and Stulz (1994)]. 
5. From the literature it is also evident that problems exist in all return studies in the 
definition and computation of unexpected/abnormal equity returns or earnings. Lang 
12 Rees (1997) notes that although the price will include the information derived from expectations 
regarding future accounting numbers, this will only constitute noise in the dependent variable, and is not a 
serious econometric problem. 
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and Stulz (1994), for example, note that the choice of a benchmark for performance 
comparisons is always a problem. As is evident from studies by Brown et al., 
(1987), Capstaff et al., (1995), Garrod and Rees (1999) and others, there is no 
consensus about the most appropriate forecasting model based on temporal series of 
earnings, and whether statistical models such as these are to be preferred to 
expectations based on financial analysts' forecasts. 
6. Rees (1999) argues that explanatory variables which are relatively stable from 
period to period can have little effect on the model when incorporated as differences 
even if they are substantive drivers of value. 
7. Another characteristic of the price-levels regression models is that they demonstrate 
substantially higher explanatory power than returns models. 
8. The valuation model is also desirable as it captures the long run relationships, while 
a return-earnings model only captures the short run associations. 
9. Changes in accounting practices, in capital structure, or in the composition of the 
group may render the change variables (in the returns models) misleading. Rees 
(1997) argues that this problem can be avoided by working with levels (where only 
the current year's accounting variables need be used) rather than changes. 
10. Garrod and Rees (1998) suggest that in the levels equation it is a simple matter to 
investigate the influence of elements of the income statement or balance sheet, by 
restating earnings or book value into their component parts. In other words, it allows 
comparing the value relevance of various constituent parts of an accounting variable 
in question. For the research question addressed in my study, this property of the 
levels model is particularly desirable. 
The price-levels models are less prone to the above listed ten problem areas. 
Nevertheless, the review of the literature reveals that albeit considerably similar, the 
design of price-level models changes considerably from study to study, reflecting 
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different assumptions regarding the formation of expectations, or different objectives in 
hypothesis testing. The differences include: measuring market value at the accounting 
year-end or with a delay to ensure that all relevant information is publicly available; not 
deflating or deflating the model by a wide variety of scale-proxies (number of shares, 
beginning or end-of-period book value or market value of equity, as well as total assets 
or turnovers); using linear or other functional form for the model; using alternative 
regression types (OLS, MAD, WLS, rank-regression, etc. ); choosing how outliers or 
influential observations should be dealt with; incorporating control and/or signal 
variables; and choosing precisely which variables (fundamentals) should be included as 
regressors. 
The issue of how the EBO is operationalised in this study is the subject of Chapter 
3. For now, it suffice to point out that in its basic form the model that I use in this study 
expresses the market value of equity in terms of three basic value drivers: current book 
value, earnings and dividends. It is, therefore, important to review some of the empirical 
findings on the valuation of these three basic value drivers, reported in papers that use 
similar research design. 
2.5.2 On value relevance of accounting numbers 
Earnings, book value of equity and dividends are key financial statement summary 
measures and extant research asserts that they are priced [Easton and Harris (1991), 
Kothari and Zimmerman (1995), Feltham and Ohlson (1995), Rees (1997), Stark and 
Thomas (1998)]. 
In modelling equity market value or returns, earlier studies tended to rely on some 
variant of the simple earnings capitalisation model [Kormendi and Lipe (1987), Collins 
and Kothari (1989), Kothari (1992)]. More recent studies, however, argue that simple 
earnings capitalisation models that do not incorporate book value are likely misspecified 
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because book value is believed to be a value-relevant factor in its own right. Thus, in the 
spirit of works by Peasnell (1982) and Ohlson (1995), when a firm is viewed as a going 
concern, its book value would be a proxy for expected future normal earnings. 
Alternatively, when the firm's going concern status becomes questionable, its book 
value will then proxy for the liquidation value and/or the adaptation value [Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997), Berger et al., (1996)]. 
A substantial body of literature is concerned with the subject-to-context relative 
value relevance of book values and earnings. Works by Hayn (1995), Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997), Barth et al., (1998), Penman (1998), Collins et al., (1999), Ou and Sepe 
(2002) are just few to name among the studies that examines conditions under which 
book value or earnings would be relatively more important in equity valuation. 
Ou and Sepe (2002) argue that when a firm's current earnings are not perceived to 
be a good indicator of future earnings, due to either a large transitory component in 
current earnings or a change in the firm's future prospects, such as an increased 
possibility of liquidation, market participants will likely turn to book value for guidance 
in valuation. The value-relevance of book value will thus increase. Ou and Sepe (2002) 
finds robust evidence that the larger the spread between analysts earnings forecasts and 
reported current earnings (which proxies for earnings persistence), the less value- 
relevant are current earnings and the more the market relies on book value for equity 
valuation. 
Penman (1998) shows that on average, book value carries more weight than 
earnings in equity valuation for firms with an extreme earnings-to-book ratio (i. e., 
ROE). Similarly, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) report that when the earnings-to-book 
value ratio is high (low), earnings (book value) is a more important determinant of 
equity value. 
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Jan and Ou (1995) demonstrate that for firms reporting net losses, earnings 
explain very little of equity price, while book value is an important determinant of 
value. Barth ° et al., (1998) show that pricing multiples on book value and the 
incremental explanatory power of book value (earnings) increase (decrease) as a firm's 
financial health deteriorates. Collins et al., (1997) report that the value-relevance of 
earnings and book value move inversely to each other. They report that while the 
incremental value-relevance of earnings has declined over the past forty years, the 
combined value-relevance of earnings and book value has not. The decreased 
importance of earnings has been replaced by the increased value-relevance of book 
value. They also find that much of the shift in value-relevance from earnings to book 
value over time can be explained be several changes over the same time period: the 
increasing frequency of nonrecurring items and negative earnings, increasing intangible 
intensity, and decrease in average firm size. These factors all imply reduced persistence 
of current earnings. Barth, Beaver and Landsman (1998) show that for firms in financial 
distress, the value relevance of book value dominates that of earnings. They also 
demonstrate that the relative importance of each variable might differ across industries 
due to the degree of unrecognised assets. That is, the greater the amount of 
unrecognised assets, the lower the relevance of book value. 
In short, this strand of literature supports the premise that when a firm's current 
earnings is not perceived to be a good indicator of its future earnings power, market 
participants will turn to book value for guidance in valuation13 
Studies by Rees (1997), Hand and Landsman (1999), Brief and Zarowin (1999) 
extend previous research into relative valuation of earnings and book value by 
incorporating dividends into the analysis. Rees (1997) operationalises the Edwards- 
Bell-Ohlson residual income valuation model and uses it to analyse the value 
13 Earnings persistence has also been identified as one major determinant of the magnitude of earnings 
response coefficients in earnings-return models [Kormendi and Lipe (1987), Collins and Kothari (1989), 
among others)]. 
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associations of earnings, book values and dividends for a sample of UK firms. He finds 
that dividends have a bigger impact on value than does retained earnings. Inclusion of 
dividends into the model also improves its explanatory power. His findings also indicate 
that in an environment characterised by information asymmetry, basic accounting 
values, such as earnings and book value, are less reliable value drivers. Retained 
earnings are also found to be relatively weak for smaller firms and firms with negative 
(and, therefore, likely transitory) earnings or higher-than-average return on equity. The 
book value variable is most influential where return on equity is either abnormally high 
or low. The relevance of book value to the market value of equity is relatively weak for 
larger firms. Dividends are found to be highly value relevant and are always positively 
related to value. 
Hand and Landsman (1999) test the predictions that emerge in Ohlson's (1995) 
model by examining the information content of dividends. They employ a price-levels 
model to assess the pricing of dividends in stock prices and find robust evidence that 
dividends have information content and are materially positively priced, which contrasts 
with the negative relation predicted by the dividend displacement theory. They also find 
that the positive pricing of dividends is at least three times larger for loss making firms 
(i. e., when earnings are transitory) than for profit-making firms. The authors' 
explanation of these results is that managers of loss-making firms use dividends to 
signal future profitability, while to a lesser degree managers of profitable firms use 
dividends to alleviate concerns about the misuse of free cash flow. They conclude that 
dividends are a component of other information about abnormal earnings that is 
reflected in price but is not yet captured by current financial statements. 
Brief and Zarowin (1999) compare alternative valuation models that relate share 
price to book value and earnings, and to book value and dividends and identify some of 
the contexts affecting valuation relevance. They find that book value has greater 
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explanatory power for price than either earnings or dividends. However, the 
combination of book value and dividends has virtually identical explanatory power as 
book value and earnings. Furthermore, earnings and dividends alone have about the 
same individual and incremental explanatory power. For firms with transitory earnings, 
dividends has greater individual explanatory power than earnings, but once again book 
value and earnings and book value and dividends have about the same explanatory 
power. This shows that book value compensates for the largely valuation irrelevant 
transitory earnings. For firms with permanent earnings, earnings has the greatest 
explanatory power of the three variables. Finally, dividends have superior valuation 
relevance when book value is a poor indicator of value (e. g., due to the presence of 
unrecognised assets in some industries), and when earnings are transitory. 
2.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter reviews different strands of literature that directly concern the 
research objective and research questions of this study. This literature provides the 
necessary anchors and `benchmarks' for (i) the theoretical arguments put forward in this 
study, and (ii) the analysis and synthesis of the empirical finding. 
The conducted review of literature on the usefulness of segmental information 
reveals the lack of consensus in the core area of interest of this study, i. e., valuation and 
value relevance of segmental information. This issue is extensively investigated in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
The section 2.5 of this chapter is deliberately kept concise because the 
theoretical aspects of the chosen accounting-based valuation framework are the primary 
subject of detailed investigation in Chapter 3, while the empirical side of the story is 
examined in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY AND TEST DESIGN 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the empirical methods, models and 
methodological issues, as well as the choices and assumptions made in respect of the 
test design. 
The chapter has the following structure. Section 3.2. discusses the issue of 
model class selection and outlines the reasons for choosing a specific class of market- 
based accounting valuation model. Section 3.3 concerns the derivation of the basic 
model used in this study. Section 3.4. examines the implications of the cross-sectional 
difference in scale on the potential inferences drawn from the empirical application of 
the basic model. Section 3.5. demonstrates how the basic models can be extended for its 
application on the segmental level. Section 3.6. provides further explanations on how 
the basic models' coefficients should be interpreted when drawing the inferences in the 
process of empirical analysis. Section 3.7. concludes the chapter. 
3.2. MODEL CLASS SELECTION 
In the empirical accounting research, a choice often has to be made between: (i) 
return-earnings models, in which returns are typically regressed on a scaled earnings 
variable (or earnings component); and (ii) price-levels models, in which share values 
might be regressed on earnings, book values, dividends, research and development 
costs, etc. Because the goal of this study is to uncover/capture the long-term 
relationships and the adequacy of segmental financial statement information as a 
summary of the segment-level events that have affected the firm to date, I argue that the 
price-levels model specification is more appropriate. 
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To link and explore the relationship between the market value of the firm's 
ordinary equity and the segmental information disclosed in the notes to financial 
statements, I adapt the residual income valuation model (RIV). This produces a price- 
levels model which, in its most basic form, expresses the market value of equity as a 
linear function of the firm's book value and earnings for ordinary. 
The review of the literature, presented in Chapter 2, suggests that the majority of 
studies that have investigated the valuation of operations of diversified firms, have used 
returns-based models. On this basis some researchers might view a return-earnings type 
of valuation model as an alternative to a price-levels research design. However, the 
emphases in these studies have mainly been the stock market performance of firms, 
measured over a period of time. Returns models consider the adequacy of financial 
statement data as a summary of events that have affected the firm over a specific `return 
interval'. As Easton and Sommers (2003) point out, inferences from the return model 
may be more pertinent to addressing questions regarding the validity of the accounting 
summary of (specific) events that have affected the firm during the return period. That 
is, returns models permit tests of hypotheses regarding the timeliness of the summary. 
However, investigation of the timeliness of the accounting summary of segment- 
level events is not the purpose of this study. The purpose here is to reveal the long-term 
relationships and examine the value association of segmental information at a point in 
time. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a price-levels model captures the long-term 
relationships, as it considers the adequacy of financial statement data as a summary of 
all events that have affected the firm to-date (i. e., it captures all returns since the firm 
came into existence). The model, therefore, does not depend on timing since it deals 
directly with the value per se [Easton and Sommers (2003)]. 
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The research question would, therefore, be best addressed through the use of the 
price-levels model. 
3.3 DERIVATION OF THE MODEL 
Various studies [e. g., Peasnell (1982), Ohlson (1995), Rees (1997)] have 
demonstrated that the residual income valuation model is theoretically identical to, and 
can easily be derived from, the classical dividend discount model (DDM). RIV based 
models are popular valuation tools in market based accounting research. What 
positively differentiates the RIV model from the DDM, given the purpose of our 
research, is that RIV relies entirely on accounting numbers. The only assumption used 
in the process of derivation of RIV from DDM is that the relationship between the 
future periods' per share earnings, book values and dividends follows clean surplus 
accounting. Clean surplus accounting assumes that changes in per share book value 
between two dates equals to net income minus dividends. Furthermore, for the RIV 
model to follow from DDM it is only necessary that the estimates of future accounting 
numbers, rather than past numbers, follow `clean surplus' identity [Rees (1997)]. 
Below I outline the sequence of steps used in the literature to derive the RIV 
model from DDM [see, for example, Edwards and Bell (1961), Peasnell (1981,1982), 
Ohlson (1989,1995)]. The DDM holds14: 
p` =; [1 + r]r 
(1) 
where: 
p1 = price of the ordinary share at time t; d1 = ordinary dividends at time t; r= 
the discount rate; and E1[. ] = expectations operator at time t. 
14 Investors may either be assumed to be risk neutral or the cost of capital may reflect the risk of the 
dividend stream. It is also assumed that there is no information asymmetry (i. e., homogeneous beliefs), 
interest rates are non-stochastic and have a flat term structure. 
ý 
r, . -, _ 
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The assumption that the book value, earnings and dividends develop in line with 
the `clean surplus' accounting holds: 
by, = bv, _, + er, - 
d, (2) 
where: 
bv, and bv1_, = book value of equity at time t and t-1, respectively; erg = clean 
surplus earnings for period t. 
The dividend variable in equation (1) can be replaced by the expression for 
dividends from (2). This and some rearrangement gives: 
(3) Pr = bv1+ 
E1 [er, 
[1 + r] 
byr+r-, ] 
r-I 
In the literature, model (3) is frequently being referred to as the Edward-Bell- 
Ohlson (EBO) model, residual income valuation model, or abnormal earnings model. In 
this study these terms are used interchangeably. This model has a straightforward 
interpretation: the market value of a firm's equity is a function of its current book value 
plus the present value of the stream of future periods' expected abnormal earnings. The 
model implies that any deviation of a firm's market value from its book value occurs 
due to limitations in the accounting-based book values in recognising the 
contemporaneous future expected abnormal earnings, that bears on a firm's goodwill. It 
is important to note that the required rate of return `r' used in conjunction with by is the 
same as that used for discounting future abnormal earnings. 
The abnormal income of each of the future periods is equal to the difference of 
that period's earnings (er1) and `normal' or `required' earnings (r*bvt_j) that investors 
require the firm to earn on their `beginning-of-period' investment in the equity of the 
firm. The abnormal income, second term in equation (3), can, therefore, be decomposed 
into its two constituent parts: the present value of future expected earnings [second term 
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in (4)], and present value of future expected `required' or `normal' earnings [third term 
in (4)], respectively. That is: 
bv +7 
Er (err+T )_' Er ýr * byr+r-t ) 
Pr =t 
T=I [1 + r]T T_, 
[1 + r]s 
(4) 
The good news about this valuation model is that it relies on accounting numbers . 
only. The bad news, however, is that the model also relies on the expected at time `t' 
future values of 'bv' and 'er' from time 't+l ' to infinity. Although the expected values 
for the immediate future periods may, arguably, be proxied by analyst forecasts, there 
are no reliable proxies (forecasts) for future expected accounting values in more distant 
future periods. This fact makes the model, in its current format, inapplicable for real-life 
valuation. For the purposes of empirical utilisation, the model requires some further 
modification. The literature suggests several approaches to how this model can be 
operationalised empirically. Although somewhat different in the underlying logic, all 
approaches rely on some additional assumptions with respect to the process of 
expectations formation. The resulting operationalised models are, nonetheless, very 
similar whatever approach one takes. 
In the sections that follow I briefly review three approaches to operationalising 
the EBO that have been most frequently used in the literature, and explain the choice of 
the approach taken in this study's 
First approach: 
Ohlson (1995) transforms equation (3) into a linear function of equity book value, 
current net income, net dividends, and a scalar 'v' representing other information about 
future abnormal earnings that is reflected in price but is not yet captured by current 
is In section 3.5 of this chapter I review the third approach, used by Wysocki (1998) specifically for 
segment-level analysis, that results in the same operationalised model. 
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financial statements. He does so by assuming that abnormal earnings (or unrecorded 
goodwill) and other information obey an autoregressive process16 
q *a 
xltl - iv Xl + Vl + Fl. ltl 
* 
vt+l - lý vt + C2. t+1 
(s) 
where 4= abnormal earnings for period t, and is defined as x, = er, -r* bv, _, ; yr 
is 
other information that impacts on the firm equity value at time t but is not yet captured 
in contemporaneous accounting numbers; e.,, and e2, are zero-mean unpredictable 
disturbance terms. tu and y are fixed at time t known autoregressive parameters, 
restricted within the interval of 0 to 1. 
By combining equations (2), (3), (5) and the definition of abnormal earnings (i. e., 
_, 
), the following model can be derived: xl = er, -r* bv, 
p, = (1-k)bv, +k(V *er, -dr)+82v, 
or 
p, =bv, +k(V *err -d, )-kbv, +82v, 
(6) 
(6.1) 
where dt = net dividends plus net capital outflow, and parameters p, k and 82 are, 
respectively: 
cp=(1+r)lr>0 
k=rw1(r+1-y), with 0: 5k-<<1 
82 =(r+1)/(r+1-w)(r+1-y) 
The book value works as a `rough' measure/estimate of value, whereas the 
abnormal earnings and 'v' augment book value as "correcting" information. Ohlson 
(1995) demonstrates that ignoring the other information V, the valuation model (6) can 
be viewed as a weighted average of an earnings capitalisation model and a book value 
16 It also follows that goodwill equals current abnormal earnings scaled by a constant. 
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model. By letting k=w =1, the value is determined only by earnings and dividends 
('pure' earnings/dividends model): 
p, =co*err-d, 
Alternatively, by letting k= co = 0, just book value is sufficient to determine the 
value ('pure' book value model): 
pr = bv1 
Ohlson's model (equation 6) also cleanly reflects Modigliani and Miller's (1958, 
1961) dividend displacement property. That is, equity value and dividends are 
negatively related in that a pound of dividends reduces equity value by exactly one 
pound'7. However, the existing empirical evidence seems to suggest the opposite: 
dividends have a positive association with value (see Chapter 2). I return to the issue of 
dividends in greater detail later in the chapter. 
Because equation (6) is a simple linear model that expresses the value `p' through 
'bv', 'er', 'd 'and 'v', one can rewrite it as: 
p, = a; bv, +a2er, +aýd, +b'Zl +u, (6.2) 
where Z is a vector of other value-relevant variables, including the other information 
component v1, and various control variables; a; = (1- k) , a2 = k( O, a; = -k and 
b' subsumes coefficients on the elements of vector Z1. 
Model 6.2, with or without the dividends term, is frequently applied in the 
empirical studies by regressing stock price on current book value and current net 
income [e. g., Rees (1997), Hand and Landsman (1999)] as follows: 
p, = ao +a, bv, +a2er, +a3d, +bZ, +u, (7) 
17 Hand and Landsman (1999) argue that this valuation property of dividends in Ohlson's model results 
from the standard dividend discount model permitting no information asymmetry. 
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where ao , a, , a2 and 
b are, respectively, the intercept, and regression-generated 
estimates of coefficients a,, a2, a' and b', respectively; ut is the regression error 
term. 
Model (7) is one of the possible operationalised valuation model versions of the 
theoretical EBO (equation 3), and the process of derivation bears on the Ohlson's linear 
information dynamic assumptions. 
Second approach: 
A virtually identical specification to model (7) is also attainable by following a 
different set of assumptions. Rees (1997) suggests modelling future periods' earnings 
and book values as growing at constant rates get and gbv. That is: 
Et [bv, 
+T 
(1 + gBV )T * bvt z= (1, oo) 
and 
E, [err+Tý - (1+gER)T *eYi r= (1ýoo) 
(8) 
However, constant growth in earnings and book values in each future time period 
is not a requirement of the model. The only requirement is that growth expectations are 
equated, in present value terms, to a constant growth term. 
The assumption of how future expected values develop is necessary because 
expectations are not observable in practice, and the only factual information available to 
investors/analysts at time "t" is the firm's bvt and erl. In other words, to operationalise 
the EBO model a certain relationship should be assumed between the current observable 
and the next-period's accounting variables. The hypothesised structure of expectations 
allows the substitution of all currently "non-observable" accounting values for future 
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periods with those that are currently observable' 
8. By substituting (8) into (3) and noting 
that gER and gBV must, in the long-term, be less than unity, equation (3) can be 
transformed to: 
Pr =bv, +er, * 
1+9ER 
-bv, 
r 
r-gER r-gev 
or 
(9) 
P, = bv, 1- r+ er, * 
1+ gER 
(9.1) 
r-gBv r- gER 
Model (9) demonstrates that one can express the firm's equity value via two 
currently observable accounting variables: bvt and ert, where the firm value pt is equal to 
bvt (the baseline value) plus a linear function of bvt and ert that represents the abnormal 
earnings. 
I (rl( 1+gý 1 
By denoting a, = 11- 
r- gav J 
and a2 =r- 
gER J, 
model (9.1) can be 
presented in a simple linear regression form: 
pt = aa +a, bv, +azer, +ur (10) 
Rees's model is another operationalised version of (3) and is essentially identical 
to the Ohlson's equation (7). In other words, virtually the same operationalised version 
is attainable by following substantially different derivation procedure and assumptions. 
The interpretation or economic meaning of coefficients al and a2, in across models (7) 
and (10), is also qualitatively identical. Therefore, in this study I adopt this 
operationalisation as the basic valuation framework. 
18 It is possible that the way the currently observable values relate to future unobservable ones may vary 
within the investing coqununity, as well as with respect to different firms, industries and over time. 
Whatever assumption one makes regarding the form of that relationship, it is going to be of restrictive 
nature. More importantly, however, is the very existence of that relation but not its true pattern. 
r 
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Some explanations of the model's relation to the firm's accounting system are 
necessary. Assuming that the firm's assets are all marked-to-market and the firm 
generates (and is expected to generate in the future) `normal' earnings, the equity 
market value pt should on average equal its book value bvt. This is not to say that under 
those conditions there could not be short-term random fluctuations of MV around BV 
due to the influence of other value-relevant factors of a random nature, which are not 
reflected in accounting numbers. The important point is that the model captures long- 
term relationships where the short-term random disturbances are assumed to balance out 
in the long-term. 
The relaxation of the marked-to-market condition does not change the above 
argument. For example, if the accounting system used by the firm shows a persistent 
bias (e. g., conservatism), and investors are aware of this fact, then it is likely that 
investors would simply adjust the reported book value figure to what they believe is its 
perceived fair value. In other words, the notion is that analysts would apply a weighting 
multiplier to reconcile the reported and `fair' book values. That is 
bvunbiased t_ li*bvbiasedr, where p is the book value weighting multiplier. If book values 
are perceived (in the long term) to be equal to fair value, the weighting multiplier would 
assume the value of unity. For downward (upward) biased reported book values the 
weighting multiplier would be larger (smaller) than unity. Therefore, the weight- 
adjusted theoretical coefficient in Ohlson's framework [equation (6)] would be 
(1- k), u , and 
in Rees's approach [equation (9.1)] it would be 1- 
r 
r-gev -) lu - 
It follows, that this weighting multiplier will then be subsumed in coefficient a] 
in regression models (7) and (10). That is, other things being equal, al in model (7) and 
(10) will be higher (lower) if the firm's accounting system is perceived to be generating 
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downwards (upwards) biased book values. Some empirical results that might support or 
refute this expectation are reported in Chapter 4. 
Leaving aside the issue of accounting system-induced biases in reported by, the 
model (3) predicts a departure of a firm's market value from its book value if the 
present value of future expected earnings varies from the `normal' or `required' level. In 
the operationalised versions of the model, the term `a2 *ert' proxies for the present value 
of future expected earnings, and the term '(al -1) *bv, ' proxies for the capitalised normal 
or required earnings. Therefore, the difference between the former and the latter terms 
bears on the firm's expected abnormal earnings (goodwill), which, in turn, explains why 
the firm's market value might depart from its book value. The model predicts that, all 
other things being equal, the higher the capitalised earnings the higher would be the 
market value of the firm. If the capitalised expected earnings are above what is 
considered as `normal' earnings, the market value will exceed the book value. The 
market value will fall below book value when the capitalised expected earnings fall 
short of normal earnings. Of two otherwise identical firms, the one that has higher 
capitalised expected earnings will have higher market value. In other terms, relative 
valuation of two firms is entirely determined by perceived difference in capitalised 
expected earnings. Difference between capitalised expected earnings of two firms is 
inferred by comparing the values of regression-estimated earnings multiplier `a2'. 
Therefore, other things being equal, the higher the earnings multiplier, the larger is the 
associated abnormal earnings. 
On the whole, in the context of this research, to differentiate between valuations 
(value contribution) associated with different firms (segment-level operations), one 
must be able to compare in relative terms the abnormal earnings associated with 
different firms (segments). Relative abnormal earnings associations are inferred from 
the regression estimated earnings multipliers. This basic rule, in my study, guides the 
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process of drawing inferences regarding the valuation or value contribution associated 
with of different firms or segments. 
3.3.1 Other valuation factors: dividends 
One can notice that dividends explicitly enter the operationalised model (6) that 
bears on Ohlson's framework, while dividends are not present in model (9) that draws 
on Rees's framework. One can argue that the operationalised models oversimplify the 
original EBO model, because they totally rely on current period data rather than the 
future expected values. The closeness of the operationalised model to the EBO model 
would depend on: (A) how well the current-period variable values proxy for values 
expected in the future; and (B) the credibility of the assumptions used during the 
modification of the EBO, resulting in a simple linear relationship between firm value 
and accounting variables. 
The condition (A), in turn, depends on at least two factors. Firstly, it is the quality 
of accounting numbers in the broad sense. That is, how closely accounting numbers 
reflect the underlying economic performance of the firm and the fair value of its assets. 
Secondly, it is the perceived degree of persistence of these accounting variables. In 
other words, even in the ideal case where all assets and liabilities are continuously 
marked-to-market and the firm does not resort to any form of earnings management or 
manipulation, current values might still convey little information regarding the future 
expected values for the same variables. 
Condition (B), in turn, may not hold. For example, parameters in these 
operationalisations are modelled as constants or, at least, are assumed to be independent 
of the values of accounting numbers. In reality, however, this might not be the case. 
Extant literature (see Chapter 2) suggests that parameters might vary depending on, for 
instance, the sign of earnings, book values, or might be affected by a range of other 
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contexts. Furthermore, the model predicts that the firm equity value would be zero if all 
accounting numbers entering the model were zeros. It is possible that the model's 
linearity/non-linearity and the set of major value drivers are contextual to the properties 
of the firm (e. g., the economic sector affiliation of the company, size, life cycle stage, 
accepted accounting practices, extremity of reported accounting numbers, etc. ) and the 
degree of market's miss-pricing of the firm's value. 
To limit information loss and mitigate possible miss-specification, one should try 
to improve the model by appending it with some `forward-looking' variables. Dividends 
might be one such additional valuation factor19. Various authors attribute different yet 
complementary roles to dividends in models similar to (7). For example, dividends are 
imbedded in Ohlson's analytical model (6). This model predicts a negative relation 
between dividends and market value, which closely reflects the Modigliani and Miller 
dividend displacement proposition. Application of a set of assumptions [e. g., such as in 
Rees (1997)] which are different from those used by Ohlson to operationalise the EBO, 
may generate similar models but without the dividend variable [e. g., equation (10)]. 
Dividends are often added into those models as an additional value-relevant variable. 
Common arguments for adding dividends into the model include: 
1. First is the signalling hypothesis: management signals its inside 
information on the firm's expected economic performance via dividends. In this 
sense, dividends might proxy for other value-relevant information that is yet to be 
reflected in future period financial statements. In this capacity, dividends can be 
applied to Ohlson (1995) model and proxy for the `other information (v)' variable. 
19 Some studies include in a similar valuation framework other forward-looking value-explaining factors, 
such as research and development costs [e. g., Green et al (1996), Stark and Thomas (1998), Stark et al., 
(2003)], or advertising expenses [e. g., Chauvin and Hirschey (1993)]. However, it is essential not to 
overcomplicate the valuation model, particularly when it comes to the segment-level analysis, by trying to 
control for all possible value drivers. Of the above factors I include only dividends, as I believe dividends 
have a more fundamental role in equity valuation and dividend information is more readily available. 
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2. Secondly, because firms are reluctant to frequent changes of dividend 
policy, dividends can also be viewed as the high-persistence component of current 
period earnings [Lintner (1965)]. 
3. Finally, depending on the set of specific assumptions used to 
operationalise EBO, the resulting model may explicitly include dividends as a 
valuation factor. For instance Hand and Landsman (1999) demonstrate how two 
alternative sets of assumptions give different roles to dividends in a model similar to 
(7). In one case, the multiplier attached to dividends has a theoretical value of `-1', 
reflecting Modigliani and Miller's (1958,1961) dividend displacement theory. 
While in the other case the theoretical value of the dividend multiplier is positive 
and has a specific structure [see equation (6.1)]. 
The above arguments suggest that including dividends into the model is likely to 
mitigate possible miss-specification and value-relevant omitted variable problems. 
Empirical studies both in the UK and the US that use price-level regressions and include 
dividends as an additional valuation factor tend to find that the valuation of dividends is 
contextual to firm-specific characteristics and, contrary to the dividend displacement 
theory, positively associated with firm value [e. g., Rees (1997), Hand and Landsman 
(1999), Akbar and Stark (2003a)]. 
Some studies advocate the use of additional value-drivers such as R&D costs 
[Hirschey and Spencer (1992), Green et al., (1996) and Stark and Thomas (1998)], 
advertising expenses [Chauvin and Hirschey (1993)], or capital contributions [Hand and 
Landsman (1999)]. The motivation for including these variables in the regression is best 
expressed in Akbar and Stark (2003a) who state that equation (10) is clearly a stripped 
down model that omits a number of (above listed) variables that have been argued to be 
value-relevant in prior studies in the US and the UK. 
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However, it is essential not to overcomplicate our valuation model, particularly 
when it is modified for the segmental level analysis, by trying to control for potentially 
numerous valuation factors. Of the financial statements variables considered by the 
literature as potentially value-relevant, only dividends are included in the model as I 
believe dividends have a more fundamental role in security valuation. Additionally, in 
terms of availability of data, in the Extel Financial Company Analysis database - the 
primary source of data for this study - dividends is a more frequently reported data item 
than R&D, marketing costs or capital contributions. Therefore, the following version of 
valuation model is used as the basis for the empirical sections of this study: 
pr = ao + a, bvr + az err + a, divr + bZr + ut (11) 
where Z is a vector of various control variables, which are detailed in subsequent 
empirical analysis chapters. 
3.4 THE IMPACT OF CROSS-SECTIONAL DIFFERENCE IN SCALE 
The process of model derivation and key theoretical properties of the model have 
been examined in Section 3.3. In the current section I examine the practical implications 
of applying the model to a cross-section of firms of different size. 
Firms included in the sample used in this study differ cross-sectionally in terms of 
size. On average larger firms have larger values of variables in monetary terms: market 
capitalisation, book values, net assets, sales, earnings, etc. That is, these variables have 
an imbedded scale or size factor. I demonstrate below, that if no account is taken of 
differences in size, the estimated regression is most likely to produce spurious results, 
i. e. be plagued by econometric problems such as biased regression coefficients, 
heteroscedasticity-related problems, overstated coefficients of determination, etc. 
Although these problems have been recognised in the market based accounting 
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literature, no universally accepted solution for these scale-related problems has been 
offered. Depending on the primary emphasis of a particular research question, different 
studies have dealt with scale effects in different ways. 
This study requires drawing inferences from actual values of regression-estimated 
coefficients. More specifically, the purpose of this research is to reveal the actual 
patterns of value contributions associated with specific industrial and geographical 
segments. The employed test design identifies these patterns by examining the values of 
particular regression coefficients. It is critical, therefore, to ensure that coefficients are 
sufficiently unbiased and robust. It has been documented in the existing literature that 
scale-related effects have considerable influence on inferences drawn from the price- 
levels models. A considerable number of studies discuss approaches to mitigate the 
effects of scale on regression results [Bernard (1987), Kothari and Zimmerman (1995), 
Easton (2000), Barth and Clinch (2001), Easton and Sommers (2003)]. Unfortunately, 
all these studies characterise scale in different ways. It appears that scale is not a single 
and well-defined concept. For example, Easton and Sommers (2003) note that the 
nature of cross-sectional data is such that the results of a regression of market 
capitalisation on financial statement data are driven by a relatively small subset of the 
largest firms in the sample. They refer to this overwhelming influence of the largest 
firms as the `scale effect'. It appears though, that the authors do not draw a fine line 
between different consequences of using size-wise heterogeneous cross-sectional data. 
They observe the presence of heteroscedasticity in the regression and call it a `size 
effect'. They apply the same `size effect' term to a situation where the relation between 
variables for larger firms differs from the relation for smaller firms (that is, large and 
small firms have different valuation multiples). Review of studies by Bernard (1987), 
Kothari and Zimmerman (1995), Easton (2000), Barth and Clinch (2001), Easton and 
Sommers (2003) points to a range of potential problems associated with cross-sectional 
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scale differences that need to be addressed. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate 
potential influences that cross-sectional differences in scale might have on regression 
results. 
It is unclear a priori which types of scale effects are present in our research 
context. To determine whether scale induces spurious inferences, one must either 
specify the nature of the scale effect and take specific steps to mitigate it, or ensure 
inferences are robust to estimating alternative specifications aimed at mitigating various 
types of scale effects. Therefore, diagnosing and mitigating scale effects requires 
specifying what scale is in the context of this research and how scale relates to the 
variables employed. 
Barth and Clinch (2001) provide a useful framework for differentiating between 
various (four) types of scale-related problems: 
1. scale differences arising from the financing base of a firm that is unrelated to 
the success or failure of the firm's operating and investing activities. That is, there is a 
difference between firms that are large because of capital infusion and firms that are 
large because of successful operating and investing activities. This results in an additive 
scale effect. 
2. Scale differences arising at the formation of the firm. This results in a 
multiplicative scale effect. 
3. Valuation parameters that vary with scale (Lee [1999]). 
4. Heteroscadasticity. 
The first three effects can result in coefficient bias, whereas the fourth can result 
in estimation inefficiency. There seem to be consensus in the literature that depending 
on the nature of the scale effect, different estimation specifications (models) might 
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become effective at mitigating scale effects. In sections that follow I discuss the 
valuation implications of those four scale effects in the settings of our tests. 
3.4.1 Additive scale effect 
When scale differences across firms reflect differences in the investment base (an 
omitted variable), we have a scale effect of the first type. Among factors that may 
account for the differences in the financing base are: issues of new equity; repurchased 
stocks; asset revaluations; and interim and annual paid dividends. Consequently, if one 
firm is larger due to a larger financial base (e. g., when issuance of new equity increases 
MV and BV), then regression estimates could show a positive relation between MV and 
BV even if none would exist in scale-free settings. That is, differences in the investment 
base can result in additive scale effects. One should be able to control for such additive 
scale effects by adjusting the dependent variable and the independent variable which 
relates to the investment-base. For instance, stock buy-backs (or payment of dividends) 
reduce book value, and this should affect the market value approximately on a pound- 
for-pound basis20. Therefore, by adjusting market and book values to new stock 
issuance (or stock repurchases, paid dividends, etc. ), one should, in theory, be able to 
overcome scale effects related to `differences-in-investment-base'. In practice, however, 
such adjustments are problematic. Factors like asset revaluations also affect the 
investment base. The problem though is that asset revaluations that directly affect book 
value might not impact on the market value of equity on a pound-for-pound basis. 
Furthermore, the non-availability of necessary data (such as new share issuance, share 
redemption, asset revaluations, etc. ) on our sample is also an impediment. Without this 
20 Issues such as taxation and information asymmetry might undermine the pound-for-pound relationship. 
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information it would be impossible to identify and quantify the additive scale effect (if 
there is one), associated with differences in the investment base21. 
3.4.2 Multiplicative scale effect 
This relates to the situation when cross-sectional scale differences reflect 
differences arising at the formation of the firm or from the fact that firms are larger 
because of successful operating and investing activities (including such events as 
mergers and acquisitions). Generally speaking, the implication of this type of scale 
effect is as follows. Suppose, a `unit-size' firm has the following values mvr, bvr, err, 
divr, for equity market value, book value, earnings and dividends, respectively. Then for 
an otherwise identical firm, whose size is a multiple `s' of a unit-size factor `s', the 
corresponding values would be s *mvr, s*bv,, s *err, s*div, 22. Therefore, if the value of 
the unit-size firm is expressed as: 
mv, *1 = ao *1+a, *(bv, *1)+a2 *(er *1)+a3* div, +u,, 
and there is no cross-sectional variation in valuation coefficients related to cross- 
sectional differences in scale, then the value of the `s'-size firm should be: 
(mv, *s)=ao*s+a, *(bv, *s)+a2*(ert*s)+a3*div, +%t,. 
where mvt*s, bvt*s and ert*s are the currently observed equity market value, book 
value and earnings of a firm which is 's' times proportionally larger than the `unit-size' 
firm. In the above model we have pure multiplicative scale-effect, which assumes that 
no other scale-related valuation differences are at place. Note that the intercept ao*s is a 
function of size and increases in proportion to T. 
21 Later in this chapter it is argued that deflation by a scale proxy is likely to purge some of the additive 
scale effect. 
22 Fora unit size firm s=1. 
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Running the above regression for a cross-section of size-wise variant firms is 
likely to produce spurious results. This point can best be illustrated graphically. For 
simplicity of illustration assume that there is only one valuation factor, that is, book 
value. 
Z/ mvt*1 = ao*1+a1*(bvt*1) 
Small 
byº 
On this graph there are two groups of firms: unit-size or `Small' firms, and 
`Large' firms that are proportionately larger by a factor of Y. In other words, a simple 
multiplicative scale effect is assumed in the group of larger firms. In both size groups 
firms have the same valuation function, with identical book value coefficient. If two 
separate regressions [mvt*1 = ao*1+aj*(bvt*1) and mvt*s = ao*s+aj*(bvt*s)] were 
estimated for the two size groups, true (unbiased) estimates the of book value 
coefficient a, and the intercept ao would have been obtained. The exhibit illustrates 
that when large and small firms are jointly included in single regression, the 
regression's estimated coefficients (ao' and aJ ') will be biased. Other regression 
characteristics, such as the Adjusted-R2 will also be biased. This is because this single 
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regression estimates the line [ p', = a'0+a', *bv, ] that would go through both small and 
large firms' groups. It is important to emphasise that this line does not reflect the true 
economic relationships (between the dependent and independent variables) which are 
meant to be explored. Only by coincidence will these regression coefficients and 
parameters equal the true coefficients. 
To sum up, when scale effect is multiplicative it induces spurious correlation 
between dependent and independent variables and also among the independent 
variables, and this biases regression results. 
Two methods are commonly suggested in the literature to deal with this scale 
problem [e. g., Barth and Clinch (2001)]. The first is to include a proxy for scale as an 
explanatory variable in the basic model, which can be effective when the scale effect is 
multiplicative or additive. The second is to estimate the regression after deflating all 
variables by a scale proxy. 
If scale is multiplicative, under some conditions, deflation is algebraically the 
same as the inclusion of a size proxy as an additional explanatory variable. However, 
the inclusion in regression of a scale proxy as an additional variable is likely to 
complicate the regression analysis and potentially bias the results. This is because scale 
is already present in all regression variables and, therefore, is correlated with both the 
dependent and independent variables. Its inclusion as an additional explanatory variable 
would induce spurious correlation between the scale variable and the dependent and 
independent variables, and might bias the results23. 
23 Results from my simulations provide empirical justification to this statement and prove that adding a 
scale variable is unlikely to solve the problem, while deflation directly eliminates the multiplicative scale 
effect. I first randomly simulate the mv, by and er variables, in such a way that they would contain no 
additive scale factor and, at the same time, would mimic the average historical book to market and P/E 
ratios of my actual panel data. Then I regress my on by and er to estimate the 'true' coefficients. By 
multiplying every initial variable by a scale parameter new variables are being generated, which contain a 
multiplicative scale factor. Then I run a regression that includes these variables and one additional 
variable - the scale factor. Results from that regression are clearly different from those of the deflated 
regression (which are identical -by construction - to the initial scale-free regression). 
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Furthermore, in our settings (where intercept is modelled as a linear function of 
scale) there is de facto no need for inclusion of an additional scale variable. It is already 
subsumed in the intercept 'ao*s' of the undeflated model: 
(mv, *s) = ao *s+a, *(bv, *s)+a2 *(er *s)+a, *div, +r, 
However, as it has been illustrated in the above graph, running this model for a 
cross-section of firms with different size will produce spurious results. It is only 
deflation that purges the multiplicative scale effects. That is: 
(mv, *s)/s = ao *s/s+a, *(by, *s)/s+a2 *(e r *s)/s+a3* div, +ir, 
is the same as 
mv, =ao+a1*by, +a2*er, +a3*div, +u, 
where all variables are scale-deflated. 
Therefore I use deflation as the means of scale control, and to bring the regression 
to `unit-size' scale24. The choice of scaling factors is discussed in Section 3.4.5 
3.4.3 Scale-varying valuation parameters 
The finance literature suggests that cross-sectional variations in size may well 
explain differences in the firm's valuation. For example, Fama and French (1992) show 
that size helps explain a significant portion of the cross-sectional variation in stock 
returns. Furthermore, the existing empirical accounting literature that specifically 
utilises price-levels models (e. g., Easton and Sommers (2003), Marietta-Westberg and 
Sierra (2000)] suggests that regression-estimated valuation coefficients are not cross- 
sectional constants but can be scale-variant. 
24 As rightfully noted by Barth and Clinch (2001), deflation itself can induce spurious estimation effects if 
scale effects are not multiplicatively associated with all variables. However, the sample in this study is 
particularly diverse size-wise, which undoubtedly affects all firm-level accounting variables. 
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Tests presented in Chapter 4 (on consolidated analysis) provide some indication 
of the presence (in my sample) of scale-related non-linearity in estimated regression 
coefficients. Non-linearity means that the true coefficients are not cross-sectional 
constants, but vary with scale and scale is correlated with un-deflated explanatory 
variables25. In other words, coefficients are not linear but vary cross-sectionally. Failing 
to control for this effect might bias the regression-estimated coefficients relative to the 
cross-sectional mean of the true coefficients. Barth and Clinch (2001) argue that the 
only remedy for this type of scale effect is to permit the coefficients to differ for firms 
with different scale. Using simulation they show that when there is no scale effect or 
when the scale effect derives from scale-varying valuation parameters, the un-deflated 
market value of equity specification exhibits the least bias and mean squared error of the 
coefficients. 
It is easy to demonstrate analytically why simple deflation by a scale proxy is 
unlikely to remove the scale effect. The following hypothetical example illustrates the 
case. Assume that the market value of equity of two independent firms, which are 
identical in all respects, can be represented in terms of the following simple valuation 
model: 
mv, = ao + a, * bv, + a2 * er, + a3 * div, + u, 
In conditions with no scale-related non-linearity in valuation parameters, a firm, 
which is a simple amalgamation of the two firms, can be expected to have the following 
valuation: 
2*mv, =2*a,, +a, *(bvr*2)+a2*(err*2)+a, *div, +e, 
25 Here it is assumed that firm size is the main manifestation of scale, therefore terms `scale' and `size' 
are used interchangeably. Nevertheless, I recognise that scale might not necessarily only relate to size. 
For instance, true valuation coefficients may vary depending on other contextual variables, e. g. industries 
(i. e. industry becomes a scale proxy), or reflect differences in unrelated-to-size cross-sectional differences 
among firms. Given that my sample includes observations which are pooled over time for a cross-section 
of firms, the `time' might also be a scale factor. 
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Similarly, valuation of a generic firm, which differs from the above firms only in 
size by factor `s', is: 
(mv, *s)=a, 
) 
*s+a, *(bvv*s)+a2*(er *s)+a3*divv+i% 
where 's' is scale or size proxy. 
The intercept in the regression model for the `s'-size firm is a multiple of the 
factor `s' size and the unit-size intercept `ao'. This means that when the sample includes 
a cross section of firms with different size, the regression would have no constant 
(term) intercept. In other words, the intercept is the scale, but not a constant. 
It has been shown earlier that the use, in the regression, of a cross-section of firms 
with significant differences in size might induce spurious correlations between variables 
(producing biased estimates of coefficients), and heteroscedasticity in the error term 
(reducing the efficiency of estimated coefficients). If coefficients were not related to 
scale, deflation by scale factor would result in estimation of the underlying true scale- 
free model, i. e.: 
(mvv, *s)/s = (a0 *s)/s+a, *(bv, *s)/s+a2 *(err, *s)/s+a3* div, +2, 
or, simply, 
my, =ao+a, *bv, +a2*er+a3*div, +u, 
where the dependent and independent variables are scale-deflated. 
It is possible, however, that amalgamation of two otherwise identical firms, would 
produce some synergistic or other effects, causing the value of the larger firm to differ 
from the simple sum of individual values (value differential). Similarly, due to a number 
of factors identified in the literature, valuation of larger firms may differ from valuation 
of smaller firms. This implies that valuation coefficients might vary with scale. That is, 
for a firm of scale `s': 
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s*mvv+4, (s)=a,, (s)+a, (s)*[bv, *s]+a2(s)*[er, *s]+a3*div, +'r 
where 4, (s) is the scale-induced firm value differential; a; (s) is the function of 
coefficient a; on scale `s' 26. In the above model, the dependent variable includes two 
parts. The first term is what would have been the value of the dependent variable if only 
the multiplicative scale effect existed. The second term is the result of scale-induced 
non-linearity in the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 
To the extent that a multiplicative scale effect is present in the data, deflation 
purges such problems as spurious correlations and heteroscedasticity, but it will not 
remove scale-related non-linearity in coefficients unless a, (s) =a, = const. After 
scaling we have: 
(13) mv, +, ý(s)Is =ao(s)ls+a, (s)*bvr+aZ(s)*er+a3*div, +u, 
where mvt + 4r (s) /s= mvt is the deflated market value of equity. 
If one restricts coefficients in the above regression to constants, the resulting 
coefficient estimate will be the mean of the true coefficients if true coefficients vary 
across firms in a way that is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables27. However, as 
with any mean, extreme true coefficients can have a noticeable effect on the estimated 
coefficients in the model. 
Ideally, the estimation procedure of the above regression should allow 
coefficients to vary with scale. This entails designing a model that is non-linear in 
coefficients. In practical terms this task is almost unachievable, because it requires 
knowing the exact functional form of scale-variant coefficients a, (s), [i=0, n]. 
Furthermore, even if the `true' functional form was known, depending on the type of 
26 Although the dependent variable is presented as a sum of two terms, these terms are not separately 
observable. It is only the sum of the two which is observed and constitutes the market value of equity. 
27 In the context of the above scale-deflated model, there is no a priori conjecture predicting any specific 
association or relation between deflated variables and the scale-related coefficients. 
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that function, it might not be possible to reduce this function to a regression-usable 
form. However, to gain at least some empirical summary about the general direction in 
the relationship between a coefficient of interest and scale, one can use a simple linear 
function to model the coefficient, i. e.: 
a; (s)=a. 0+ aft s 
Substitution of these functions into (13) gives: 
p, = ao, o * (1 Is) + ao,, +a10 * bv, + a,,, * [s * 
bv, ]+ a2, o * er + a2,, * [s * er, ] + a,, o * div, + u, 
This model estimates the central tendency of the coefficient for each value driver 
and also provides indication about the expected direction of scale-related change in the 
coefficients. In this form the model simultaneously employs scale-deflated variables 
(mvt, by,, ert) and un-deflated variables (s*bvt, s*ert) variables. To avoid the biasing 
effect on the regression of spurious correlations between un-deflated variables, in the 
empirical tests only one coefficient of interest (e. g., the book value multiple) is 
modelled at a time. For instance, to control for non-linearity of earnings coefficient 
only, the following regression will be estimated: 
mvr = ao, o * (I/ s) + ao,, + a, * bvr + a2, o * err, + a2,, * [s * err ]+ as. o * divr + ur (14) 
Alternatively, one could partially control for non-linearity by categorising 
regression variables into scale-related intervals (e. g. size-based quintiles), and then add 
dummies and interaction terms for each of the interval. This procedure, as noted by Lo 
and Lys (2000), is not an effective solution because if scale affects the entire sample, 
then it will also be present in each partition. Additionally, this procedure would inflate 
the number of regression parameters, particularly during the segment-level analysis, 
producing unreliable results. 
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3.4.4 Heteroscedasticity 
Heteroscedastic regression error variances is another common form of scale effect 
present in data sets drawn from a cross-section of size-wise different firms. In empirical 
accounting literature, this problem is typically rectified by deflating regressions by a 
size proxy (Easton and Sommers (2003), Rees (1999), Barth and Clinch (2001), and 
others). For example, Rees (1999) suggests that when deflated by some measure of size, 
such as book value, the model is less likely to suffer from heteroscedasticity and from 
dependence between the error terms where the samples are pooled across cross-section 
and time-series. Different authors advocate the use of different variables as size proxies. 
Barth and Clinch (2001) suggest that when scale effects are associated either with 
omitted scale variables, related to external equity growth or initial investment, or with 
scale-related heteroscedasticity, the per-share deflation is the most effective of the 
alternative specifications. It can be argued, however, that per-share specification is 
unlikely to purge the scale effect, because the cross-section of firms is likely to include 
both penny stocks and stock with high value per share. In the section that follows I 
discuss the use of specific variables as scale-proxy. 
3.4.5 What is the 'best' scale proxy? 
Having examined the types of scale-related effects and their implications to 
valuation in cross-sectional settings, I have argued that scale-deflation and subsequent 
inclusion in the regression of an unscaled variable of interest is the most adequate 
treatment of scale in the settings of this study. Now the choice of specific variable(s) as 
scale proxy needs to be justified. 
There is no agreement in the literature as to what variable is the `best' deflator. A 
recent study by Akbar and Stark (2003) for UK-based firms, compared the effectiveness 
of deflation by alternative scale proxies: sales, number of shares, opening and closing 
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market value, and closing book value. They conclude that none of the deflators are 
entirely successful in eliminating scale effects. 
Current or lagged market or book value of equity, number of shares, group total 
assets or sales are among the frequently used size-proxies. Below I discuss theoretical 
and practical implications of using specific deflators. 
1. Number of shares: 
This deflator was employed in a number of studies [e. g. Barth et al., (1992), 
Kothari and Zimmerman (1996), Garrod and Rees (1998), and Hand and Landsman 
(1999)]. For example, Barth and Clinch (2001) find some evidence that when scale 
effects are associated either with omitted scale variables related to external equity 
growth or initial equity investment, or with heteroscadasticity related to book value of 
equity, the share-deflated price specification is most effective at mitigating scale effects 
on coefficient estimation. However, Brown, Lo and Lys (1999) rightfully argue that the 
use of per share values might not adequately remove scale effects as shares come in 
different sizes: some shares are very large, while others are as small as penny stock. 
Easton (1998) notes that the magnitude of share-deflated dependent variable reflects no 
more than the choice by management of the number of shares outstanding, which will 
also affect the scale of the per share measure of many firm attributes, so that a 
regression of share price on the firm attributes will lead to coefficients that may capture 
no more than the fact that all variables have the same scale. In their empirical tests of 
alternative deflators in the UK settings Akbar and Stark (2003) find that neither OLS 
nor WLS regression, with number of shares as the deflator, appear to be effective in 
removing scale effects or heteroscedasticity. 
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2. Closing market value of equity: 
Other authors argue in support of closing market value being the only 
theoretically justified deflator. Easton (1998) and Easton and Sommers (2003), for 
instance, argue that market value is more than just a possible scale proxy - rather it is 
scale. They define scale effect as the undue influence of firms with large market 
capitalisation and suggest that it should be considered as an appropriate deflator in 
price-levels regressions. Although Easton and Sommers's deflation appears to work in 
US data, Akbar and Stark (2003) replicate Easton and Sommers's tests for UK firms 
and conclude that market value is not superior, in comparison to other scale proxies, in 
reducing scale effects. 
On a notional level one can also suggest arguments for and against the market 
value being able to represent the `intrinsic' scale. Equity market value could have been 
the most desirable deflator as it is always positive (i. e., does not reduce the sample size 
due to only-positive values of the deflator) and, in efficient markets, is unaffected by the 
choice of accounting practices. There are, however, some problems as well. MV of 
equity is the stock market's assessment of the value of the capital contributed by 
ordinary shareholders plus the capitalised expected abnormal earnings perceived by the 
market. One might argue that from the investors' perspective, scale or size is the actual 
value of the capital base contributed by shareholders and used by the firm for its 
operations. It is the fair value of the firm's net assets (and, therefore, the true measure of 
scale). MV is the sum-total of this fair value and the perceived present value of future 
growth opportunities (PVGO). The larger the proportion of PVGO in the MV, the more 
MV will deviate from the true value of the capital initially contributed by 
shareholders28. Furthermore, when the dependent variable in the un-deflated basic 
28 For instance, goodwill resulting from acquisitions - an example of PVGO - often accounts for a 
substantial portion of MV. 
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model is MV, deflation by MV results in a constant value (unity) of the dependent 
variable of the regression. 
In addition, an error-in-variable, induced to the extent that on the measurement 
date MV will deviate from the intrinsic value of a firm (either because of stock price 
random fluctuation or more persistent market mis-pricing), will introduce noise to the 
deflated dependent and independent variables. While MV can be very volatile in the 
short-term, the `intrinsic' size of the firms can hardly fluctuate at such a rate. This error 
in variable problem substantially undermines, in my opinion, the role of market value as 
the theoretically unequivocal scale proxy. 
3. Opening market value: 
As an alternative, one could use the beginning of period mv. This deflator is used, 
for example, by Christie (1987), Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) and Lo and Lys 
(2000). Deflation by this variable has all the deficiencies as deflation by current period 
mv. For instance, the distortion associated with MV capturing the effect of PVGO 
would still exist. In addition, this would reduce the sample size because the observations 
related to the first year of the sample period would be lost. 
Furthermore, deflation by the lagged market value produces, in fact, a return 
model. In other words, the independent variables will now be explaining the cross- 
sectional variation in market returns, rather than cross-sectional variation in market 
value. And this, as has been discussed in Chapter 2, is a different research question. 
4. Opening book value: 
The beginning-of-period by could have been the most theoretically justified 
deflator in the context of this study, as it is associated with initial capital contributed to 
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the firm by its ordinary shareholders (owners). At the time of the inception of the firm, 
the beginning by would reflect the fair value of net assets acquired, regardless of 
accounting methods used. If all firms in the sample had the same inception date, then by 
deflating the end-of-period accounting data by the beginning-of-period by would fully 
control for cross-sectional variation of the initially contributed equity capital. The 
following period's beginning-of-the-period BV will then serve as the deflator for the 
following year's end-of-period data. However, this is the point when distortions begin. 
Unless the entire cross-section of firms adheres to mark-to-market accounting (for all 
future periods), the next period's beginning-of-period by could no longer be expected to 
reflect the fair value of total capital contribution associated with ordinary shareholders. 
Therefore, by continuing to use this measure as a deflator, one can no longer guarantee 
that the scale factor is controlled for. It could, perhaps, have still been a suitable deflator 
if all firms had used other than mark-to-market yet identical accounting methods29. 
However, because firms exercise considerable discretion in selecting appropriate 
accounting practices, the distortion of by from the fair value is likely to vary 
substantially in the cross-section of firms. The age difference of firms could also have 
its role in diminishing the suitability of by as deflator. Of two firms that adhere to the 
historical cost method, the BV of the younger firm is likely to be closer to its fair value. 
Beginning-of-period by could have been appropriate if the sample firms were all 
of the same age, operated in a non-inflationary economy, and used mark-to-market or, at 
least, identical accounting methods. My panel data, however, spans over more than a 
decade, and covers firms of different age, operating in different sectors of the economy. 
Another complication in using lagged by as deflator is that by may often assume 
negative values. Deflation by negative values is meaningless and those cases would 
need to be eliminated from the sample. Additionally, the data requirement for the 
29 This would not safeguard against bias, but at least the bias would be identical for all firms in the 
sample. 
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availability and positive sign of the beginning-of-period by reduces the sample by about 
16%, and is fraught with inducing self-selection bias to the extent that deleted firm- 
years are qualitatively different from the rest of the sample. Sample reduction is highly 
undesirable given the a priori relatively small segment-disclosing firm-year sample. 
5. Closing book value: 
Although most of the points made above are also relevant to current period BV as 
deflator, this measure is a popular scale factor used in the literature [e. g., Green et al., 
(1996), Easton (1998), Stark and Thomas (1998), Danbolt and Rees (2002)]. Easton 
(1998) note, for example, that since the ratios of market to book value are not affected 
by management's choice of the number of shares outstanding, the inferences from a 
regression where price-to-book is the dependent variable will not be due to spurious 
scale effects. He also suggests that the inferences might be affected by the inclusion of 
book value in the denominator of the dependent and independent variables, but this 
effect can be removed by including the inverse of book value as another explanatory 
variable 30 . 
Theoretically, this deflator is specifically relevant if one follows Ohlson's 
framework, where book value of equity is the perceived volume of shareholders' 
investment base. One of the possible arguments against the use of book value might be 
the substantial difference (which are reported in Chapter 4) in book value-deflated 
variables and regression parameters across different industries. Another technical 
limitation of this deflator is the requirement for the closing book value to be positive. 
This reduces my sample by about 4%. Finally, should scale encapsulate the notion of 
firm size, by of equity (either lagged or contemporaneous) is no longer a better scale 
proxy than other firm-level size proxies. 
30 In fact, this is exactly what I do in relation to the scale-proxy(ies) used in this study. 
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6. Total Assets: 
A substantial portion of capital that the firm uses to generate positive returns for 
ordinary shareholders might come from the incurred liabilities. Although debt financing 
is not a contribution of shareholders, the profits or losses in excess of interest payments 
flow to shareholders (leverage effect) and/or impact on the equity book value. 
Therefore, some size effects may be attributable to or originate from differences in the 
level of debt. Previously discussed size proxies ignore debt-induced differences in scale. 
In contrast to BV and MV, Total Assets (TA) reflects the entire capital (liabilities 
plus equity) invested in the firm. On a positive side is the fact that TA encapsulates the 
book value of equity and, has no negative values, which saves data points. On the 
negative side, one may argue that ratios of book value or earnings to total assets (i. e., 
TA-deflated variables) might be affected by the economic sector of the firm. 
7. Sales: 
Sales has also been used in some studies as firm-size proxy [e. g., Hirshey (1985), 
Barth and Clinch (1998)]. It could be argued that because group sales is an `outgrowth' 
of all sources of the firm's capital (i. e., is generated by employing the firm's entire asset 
base) sales mighty proxy for firm size. Sales-deflation expresses all variables as ratio, 
hence removes the `per share' effect. As is the case with other scale factors, the sales- 
deflator has its shortcomings. Easton (1998), for instance, notes that both the sales- 
deflated variables and the regression parameters might be affected by such factor as the 
industrial affiliation of the firm. 
Sales and TA might proxy for size, yet as any accounting number, both TA and 
Sales can be distorted. Nevertheless, these measures create less econometric problems 
and do not require elimination of observations. Due to the fact that total assets is more 
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highly correlated with other measures of size (i. e., BV and MV) than sales, I choose TA 
as the primary deflator for tests carried out in Chapter 4 31 
However, due to the lack of consensus on the issue of scaling in market based 
accounting literature, I perform crosschecks for sensitivity/robustness of the empirical 
results by using alternative scale proxies (total assets, group sales, one year lagged 
equity market value, and a composite scale deflator). 
3.5. EXTENDING THE MODEL FOR SEGMENT-LEVEL ANALYSIS 
Having developed the basic valuation model, it now has to be expanded for the 
segment-level use. As was noted before, of two identical firms, the one that has higher 
capitalised expected earnings will have higher market value. That is, in the basic 
valuation model, relative valuation of two firms is determined by comparing their 
capitalised expected earnings that proxy for the abnormal earnings32. One can follow 
this line of reasoning to compare valuations of two constituent segments of one firm. 
More specifically, one can consider the firm to be the sum-total of its constituent 
reported (domestic and foreign) geographical segments. Hence, the value of the entire 
firm might be thought of as the sum of values contributed or associated with each of its 
specific segments. 
The notion of the value contribution of a segment to the market value of the entire 
firm requires some clarification. Two otherwise identical segments representing, say, 
different geographical regions or lines-of-business might be perceived by the market to 
have different relative capitalised abnormal earnings if these segments are believed to 
have different performance prospects. It is logical to assume that investors would attach 
a higher value to the segment which is associated with higher growth opportunities, 
31 For few observations the sales figure is missing, therefore the sales-deflated sample would be slightly 
smaller. 
32 Recall that the capitalized book values proxy for normal earnings and the base-value of firms. 
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profitability, lower risk and, in case of geographic segments, with favourable changes in 
the future exchange rates. Because of the above factors, the market might perceive 
different segments to create/contribute to the firm different values, in relative terms. 
This notion of different relative value contributions of segments is demonstrated below 
in analytical terms. 
Starting from the EBO model, one can disaggregate the firm-level abnormal 
earnings component into the segment-level constituents: 
Pr = bvr + 
Et [ert+r -r* byr+r-1 ] 
r=, [1+r]r 
=> 
n -o Er [er, - rr * bvr+, a, r ] pt = bvr + 2: 2: z ; =I : =l 
[1 + rt ] 
where subscript i indicates segment. 
The above representation highlights the conjecture that any divergence of market 
value of equity from its book value reflects the capitalised abnormal earnings of the 
firm's constituent segments. Similar to the firm-level construct, a segment's capitalised 
abnormal earnings is the difference between the present value of the stream of the 
segment's future expected earnings and the present value of future required 
earnings. 
Two points of clarification are in order. First, in accounting terms, the sum of 
segments' earnings or book values will always equal their consolidated counterparts. 
This is because all disaggregated numbers are associated with specific geographic or 
industrial segments, or `instrumental' segments. An instrumental segment is, 
effectively, a balancing item, which might cover inter-segment operations, or a 
geographically or industry-wise unidentified segment. Instrumental segments shall be 
included in the segment-level model to maintain its equivalence with the consolidated 
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model. However, in empirical tests, conclusions will be drawn on and concern only the 
valuation properties of specific geographical or business segments. 
Second, some might put forward an argument that in economic terms the total 
may not equal the simple sum of this total's constituent parts. That is, agglomeration 
may be associated with non-zero synergies. This problem, however, does not arise in 
our settings. The notion of abnormal earnings associated with a specific segment is not 
used in the sense as if that segment was in itself a stand-alone independent firm. In our 
settings the abnormal earnings of each segment encapsulates its share in the total 
synergy resulting from uniting different segments under one firm's umbrella. In other 
words, our construct implies that the non-zero synergies are `allocated' to all segments, 
therefore segments' abnormal earnings reflect their `post-synergy' contributions to the 
value of the entire firm. It is important to emphasise that this study is not trying to 
`evaluate' a specific segment on a stand-alone basis, or what would have been the 
segment's implied valuation compared to a comparable single-segment firm. Rather, the 
focus here is on relative valuation associated with a specific segment when it already 
constitutes an integral part of a larger economic entity, the firm. 
Separating capitalised segmental earnings from the required earnings will give: 
Pr = bv, + 2: 2: 
Ef [er, ] 
-G. 2: 
Er [rj * bvr+f-1 ] 
T 1f 1=I T=1 [I+ r; 
] 
1=1 T=I [1 + rt ] 
(is) 
where the first (second) bracket represents the present value of future earnings (required 
earnings) for segment i, (i =1, n). 
The above analytical model can easily be operationalised into a regression form in 
the same way as it was done with the firm-level model. That is, by applying to segment- 
level earnings and book values either Ohlson's framework or Rees's assumptions, the 
104 
above model can be reduced to a single period linear equity valuation model. The 
former approach implies: 
p1 = (1- k; )bvr, t + k; (pi * er,, t - kd 1+ 
52 v1 
t=t . =t 
and the latter approach results in: 
n, rt 
n, 1+ gERr 
Pt = bvrr 1- +ert, r 
r rt - gev, r r rt - SER, r 
(16) 
(17) 
where subscript "i" denotes the i`h segment, and 'n' is the number of disclosed 
segment by the firm in time t. 
A virtually identical operationalisation that allows testing the valuation of 
segments can be obtained by using Wysocki's (1998) model of firm value. Using a set 
of initial assumptions, he expresses the value of the firm as a function of earnings and 
managerial operating decisions33: 
Pr = 
(Max[en, 
r 
/(r - gER, t ), A;,, ]) 
(18) 
where all subscripts are as before; er;,, /(r - gER,; ) is the (market) value of segment i, if 
the management exercises future expansion options; A;, 1 is the value of segment i, if the 
management `adapts' the segment to an alternative use3a 
Wysocki's model suggests that the profit-maximising manager will continue to 
operate segment i and exercise all future expansion options if the expansion value of 
segment i exceeds its current adaptation value (i. e., er;,, /(r - gER, J) >A;, t). This 
implies 
33 The assumptions are: the firm is comprised of N independent segments; the firm's manager maximises 
total firm value; the manager has the flexibility to adapt or expand each segment; segment i earnings, er,,, 
follow a random walk with drift, gEa i, per period if the manager optimally exercises future expansion 
options; the adaptation value of segment i, A;, 1, follows a random walk. 3 Adaptation encompasses any real operating decision that changes the current use of an asset to a 
superior alternate use. 
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that for relatively high levels of current earnings from segment i, the association 
coefficient between firm value and segment i earnings will approach 1/(r - gER. r)" If 
er, 1 
/(r - gER,; ) <A1, t, then the adaptation value of segment i exceeds its expansion value. 
If the book value of the firm (or segments) proxies for the firm's (or segment's) 
adaptation/abandonment value (i. e., A;, t=bv;, t) then the value of a firm can be presented 
as a weighed-average of the two options, expansion and adaptation35. For firm-level 
book value and earnings this implies: 
Pt =w*bvt+((1-w) ert 
\r gER) 
or, when values are disaggregated into segmental counterparts: 
ný n1_ li)ý 
*1 
Pe =ý bvr, r w, + err ; 
;; ri - öER,; 
(19) 
(20) 
where co and w; (0 5 co, w; 51) is the probability that the management will 
exercise the adaptation option to the entire firm or segment i. 
This operationalisation, which draws on Wysocki's simple model, is virtually 
identical to the previously examined operationalisations that use Ohlosn's and Rees's 
frameworks. 
The above three operationalisations [equations (16), (17) and (20)] imply that 
all parameters k, gyp, r, g,, gb, co attached to segment-level variables bv; and er, can 
vary across specific geographical and industrial segments, but remain constant 
within the cross-section of different firms and over time. 
In Rees's setting the earnings multiplier for segment i is determined by that 
segment's earnings growth rate (ge,, f) and discount rate (ri); in Ohloon's setting the 
segmental earnings multiplier is determined by the segment's parameters k,, and (pi.; in 
ss The weigh(s) reflect(s) the market's perception of the probability that the management will exercise 
either an expansion of adaptation option with regards to the firm's total assets or specific segment(s). 
106 
Wysocki's approach the segment's earnings coefficient is determined by that segment's 
earnings growth rate (ge,, i) and discount rate (r) and expansion option probability (CO). 
In summary, if across its various segments a firm has different relative growth 
options, degrees of earnings persistence and capitalisation rates, then earnings from 
these segments should be valued differently, contributing positively or negatively to the 
value of a firm. 
In the above tree operationalisations, both earnings and book values are supposed 
to be disaggregated into their segmental counterparts. In this study, however, I argue 
that disaggregation of consolidated book values is unnecessary and impractical. 
There are three practical problems that make book value disaggregation 
impractical. 
First of all, book values are not (and cannot be) reported by firms on segmental 
level. Segmental book value cannot be defined in most real-life cases, because even the 
firm's management is unlikely to be able to determine in what proportion a specific 
segment's total assets are financed through equity vs. liabilities. Garrod and Rees 
(1998), however, disaggregate firm-level book value, but replace the model-required 
segment-level book values with segmental net assets. From the definition (or, more 
precisely, lack of precise definition) of segmental net assets in SSAP 25, it is obvious 
that segmental net assets, as an accounting item, is qualitatively different from that 
required by the theoretical model. Discretionary allocation of long and short-term 
liabilities, minority interests and contributions of non-ordinary equity shareholders to 
specific segments distort what would have been the `true' segmental book values. This 
allocation works in a straightforward way at the consolidated level, where the firm's net 
assets are simply the difference between total assets and long and short-term liabilities. 
If the requirement of accounting standards were such that the firm's liabilities had to be 
allocated to segments on a pro-rata basis to their total assets, disaggregation would then 
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make sense. However, financial statements liabilities are not reported with regards to 
specific segments. In the vast majority of firms' financial reports, it is impossible to 
identify or establish a relationship between reported segmental net assets and segmental 
total assets by studying financial statements. Furthermore, even when there is some 
degree of consistency in the definition of segmental net assets in one firm, the 
idiosyncrasy of what constitutes segmental net assets will necessarily arise in a sample 
that represents a cross-section of firms with very different characteristics. 
Arguments similar to those offered above are also put forward by Wysocki 
(1998). He notes that a direct test of value relevance of segment-level book values is not 
possible because firms typically do not report liabilities for business segment, reflecting 
the fact that assigning specific liabilities to a segment may be difficult and does not 
reflect current reporting standards and practices 
36 
Secondly, even when segmental net assets are accepted as proxies for book 
values, in practice firms report this item less frequently than the segmental earnings. 
This would reduce the sample by approximately 12%. 
Thirdly, because segmental earnings and net assets appear to be strongly 
correlated (possibly due to uncontrollable segment-level scale effect) the regression 
results are likely to be biased due to multicollinearity37. 
It can further be argued that disaggregation of the book value is also unnecessary 
from an economic perspective. 
The third term in equation (15) represents the sum of present values of all future 
required earnings from all segments. Book value of equity is the accounting 
36 Because the direct valuation of segmental book values is impossible, Wysocki hypothesises a 
directional relationship that might exist between the valuation of consolidated book value and 
performance of segments. He suggests that: the value relevance of total book value of equity should be 
increasing in the likelihood that a number of segment adaptation options (i. e., any real operating decision 
that changes the current use of an asset to a superior alternate use) will be exercised. 
37 The relevant descriptive statistics and the regression results of alternative model specifications are 
reported in chapters 5 and 6. 
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representation of the actual capital invested by owners of the firm during the entire life 
of the firm. Hence, investors would expect these assets to earn some required 
accounting rate of return or, in absolute terms, required earnings. It is a fact that 
investors, in general, have some expectations with regards to `required' returns on their 
investment in a firm's equity capital, which should be commensurate with the perceived 
riskiness of the entire firm. Because equity investors commit their funds to the entire 
firm, rather than to a specific project/unit within the firm, it is logical to assume that it is 
the `required' earnings of the entire firm that matters to investors. When investing into 
the equity of a multy-segment firm, investors, in fact, buy a `portfolio' of different 
geographical and/or industrial assets/segments which comprise the firm. If one takes the 
view that equity investors act in spirit of the Markowitz mean-variance portfolio 
selection, then it is the risk-(required)retum characteristics of this entire `portfolio' (i. e., 
return which is relevant to firm-level `systematic'/'undiversifiable' risk) rather than the 
risk-(required)return characteristics of particular segments comprising the `portfolio' 
(i. e., return which would also compensate for segment-specific yet within-firm- 
diversifiable risks) that matters to investors. 
This argument holds even if one refutes the mean-variance portfolio selection 
argument. Had the investor invested directly into the net asset base of a specific 
segment, and had her profits been tied up exclusively to the earnings generated from 
that particular segment, then she might have expected a specific required rate of return 
on these segmental assets. However, the decision on the geographical allocation of real 
assets is internal to the firm and reflects the discretion of its management. 
Furthermore, the nature of assets might differ across different reported segments. 
Depending on the geographic allocation and lines-of-business of firm's operations, the 
composition of the firm's real assets will vary across geographic segments (assuming 
that different activities would require deployment of different asset classes). For 
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example, a car manufacturer may position its R&D unit (and the assets attached to 
R&D) in country A, component manufacturing units (and the relevant assets) in country 
B, assembly lines in country C, etc. At the same time the company may sell cars (and 
report segmental profits) in all of these geographic locations. Thus, if one mechanically 
infers that profits from the segment "A" are attributable to the net assets employed in 
that geographic location (but in fact these assets do not relate to these segmental profits) 
when attempting to compute the abnormal earnings using the segment-level model, the 
results would be misleading. These assets may reflect different organisational functions 
and market analysts might not be able to "apply" the notion of required earnings in 
relation to these segmental assets. Hence, it is sensible to assume that investors would 
mainly be considering the required earnings for the net asset base of the entire firm. 
Even in the ideal case when the structure of assets maintained in different geographic 
segments is identical (this may be the case, for example, in the retail sector firms that 
operate similar stores in different regions), the management's discretion in allocating 
firm's liabilities might make segmental net assets figures meaningless. 
Therefore, in contrast to the approach taken by Garrod and Rees (1998), 1 do not 
disaggregate the consolidated book value. 
Therefore, by appending equations (16) and (17) with the adjustments discussed 
in Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, the following operationalised segment-level model can be 
derived: 
mv, l sr = ao, o *(I / s) + ao,, +a,,,, *(bv, l s, ) + a,,, *[s, * (bv, /s1)]+ 
nn 
+a20 t* (err, t / st 
)+Z a2, l, r 
* [Sr *(er, / Sl )] +b*Z+u, 
i=l ; _I 
(21) 
It should be mentioned that similar models have already been applied in segment 
valuation literature. Wysocki (1998) employs essentially the same segment-level 
earnings disaggregation approach, but without proper control for scale and scale-related 
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nonlinearities, dividends and other contextual variables. Garrod and Rees (1998) 
disaggregate earnings and, additionally, the book values (which, I argue, is impractical 
and unnecessary), yet do not control properly for scale and scale-related nonlinearities, 
and other value affecting contexts. 
The section that follows provides further particulars regarding the expected 
sign(s) and magnitude of coefficients of interest in model (21), their variation depending 
on contexts, as well as properties of some variables of interest. 
3.6 INTERPRETATION OF COEFFICIENTS, INFERENCES AND 
HYPOTHESES 
Having outlined the theoretical valuation framework and the subsequent 
operationalised version of the model for both consolidated and segment-level analysis, 
in this section I explain the economic meaning of the models' coefficients, hypothesise 
on their magnitude, sign, interactions and context-specific variations. A concise review 
of expectations/hypotheses regarding the model's coefficients is presented in the 
sections that follow. 
3.6.1 The intercept 
The literature is terse in theorising the role of an intercept and why it should (not) 
be included in the deflated or undeflated regression models of market value on 
accounting variables. I argue that in its undeflated form the model has to be estimated 
with an intercept. Theoretically, an un-deflated model shall be estimated without 
intercept (i. e., intercept is strictly zero) if the following three conditions hold 
simultaneously: 
1. the RIV model is a reliable and unbiased tool for deriving the `intrinsic' value 
of the firm; 
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2. there is no mispricing or the market is informationally semi-strong efficient; 
and 
3. the simple price-levels regression is a legitimate statistical 
counterpart/representation of a rather complex theoretical RIV model. 
Only if all of the above conditions are met will there be no apparent role for a 
non-zero average unexplained cross-sectional variation in market capitalisation in the 
basic un-deflated model. Although the analytical RIV model leaves no role to be played 
by the intercept, a regression-estimated value of the intercept (if statistically different 
from zero) would reflect possible misspecifications existing in the theoretical model 
and/or the market's mispricing. Inclusion of an intercept will at least partially mitigate 
the consequences of violation of the above three conditions. Furthermore, if the un- 
deflated model is to reflect the reality closer, then even in its theoretical form the 
intercept is unlikely to be zero. For example, even when the non-dividend paying firm's 
book value of equity drops to near-to-zero levels or (in some unusual circumstances) 
becomes negative, and, at the same time, the current period's reported net income is 
near-to-zero, the firm would still be trading at above-zero price. In fact, the market 
capitalisation of the firm may still be relatively high if the current period's reported 
`near-to-zero' BV and earnings are perceived to be transitory, and the market expects 
them to improve/reverse in future periods. In other words, the theory must permit an 
average effect that is not explained by a linear combination of the chosen financial 
statement data. 
Furthermore, in Section 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 it has been argued that a non-zero 
intercept is unlikely to be constant across firms of different scale. Therefore the 
intercept has been modelled as a simple linear function of scale. Effectively, this means 
including an intercept and a reciprocal of the scale variable in the deflated model. The 
estimated coefficient on the inverse of the deflator should be interpreted as the estimate 
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of the `constant' portion of a scale-related linearly modelled intercept in the un-deflated 
regression. 
A point of interest in the deflated regression will be the level of statistical 
significance of the coefficient on the deflator's reciprocal, and the sign of the intercept: 
(1) a positive (negative) sign of this intercept would indicate that the intercept in the un- 
deflated model is not a size-unrelated cross-sectional constant, but is positively 
(negatively) correlated with the size of the firm; and (2) a statistically significant 
coefficient of a deflator's reciprocal would suggest that in the undeflated model there is 
a non-zero average effect that is not explained by the chosen value drivers. 
For the completeness of the analysis of the intercept, one potential difficulty is 
worth mentioning. When the intercept in the undeflated model is modelled as a linear 
function of scale, a variable that is selected to proxy for scale might simultaneously be 
an additional value driver in its own right. In this situation it would be virtually 
impossible to disentangle its role as an indicator of scale vs. an additional valid value 
driver. If, for instance, one believes that total assets belong in the un-deflated model as 
an additional value driver and also the same variable has to be a scale proxy, then the 
value of the intercept in the total assets-deflated regression would produce a `blended 
estimate' of the un-deflated model's two theoretically separate coefficients on: (i) total 
assets variable being an additional value driver; and (ii) total assets in a linearly 
modelled intercept. On the other hand, if total assets do not belong in the un-deflated 
model as a legitimate value driver, the value of an intercept in the deflated regression 
would only relate to a linearly modelled intercept in the original un-deflated model. 
However, to the best of my knowledge, such variables as group sales or total assets have 
not been considered by the literature as important value drivers even on a theoretical 
level. Therefore, in the empirical analysis chapters I will not be interpreting the 
intercept as being a `blended estimate'. 
113 
3.6.2 The book value coefficient 
Because this coefficient is an estimate of the first bracket in equations (6) and 
(9.1), its theoretical value has a limit of unity. Theoretically, its lowest value depends on 
what framework is used to operationalise the model. If we follow Ohlson's line in 
operationalising the model, then this coefficient has the lower limit of zero. This reflects 
the theorisation that book value enters the model twice: first, on a stand-alone basis, 
being the proxy for the base value and, second, in a capitalised form, being a proxy for 
the required/normal returns. When Rees's framework of hypothesis is taken, the book 
value coefficient still reflects the dual role of the book value38. Contrary to Ohlson's 
approach, however, here this coefficient might assume a negative value. From the 
theoretical model, it will only have a positive value when the assumed long-term book 
value growth rate is negative or exceeds the cost of capital `r'. For economically 
sensible book value growth rates (i. e., gBv < r) the theoretically expected book value 
coefficient is negative [see equation (9.1)]. A negative sign of the book value 
coefficient, when regressed on market value, is rather contraintuitive. 
In the empirical tests, I expect to find a significant association of book value with 
market value, which would be suggestive of book value being a major value driver. The 
sign of this coefficient is expected to be positive and, normally, have a value below 
unity. Consistently downwards biased book values might result in book value 
coefficient to exceed the upper limit of unity' 9. 
3.6.3 Firm-level and segmental earnings coefficients 
Earnings coefficients are of central importance to this research because valuation 
differences associated with segments are inferred from differences between valuation 
38 This is because both approaches originate from the residual income valuation model. 
39 Proof of this is available from the author. 
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multiples associated with earnings from specific segments. In all examined 
operationalisations (i. e., Ohlson's, Rees's and Wysocki's valuation frameworks), the 
earnings coefficient has an expected positive value. Because the operationalisation used 
in this study equally well reflects all three frameworks, the regression-estimated 
earnings coefficients would, to some extent, subsume factors that determine theoretical 
coefficients in all three frameworks. 
Thus, the firm-level earnings multiple will `summarise' investors perceptions 
regarding the following factors: the level of persistence of earnings, the discount rate 
(risk-adjusted cost of capital), and the expected long-term earnings growth rate. 
Similarly, the actual value of the coefficient on earnings from a specific segment, e. g., 
the `America' geographic segment, would be a summary measure of investors' 
perception about the persistence of earnings reported from the `America' segment, risks 
attached to this segment and reflected in the discount rate, and the expected long-term 
rate of growth of `American' earnings. In other words, the earnings valuation coefficient 
is the capitalisation rate attached by the market to current period earnings from a 
specific segment, which summarises investors' perceptions regarding the firm/segment 
long-term growth rate, required rate of return and degree of earnings persistence. It is 
this overall assessment of the earnings capitalisation rate that is of key interest in this 
study, as it allows comparison of value contributions associated with specific segments. 
The issue of what factors are responsible for identified differences between segments' 
earnings multiples is of secondary importance and is addressed by further appending the 
model by additional signalling variables. 
Another important issue is the stability of earnings coefficients. The existing 
literature [e. g., Hayn (1995), Basu (1997), Barth, et al., (1998), Collins et al., (1999) 
and others] demonstrates that the capitalisation of earnings (i. e., earnings coefficients) is 
a function of the sign of reported earnings (i. e., profits vs. losses), and/or normality 
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(abnormality) of earnings. In these and other empirical studies, the coefficient on 
negative (or abnormally high/low) earnings is usually found to be much smaller in 
absolute terms and often statistically not significant. A transitory quality of losses (or 
unusual level of reported earnings) is put forward as a common interpretation for this 
finding. Whatever is the explanation, it is a well-documented fact that the sign of 
earnings affects the way the market perceives and capitalises earnings into the share 
price40. Results presented in the empirical Chapters 4 through 6 confirm the existence, 
in my data set, of this sign-related effect for both firm and segment-level earnings. 
These results also provide further context-related particulars with reference to valuation 
of negative earnings and general regression properties. 
3.6.4 Coefficient on dividends 
It has been argued, in Section 3.3.1, that dividends needs to be added in the model 
as an additional value driver. What can be expected from the valuation of dividends is 
less obvious than is the case with book value and earnings. From the Modigliani and 
Miller's (1958) dividend displacement theory, it follows that the payment of dividends 
shall be negatively related to the value of the firm and replace the firm value on a 
pound-for-pound basis. This theory would predict a negative coefficient on dividends in 
our operationalised model. In Ohlson's theoretical framework, dividends closely reflect 
the dividend displacement theory and enter the model with a negative coefficient. 
However, extensive accounting literature both in the UK and the US (with test design 
similar to the one employed here) tend to find a positive valuation role for dividends, 
and put forward various rationalisations for such results. As this issue and the 
expectations regarding the role of dividends in the valuation model employed in this 
study has already been analysed, it suffice to note that dividends coefficient is expected 
40 The economics of this effect is outside the scope or current research. 
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to have a positive sign. Having said that, the value of the dividends coefficient is 
expected to vary, being affected by such contexts as: loss vs. profit firms; segment- 
disclosing vs. non-disclosing firms; firms of different industrial affiliation; and different 
time periods (macroeconomic growth vs. stagnation). Results reported in the empirical 
chapters confirm this expected sensitivity of dividends valuation to be substantially 
contextual. 
3.7. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The aim of this chapter has been to discuss and justify the choice of specific 
methodological approaches, which underpin the test design(s) employed in the 
empirical Chapters 4 through 6. Specifically, the chapter demonstrates how the RN 
model can be adapted to allow both firm-level and segment-level analysis. The chapter 
also discussed the problems and the choices made to resolve them, associated with 
scaling and choice of size-proxy when utilising price-level data for cross-sectional 
sample estimates. The chapter also examined some of the important properties of the 
developed valuation framework and hypothesises regarding the expected links between 
the market value of equity and the value drivers of interest. 
CHAPTER 4 
CONSOLIDATED FIRM-LEVEL ANALYSIS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the general valuation properties of the 
operationalised valuation model, introduced in Chapter 3, by using the firm-level data. 
Among the main objectives of this chapter is to identify exogenous and endogenous 
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factors that significantly influence firm-level valuation inferences. These factors will 
constitute the `contexts', which are necessary to control for in the subsequent segment- 
level empirical analysis chapters. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the process of data 
collection, explains variables used in the analysis, examines the data and sample's 
properties and reports the descriptive statistics. Section 4.3 reports the firm-level 
regressions, carries out the empirical investigation of the contexts/factors that impact on 
the firm-level valuation results, and analyses the obtained results. Section 4.4 provides 
further empirical testing of the sensitivity of the results to such potentially influential 
factors as the use of an alternative deflator, or the definition and treatment of the 
extreme observations. Section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2 DATA, VARIABLES, SAMPLES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.2.1 Data collection and variables 
This section provides details on data sources, data selection methodology, types of 
data and variables selected for performing the firm-level analysis, and relevant 
descriptive statistics. 
The data is collected from the Extel Financial Company Analysis service, unless 
otherwise specified. I select all UK based, non-financial, `dead' and `live' quoted 
companies with annual financial statement and market data available from the Extel 
database. In Extel this information is available beginning from year 1986. The initial 
sample covers the period from January 1986 to November 2002 (date of data 
collection). 
The reason for selecting Extel Financial Company Analysis as the primary source 
of data is because it is the only database available to me that provides segment-level 
financial statement data for UK multi-segment firms. 
118 
In the process of data collection, the following Extel company selection criteria 
have been used: 
Country: UK 
Currency: Pound Sterling (amounts are expressed in thousands) 
Industry (according to FTSE Global Classification System): 
1. Resources 
2. Basic Industries 
3. General Industries 
4. Cyclical Consumer Goods 
5. Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
6. Cyclical Services 
7. Non-Cyclical Services 
8. Utilities 
9. Information Technology 
Status: not selected (i. e., all live and dead firms are selected) 
Data/variables requested: see Appendix 4.1 
Classification of companies into specific economic sectors (industries) can be 
done on the basis of different systems of industrial classification. The definitions of 
industries and economic sectors of business activities vary depending on the choice of 
industry classification system. Although some big investment houses (e. g., Merrill 
Lynch) use their - own systems of industrial classification, the FTSE Global 
Classification System (FTSE) and the US Standard Industrial Classification System 
(SIC) are perhaps the dominant systems in the UK. There are significant structural 
differences between these two systems (this issue is analysed in more details in Chapter 
6). 
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Because of these differences, non-selection of firms classified as financials by 
the FTSE system does not guarantee non-selection of firms which would be classified as 
financials by the SIC system. I use the FTSE system as the basis for selecting firms 
from Extel. 
During the sample period some firms changed their principal industrial 
affiliation. For this reason some financial firm-years appear in the initial sample. In the 
empirical analysis, when necessary, these observations are eliminated. 
As of the date of final data collection (01.11.2002) there were 3,615 (live and 
dead) companies meeting the above selection criteria. Corresponding to these firms 
there are 35,214 firm-year observations. This means that in this initial sample, on 
average, 9.7 years of financial statements are available per company in the Extel 
database. 
To minimise losses in data points, where possible, the missing value of equity 
market capitalisation has been imputed by multiplying the share price at the balance 
sheet date and the number of ordinary shares outstanding. However, some 15,906 firm- 
year observations have been deleted due to missing market capitalisation data. I also 
delete observations with missing values for book value of ordinary equity (ordinary 
shareholders' equity) and firm-level profit before tax. With respect to other variables of 
interest, where possible, the missing values are retrieved from other sections of the 
Extel database'. At this stage, I do not impose additional segmental data availability 
restrictions on this initial sample because segment-level information is not used for the 
consolidated-level analysis of this chapter. 
Extremely thinly-trading and non-trading firm-years are also identified and 
deleted from the sample. The firm is identified as non-trading if in two or more 
For example, Sales are reported both in Extel's "Segmental Analysis" and "Earnings" sections. When 
the value is missing from "Segmental Analysis" it may sometimes be found in the "Earnings" section. In 
total there are 28 such cases. The same applies to PBT, as this component can also be found in two 
different data sections of Extel. 
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consecutive years it reports identical market value of equity, or there is no change in the 
share price and number of shares for two consecutive years. 
The above eliminations reduce the number of firms in the sample to 2,390 and 
number of corresponding firm-year observations to 19,213. That is, on average, 8 years 
of financial statement data is available per company. 
4.2.2 Industrial and yearly sample characteristics 
As a starting point for the empirical analysis it is important to explore yearly and 
industrial characteristics of the initial sample. The Extel database reports the economic 
sector affiliation of firms based on both FTSE Global classification system and the 
Standard Industrial Classification system. It is, a priory, unknown which of these two 
systems of categorisation of a firm's industrial affiliation more adequately reflects the 
principal area of the firm's operations. More importantly, though, is to know which of 
these two systems are being commonly used in the UK by the investment community 
(i. e., informed investors, market analysts, fund managers, etc. ) to relate a firm's 
activities/performance to its peer group. It is likely that different members of the 
investment community use different classification systems. Furthermore, it is known 
that large investment houses use their own `in-house' classification for economic 
sectors and industries. As there is no reliable indication regarding the type of 
classification system that is being commonly used by the market, I analyse the sample 
firms in terms of two widely used industrial classification systems. Appendix 4.2 
provides the summary of the industrial and yearly properties of the initial sample. 
I first analyse the `industry-year matrix' of distribution of firms-years, when 
industrial affiliation of firms is identified according to the FTSE Global Classification 
system. 
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The Cyclical-Services comprises the largest industrial category of firms, 
accounting for 34.4% of the total number of cases. This economic group includes 
retailers, leisure, hotel, media and entertainment companies, business support and 
transportation firms. The number of firms in this industry showed an increase through 
the years 1987-1997, and stabilised in the years 1998-2001. 
The second-largest economic group, General Industrials, accounts for 15% of 
total sample and includes aerospace and defence companies, and firms that manufacture 
machinery, engineering products, electronics and electrical equipment. The yearly 
number of firms in this group was stable throughout 1998-1996, but showed a 
substantial downward sloping trend in later years. 
The third-largest economic group, Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods, contributes 
12% to the total sample and represents firms producing food, beverages, tobacco, drug 
and household products. The number of companies in this economic group had an 
increasing trend until the mid-1990s, but have been declining steadily thereafter. 
Basic Industries firms comprise 11.5% of the total sample and are engaged in 
chemicals, building materials, timber and metals manufacturing, as well as construction. 
The yearly number of firms in this group was stable throughout the 1989-96 period, but 
showed a pronounced declining trend thereafter. 
The Cyclical Consumer Goods group accounts for 9.6% of the sample in firm- 
years and includes automobile manufacturers and household goods and textiles 
producing firms. In its pattern of the yearly firms numbers, this group is virtually 
identical to Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods. 
The Information Technology economic group (which includes IT hardware and 
software manufacturers and service providers) contributes 8% to the total sample. 
However, there has been a substantial growth in the number of firms in this group over 
the entire sample period. For example, in 1990, IT firms comprised 4.9% of that year's 
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total sample, while in years 1995,1999 and 2001 these figures grew to 6.1%, 10.6% and 
15.4% respectively! 
Firms in the Resources economic group, which operate in mining and oil and 
gas industries, account for only 3.4% of the entire sample and the yearly numbers show 
no apparent trends. 
The Utilities economic group firms and Non-Cyclical Services (food and drug 
retailers and telecommunication) firms contribute less than 3% each to the number of 
firm-years in the sample. The number of Utilities firms, in the entire sample, has been 
steadily declining from year 1995 onwards, yet the yearly numbers of Non-Cyclical 
Services firms showed a steady increase over the entire sample period. 
Although detailed analysis of industrial trends and their economic determinants 
is outside the scope of this study, and without an in-depth examination it would be 
difficult to ascertain what produces those trends, some general overview is still 
necessary. The observed above `in-sample' patterns might not be totally descriptive of 
the entire population, yet are indicative of the general trends in economic sectors 
because the sample includes all major quoted public limited companies (in a given 
industry) available from the Extel database. 
There are industries, in particular the two Services sectors and Information 
Technology sector, that tend to expand (in terms of number of firms per year) over the 
entire sample period. Virtually all manufacturing industries (such as Basic and General 
Industries, and Cyclical and Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods) and the Utilities 
`downsized' in terms of the number of firms over the second half of 1990s and early 
2000s, while the Resources has been the most stable sector2. These patterns reflect, 
perhaps, shifts in the industrial composition of the UK economy and changing relevant 
importance of particular industries. 
2 Consolidation within these industries could, perhaps, partially explain the observed downward trends in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, but this is unlikely as the global economic downturn of that period 
substantially depressed mergers and acquisitions activities. 
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Similar trends are observable when the sample is partitioned yearly and analysed 
across SIC classification-based industrial categories. 
The Services division is the largest economic group and accounts for 22.7% of 
the entire sample. Furthermore, its proportion in the yearly samples has been constantly 
increasing over the entire sample period. Thus in the early-1990s Services firms 
comprised about 18% of yearly samples, in mid-1990s the share of this economic sector 
went up to about 22%, and in late-1990s and early 2000s this percentage topped 30%. 
This pattern is virtually identical to that of the two Services sectors in FTSE-based 
sector classification. 
The second and third largest economic sectors are Manufacturing (22%) and 
Food, Textile, Paper and Chemicals (17%)3. Both sectors expanded steadily until 1996, 
but after that exhibited a substantial downsizing trend. 
Retail Trade sector comprises 10% of the total sample, and steadily expanded 
over the 1990s only to drop in year 2001. 
The Wholesale Trade sector firms contribute 9% to the total sample. This sector 
had no particular trend up until the late 1990s, but then decreased notably. 
The Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary services 
sector, comprising 8% of the entire sample, showed a sharp increase in the first half of 
1990s, but had no particular trend thereafter. 
The Construction sector contributes 5% to the sample and has a notably 
declining trend in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
The Mining sector contributes 3.3% and is the most stable throughout the sample 
period. This pattern is virtually identical to that of the FTSE's Resources sector. 
The Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing is the smallest economic sector, and 
shows no particular trend. 
s It should be noted that these two sectors are created artificially, by splitting the SIC's single 
Manufacturing Division into two parts. That is, I separate heavy industries from consumer goods 
manufacturers, as these two groups might have different valuation characteristics. 
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As one could expect, there is a great deal of similarity between the FTSE and 
SIC-defined economic sectors that relate to similar types of business activities. Thus 
Services-related industries both in the FTSE and SIC classifications exhibit similar 
trends and increasingly comprise the largest share of the total sample. Similarly, 
identical trends can be observed in: the Manufacturing sectors of SIC system and 
General and Basic Industries of FTSE system; and Mining sector of SIC system and 
Resources economic group of FTSE system. This evidence suggests that FTSE and SIC 
systems of industrial classification are similar in nature. 
In terms of both the FTSE and SIC classifications, yearly samples are of similar 
size, within 1000-1450 cases, apart from the first and last year of the sample period, 
where yearly samples contain about 400 and 700 cases, respectively4. 
4.2.3 Variables-related sample characteristics 
Having examined the yearly and industrial composition of the total sample, I 
now turn to the analysis of the characteristics of the key value-relevant financial 
statement variables in the industrial and yearly sub-samples. The objective is to identify 
those economic sectors that are most similar/dissimilar to each other in terms of key 
financial statement variables. This information would provide more insight during the 
process of drawing inferences about the valuation of firm's business segments. This 
may also reveal industrial sectors, and hence business segments, which are qualitatively 
similar and, therefore, could be agglomerated without loss of integrity. 
Similar/dissimilar sectors are identified by comparing descriptive statistics of a number 
of accounting and market variables of firms from different industrial sectors. 
° This is because the data collection was completed in November 2002. With regards to the low number 
of observations in the first year, 1987, of the sample period, at that time Extel database was still in the 
process of expanding its coverage. 
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4.2.3.1 Book value of equity 
First, I examine the frequency of lirm-years with negative equity book values 
across different economic sectors. The sign of the book value of equity is an indication 
of the financial health of a company. When compared across industries, the frequency 
of negative BVs could provide some insight into the relative financial health of different 
industries. The figure below ranks industries by number of firm-years with reported 
negative book values. 
Figure 4.1 
Industry Total Neg. BV % of neg. 
SIC 0 145 0 0.0% 
SIC 2 923 20 2.2% 10.0% 
SIC 4 4202 94 2.2% 8.0% 
SIC 3 3304 91 2.8% 6.0% 
SIC 7 1906 58 3.0% 4.0% 
SIC 5 1523 50 3.3% 
2.0% 
SIC 6 1685 58 3.4% 
SIC 8 491 18 3.7% 
0.0% 
SIC 1 644 26 4.0% 
SIC 9 4347 361 8.3% 
Percentage of negative BVs 
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* The employed industry SIC abbreviations are as follows: SICO - Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; 
SIC1 = Mining; SIC2 = Construction; SIC3 ý- Food, textile, paper and chemical products (i. e., two-digit 
SIC codes of 20 through 29); SIC4 = Manufacturing (i. e., two-digit SIC codes of 20 through 29); SIC5 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanctuary Services; SIC6 - Wholesale Trade; SIC7 
Retail trade; SIC8 = Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; SIC9 Services. 
The figure shows that the percentage of firm-years with negative BVs varies 
within the range of 2-4`Y, for 8 out of 10 industries. There is only one industry, Services 
(SIC9), with unusually high proportion of firm-year observations with negative book 
values. The analysis of this industry across the sample period (see the previous section) 
suggests that this is a rapidly growing sector with more new firms entering the market 
each consecutive year. Therefore, the observed high level of negative BV cases in the 
Services industry, may be due to new firms being more likely to report negative 
financial results in the initial stage of their life cycle. Therefore a special consideration 
should be given to the valuation model's results with regards to Services industries. 
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The cross-sectional mean and median values of the unsealed BVs, when 
compared across different sectors, might be indicative of differences in the average size 
of firms that belong in different industries. However, when drawing such conclusions 
one should remember that some of the differences might stem from possible inter- 
industry differences of the accounting nature, i. e., what accounting treatment is given to 
certain categories of assets, expenses and transactions or events. Figure 4.2 provides 
this summary 5. This figure indicates that 'Transportation, C'onlnamications, Electric, 
Gas, and Sanitary Services' sector firms are, on average, larger than other firms in the 
sample, while 'Services' sector firms are among the smallest firms in the sample. The 
latter agrees with our previous observation that the 'Services' sector includes more, new 
growing firms. One can also note that median values are substantially smaller than the 
means, suggesting that intra-sector frequency distributions of BVs are right-skewed. 
Figure 4.2 
Industry` Mean Median 
SIC o 50.6 7.5 
SIC 9 70.1 10.1 
SIC 6 99.2 15.8 
SIC 4 128.7 19.0 
SIC 1 371.0 20.7 
SIC 3 207.6 25.6 
SIC 7 237.9 26.4 
SIC 8 270.2 30.0 
SIC 2 127.3 37.0 
SIC 5 837.3 66.0 
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* The employed industry SIC abbreviations are as follows: SICO Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; 
SIC] Mining: SIC2 Construction: SIC3 = Food, textile, paper and chemical products (i. e., two-digit 
SIC codes of 20 through 29); SIC4 - Manufacturing (i. e., two-digit SIC codes of 20 through 29); SI('S 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanctuary Services; SIC6 Wholesale Trade; SIC7 
Retail trade: SICK Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; SIC9 Services. 
Figure 4.2 is based on the unde(lated By. In the regression analysis, however, 
all employed variables are deflated by the scale proxy. ThereFore it would he 
Although the Median and Mean values in the table are computed only for firm-years with positive hook 
values, the patterns remain identical when negative 13V cases are also included. 
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införmative to examine the industrial characteristics of' the deflated BV (sec Figure 
4.2.1)`' 
Figure 4.2.1 
BV by economic sectors 
(BVs are scaled by TA, and exlcude negative cases and outliers) 
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Figure 4.2.1 demonstrates that the mean and median deflated BVs are 
remarkably stable in 8 out of 10 industries. Only the Alining (SIC1) [Construction 
(SIC2)] industry firms appear to have a slight/ larger [smaller] mean and median BV 
than the rest of industries. By and large, Figure 4.2.1 demonstrates that deflation by 
scale eliminates most of the inter-industry variation in mean and median of raw By. 
Therefore, it could be said that patterns in Figure 4.2 are mostly driven by firm size- 
related inter-industry differences. 
Having examined the cross-industry differences in BV, additional insight might 
be gained from exploring the dynamics of changes in BVs. Figure 4.3 below is called to 
expose yearly patterns in the sign of BVs. The figure reveals a pronounced upward 
sloping trend, throughout the decade 1988-1998, in the percentage of' firms, in the entire 
sample, that report negative book values. This trend is somewhat surprising, as that 
decade corresponds to a period of relatively strong performance of the UK economy. 
I Irre and in the fi)IIow-up figures that report deflated yearly and industrial 13V, PHI' and MV, total 
assets are used as the scale proxy. I lovvever, deflation by alternative scale-proxies, such as sales, lagged 
MV, or composite deflator, does not change the observed patterns. 
Because hoof: values are deflated by total assets, the reported means and medians also reflect the 
industry-average capital structure. 
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Contrary to intuition, in the period of the 1999-2001 economic slowdown the frequency 
of reported negative book values was lower than in periods of strong economic growth. 
Figure 4.3 
Year Total Negative % of neg. 
Y 1987 393 6 1.5% 
Y 1988 1012 8 0.8% 
Y 1989 1152 20 1.7% 
Y 1990 1235 37 3.0% 
Y 19,91 1269 48 3.8% 
Y 1992 1234 57 4.6% 
Y 1993 1286 67 5.2% 
Y 1994 1364 59 4.3% 
Y 1995 1367 64 4.7% 
Y 1996 1414 69 4.9% 
Y 1997 1448 75 5.2% 
Y 1998 1395 81 5.8% 
Y 1999 1286 57 4.4% 
Y 2000 1329 39 2.9% 
Y 2001 1327 55 4.1% 
Y 2002 702 39 5.6% 
Percentage of negative BVs 
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Analysis of specific industries (not reported here) also reveals that this pattern is 
not caused by a specific industry 8. In the context of the RN mode, which underpins the 
operationalised model developed in Chapter 3, and employed in the empirical ananlysis 
throughout chapters 4 to 6, negative book values cannot be a meaningful valuation 
factor. The phenomenon of the growing frequency of reporting negative book values 
might ultimately undermine the value relevance of that accounting variable in the 
context of residual income valuation models. 
As has been discussed in Chapter 3, BV is often used in the literature as a proxy 
for firm size. The chronological analysis of firms' average BVs, presented in Figure 
4.4, suggests that firms were growing in size for almost the entire sample period, with 
the exception of last two years (2001 and 2002)9. 
8 An in-depth investigation of what might cause this phenomenon (e. g. goodwill write offs) would, 
perhaps, be an interesting exercise, yet it is outside the scope of this study. 
Although reported in the table average numbers exclude cases with reported negative BVs, inclusion of 
such cases does not change the pattern. 
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Figure 4.4 
Year Mean Median i 
Y 1987 117114 12588 
Y 1988 132154 13934 
Y 1989 138974 152071i 
Y1990 152111 16217 
Y 1991 171499 16684 
Y 1992 178404 18161 1 a`Oi 
Y 1993 185608 187251 2 
Y 1994 186047 19943' 
Y 1995 182412 20342.; 
Y 1996 186606 20485 
Y 1997 171478 19515 
Y 1998 183483 20909 
Y 1999 213643 23410 
Y 2000 342255 25400'' 
Y 2001 336281 24481 
Y 2002 429526 22222 
BV by years (only positive BV cases) 
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To examine whether this upward sloping trend is a size-driven phenomenon, I 
compute yearly mean and median total assets-scaled BV (see Figure 4.4.1). 
Figure 4.4.1 
Figure 4.4.1 demonstrates that during first 13 years of the sample period the 
yearly mean and median sealed ßV had been virtually constant, while in the case of the 
unsealed yearly 13V (see Figure 4.4) there had been a strong upward trend. This 
indicates that the size of sample firms was growing in that period. Figure 4.1.1 shows 
that there was a sharp yet, in percentage terms, small increase of the mean and median 
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value of scaled BV in year 2000. This seems to suggest that in the period of economic 
slowdown of 1999-2002 the average indebtedness of firms was lower (by about 10%) 
than in period 1987-19981". 
Another supporting indication of the time-related size increase is the fact that the 
absolute values of mean and median unsealed nc'gutive hook values were increasing 
throughout the sample period (see Figure 4.5). The patterns on Figure 4.5 seem to 
conform with intuition, because firms tend to grow over time in real and, in an 
inflationary environment, in nominal terns''. Even with inflation accounted for, there 
still exists an upward trend in yearly BVs, suggesting that firms have been growing in 
real terms over the sample period. 
Figure 4.5 
Years Mean 
Y1987 -25577 
Y 1988 -24161 
Y1989 -67932 
Y1990 -40640 
Y1991 -57250 
Y1992 -59213 
Y 1993 -43504 
Y 1994 -49475 
Y 1995 -73839 
Y 1996 -72732 
Y 1997 -67228 
Y 1998 -74898 
Y 1999 -93151 
Y 2000 -1E+05 
Y 2001 -67124 
Y 2002 -1E+05 
Median 
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4.2.3.2 Profit Before Tax (PBT) 
Having examined the in-sample `behaviour' of book value of equity, I now 
explore, perhaps, the most important value driver, earnings. In theory, we shall he 
talking about `carninos liar ordinary equityholders', as this is the variable required by 
Examination of factors that caused this shift in capital structure is outside the scope of this study. 
Note that nominal monetary numbers are used to calculate mean and median values in the table. 
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the opeartionalised model. Because the ultimate purpose of this study is the valuation of 
business and geographical segments, and segmental results are only reported in PBT 
terms, I use the PBT variable for the firm-level analysis. The major component of the 
difference between PBT and earnings for ordinary shareholders is the net taxes. Other 
components include: after tax items and extraordinary items, and the difference between 
total and ordinary dividends. Normally, PB]' is larger than earnings for ordinary 
shareholder, reflecting the net taxes and the difference of the total and ordinary 
dividends. To maintain the equivalence of models that use PBT with the 
operationalised model (which is based on ordinary earnings), I follow Garrod and Rees 
(1998) and append it with an adjustment term (Adj. ER = Earnings for ordinary PBT). 
Following the same path as with the BV analysis, I first analyse the industrial 
distribution of loss-making firms. Figure 4.6 ranks industries by the percentage of loss- 
making firms. 
Figure 4.6 
Industry' Total 
SIC 7 1906 
SIC 6 1685 
SIC 3 3304 
SIC 5 1523 
SIC 2 923 
SIC 4 4204 
SIC 0 145 
SIC 8 491 
SIC 9 4347 
SIC 1 644 
Negative %of negi Percentage of negative PBTs LýjýI IJ. /%U 
297 17.6% 45.0% 
591 17.9% 40.0% 
287 18.8% 35.0% 
30.0% 
174 18.9% 25.0% 
827 19.7% 20.0% 
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* 'I lie employed industry SIC abbreviations are as löllows: SIC'0 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; 
SICI Mining; SIC2 Construction; S1C3 Food, textile, paper and chemical products (i. e., two-digit 
SIC codes of 20 through 29): SIC4 - Manufacturing (i. e., two-digit SIC codes of 20 through 29); SIC5 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanctuary Services: SICG Wholesasle'I'rade; SIC7 
Retale trade; SICH Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; SIC9 Services. 
The difference in the performance of firms across industries is striking. Nearly 
40% of firm-years in the 'Miring' sector report losses. A yearly analysis of firms' 
profitability in this sector (not reported here) indicates that this level of losses was 
sustained throughout most years of the sample period. This, combined with the lhct that 
nýnýn 
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Mining is the stalest industry in terms of the number of firms comprising it, suggests 
that this sector lacks growth opportunities and is the least profitable. Therefore one can 
expect/hypothesise Mining business operations, reported by multi-segment firms, to 
receive low valuation in segment-level analysis. 
The next, least profitable industry is Services, as about 32% of firm-years in this 
sector report losses. This conforms to our earlier observation that most of the firms in 
this sector are newcomers, which are at the initial stage of their life cycle. However, 
because the number of firms in this sector was rapidly and constantly increasing 
throughout the sample period, it could be hypothesised that the business community 
believes in high growth potential of this sector. If this is the case, then we can expect the 
reported `Services' segments of multi-segment firms to have a relatively high valuation. 
Another surprising observation is the relatively high proportion of loss-making 
firms in the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate sector. It shall be emphasised, however, 
that these firms constitute only a fraction of the total number of firms in this sector, as 
only non-finance firms (in FTSE GCS system terms) have been included in the sample. 
Therefore, because the analysis in this section is based on the SIC system, some firms 
(which are non-financial in terms of FTSE classification) might still be in the financial 
sector when the SIC system is used. With this caveat in mind, some analysis of this 
sector would still be informative. 
The number of firms in this sample of financial firms had been increasing up 
until year 1995 (when the average loss-making cases accounted for 22.5% of that 
period's sub-sample), but steadily declined thereafter (with the proportion of loss 
making firm-years increasing to 26.7%). This suggests that finance-related business 
activities held low growth opportunities, particularly in the second half of 1990s, which 
might result in lower relative valuation of financial firms in general, and in low 
valuation of reported financial operations of multi-segment firms. 
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With regard to the remaining sectors, Figure 4.6 suggests that the ('onshwNion, 
Maligli cturing and trade-related sectors are similar in terms of frequency of reported 
losses (within a range of 15.7-19.7%). 
The analysis of profits by economic sectors, also reveals some interesting 
features (see Figure 4.7). Similar to the case with BVs, the mean and median values of 
PBTs indicate that the 'Transportation, Communications, Electric, Geis, and Sanitara' 
Services' sector firms report the largest profits. 
Figure 4.7 
Industry* Mean Median 
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* The employed industry SIC abbreviations are as follows: SILO Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; 
SICI Mining: SIC2 = Construction: SIC3 Food, textile, paper and chemical products (i. e., two-digit 
SIC' codes of 20 through 29): SIC4 = Manufacturing (i. e., two-digit SIC codes of 20 through 29); SIC5 
'Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanctuary Services; SIC6 Wholesasle Trade; SIC'7 
Retale trade; SIC8 = Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; SIC9 -- Services. 
The inter-industry differences of raw PBTs, reported in Figure 4.7, might 
merely reflect the industry-related differences in firm sire. Because actual regressions 
are based on the scale-deflated variables, it would be more insightful to examine the 
scale-deflated industrial PBT, which, when deflated by total assets, would be a variant 
of returns on asset (ROA). 
As is evident from Figure 4.7.1, the mean (median) ROA varies, across 
different industries, within the range of 6.51%, to 12"rß% (4"/,, to 10.5%). The most 
profitable industry is Services (SIC9), where mean ROA is 121, )x,, while in the Finance 
(SIC8) sector the mean ROA is only 6.5'%x. z1gricithurc, Alining and Construction 
industries (i. e., SICO, SICI and SIC2) appear in the lower profitability band, with ROA 
only positive PBT cases) 
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in the range of 8% to 8.7°/,, while Malik during, "Prude-related, and transportation 
and ('on, nnuiiculion Services-related industries are in the higher profitability band, with 
ROA being within 10.5% to 1 1.5`%x. 
Table 4.7.1 
PBT by economic sectors 
(PBTs are scaled by TA, and exlcude negative cases and outliers) 
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Patterns in Figures 4.7 and 4.7.1 are completely dissimilar, which indicates that 
inter-industry pi-oJitahility and level of profits are unrelated. 
Some interesting characteristics emerge from the analysis of loss-making cases 
in yearly sub-samples. 
Figure 4.8 
Years Total Negative % of neg. 
Y 1987 395 36 9.1% 
Y 1988 1011 56 5.5% 
Y 1989 1153 88 7.6% 
Y 1990 1236 181 14.6% 
Y 1991 1269 303 23.9% 
Y 1992 1234 334 27.1% 
Y 1993 1286 308 24.0% 
Y 1994 1365 232 17.0% 
Y 1995 1368 236 17.3% 
Y 1996 1415 259 18.3% 
Y 1997 1449 280 19.3% 
Y 1998 1394 315 22.6% 
Y 1999 1286 318 24.7% 
Y 2000 1330 451 33.9% 
Y 2001 1329 589 44.3% 
Y 2002 703 329 46.8% 
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Figure 4.8 reports the percentages of loss-making firms in yearly sub-samples. 
Two obvious observations can be made from this table. First, throughout nearly the 
entire sample period (12 out of 15 yearly periods) the percentage of loss-reporting firms 
showed a sharply increasing trend. Thus in late 1980s less than 10% of firms were 
reporting losses, while in the early 2000s more than 30% of firms were reporting losses. 
Even during the period of strong economic growth, 1994-1998, between 17 and 25% of 
firms were posting losses. 
Second, in periods when general economic conditions of the UK were poor 
(recessions of 1991-1993 and 1999-2002) a significantly larger number of firms, in 
yearly sub-samples, reported negative results. In years of the most recent economic 
downturn of 1999-2002 that percentage was exceptionally high. Given these apparent 
cross-industry and yearly differences, it is appropriate to control for industry and yearly 
effects when working with the pooled cross-sectional total sample. 
Some additional confirmation of the previous generalisations can be found when 
average measures of yearly PBTs are plotted against time. 
Figure 4.9 
Years Total sample 
Years Mean 
Y1987 31776 
Y 1988 35826 
Y 1989 35516 
Y 1990 32986 
Y1991 28648 
Y1992 25131 
Y 1993 30762 
Y1994 36099 
Y 1995 39462 
Y 1996 38621 
Y 1997 41182 
Y 1998 43480 
Y 1999 42893 
Y 2000 43655 
Y 2001 15184 
Y 2002 -20317 
Median 
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Figure 4.9 explicitly demonstrates how closely the average (i. e., mean or 
median) reported yearly profits reflect the cyclic patterns of the British economy. When 
the same measures of central tendency are separately computed and plotted for profit 
and loss firms (Figure 4.10 and 4.11), there is a clear upward trend Im- the former, and 
downward trend for the latter. 
Figure 4.10 
Years Mean Median 
Y 1987 35555 3445 
Y 1988 38016 4099 
Y 1989 39327 4258 
Y 1990 40061 4514 
Y 1991 42035 4043 
Y 1992 43141 4007 
Y 1993 44275 4311 
Y 1994 46647 5060 
Y 1995 51318 5728 
Y 1996 50857 5386 
Y 1997 53961 6062 
Y 1998 60138 6609 
Y 1999 61988 7208 
Y 2000 75163 6619 
Y 2001 60809 7228 
Y 2002 56380 6583 
Figure 4.10.1 
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Figure 4.11 
Years Mean Median 
Y1987 -5909 -698 
Y 1988 -1517 -638 
Y 1989 -10607 -912 
Y 1990 -8250 -1014 
Y 1991 -14033 -1561 
Y1992 -23400 -1955 
Y 1993 -12147 -2109 
Y 1994 -15411 -1609 
Y1995 -17407 -1999 
Y1996 -15993 -2672 
Y1997 -12174 -1852 
Y 1998 -13580 -2652 
Y 1999 -15233 -2228 
Y 2000 -17753 -3321 
Y 2001 -42138 -3621 
Y 2002 -1. E+05 -3300 
Mean and Median yearly PBTs (loss firms) 
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Figure 4.10.1 reveals the cyclical nature of the cross-sectional mean and median 
of total-assets deflated PBT (i. e., profitability or ROA). Profitability was steadily 
increasing during the period of strong economic growth (1993-1998), and decreasing in 
periods when the economy was relatively weak (i. e. early 1990s and 1999-2001). 
Because the total assets-deflated PBT (i. e., ROA) does not show an increasing time- 
related trend over the entire sample period (see Figure 4.10.1), the yearly increasing 
pattern of the level PBTs (on Figure 4.10) is likely to be the result of time-related 
growth in firm size. 
4.2.3.3 Residual Value (RV) 
In the context of empirical accounting, one needs to understand the time and 
industry-related relations between two measures of the firm's equity value: market 
value of equity (MV) and book value of equity (BV). For this purpose, and hearing in 
mind that we deal with a residual income-type model, it might be more informative to 
analyse the measure of the residual income itself (a measure of incremental value 
created), rather than to perform separate analyses of MV and 13V. The theoretical 
residual income model, discussed in Chapter 3, holds that in expectation residual 
138 
income shall account for any excess (shortfall) of market value of equity over (1'1'0111) Its 
book value. In other words, the difference between the market and book value 
represents the residual value. That is: RV=MV-BV. RV is, therefore, a measure of 
incremental value created. Other things being equal, the positive RV (i. e., firm trades 
above its book value) indicates the perceived presence of expected future abnormal 
earnings, if one assumes that BV approximates the fair value of net assets. Conversely, 
a negative RV (i. e., firm trades below hook value) indicates that the market perceives 
the firm's future expected performance to be `value destroying'. Therefore, as a 
measure of value creation I analyse this residual value (RV). 
Figure 4.12 
Industry* Total Neg. RV % of neg. 
SIC 5 1523 250 16.4% Percentage of negative RVs 
SIC 9 4350 719 16.5% 
° 45.0% { ° SIC 4 4204 802 19.1% ý, - 
SIC 6 1685 328 19.5% 35.0% 
I' 
SIC 3 3304 685 20.7% 25.0% 
SIC 7 1906 485 25.4% 
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* The employed industry SIC abbreviations are as follows: SIC() Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; 
SICI =- Mining: SIC2 = Construction; SIC3 Food, textile, paper and chemical products (i. e., two-digit 
SIC codes of 20 through 29); SIC4 = Manufacturing (i. e., two-(Iigit SIC codes of 20 through 29); SICK 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanctuary Services; SIC6 - Wholesasle 'I rade; SIC7 
Retale trade; SIC8 = Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; SIC9 Services. 
Figure 4.12 ranks industries by their relative market performance, measured in 
terms of the frequency of negative RV firms in a given industry. It appears that more 
than 40% of Agriculture, Forestcv and Fishing, along with h'inunce, Insurance and Real 
Estate sector firm-years are traded below book value, that is, perceived by the market to 
have the worst value creating prospects I2. Construction companies are also at the 
bottom end of value creation prospects, with some 30% of firm-years reporting negative 
RV. The best performers, in these terms, arc the two services sectors (`S'rviccs ', and 
'' This interpretation, however, comes with a caveat, as explained in section 4.2.3.2. 
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`Communication, Transportation, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services) with only up to 
17% of firm-years having negative RVs. Although not reported here, these patterns 
generally hold when computations are performed on a yearly basis. It should be 
mentioned that if general accounting practices differ among different industries, than the 
identified cross-industry divergences in RV might, in part, reflect the cross-industry 
heterogeneity in accounting practices. For example, if the balance sheet items are more 
often carried at fair value in construction firms, and at cost in the manufacturing sectors 
than, ceteris paribus, BV (RV) might be lower (higher) in manufacturing firms'3 
If the investors' perceptions of industrial performance are transferable onto the 
perceived valuation of firm's business segments, then one can expect the business 
segments in the two services sectors to have higher relative valuation, while segments 
operating in Finance, Agriculture and Construction sectors to have lower relative 
valuation. 
Figure 4.13 
Year Total Neg. RV % of neg. RV 
Y 1987 395 45 11.4% 
Y 1988 1011 125 12.4% 
Y 1989 1153 152 13.2% 
Y 1990 1236 360 29.1% 
Y 1991 1268 385 30.4% 
Y 1992 1234 412 33.4% 
Y 1993 1286 281 21.9% 
Y 1994 1365 196 14.4% 
Y 1995 1368 226 16.5% 
Y 1996 1415 185 13.1% 
Y 1997 1449 192 13.3% 
Y 1998 1394 273 19.6% 
Y 1999 1286 261 20.3% 
Y 2000 1330 315 23.7% 
Y 2001 1329 370 27.8% 
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"I acknowledge this fact, however controlling for cross-industry heterogeneity in accounting practices is 
impracticable in the context of this study. 
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Figure 4.13, which reports the yearly dynamics of the RV, indicates substantial 
time-related variability of the proportion of firms trading below book value, yet one 
distinctive feature of the pattern stands out. 
The figure suggests that ears with a higher percentage of negative RVs 
correspond to periods when the UK economy was weak (1990-1992 and 1999-2002), 
while in strong economic growth periods (late 1980s and mid-1990s) the percentage of 
firms trading below BV was substantially lower. 
Yearly changes in the percentages of negative RV reflect the joint effect of 
changes in MV relative to changes in By. It is virtually impossible to take the analysis 
of the changing pattern of the RV further and decipher relative contributions of each of 
these sources14 
4.2.3.4 Market Value of Ordinary Equity 
Finally, it is necessary to have some insight of yearly and industry-related 
variability of the market value of equity (MV). MV is one of the measures of the firm's 
size. 
The sector-related difference in firms' size is striking. As is evident from Figure 
4.14, the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector firms are on average 16 times smaller 
than firms from the Communications, Transportation, Electric and Gas services sector, 
which is also statistically larger than all other sectors. This is primarily due to the fact 
that this sector includes UK's largest firms (e. g., BT, BAA, British Airways, British 
Energy, Vodafone, Granada, British Sky, Cable and Wireless, etc). 
Leisure, Personal, Health & Business services sector is the next smallest firms 
industry, though statistically significantly larger than the Agricluture, Forestry and 
Fishing. Although the SIC Division D (Manufacturing) has been subjectively split into 
14 The time series pattern of MV is analysed in section 4.2.3.4. 
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two sectors (i. e., 'Food, Tc-vlilc', lºu/ºc'r & chcºººicul product ºuuººrr/ruvurrr. ý ' and 
'ItIann/irctru-ing'), on average, Munn/iwtnring firms are statistically smaller than 
Tc. vtilc, Paper ct- C'hcnnicul Product Munu/ncturers. 
Figure 4.14 
Industry" Mean 
S/CO 82 
S/C9 178 
SIC6 240 
S/C1 615 
S/C4 309 
S/C8 424 
S/C2 184 
S/C7 499 
S/C3 735 
S/C5 1602 
Median ý 
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MV by economic sectors 
SILO SIC9 SIC6 SIC1 SIC4 SIC8 SIC2 SIC7 SIC3 SIC5 
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Food, 
* The employed industry SIC abbreviations are as follows: SICO - Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing; SICI - Mining; SIC2 = Construction; SIC3 Food, textile, paper and chemical products (i. e., 
two-digit SIC codes of 20 through 29); SIC4 = Manufacturing (i. e., two-digit SIC codes of 20 through 
29); SIC5 = Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanctuary Services; SIC6 = Wholesasle 
Trade; SIC7 = Retale trade; SIC8 Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; SIC9 - Services. 
Also is noteworthy that 'Wholesale trw/c' companies are statistically smaller 
than the 'Retail trade' firms. Another characteristic of our sample is that inferences are 
sometimes sensitive to the choice of a measure of central tendency (mean vs. median). 
This is due to the existence of a few extremely large firms, which cause the frequency 
distributions of industry-related MVs to have very long right tails. 
Figure 4.14 demonstrates the differences in the average size of firms operating 
in different industries. Figure 4.14.1 provides some insight into the industry-related 
characteristics of the scaled MV. It suggests that TA-scaled MV differ notably across 
industries. Provided that (1) capital structure (the ratio of equity hook value to total 
assets) is constant across industries, and (ii) there are no inter-industry accounting 
differences then, when compared across industries, the nrean/median 'IA-scaled MV 
would reflect the market's perception of relative growth opportunities associated with 
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diflcrent industries. However, if the above two assumptions do not hold, it would be 
difficult to interpret the patterns in Figure 4.14.1. 
Figure 4.14.1 
MVs by industries 
(MVs are deflated by TA and exclude outliers) 
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It is also important to examine the dynamics of average size of sample firms 
throughout the sample period. The median yearly market capital 1sations, plotted in 
Figure 4.15, show some periodicity. 
Figure 4.15 
Years Mean Median 
1987 265 27 
1988 244 30 
1989 286 30 
1990 252 21 
1991 313 22 
1992 340 23 
1993 412 34 
1994 408 44 
1995 426 45 
1996 468 49 
1997 490 44 
1998 615 41 
1999 738 49 
2000 869 55 
2001 638 35 
2002 606 27 
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Overall, the cross-sectional mean and median MV lines have an increasing trend 
over the sample period. However, MV seems to be lower in the periods of 1990-92 and 
2001-02, when the economy was weak. These patterns bear some similarity to those of 
the residual values. There is, however, one significant drop of median MV in 1998 and 
an unexpectedly high median and mean MV in year 2000, which does not `fit' the 
economic cycle premise. 
As was the case in the industrial analysis section, the large divergence of mean 
and median values of MV for a specific year is due to the existence of relatively few 
extremely large MVs. Because my sample includes all publicly traded companies, 
available from the Extel database, one can expect the trend of yearly mean MVs to 
reflect a broad market index (e. g. FTSE All-share) for the same period15. This is 
because the mean MV - the average market capitalisation for firms 
in the sample - 
turns into a value weighted market index when scaled by a devisor, e. g. mean MV of 
1987. 
As is the case with a FTSE market index, mean MVs are influenced by a few 
large capitalisation companies, whereas median MVs are unaffected by large 
capitalisation firms included in the sample. The median is, therefore, a better measure of 
the time-related size properties of firms comprising the sample. 
Finally, Figure 4.15.1 indicate that the yearly pattern of scaled MV is not stable 
over the sample period. Because TA is an accounting representation of the value of the 
entire firm (i. e., book value of the entire firm), the inter-temporal changes of mean and 
median TA-scaled MV might, to some extent, reflect the dynamics of changes in 
investors' perception regarding the growth opportunities associated with the entire 
16 sample of firms 
15 However, the sample might slightly miss-represent the entire market because most financial firms are 
excluded from the sample. 
16 This conjecture is correct if capital structure remains constant over the sample period, so that the 
dynamics of MV/TA and MV/BV would be similar. 
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Figure 4.15.1 
4.2.3.5 Dividends for Ordinary Shareholders 
An interesting pattern is observed in relation to dividend payments. There are 
substantial differences in the `popularity' of this method of distributing value to 
investors both across economic sectors and years. Figure 4.16 demonstrates this point. 
Figure 4.16 
Industry" Div. ý 
Payment 
SIC1 60.4% s5°% 
SIC9 84.7% soo% 
SIC8 89.6% 850% 
SIC6 92.6% 80.0% 
SIC7 94.1% 750% 
SIC5 94.9% 700% 
SIC4 95.0% 550% 
SIC3 95.6% eoo% 
SIC2 95.6% 
SICO 96.4% 
Percentage of divident paying firm-years by economic sectors 
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* The 
employed industry SIC abbreviations are as Billows: SI('0 Agricullurc, Forestry and Fishing; SI('I 
Mining; SIC2 Construction; SIC3 Food, textile, paper and chemical products (i. e., two-digit Sic 
codes of 20 through 29); SIC4 Manufacturing, (i. e., two-digit Sl(' codes of 20 through 29); SI('5 
'I ransportation, Communications, Flectric, (ias, And Sanctuary Services; SIC6 \V'holcsaslc Prude: SI('7 
Retale trade; SICK{ Finance, Insurance, and Real Fstate; SIC) Services. 
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In the majority of industries more than 90% of firm-years pay dividends. The 
lowest frequency of dividend payment is observed in 'Mining, `Services' and 
'Financial' sectors which is in direct correlation with the frequency of losses reported 
from these sectors. 
When the percentage of dividend paying firm is analysed by years, as on Figure 
4.17, a pronounced declining dynamics is observed. 
Figure 4.17 
Years Percentage 
1987 95.5% 
1988 95.6% 
1989 94.3% 
1990 95.6% 
1991 94.5% 
1992 92.8% 
1993 91.9% 
1994 91.9% 
1995 92.9% 
1996 91.5% 
1997 91.6% 
1998 90.5% 
1999 90.1% 
2000 86.0% 
2001 82.9% 
2002 87.5% 
Dynamics of the percentage of divident paying firm years in yearly samples 
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On average, more that 94% of the firms were paying dividends in years 1987- 
1991. However, for the years 1992-1999 this fell to between 90 and 93%, while during 
2000-2002 dividends were paid by less than 86% of firms. This trend is highly 
correlated with the dynamics of the frequency of firms reporting losses (the correlation 
coefficient is -0.86). This seems to suggest that dividends are paid more frequently in 
years with low incidence of losses17. 
In summary, Section 4.2.3 sheds some light on additional factors that should be 
considered in the process of subsequent empirical analyses. Because similar yearly 
17 There may also have been shifts in the forms of distributions over time from dividends to, e. g., share 
repurchases, which might explain the patterns. However, an analysis of share repurchases is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. 
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patterns were observed for both financial statements variables (PBTs, BVs, and 
Dividends) and market-related variable (RV), it is likely that in `good' and `bad' 
economic periods the market values firms differently. Therefore, in the empirical tests it 
might be necessary to control for the `time' or `economic period' effect. 
Furthermore, some of the revealed cross-industry differences might appropriate 
the use of, for instance, fixed industry effects in our panel data regressions. 
4.2.4 Descriptive statistics of firm-level variables used in regression analysis 
In this section I report general descriptive statistics for firm-level independent 
and dependent variables used in further regression analyses. All analysed variables (i. e., 
MV, By, PBT and DIV) are deflated by Total Assets, unless otherwise specified. To 
lessen the effect of extreme values affecting descriptive statistics and subsequent 
regression results, I follow the convention and eliminate the top and bottom 0.5% of 
cases of each scale-deflated value drivers (i. e., PBT, BV and DIV) and scale-deflated 
dependent variable (i. e., MV). A separate section of this chapter deals in more detailed 
fashion with the issue of outliers and/or influential observations. Because the time and 
industry-related characteristics of scale-deflated variables have already been analysed in 
section 4.2.3, descriptives reported in the current section relate to samples where the 
cross-sectional data is pooled over time. 
The discussions in Chapters 2 and 3 have suggested that positive and negative 
earnings can be expected to have different valuation properties. Therefore variables' 
descriptive statistics shall be examined separately for positive and negative PBT sub- 
samples. 
Several points should be mentioned with regards to variable descriptive 
statistics. As is evident from Panels A and B of Appendix 4.3, even after the 
elimination of extreme values, the frequency distributions of MV have long right-tails in 
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both profit-making and loss-making sub-samples. The degree of variability of MV, 
measured by the coefficient of variation (Standard Deviation / Mean), is substantially 
smaller in the profit-making sample. In the profit-making sample the ratio of the mean 
(median) MV of ordinary equity to TA is slightly higher (lower) than unity, while in the 
loss-making sample this divergence is much larger. Considering that frequency 
distributions of most variables reported in Panel A and B are substantially skewed, the 
median values might be more appropriate for comparing the variables' central 
tendencies. By and large, one could conclude that deflated MVs are more stable cross- 
sectionally and over time, when firms report profits. In addition, judging by median 
values, profit-making firms have larger MVs18. 
The analysis of the profit sign-related variability of the deflated BVs and PBTs 
renders similar conclusions. That is, BV and PBT of profit-making firms are more 
stable. Because BV and PBT are deflated by TA, they can be viewed as a gearing ratio 
and return on asset (ROA), respectively. This provides further insight into the 
characteristics of the sample firms. Thus, the mean and median BV suggest that in the 
capital structure of the profit-making firms 46% of financing comes from ordinary 
shareholders. With regard to ROA, assets of the profit making-firms return, on average, 
10%. However, for loss-making firms the absolute value of this percentage exceeds 
12%. 
The cross-sectional mean and median values of firm size-deflated dividends 
indicate that profit-making firms pay higher dividends than loss-making firms. 
Correlation coefficients reported in Panel A and B provide further details on the 
relations between equity market value and accounting fundamentals, subject to the 
profitability of firms. In the profit-firms sub-sample, MV is highly correlated with 
profits, 60%, followed by dividends, 22%, while the correlation with book value is 9%. 
18 Using the means results in opposite conclusions. 
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In the loss-firms sub-sample market value has the highest correlation (- 24%) with 
earnings, which are negative. The fact that this correlation coefficient is negative is 
counter-intuitive. This negative correlation seems to suggests that, ceteris paribus, firms 
with larger scaled losses have larger scaled equity market values. 19 In the loss-making 
sample correlations of dividends and book value with equity market value is similar to 
those observed in the profit-making firms. That is, MV has the second-larges correlation 
with dividends, 22%, and third-largest with By, about 8%. 
4.3 FIRM-LEVEL REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
In this and following sections I test the operationalised model, developed in the 
Chapter 3. This involves estimating ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that reflect 
the theoretical valuation model. The operationalised model explains the cross-sectional 
variation in equity market value by three key value drivers: profits, book value and 
dividends. For reasons of keeping firm-level and segment-level regression results 
compatible, I replace the earnings for ordinary variable, in the operationalised model, 
with profit before tax variable, and add a balancing item, the adjusted earnings (AdjER 
= ER - PBT). The scale-deflated model, therefore, is: 
mv, Is = ao, o *(I Is) + ao, l + a, * (bv, Is) + aZ, o * (pbt, /s) + 
+aZ,, *[s*(pbt, ls)]+a3 *(divls)+a4 *(AdjERls)+u, (21) 
where the dependent and all independent variables (mv, by, pbt, div, AdjER) are deflated 
by a scale proxy T. Coefficient ao, 0 is the constant part of the would-be intercept in an 
un-deflated model, and ao., allows for scale-related non-linearity in the would-be 
"Further investigation into possible causes of this result suggests that the negative correlation effect is 
likely to be caused by scaling. That is, when the value of the deflator approaches zero, scaling of MV and 
negative PBT would produce very large (in absolute terms) values, inducing spurious positive correlation. 
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intercept in an un-deflated mode120; a, is the book value valuation multiple21; a2,0 is the 
profits capitalisation coefficient, and a2., is similar in nature to ao., and captures a 
possible scale-related non-linearity of the profit coefficient a2,0; a3 is the dividend 
capitalisation coefficient; and a4 is attached to the earnings balancing item and has no 
prior conceptualisation of its value relevance. 
4.3.1 Valuation of positive vs. negative PBTs and BVs 
In this section I examine the issue of value relevance of negative earnings and 
book values in the context of the operationalised model (21). The reason for specifically 
addressing negative values is based on a fact well documented in the literature, that 
negative earnings have different valuation characteristics [e. g., Collins et al. (1999)]. 
Specifically, negative earnings have been found to have weaker association with value. 
Common explanation found in the literature is that reported losses are perceived by 
investors as temporary [Hayn (1995)], and are, therefore, more weakly associated with 
equity returns than profits. According to this literature, losses are likely to be considered 
temporary because shareholders can always liquidate the firm, rather than suffer from 
indefinite losses. In other words, equity holders have a put option on the future cash 
flows of the firm whereby they can sell their shares at a price commensurate with the 
market value of the net assets of the firm. By and large, the value of the firm's equity is 
the higher of the present value of its expected earnings and its liquidation value. 
Consequently, when a loss is reported, the value of the firm shall not drop below the 
liquidation value nor decline proportionally to the change in earnings. Because of the 
20 A statistically significant coefficient would suggest that the intercept in an un-deflated model is not a 
cross-sectional constant, and is likely to vary with scale. A positive (negative) sign of a01 would indicate 
that regressions with larger firms have, on average, larger intercept. 
21 Although the complete version of this model allows for scale-related non-linearity of all value driver 
coefficients, when used in regressions this will create spurious correlation problem. Therefore, this non- 
linear structure is only imposed on the coefficient of the main variable of interest, PBT. 
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perceived low persistence of negative earnings, the inclusion of loss firm-years in the 
sample is likely to dampen the regression estimated earnings coefficient and the level of 
its statistical significance. For the loss-making firms the book value coefficient is likely 
to become a statistically more significant value driver. 
In light of these arguments in the empirical analysis that follows I partition the 
sample according to the sign of earnings22. Table 4.1 summarises regression results of 
model (21) when it is tested for such contexts as the sign of the firm's financial results 
(i. e., profit vs. loss firms) within differently defined samples. 
Differences in the regression results between the profit and loss sub-samples are 
self-evident. First of all, the explanatory power of the model is substantially lower for 
the loss-making sub-sample. The absolute value of the PBT coefficient is much higher 
in the sub-sample of profitable firms. Unexpectedly though, the PBT coefficient for 
loss-making firms is negative and statistically significant, which implies that ceteris 
paribus higher losses are associated with higher value. Book value capitalisation, 
however, is substantially higher in loss-making firms, which conforms to the view (and 
other literature) that in situations close to financial distress, book value represents an 
exit option value. 
When comparing models 4 and 8, dividend payments appear to be value- 
irrelevant for profitable firms, while in loss-making firms, they are statistically 
significant at the 1% level and are positively related to the firm value. Furthermore, 
negative PBT become no longer statistically significant when the analysis is restricted 
to dividend paying firms. 
22 Given the evidence [e. g., Hayn (1995)] that firms whose earnings are expected to fall just below the 
zero earnings point engage in earnings manipulations to help them cross the `loss' barrier, it might be 
reasonable to treat marginally small positive earnings similar to losses. However, what shall be 
considered as marginally small profits involves subjective judgement, and also is unlikely to add value to 
the core investigation. 
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Table 4.1 Valuation impact of the sign of earnings and book values 
mv, ITA, = ao, o *(1/TA, )+ao,, +a, *(BV, ITA, )+a2, o *(PBT, ITA, )+ 
+a2., * [f(TA) * (PBT, ITA, )]++a3 *(DIV ITA, )+a4 * (AdjER / TA, ) + u, 
PANEL A: Profit reporting firms 
Model 1 p-value Model 2* p-value Model 3* p-value Model 4 p-value 
Intercept 0.128 0.113 0.063 0.077 
t-ratio 5.970 0.000 5.184 0.000 2.876 0.004 3.549 0.000 
1 /TA 573.270 690.170 789.132 278.223 
t-ratio 4.883 0.000 5.032 0.000 5.970 0.000 2.256 0.024 
BV 0.251 0.257 0.348 0.146 
t-ratio 5.707 0.000 5.887 0.000 7.719 0.000 3.614 0.000 
PBT 7.836 7.211 7.128 7.804 
t-ratio 42.026 0.000 27.799 0.000 26.806 0.000 27.524 0.000 
PBT*f(TA) 1.20E-07 0.077 0.080 0.070 
t-ratio 2.270 0.023 3.396 0.001 3.573 0.000 3.129 0.002 
DIV 0.342 0.339 0.305 0.588 
t-ratio 0.717 0.473 0.717 0.474 0.677 0.498 0.857 0.391 
Adj. ER -0.010 0.004 -0.085 0.080 
f-ratio -0.052 0.958 0.020 0.984 -0.351 0.726 0.294 0.769 
Adj. R-Square 36.5% 36.5% 37.0% 42.9% 
No. of Cases 14487 14487 14251 13209 
PANEL B: Loss reporting firms 
Model 5 p-value Model 6* p-value Model 7* p-value Model 8* p-value 
Intercept 0.922 0.985 0.025 0.205 
t-ratio 10.256 0.000 11.526 0.000 0.285 0.776 3.602 0.000 
1 [TA 1336.160 1191.020 1272.830 1270.370 
t-ratio 4.573 0.000 3.877 0.000 4.570 0.000 5.081 0.000 
BV 0.894 0.894 2.698 0.532 
t-ratio 6.523 0.000 6.500 0.000 12.923 0.000 3.743 0.000 
PBT -0.863 -1.542 -2.189 -0.793 
t-ratio -5.692 0.000 -3.669 0.000 -3.356 0.001 -1.336 0.182 
PBT*f(TA) 1.99E-07 0.130 0.213 0.062 
t-ratio 2.614 0.009 2.292 0.022 2.592 0.010 1.124 0.261 
DIV -15.808 -15.517 -10.586 7.510 
t-ratio -5.525 0.000 -5.164 0.000 -4.216 0.000 3.524 0.000 
Adj. ER 0.097 0.117 -0.078 -0.165 
t-ratio 0.332 0.740 0.399 0.690 -0.186 0.853 -1.144 0.253 
Adj. R-Square 14.4% 14.5% 17.0% 10.6% 
No. of Cases 4202 4202 3791 1159 
All variables in the reported models are scaled by total assets, a size proxy. In all models top and bottom 
0.5% of values of MV, PBT, BV and non-zero DIV are deleted as outliers. PBT*f(TA) is the unscaled 
row PBT, where unscaling is done by multiplying the scale-deflated PBT by the scale factor. This implies 
that true regression coefficient on PBT is a simple linear function of the unscaled PBT. 
* In these models PBT*f(TA) is computed by multiplying the scale-deflated PBT by the 5th order root of 
the scale factor. This mitigates the effect of extreme values of the un-deflated row PBT, and also allows 
for non-linearity in the functional form of the scale PBT coefficient. 
Model 1 is estimated for only positive firm-year PBT cases. Model 2 differs from Model 1 only in 
definition of PBT*Sales. Model 3 is estimated for only positive firm-year PBT and positive firm-year BV 
cases. Model 4 is identical to Model 3, apart from that the sample excludes non-dividend firms. Models 5, 
6,7 and 8 are the same as Models 1,2,3 and 4 respectively, but are estimated for negative PBT firm-year 
cases only. Estimated coefficients' White-adjusted t-ratios are reported below coefficients, and the level 
of significance (p-value) is reported next to the t-ratios. 
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As hypothesised earlier, the balancing item AdJER is totally irrelevant to value, 
as its coefficient is not statistically significant in any of the regressions. 
High levels of statistical significance, in all models, of coefficients on the 
reciprocal of the scale proxy (i. e., total assets) imply the existence of a non-zero 
intercept in the un-deflated model. Furthermore, the positive and statistically significant 
intercepts (as is in all models except Model 7) in scale-deflated regressions suggest that 
the intercept in un-deflated model increases with scale. In other words, larger companies 
tend to have larger intercepts. 
The PBT coefficient is also not a cross-sectional constant and, as indicated by 
positive and statistically significant value of the coefficient on PBT*f(TA), is positively 
related to scale. In other words, earnings from larger firms are likely to have a higher 
capitalisation rate. In models 1 and 5 the PBT coefficient in an un-deflated model is 
hypothesised as a simple linear function of a constant and firm size proxy 
(a0,0 + a01 *s). This construct might be susceptible to extremely large (in absolute 
terms) un-scaled PBT values. Therefore, in models 2-4 and 6-8 this PBT coefficient is 
modeled as a linear function of a constant and a `depressed' scale (a0,0 + ao,, *5s )23 
The Basic regression results are qualitatively similar in both cases. 
Models 1,2,4 and 5 are estimated for samples that include positive and negative 
book values. It has been argued earlier that negative book value should be value- 
irrelevant, at least in the theoretical model. A negative book value (i. e., the total balance 
sheet liabilities exceed total assets) might be the result of accounting treatments (e. g., 
when goodwill is written off against the reserves in the equity section of the balance 
sheet) or indicate that the firm is in temporary financial distress or the firm is in the 
initial stage of its life cycle. Nevertheless, I do not exclude such firms from the samples 
23 The choice of the second term in the formula for this coefficient is arbitrary. The use of alternative 
functional forms, e. g., logarithmic or exponential, does not affect empirical results. However, the 5`h root 
is chosen because the log function is not determined for negative values (i. e., can not be used for negative 
PBTs). 
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as negative book value will not necessarily result in the firm filing for bankruptcy24. 
However, to test the sensitivity of estimated coefficients to negative book value cases, 
regressions 3,4,7 and 8 are estimated with these cases being eliminated. 
This exclusion does not affect the PBT and dividend coefficients in positive 
PBT sub-samples in any significant manner (Model 2 vs. Model 3). However, in the 
negative PBT sub-samples (Model 6 vs. Model 7) all key valuation coefficients are 
changed substantially. This is because negative BVs are more closely associated with 
the loss-making sub-sample: 10% of cases in the negative PBT sub-sample have 
negative BVs, while only 1.6% of positive PBT sub-sample cases have negative BVs. 
An expected effect of the exclusion of negative (and theoretically irrelevant to 
valuation) BV cases is the increased valuation of positive BVs and an improved 
explanatory power of regressions in both the positive PBT (to a smaller extent) and 
negative PBT (to a larger extent) sub-samples. 
With regard to the valuation of dividends one shall note that not all firm-years in 
the sample pay dividends. Regression-estimated dividend coefficients might be biased if 
no account is taken of the dividend-paying status of the firm. Therefore, in Models 4 
and 8I exclude all non-dividend paying firms25. Elimination of these firm-years reduces 
the positive PBT sample by 7.3% and does not change the valuation of dividends. 
In the negative PBT sample, however, this elimination reduces the sample by 
69.4% and completely changes the valuation of dividends. Here, dividends are 
positively associated with firm value and are statistically significant at the 1% level, 
while the value of the BV coefficient drops notably and the PBT coefficient is no longer 
24 The firm might continue its operations if debt is not immediately due or could be rescheduled, and/or 
there are prospects of future reversal in the performance. 
2$ These results should be red with a caveat that the elimination of the non-dividend observations impacts 
upon the yearly and industrial structure of the sample. Thus the Mining sector would be relatively under- 
represented in the new samples, because only 60% of firms in this sector pay dividends (see Figure 4.16). 
Similarly, because there has been a pronounced decline in dividend paying firms over the sample period 
(see Figure 4.17), the new samples will include less observations from the more recent years of the 
sample period. 
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statistically significant. This suggests that in loss-making dividend-haying firn's, 
dividend is, perhaps, the major value driver. 
4.3.2 The effect of time on value relevance of major value drivers 
This section analyses the characteristics of the yearly regression results, as 
reported in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 
nnv, ITA, =a0o *(1/TA, )+ao,, +ai *(BV, ITA, ) *(P13T, IT, A, )+a, i 
*jf(7A)*(PB7; 17A, ) 
+a, * (DIV /TA, )+ay *(Adjl; R/TA, )+u, 
Year Intercept 1/TA BV PBT PBT x DIV Adj. ER 
No. of Adj. 
f(TA) cases R-Square 
1987 -0.015 1463.9 0.539 4.804 0.124 -0.825 -1.859 349 37.30% 
t-ratio -0.106 3.132 2.031 3.210 0.908 -0.209 -1.166 
P-value 0.916 0.002 0.043 0.001 0.364 0.835 0.245 
1988 0.076 833.3 0.252 6.426 -0.068 0.873 -0.876 932 56.60% 
t-ratio 1.504 2.443 2.519 11.342 -1.672 0.519 -1.889 
P-value 0.133 0.015 0.012 0.000 0.095 0.604 0.059 
1989 0.183 395.2 0.195 5.760 -0.039 2.045 -0.595 1036 43.00% 
t-ratio 3.117 1.615 1.781 9.738 -0.796 1.105 -1.908 
P-value 0.002 0.106 0.075 0.000 0.426 0.269 0.056 
1990 0.011 395.7 0.367 4.414 0.090 -0.143 -0.029 1025 48.00% 
t-ratio 0.266 1.493 5.060 11.056 2.388 -11.690 -0.115 
P-value 0.791 0.135 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.908 
1991 0.085 323.6 0.187 3.707 0.121 7.239 -0.143 940 49.50% 
t-ratio 1.758 1.059 2.263 6.385 2.086 4.401 -0.454 
P-value 0.079 0.290 0.024 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.650 
1992 0.146 -91.6 0.091 6.660 0.065 2.735 0.097 878 55.20% 
t-ratio 2.797 -0.299 0.869 9.068 1.088 1.213 0.631 
P-value 0.005 0.765 0.385 0.000 0.277 0.225 0.528 
1993 0.242 57.1 -0.076 8.144 -0.005 6.412 0.294 952 53.00% 
t-ratio 3.078 0.147 -0.480 7.561 -0.093 3.295 0.152 
P-value 0.002 0.883 0.631 0.000 0.926 0.001 0.879 
1994 0.124 457.5 0.180 5.658 -0.007 7.908 -3.881 1102 58.90% 
t-ratio 2.413 1.191 1.798 5.561 -0.120 3.819 -2.116 
P-value 0.016 0.234 0.072 0.000 0.904 0.000 0.034 
1995 0.053 737.3 0.147 5.774 0.055 5.158 -3.570 1105 61.70% 
t-ratio 1.171 2.206 1.700 7.528 1.105 2.898 -2.630 
P-value 0.242 0.027 0.089 0.000 0.269 0.004 0.009 
1996 0.015 1868.5 0.241 10.169 0.022 1.596 2.476 1130 46.00% 
t-ratio 0.172 2.726 1.357 8.943 0.340 0.560 3.315 
P-value 0.863 0.006 0.175 0.000 0.734 0.576 0.001 
1997 0.057 1669.1 0.172 8.092 -0.003 3.809 -1.824 1139 43.30% 
t-ratio 0.602 2.517 0.984 6.168 -0.036 1.182 -0.931 
P-value 0.547 0.012 0.325 0.000 0.971 0.237 0.352 
1998 0.144 1301.5 -0.183 7.293 0.222 4.735 1.512 1051 31.90% 
t-ratio 1.271 2.271 -0.871 4.512 1.994 0.940 2.226 
P-value 0.204 0.023 0.384 0.000 0.046 0.347 0.026 
(table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 4.2 (continucd from the previous page) 
1999 0.308 1483.3 0.087 6.159 0.340 -3.189 -1.508 943 17.70% 
t-ratio 1.869 2.228 0.202 4.020 2.575 -0.827 -1.241 
P-value 0.062 0.026 0.840 0.000 0.010 0.408 0.215 
2000 0.169 4885.3 0.925 9.335 0.010 -6.967 1.527 855 19.00% 
t-ratio 0.973 4.338 2.367 3.549 0.071 -1.673 0.943 
P-value 0.331 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.943 0.094 0.346 
2001 0.031 1379.6 0.832 4.226 0.151 -2.394 -5.194 717 23.10% 
t-ratio 0.310 2.959 4.022 2.101 1.299 -0.845 -1.277 
P-value 0.756 0.003 0.000 0.036 0.194 0.398 0.202 
2002 0.162 899.1 0.381 4.526 0.136 3.163 1.478 366 41.10% 
t-ratio 2.215 4.243 3.017 3.784 1.787 1.293 0.807 
P-value 0.027 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.075 0.197 0.420 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below the regression 
coefficients. Yearly regressions are scaled by TA, estimated for profit-making firms and exclude the 
outliers. PBT*t(TA) is the unsealed PBT, where unsealing is computed by multiplying the scale-deflated 
PBT by the 5th order root of the scale factor. This mitigates the effect of extreme values of the un- 
deflated raw PBT, and also allows for non-linearity in the functional form of the scaled PBT coefficient. 
Coefficients which are statistically significant at the 5'i0 level or higher are highlighted. 
Some general observations are in order. The explanatory power of the basic 
model has a particular pattern (Figure 4.18). 
Figure 4.18 
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In the years 1988-1995, the valuation factors comprisin the model explained 
more than 40`% of the variation in equity market value, and this explanatory power had a 
pronounced increasing trend. In later years (1996-2002), however, the model's ability to 
explain the equity market value was substantially lower and had a declining trend in 
1996-1999. Overall, this suggests that the cumulative value relevance of such 
accounting-based value drivers as PEST, dividends and BV is changing through time. 
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A rather unexpected finding is the level of value association of equity book 
value. In 10 out of the 16 years, the BV coefficient is not statistically significant, yet 
when significant it has the theoretically expected positive sign. In the regressions 
reported in Table 4.2 above I do not exclude cases with negative BVs, as on average 
only 3% of cases in yearly samples have negative By. Repeating the tests with negative 
BV cases being excluded (results are not reported) partially `rectifies' the situation, yet 
still does not produce statistically significant book values in 5 out of 16 years, and 
repeating the tests with negative BVs set to zero produces statistically insignificant BV 
coefficients in 7 out of 16 years. This effect can be easily controlled for, when 
necessary, by appending the model with a negative BV-related dummy and a negative 
BV interaction terms. 
PBT appears to be the most robust value driver, as the PBT coefficients are 
positive and statistically significant at 1% level in all years. The values of the yearly 
PBT coefficients do not exhibit trend and vary substantially in magnitude. The 
coefficients on PBT*f(TA) indicate that in 11 out of 16 years PBT coefficients seem not 
to be prone to scale-related non-linearity. 
Another noteworthy result is the lack of `incremental' value relevance of 
dividends. We use the word `incremental' because dividends are already a part of PBT. 
The separate dividends variable, which is additionally included in the regression, will 
have a statistically significant coefficient only when dividends and retained PBT (i. e., 
PBT-Dividends) have different value association. From the yearly regressions results 
one could infer that dividends and retained earnings have statistically similar value 
association in 11 out of 16 years. 
In the above regressions the dividend-paying and non-dividend observations 
have been pooled, which might lower both the value of estimated BV coefficient and 
the level of its statistical significance. Therefore, I re-run the yearly regressions for only 
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dividend-paying firms (see Table 2 in Appendix 4.6). Although the pair-wise yearly 
correlations between dividends and the equity market value are higher in `only dividend- 
paying' yearly samples, dividends' valuation is largely unaffected (except that the 
dividends coefficient in year the 1996 becomes statistically significant), as in 10 out of 
16 years dividends, in dividend-paying firms, do not have incremental value 
association. One surprising result is observable in respect of the dividend-paying yearly 
samples: the explanatory power of each of the 16 yearly regressions is higher, on 
average, by 5 percentage points. 
To control for the revealed yearly dynamics of the combined value relevance of 
the accounting fundamentals and other time-related effects, regressions on pooled data 
shall be estimated with yearly fixed effects. 
4.3.3 Firms' industrial affiliation and the value relevance of major value drivers 
To examine the performance of the operationalised model across different 
industries, I partition the entire sample into ten SIC-based industrial sub-samples and 
run ten separate regressions. 
Results in Table 4.3 indicate that there is a sharp divergence among the various 
economic sectors in terms of regression explanatory power. The model appears to work 
better for such economic sectors as `Finance, Insurance and Real Estate', and `Retail 
Trade', with the Adjusted R2 being above 57%, while in the Services sector the 
financial statement variables explain only 27% of the cross-sectional variation in equity 
market value. The apparent cross-industry variation in the models ability to explain 
value might necessitate the inclusion of industry-related fixed effects in the pooled total 
sample. 
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Table 4.3 
nm, 17A, -u,  
*(1/7A, )+u,, +n, *(RI', l'l: -i, ) i a,,,, *(/'/37; /7: -I, )f u,., *1 /ý(7; I)*(l'R"l; /7: I, )I i 
a, *(/)7V /7A, )+Q4 *(At/j/iR/7: 1, )+it, 
Industry* Intercept 1/TA BV PBT 
PBT x DIV Adj. ER 
No. of Adj. R- 
f(TA) cases Square 
SIC 0 0.154 2170.2 -0.029 0.556 -0.175 19.187 -1.668 107 51.409/, 
t-ratio 2.091 4.302 -0.177 0.495 -1.602 6.878 -2.734 
p-value 0.039 0.000 0.860 0.622 0.112 0.000 0.007 
SIC 1 0.338 2185.8 0.577 4.617 -0.232 11.131 -0.048 376 31.80'/ 
t-ratio 2.432 3.373 2.502 5.405 -4.586 4.187 -0.414 
p-value 0.015 0.001 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.679 
SIC 2 0.075 1389.7 0.365 2.189 0.000 8.438 -0.184 733 44.80% 
t-ratio 2.203 5.578 3.050 3.265 0.004 5.011 -0.177 
p-value 0.028 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.997 0.000 0.860 
SIC 3 -0.003 350.1 0.323 4.689 0.170 7.286 0.396 2647 38.50% 
t-ratio -0.051 1.662 3.385 7.289 4.596 3.503 0.647 
p-value 0.959 0.096 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.518 
SIC 4 0.063 596.2 0.249 6.181 0.027 4.220 -0.079 3299 43.20% 
t-ratio 1.825 1.912 2.517 14.789 0.918 3.111 -0.167 
p-value 0.068 0.056 0.012 0.000 0.358 0.002 0.867 
SIC 5 0.147 1951.3 -0.461 5.686 0.082 14.651 0.823 1204 50.10% 
t-ratio 2.222 1.940 -2.767 4.786 1.338 5.228 1.804 
p-value 0.026 0.052 0.006 0.000 0.181 0.000 0.071 
SIC 6 0.162 557.1 0.078 6.225 0.091 1.432 0.011 1352 41.00% 
t-ratio 3.128 4.077 0.596 9.619 1.565 0.826 0.016 
p-value 0.002 0.000 0.551 0.000 0.118 0.409 0.987 
SIC 7 0.050 869.2 0.185 7.252 0.053 4.923 0.726 1563 57.20% 
t-ratio 0.971 2.500 1.993 11.745 1.560 4.009 1.746 
p-value 0.332 0.012 0.046 0.000 0.119 0.000 0.081 
SIC 8 0.015 3023.2 0.445 2.697 0.205 -0.143 -1.630 361 70.20% 
t-ratio 0.398 8.202 6.648 1.709 1.920 -5.172 -0.620 
p-value 0.691 0.000 0.000 0.088 0.056 0.000 0.536 
SIC 9 0.250 679.7 0.407 5.468 0.471 -2.708 -0.120 2880 27.10% 
t-ratio 4.264 2.716 3.913 6.412 4.603 -2.138 -0.358 
p-value 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.033 0.720 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to the regression 
coefficients. Industrial regressions are scaled by 'FA, estimated fir profit-making firms and exclude the 
outliers. PB'I'*f('l'A) is the unsealed PIT, where unsealing is computed by multiplying the scale-deflated 
P13T by the 5th order root of the scale factor. This mitigates the effect of extreme values of' the till- 
deflated raw PI3T, and also allows for non-linearity in the functional firm of the scaled I'13"I coefficient. 
('ocf'licients which are statistically significant at the 5°,, level or higher are highlighted. 
* The employed industry SIC abbreviations are as follows: SI('(1 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; 
SI('I Mining; SIC2 Construction; Sl('3 Food, textile, paper and chemical products (i. e., two-digit 
SI(' codes of 20 through 29); SIC4 Manufacturing (i. e., two-digit SI(' codes of 20 through 29); SI('5 
"Transportation, Communications, Electric, (las, And Sanctuary Services; SI('6 Wholesasle'Trade; Sl('7 
Retale trade; SICK Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; SIC9 Services. 
Figure 4.19 demonstrates that across all ten industries the elimination of non- 
dividend firm-years increases the explanatory power of the regressions, with the average 
increase being about 6'%%. Recall that a similar effect was observed in the yearly 
regressions. 
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* The employed industry SIC abbreviations are as follows: SIC'0 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; 
SICI Mining; SIC2 Construction; SIC3 Food, textile, paper and chemical products (i. e., two-digit 
SIC codes ot'20 through 29); SIC4 Manufacturing (i. e., two-digit SIC codes ol'20 through 29); SIC5 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanctuary Services; SIC6 Wholesasle'I'rade; SIC'7 
Resale trade; SIC8 - Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; SIC9 Services. 
With regards to the major valuation factors, the dividend coefficients are 
statistically significant in 9 out of 10 industries. Ilowever, in two out of these 9 
industries (Services and Finance, Insurance and Real Estate), dividends have negative 
association with value. This pattern persists when the tests are repeated for dividend- 
paying firms only (Figure 4.20). 
The absolute value of the dividend coefficients varies substantially across the 
different economic sectors, and increases in all sectors when samples exclude non- 
dividend firms. 
In two sectors (Agriculture, Pores/rt, and Fishin 9, and Finance, Insurance and 
Real Estate) the PBT coefficients are not statistically significant, irrespective of whether 
or not the non-dividend firms are excluded from the samples. 
The substantial cross-industry difference in the valuation of' PBTs is evident 
from Figure 4.21, with profits having higher capitalisation in the trade, maim) icturing 
and services sectors. This might be a point of reference when comparing the market's 
perception of values, associated with specific business scgmenls, with the valuation of, 
firm-level PI3T coefficients in specific industries. 
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* The employed industry SIC abbreviations are as follows: SICO Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; 
SICI = Mining; SIC2 - Construction; SIC3 Food, textile, paper and chemical products (i. e., two-digit 
SIC codes of 20 through 29); SIC4 - Manufacturing (i. e., two-digit SIC codes of 20 through 29); SIC5 
"Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanctuary Services; SIC6= Wholcsasle'fradc; SI('7 
Retale trade; SIC8 = Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; SIC '9 - Services. 
Figure 4.21 
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As has been suggested in Chapter 3, the theoretical book value coefficient may 
have a positive, as well as negative signor. The book value coefficient is not statistically 
significant in 2 out of' 10 industries. This appears to he the case for one industry 
2 From the theoretical models that underlie our regressions, it is difficult to hypothesise about the sign 
and magnitude of the book value cocfticicnt. As ('haptcr 3 demonstrates, the theoretical book value 
cocfticicnt is the sum of two terms: unity and a negative term that represents the present value factor of 
all future expected required returns on ordinary equity. Because we arc unaware of the expected 
magnitude of the second term (it might take up a value which is huger or smaller than unity), the 
theoretical book value coefficient in our model can have any sign. Therefore, the fact that in sonic yearly 
or industrial regressions book attic coefficients appear statistically not significant, does not mean that in 
those years' or industries' book values vycre value irrelevant 
. 1111] 
1 1ý1 
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('Transportation, Communications, etc. Services') in our tests. One can also observe 
that, for all industries, except the `Finance, Insurance and Real Estate', BV coefficients 
have lower statistical significance than the corresponding PBT coefficients. This, 
perhaps, confirms the fact that the balance sheet items of financial sector firms tend to 
be more closely marked-to-market, hence their value relevance is relatively high 
compared with that of PBT. 
To take the examination of the valuation relevance of BV further, I estimate all 
industrial regressions with the BV variable being omitted. Results (see Table 4 in 
Appendix 4.6) indicate that the BV variable plays a marginally low role in valuation 
across all industries. Omitting the BV variable from the regressions reduces the 
explanatory power of 9 out of 10 industrial regressions only by less than 2 percentage 
points, and in `Financial, Insurance and Real Estate sector' by less than 4.5 percentage 
points. 
In comparison to equity book value, the PBT variable is clearly a more 
substantial value driver across all industries. This becomes evident when tests (see 
Table 5 in Appendix 4.6) are repeated with the PBT variable being omitted. Here, the 
explanatory power of all industrial regressions drops substantially, on average by 10 
percentage points, yet the BV and dividends coefficients remain generally unaffected. 
Finally, the dividend variable has an industry-variant valuation role. Exclusion 
of the dividends variable from regressions in the `Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing' 
and `Construction' sectors depresses the explanatory power of the regressions by 20.7% 
and 6.2% respectively, and this reduction is statistically significant. In the remaining 
industries, dividends seem to be a less important value driver, as its exclusion reduces 
the explanatory power of the regressions by less than 1.6%, on average, and this 
reduction is not statistically significant. 
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Industrial sub-samples in the preceding tests did not exclude firms that do not 
pay dividends. Therefore, I repeat these tests and once again examine the valuation role 
of dividends for only dividend-paying-firms sub-samples. The results (see Table 4 in 
Appendix 4.6) are virtually unchanged for most of the industries, except for the 
`Mining' sector where the exclusion of dividends causes a statistically significant 
reduction in the explanatory power of the regression. 
In summary, it is evident that there are cross-industry differences in investors' 
perception of the valuation role of various financial statements variables. The 
cumulative value association of these variables is also industry-specific. With regards to 
the segmental analysis, the above findings appear to oblige the researcher to, at least, 
control for industry fixed effects. Furthermore, across all industries, firm-level profits 
prove to be the `strongest' value driver, whereas equity book value is the `weakest' 
valuation factor. This finding supports my argument, put forward in Chapter 3, that PBT 
coefficients should be the main reference point when comparing relative valuation of 
specific segments. 
4.3.4 Market-to-book ratio and value relevance of major value drivers 
The entire notion of the RIV model is to explain the divergence between the 
equity market value and the book value. According to the residual income valuation 
model, the excess of market value over book value implies the existence of positive 
perceived growth opportunities, while the opposite is true when market value is below 
book value. The fact that one firm might trade above book value while another might 
trade at a discount to its book value points to the existence of a divergence between 
these firms' valuation. It follows that these firms are most likely to differ in terms of 
value association of key accounting value drivers (BV, PBT, DIV). To prove or 
disprove this point I run separate basic model regressions for two sub-samples of firms: 
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(i) where the market-to-book ratio (MB) is greater than unity (i. e., firms that trade above 
BV), and (ii) where the MB is below unity (i. e., firms that trade at a discount to BV). 
All models reported in Table 4.4 exclude negative profit cases, and negative 
BVs are set to zero. A general review of results suggests the following: 
1. In the total sample, there are about 4.6 times more firms that trade above book 
value than firms trading below book value; 
2. The explanatory power of the regressions are always larger for finns that trade 
at a discount to book value, regardless of the treatment of dividend non-dividend firms 
and fixed effects; 
3. The inclusion of industry and yearly fixed effects always increases the 
explanatory power of the regressions, and this increase is more pronounced for firms 
that trade at premium to book value. 
Some interesting patterns emerge when comparing the valuation properties of 
MB>1 firms with MB: 51 firms. Thus, in all pairs of corresponding regressions (that is: 
Model 1 vs. Model 3; Model 2 vs. Model 4; Model 5 vs. Model 7; Model 6 vs. Model 8) 
the magnitude of the PBT coefficients for MB>1 firms are substantially higher and 
statistically more significant than those of firms with MB51. 
Furthermore, among the MB51 models, there is only one (Model 3) where the 
PBT coefficient is statistically significant at the 4% level, while in the remaining MB51 
models the PBT coefficients are not significant at the 10% level. 
Overall, these results are persistent in all the tested model specifications (with 
and without industry and yearly effects) and sub-samples (total sample vs. only 
dividend-paying firms), which suggest that earnings do not play a significant role in the 
valuation of firms trading below book value. 
Another robust result is the differential valuation role played by dividends. First 
of all, dividends are always value relevant and are highly significant in statistical terms. 
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Furtherniore, when the dividend coefficients are compared in Model I vs. 3, Model 2 
vs. 4, Model 5 vs. 7, and Model 6 vs. 8, it appears that dividends are hosiliºve'h, 
(iregaNvchv) associated with firm value when firms trade ahun' (below) book value. 
Table 4.4 
nrr,; '7: 1 =u*(I/"l; 1 )+ui+u1 *(BI', 17A, )+n,,, *(l'BT, l7A, )+u, 
1 
*1 1(7A)*(PB7; /7: -1, )ý u, *(l)/I'l"l'A, )+u, *(AiljliR/7i1, ) i- if, 
Dividend and non-Dividend profit-making Dividen d paying profit-making firms only firms 
Market-to-Book >1 Market-to-Book<1 Market-to-Book >2 Market-to-Book<2 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4** Model 5 Model 6** Modell Model 8** 
Intercept` 0.052 -0.048 0.027 -0.04 0.082 -0.115 0.02 -0.035 
t-s1at 2.118 -0.552 3.18 -1.213 3.347 -1.349 2.57 -1.098 
p-value 0.034 0.581 0.001 0.225 0.001 0.177 0.010 0.272 
1/TA 301.9 294.5 -53.6 -75.3 731 662.7 -1.806 -15.4 
t-scat 2.319 2.226 -0.768 -1.058 4.803 4.835 -0.033 -0.276 
p-value 0.020 0.026 0.443 0.290 0.000 0.000 0.974 0.782 
BV 0.339 0.369 0.621 0.626 0.617 0.614 0.625 0.631 
t-stat 6.689 7.448 33.475 34.636 11.075 11.451 34.739 36.045 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT 6.657 6.689 0.254 0.208 6.432 6.425 0.161 0.087 
t-slat 22.212 21.408 2.058 1.627 21.969 21.39 1.359 0.706 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.104 0.000 0.000 0.174 0.480 
PBT x 
f(ta) 0.052 0.059 0.028 0.038 0.049 0.054 0.037 0.047 
t-sau 2.29 2.575 2.698 3.411 2.06 2.305 3.725 4.384 
p-value 0.022 0.010 0.007 0.001 0.039 0.021 0.000 0.000 
Div 5.916 4.914 -0.083 -0.085 2.784 2.636 -0.08 -0.08 
t-stat 7.046 5.673 -2.897 -2.87 3.786 3.442 -2.534 -2.508 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.011 0.012 
Adj. ER 0.404 0.236 0.002 0.009 0.105 -0.064 -0.033 -0.033 
t-star 1.616 0.914 0.014 0.083 0.574 -0.344 -0.302 -0.295 
value 0.106 0.360 0.989 0.933 0.566 0.731 0.763 0.768 
Adj. R- 40.26% 45.13% 47.39% 49.30% 33.60% 39.26% 47.73% 49 06% Square . 
No. of 11019 11019 2352 2352 11894 11894 2593 2593 
cases 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below each regression 
coefficient. Models are scaled by TA, estimated for profit-making firms and exclude the outliers. 
P13T*t(TA) is the unsealed P13T, where unsealing is computed by multiplying the scale-deflated P13'T by 
the 5th order root of the scale factor. This mitigates the effect of extreme values of the un-detlated raw 
Pl3'1', and allows for non-linearity in the functional form of the scaled PBT coefficient. ('ocfficients which 
arc statistically significant at the 51,,,, level or higher are highlighted. 
** These models are estimated with industrial and yearly fixed effects. For brevity, the regression 
coefficients of yearly and industrial dummies are not reported in the table. Ilowever, statistically 
significant yearly and industrial coefficients are discussed in the text. 
*In these models negative BVs are set to /ero. 
Models I through 4 arc estimated for only dividend-paying firms. Models 5 through S include both 
dividend paying and non-dividend firms. Models 1,3,5 and 7 are estimated without yearly and industry 
fixed effects, while Models 2,4,6 and S include yearly and industrial dummies. Models I, 2,5 and 6 only 
include firms with market-to-book ratio greater than I (i. c., trade above book value). Models 3,4,7 and S 
only include firms with market-to-book ratio below I (i. e., trade at a discount to book value). 
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This finding of dividends' differential valuation is surprising yet robust, as neither it is 
influenced by the inclusion of fixed industry and yearly effects, nor does it change when 
we eliminate dividend non-dividend firms. 
The analysis of the level of statistical significance of the BV coefficients (see 
Table 4.4) suggests that whether or not one controls for industry and yearly effects, 
BV's value relevance is higher when firms trade below market value. The analysis of 
BV coefficients in Model 1 vs. 3, and Model 2 vs. 4, indicates the existence of higher 
capitalisation of the BV variable in firms with MB51. A similar pattern exists when this 
analysis is performed for only dividend-paying firms (i. e., Model 5 vs 7, and Model 6 
vs. 8), yet statistically this difference is less robust. This result might have the following 
economic interpretation: when the firm's market value falls below its book value, book 
value is likely to become the major indicator of the fair value of an alternative use of a 
firm's net assets. In other words, shareholders might demand the `liquidation' of the 
firm to `receive' the fair value of their assets (if, of course, BV reflects fair value). 
To reaffirm this valuation importance of book values when MB<1, compared to 
profits and dividends, I analyse the changes in the explanatory power of regressions 
when a specific variable (BV or PBT and Dividend) is dropped out from the regression. 
Results (see Table 3 in Appendix 4.6) confirm prior indications of BV valuation. 
Specifically, omitting the BV from Models 4 and 8 reduces these regressions' 
explanatory power from 49.3% and 49.1% to 13.6% and 12.6% respectively, while 
jointly omitting the PBT and Dividend variables causes only about 1% fall in the 
explanatory power. Furthermore, omitting the BV from Models 2 and 6 (i. e., where 
MB>1) only marginally reduces these regressions' explanatory power, from 45.13% 
and 39.2% to 44.7% and 38.12% respectively, while dropping out PBT and Dividend 
variables causes at least 8.5% loss in the explanatory power. 
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In summary, BV is more value relevant and have larger valuation multiples for 
firms that trade below By. Furthermore, for these firms BV is a more important value 
driver than PBT and dividends, while for firms with MB> I the situation is exactly the 
opposite. 
Finally, the estimated coefficients on industrial and yearly dummies provide 
some indication of the relative valuation of firms in specific economic sectors and over 
time, as the directions of relative valuation of specific industries (and years) appear to 
be contextual to the MB ratio. Detailed analysis of this issue is outside the scope of this 
study. 
4.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
The objective of this section is to extend the analysis of the firm-level empirical 
results by repeating the major tests in new settings. Firstly, I examine the robustness of 
the previous results to the use of alternative scale proxies (i. e., deflators): (1) one-year- 
lagged equity market value; (2) group sales; (3) and a composite scale factor. 
Secondly, I explore further the implications of the adopted `conventional' view to 
eliminating cases with the largest and smallest 0.5% of values for MV, PBT and By, by 
comparing changes in the regression results if different thresholds for the elimination of 
extreme values were used (e. g., 0.2%, 0.4%, 0.6%, 0.8%, 1% and 1.2%). The effect of 
using different thresholds for trimming the extreme observations is analysed separately 
for each of the key variables (MV, PBT, BV and Dividends) in order to identify 
variables that are more likely to influence regression results with their extreme values. I 
also emphasise and argue that one should distinguish between `extreme' and 
`influential' observations, and discuss some of the pertinent empirical implications. 
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4.4.1 Using the one-year-lagged MV as deflator 
Before proceeding to the empirical results, it is important to note that by scaling 
the basic model with lagged MV we, in fact, transform the price-levels model into a 
return model. As discussed in Chapter 3, the economic interpretation of parameters in 
return models is different from those of price-levels models. The dependent variable in 
the lagged MV-deflated model is a sort of `dirty' one-year return, because: (i) it 
captures one-year change of the firm's share price; (ii) it reflects changes in the firm's 
equity capital which are due to issuance of new shares of share buy-backs; and (iii) it 
ignores the redistribution of value through dividend payment. 
Deflation by lagged MV substantially reduces the total sample size as it shortens 
the sample period by one year, that is we loose the earliest year 1987. Some more 
observations are also lost because the firm composition of yearly sub-samples changes 
each year, that is, the firm might exist in year 1995 sub-sample, but be missing from the 
year 1994 sample, making the lagged deflation impossible. Overall, deflation reduces 
the sample from the initial 19,213 firm-year observations to 16,828 cases (i. e., a 12.4% 
reduction)27. As before, in the process of analysis I partition this sample according to 
the sign of PBT and analyse the two sub-sample results separately. The positive PBT 
sub-sample contains 13,045 cases, while losses are reported by 3,783 firm-years (i. e., 
22.5% of total sample is loss-reporting firms). 
4.4.1.1 General properties 
Some commentary on the specifics of the profit and loss sub-samples is in order. 
First, the frequency of dividend-paying firms is substantially lower in the loss-making 
sub-sample, where only 30.6% of firm-years are dividend paying, compared to 92% in 
the profit sub-sample. 
27 The reported numbers do not exclude the outliers. 
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Second, in 11.4% of the loss-making firm-years, the reported BVs are negative, 
which is substantially higher than the frequency of negative reported BVs, 2.3%, in the 
profit sub-sample. Our data indicates that loss-making firms with negative BVs are less 
likely to pay dividends, as elimination of non-dividend paying firms from the loss sub- 
sample reduces the proportion of negative BVs to as low as 2%. In other words, there is 
a close association between the sign of BV and the dividend status of the firm. 
The comparative analysis of variable correlation matrixes in two sub-samples 
reveals some further particulars (see Appendix 4.4). The comparison of quadrants Q1 
and Q3 indicates that PBT of profit firms has the highest correlation with MV, while in 
loss-reporting firms the correlation coefficient of PBT and MV has the lowest in 
absolute terms value, and is negative. The negative sign of this correlation coefficient is 
rather unexpected as it seems to suggest that higher losses are associated with higher 
gains in the firm's value. Dividends in profit firms have the second-highest correlation 
coefficient with MV, and have the highest correlation coefficient in the loss firm sub- 
sample. 
BV has a stronger correlation with MV in loss-making firms then in profit firms, 
and setting negative BVs equal to zero does not influence its correlation with MV and 
other variables (see quarter Q1 vs. Q3). 
In the regression analysis that follows I use the same approach as in the TA- 
deflated case and eliminate top and bottom 0.5% of extreme values for the following 
regression variables: lagged-MV-deflated MV, lagged-MV-deflated BV, and lagged- 
MV-deflated PBT, lagged MV-deflated dividends. 
The difference between lagged MV and TA-deflated models is self-evident. The 
lag-MV deflated regressions (Table 4.5) have notably lower explanatory power and 
profits (PBT) multiples than TA-deflated regressions. 
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Profit making firms Loss making firms 
Dividend and non-Dividend Dividend Dividend and non-Dividend Dividend 
firms firms firms firms 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.886 0.884 0.824 0.646 0.584 0.395 
t-stat 43.015 42.756 32.086 12.682 11.422 3.881 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1/MV -123.228 -125.673 -268.525 1264.74 1032.28 1788.68 
t-stat -1.936 -1.977 -3.851 4.85 3.784 1.965 
p-value 0.053 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.049 
BV 0.091 0.095 0.041 0.35 0.504 0.13 
t-stat 4.528 4.651 1.95 6.773 7.507 2.777 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.005 
PBT 2.198 2.186 2.639 -0.527 -0.519 -0.304 
t-stat 11.211 11.131 11.973 -3.054 -2.978 -0.636 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.525 
PBT*Scale -0.052 -0.052 -0.053 0.043 0.055 0.02 
t-stat -4.216 -4.178 -4.416 1.862 2.329 0.428 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.063 0.020 0.668 
DIV 1.473 1.465 2.823 0.239 -0.78 8.439 
t-stat 2.408 2.394 3.222 0.148 -0.469 3.851 
p-value 0.016 0.017 0.001 0.882 0.639 0.000 
Adj. ER 0.181 0.175 0.683 -0.337 -0.265 0.106 
t-scat 1.428 1.375 3.223 -2.602 -2.197 0.615 
p-value 0.153 0.169 0.001 0.009 0.028 0.539 
No. of 
cases 12737 12737 11824 3691 3691 1143 
Adj. R- 
Square 12.90% 12.90% 16.00% 11.70% 13.30% 25.20% 
White adjusted (hctcroskcdasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below the regression 
coefficients. Models are scaled by one-year-lagged equity market value, is estimated for profit-making 
firms, and exclude the outliers. P1T* f(mv, _1) 
is the unsealed PR! ', where unsealing is computed by 
multiplying the scale-deflated P13T by the 5th order root of' the scale factor. This mitigates the effect of 
extreme values of'the un-deflated raw P13T, and also allows fin non-linearity in the tunettonal form of the 
scaled PUT coefficient. Coefficients which are statistically significant at the level or higher are 
highlighted. 
Models I through 3 relate to profit firm sub-samples. Models 4 through 6 relate to loss firms sub-samples. 
Models I, 2,4 and 5 include dividend paying and non-dividend firm-years, while models 3 and 6 are 
estimated for dividend-paying firms only. In Models 2,3,5 and 6 negative BVs are set to iero. 
I lowever, similar to the 'I'A-deflated model, PHI' coefficients 1161- loss III-ills are 
negative, have smaller absolute values, and statistically less significant than profit 
firms' P13'I' coefficients. 
Furthermore, similar to the TA-deflated tests, the book value coefficients fi)r 
loss-making firms have higher values and statistical significance. 
Low regression explanatory power and small in absolute value 'earning, 
response cocfficients', when the model has a `returns-earnings' specification, arc well 
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known phenomena in empirical accounting literature. `Pure' returns-earnings models 
are usually estimated on per share basis in order to capture the pure market performance 
only. Because the dependent variable in my model is the firm's current market 
capitalisation scaled by one year lagged market capitalisation, it captures both the pure 
market performance effect and the change-in-the-scale effect (e. g., issuance or 
repurchase of shares), and therefore the model has less straightforward interpretation. 
Recall, that setting negative BVs to zero would imply that negative BVs should 
have a valuation coefficient equal to zero, or, in other words, negative BVs have no 
valuation role. This conjecture is tested by means of running basic regressions with an 
additional dummy variable (dummy=l if BV: 50, and dummy=0 otherwise) and a BV 
interaction term (BV;,, t=BV if BV: 50, and BV;,, t=0 otherwise) both for the profit-firm 
sub-sample, and the loss-firm sub-sample. Results (Wald p-values are reported in Table 
1 of Appendix 4.6) indicate that in both the profit and loss-firm sub-samples, the 
coefficient on negative BV is not statistically different from zero. Consequently, setting 
negative BVs to zero is justified. This point gains further support when comparing 
Model 1 vs. Model 2, and Model 4 vs. Model 5. Thus, Models 1 and 2 parameters are 
virtually identical, and so are those of Models 4 and 5. 
For firms that pay dividends, dividends are positively and statistically 
significantly associated with the change in market capitalisation both in profit and loss 
sub-samples. 
4.4.1.2 Yearly and economic sector regression characteristics 
In this section I examine the yearly and economic sector-related characteristics 
of lagged MV-scaled model. Before analysing yearly regressions, it is important to 
emphasise again that because of deflation by the lagged MV, the nature of the model is 
changed and it is now a `mixture' of price-levels and returns-earnings model. Therefore 
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regression parameters might be expected to resemble those reported in literatures that 
use returns-based regressions. 
Recall that in the undeflated model the intercept is modelled as a linear function 
of scale (see Chapter 3), that is, Intercept: = ao + ao * scale, . When 
lagged MV is the 
scale, the intercept of the undeflated model is: Intercept ,= ao + ao * mv, _, . 
Consequently, the regression intercept in the deflated model would be the estimate of 
ao . Noting that the 
dependent variable is mvi, the inclusion of this intercept into the 
undeflated model would partially turn it into a `random walk with drift' model. That is: 
mv, = ao + ao * mv, _, + of 
* x, +u, 
i 
where x; and a; are vectors of valuation factors and the attached coefficients 
respectively. 
The mvt_I variable is somewhat different from the rest of possible deflators, 
because not only it does proxy for scale, but it is also a variable which is used as a 
regressor in the time-series regressions of market value. Although this fact might 
complicate the interpretation of the regression-estimated (in the deflated model) 
intercept ao, one can expect it to be positive and statistically significant because of the 
valuation role of mvt_I in time-series regressions of equity market value. 
Yearly regressions (Table 4.6) prove some of the above general theorisations. 
First of all, the explanatory power of yearly lagged MV-scaled regressions is lower than 
when TA is used as deflator. Nevertheless, the yearly patterns of the explanatory power 
in lag MV-scaled tests closely reflect those of the TA-scaled regressions. 
Secondly, in all 15 yearly regressions the intercept appears with a positive sign, 
is substantially stable across all years (with average value of 0.85), and is always 
statistically significant at least at the 0.1% level. 
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Intercept 1/MV BV PBT 
PBT x DIV Adj. ER No. of 
Adj. R- 
f(mv) Cases square 
1988 0.783 537.8 -0.003 1.764 -0.125 9.939 1.073 366 26.40% 
t-ratio 6.538 1.182 -0.030 2.204 -2.168 2.449 3.913 
p-value 0.000 0.238 0.976 0.028 0.031 0.015 0.000 
1989 0.894 -181.9 0.216 1.284 0.015 0.455 -0.044 903 11.30% 
t-ratio 11.596 -1.239 2.047 2.145 0.471 0.240 -0.109 
p-value 0.000 0.215 0.041 0.032 0.637 0.810 0.913 
1990 0.702 -44.2 0.021 1.048 0.065 -0.393 0.964 940 14.50% 
t-ratio 22.526 -1.718 0.691 2.559 3.462 -0.774 2.732 
p-value 0.000 0.086 0.489 0.011 0.001 0.439 0.006 
1991 0.710 -147.9 -0.011 1.842 0.001 5.548 -0.499 908 29.50% 
t-ratio 12.566 -0.614 -0.179 4.338 0.024 4.696 -3.044 
p-value 0.000 0.539 0.858 0.000 0.981 0.000 0.002 
1992 0.896 -382.5 0.000 3.830 -0.102 -0.819 0.022 853 20.10% 
t-ratio 16.349 -2 157 0.007 5.904 -2.432 -0.687 1.468 
p-value 0.000 0.031 0.994 0.000 0 015 0.492 0.142 
1993 0.859 -611.2 0.189 3.516 -0.114 7.794 2.818 895 
27.40% 
t-ratio 12.216 -3.005 4.209 3.522 -2.426 4.719 
1.876 
p-value 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.061 
1994 0.882 -184.8 0.072 4.659 -0.234 2.782 0.352 1011 
31.40% 
t-ratio 13.517 -1.095 1.244 5.359 -5.908 1.308 
0.224 
p-value 0.000 0.273 0.214 0.000 0.000 0.191 0.823 
1995 0.842 -302.5 -0.042 2.069 -0.065 4.699 -0.432 1050 18.50% 
t-ratio 15.440 -1.679 -0.864 3.507 -2.352 2.902 
4306 
p-value 0.000 0.093 0.387 0.000 0.019 0.004 0.759 
1996 0.937 -176.5 0.039 3.145 -0.056 2.276 1.129 1042 14.50% 
t-ratio 16.604 -0.761 0.536 4.510 -1.728 1.353 2.321 
p-value 0.000 0.447 0.592 0.000 0.084 0.176 0.020 
1997 0.841 187.3 -0.012 2.798 -0.084 3.835 1.144 1028 12.50% 
t-ratio 13.635 0.694 -0.236 3.698 -2 546 1.267 2.130 
p-value 0 000 0.488 0.813 0.000 0.011 0.205 0.033 
1998 0.819 853.4 -0.125 2.406 0.104 -1.013 1.311 993 16.30% 
t-ratio 11.232 2.093 -2.379 3.043 1.754 -0.599 3.142 
p-value 0.000 0.036 0.017 0.002 0.079 0.549 0.002 
1999 0.978 759.0 0.230 0.824 0.033 -1.776 -0.149 911 10.20% 
t-ratio 12.213 1.805 2.601 1.033 0.461 -0.854 -0.154 
p-value 0.000 0.071 0.009 0.302 0.645 0.393 0.877 
2000 1.183 551.9 0.235 2.491 -0.146 -5.298 0 950 800 7.60% 
t-ratio 16.065 1.080 2.427 3.065 -3.084 -3.189 1.142 
p-value 0.000 0.280 0.015 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.253 
2001 0.736 25.4 0.097 0.600 0.072 3.023 0.290 684 20.00% 
t-ratio 20.754 0.264 2.676 1.401 1.993 3.051 0.359 
p-value 0.000 0.792 0.007 0.161 0.046 0.002 0.720 
2002 0.664 238.1 0.126 0.336 0.177 2.581 0.456 350 32.50% 
t-ratio 13.624 0.821 2.947 0.422 3.112 2.379 0 727 
p-value 0 000 0.412 0.003 0.674 0.002 0.018 0.468 
White adjusted (hctcroskc(iasticity-consistem) t-ratios and p-Values are reported below each regression 
cocfticient. (uefficicu is which are statistically significant at the 94 level or higher are highlighted. 
Yearly regressions are scaled by one year lagged MV and are estimated for yearly samples that eyclu(le 
negative NIT cases and outliers. Negative BVs are set to ecru. PU I'* f(mv, i) is the unsealed PI3"f, where 
unsealing is computed by multiplying the scale-detlatcd I'll f by the 5th order root of the scale factor. 
This mitigates the eftcct of ext reme Valdes of the Lill-detlatcd raw Pill, and also allows for nun-linearity 
in the functional form of' the scaled NIT coefficient. 
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In these regressions intercept appears to be by far the most robust (and 
significant) regression parameter, and this fact demonstrates the `special' role that the 
lagged MV would play in the undeflated model28. 
With regards to the valuation factors included in the deflated model, none of 
them is an `apparent leader' in terms of value relevance. Thus, in the years 1988-1998 
PBT had positive and statistically significant multiples, but became not significant 
statistically in years 1999,2001 and 2002. Furthermore, these coefficients are 
substantially smaller in value than the corresponding coefficients from the TA-deflated 
yearly regressions. This reflects the fact that in the lagged MV-deflated model, PBT 
coefficients are closer to the returns-model's earnings response coefficients (ERC). A 
relatively lower ERC in returns-earnings models is a well-documented fact in the 
literature. 
With regard to equity book value and dividends, it is difficult to conjecture 
about these variables' theoretical role in the current model specification. Empirically, 
BV has clearly a weaker association with the dependent variable, and is statistically 
significant only in 7 out of 15 years. However, it is statistically significant in the years 
(last years of the sample period, 1998 through 2002) when PBT is not. Dividends are 
similarly `weak' in explaining the lagged MV-scaled MV, and are statistically 
significant in 7 years. 
The R-square values also show a similar trend to the TA-deflated models. 
In general terms, the industry specific regressions, reported in Table 4.7, exhibit similar 
characteristics. The lagged MV-scaled regressions' explanatory powers are distinctly 
lower than those for the TA-deflated industrial regressions, and so is the value of 
estimated PBT coefficients. 
28 One would be keen to examine the share of the explanatory power 'contributed' by this intercept and 
compare it with that of the model's other explanatory variables. This, however, would require estimating 
the deflated yearly regressions without intercept, creating the econometric problems of R-squares from 
no-intercept models being incomparable to R-squares from models that include intercept. 
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PBT x DIV Adj. ER No. of 
Adj. R- 
f(mv) Cases Square 
SIC 0 0.525 353.4 0.026 3.646 -0.356 10.950 0.533 98 33.30% 
t-ratio 4.341 0.883 0.308 2.184 -3.249 3.914 0.301 
p-value 0.000 0.379 0.759 0.032 0.002 0.000 0.764 
SIC 1 0.939 849.3 0.346 -0.665 0.077 -1.645 -0.026 332 19.90% 
t-ratio 14.662 1.871 4.075 -1.293 1.753 -0.716 -0.785 
p-value 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.197 0.081 0.474 0.433 
SIC 2 0.598 1186.0 0.271 0.405 0.047 4.681 0.789 646 20.90% 
t-ratio 9.651 2.359 3.422 0.754 1.142 3.212 1.287 
p-value 0.000 0.018 0.001 0.451 0.254 0.001 0.198 
SIC 3 0.827 -30.9 0.034 1.728 -0.006 3.832 1.214 2322 11.70% 
t-ratio 24.727 -0.725 1.056 4.035 -0.333 3.902 1.984 
p-value 0.000 0.468 0.291 0.000 0.739 0.000 0.047 
SIC 4 0.762 330.9 0.046 3.278 -0.020 -0.612 0.646 2960 20.70% 
t-ratio 21.467 1.854 1.200 8.590 -0.829 -0.623 2.338 
p-value 0.000 0.064 0.230 0.000 0.407 0.533 0.019 
SIC 5 0.772 418.3 -0.019 2.360 -0.039 5.594 -0.172 1052 18.30% 
t-ratio 10.920 1.729 -0.289 3.847 -1.240 2.675 -0.434 
p-value 0.000 0.084 0.773 0.000 0.215 0.007 0.665 
SIC 6 0.715 252.3 0.015 3.284 -0.095 3.592 0.428 1216 21.10% 
t-ratio 11.098 1.802 0.298 4.385 -1.512 2.134 0.849 
p-value 0.000 0.072 0.766 0.000 0.130 0.033 0.396 
SIC 7 0.712 611.0 0.141 1.396 0.119 3.521 1.703 1397 18.50% 
t-ratio 10.635 1.682 3.352 1.910 2.669 1.864 6.364 
p-value 0.000 0.092 0.001 0.056 0.008 0.062 0.000 
SIC 8 0.888 378.3 0.155 1.080 -0.015 1.785 1.791 283 6.70% 
t-ratio 7.943 0.977 2.120 1.400 -0.267 0.948 2.687 
p-value 0.000 0.329 0.035 0.163 0.790 0.344 0.008 
SIC 9 1.019 -453.1 0.130 2.950 -0.148 0.539 -0.312 2408 13.20% 
t-ratio 26.552 -5.712 2.548 5.996 -3.300 0.488 -0.692 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.001 0.626 0.489 
White adjusted (hctcroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below the regression 
coctlicients. ('octlicicnts which are statistically significant at the 5 Ievcl or higher are highlighted. 
Industrial regressions are scaled by one year lagged MV, and e\elude negativc PI3"I cases and outliers. 
Negative BVs are set to icro. PI3T* I(mv, i) is the unsealed PIt'I', where unscahng is computed by 
multiplying the scale-deflated P13T by the 5th order root of the scale factor. This mitigates the effect of 
extreme values of the un-deflated raw P13'1', and also allows for non-linearity in the functional form of the 
scaled PBT coefticicnt. 
* The employed industry SIC abbreviations are as follows: SICO Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, 
SICI - Mining; SIC2 - Construction; SIC3 Food, textile, paper and chemical products (i. e., two-digit 
SIC' codes of 20 through 29); SIC4 Manufacturing (i. e., two-digit SIC codes of 20 through 29); SI('S 
"Transportation, ('onurnLill icatioils, Electric, Gas, And Sanctuary Services; SI('6 Wholesasle Trade: SI('7 
Rclalc trade; SICS Finance, Insurance, and Real Istate: SI('9 Services. 
Furthermore, as in the case of' the yearly regressions, the only robust parameter 
in terms of its value and statistical significance across all industries is the intercept, 
while the other valuation factors are less so. 'T'hus I113'1' is statistically signil'ieant (at the 
5% level) in only 6 out of 10 industries, 13V is significant in 5 out of, 10, and I)IV is 
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significant in 5 out of 10 industries. The comparison of the TA and lagged MV-deflated 
industrial regressions reveals no consistency in the corresponding regression parameters 
and general results. 
In light of the results presented in this section and the theoretical difficulties 
associated with lagged MV deflated model specifications, I conclude that deflation by 
lagged MV creates unresolved ambiguities in terms of the deflated model's theoretical 
implications and hampers the interpretation of the empirical results. Therefore, I will not 
be reporting the results of the lagged MV-deflation in the empirical chapters on segment 
valuation. 
4.4.2 Using group sales as the deflator 
Group sales numbers are missing for 459 observations, reducing the sample to 
18,754 cases (before the elimination of outliers). When the remaining sample is split 
into industrial sub-samples, for the purposes of industrial analysis, some 39 
observations are further excluded due to missing information relating to the industrial 
classification of the firm. 
Two important facts should be underlined before the analysis of yearly and 
industrial valuation pattern. First, unlike lagged MV deflation, deflation by sales does 
not alter the model specification. Second, deflation by sales implicitly assumes that: (1) 
sales is the market's/investors' `universal' perception of what constitutes the notion of 
firm size; (2) there is no cross-sectional difference among sample firms with different 
characteristics (e. g., industrial affiliation, financial and operating structure, stage of life 
cycle, etc) in terms of the relationships between group sales and the firm's financial 
statement and market data. The second point implies that the relationships between sales 
and PBT (e. g., profit margin), sales and By, sales and equity market value, etc., is 
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similar across firms operating in diflerenl industries or firms that differ in some other 
respect. Realistically though, this assumption cannot hold in practice. 
Similarly, the first assumption might not he realistic either, as the whole notion of 
scale/size remains a controversial issue in the literature. I'hcrefore, one should be 
careful when interpreting the sales-deflated regression results. 
Panel A of Table 4.8 reports regression results for ten till'-based industries, and 
Panel B reports results for 16 yearly sub-samples. The industrial regression results 
demonstrate how different the industries are in terms of the pricing of specific financial 
statement information and the combined value relevance of' all accounting variables. 
Book values, earnings and dividends are substantially differently priced across different 
industries. In addition, the role of specific accounting fundamentals vary notably across 
different industries. 
Table 4.8 
Panel A: Industry-based regressions 
PBT No. 
Industry** Intercept 1/Sales BV* PBT x DIV Adj. ER of 
Adj. R- 
f(sales) cases 
Square 
sic0 0.291 194.6 1.221 2.953 -0.842 -12.606 -5.379 92 90.1% 
t-ratio 2.452 0.292 5.665 0.959 -2379 -1.074 -1.910 
P-value 0.016 0.771 0.000 0.341 0.020 0.286 0.060 
sicl -0.248 2424.3 1.229 5.655 -0.139 7.785 1.181 336 56.8% 
t-ratio -1.029 3.165 8.385 2.643 -1.201 1.648 0.813 
P-value 0.304 0.002 0.000 0.009 0.231 0.100 0.417 
sic2 0.027 2345.1 0.445 1.594 -0.048 10.392 -3.093 736 527% 
t-ratio 0.850 2.766 2.675 1.369 -0.742 4.231 -2.221 
P-value 0.395 0.006 0.007 0.171 0.458 0.000 0.026 
sic3 -0.352 -20.5 1.185 7.097 0.045 6.616 1.008 2589 46.6% 
I-ratio -5,047 -0.048 6 224 4,081 0.634 1.987 0.502 
P-value 0.000 0.961 0.000 0.000 0.526 0.047 0.616 
sic4 -0104 563.7 0.954 6.803 0.010 -2.269 -1.469 3325 42.5% 
t-ratio -2.672 1.118 5.129 8.800 0.244 -0.818 -1.184 
P-value 0.008 0.264 0.000 0.000 0.807 0.413 0.237 
sic5 0.246 4829.8 0.064 4.337 0.120 3.960 -2.246 1197 42.0% 
t-ratio 4.730 3.200 0.706 3.459 1.600 1.128 -1.131 
P-value 0.000 0.001 0.480 0.001 0.110 0.259 0.258 
sic6 0.024 415.8 0.942 3.663 -0.023 3.639 -3.319 1371 37.3% 
t-ratio 0.317 1.068 3.818 2.429 -0.209 0.386 -1.092 
P-value 0.751 0.286 0000 0.015 0 834 0 1i99 0 275 
(tablc is continucd on the next page) 
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sic7 0 007 2115.1 0.234 8.782 0.038 1.918 0.789 1566 69 2'7 
t-ratio 0,332 7.421 4.148 9.931 0.889 1.055 1.284 
P-value 0.740 0.000 0.000 0.000 0374 0.291 0.199 
sic8 0.275 3213.4 -0.073 3.026 0.064 12.292 1.073 203 66.9% 
t-ratio 2.413 5.235 -0.681 1.595 0.575 4.424 0.581 
P-value 0.017 0.000 0.497 0.112 0.566 0.000 0.562 
sic9 0.283 949.7 0.708 6.603 0.249 -8.603 -0.542 2812 31.7% 
1-ratio 5.574 2.058 7.544 5.429 1.920 -4 217 -D. 800 
P-value 0 000 0.040 0 000 0.000 0-055 0 000 0 424 
Panel B: Yearly regressions. 
PBT No. of Adj. R- Intercept 1/Sales BV* PBT x DIV Adj. ER cases Square f( f(sales) 
1987 -0 306 3890.7 0.597 6.167 0 063 16 500 4.513 354 55 4 
t-iatio -1.852 2.095 3.475 2.346 0 245 1.622 0.897 
P-value 0.065 0.037 0.001 0.020 0.806 0.106 0.370 
1988 -0.152 1829.0 0.957 4.889 -0.097 8.007 0.232 933 62.0% 
t-ratio -2.238 2.441 4.081 2.953 -1.136 1.948 0.289 
P-value 0.025 0.015 0.000 0,003 0.256 0.051 0.773 
1989 -0.159 347.7 1.090 5.570 0.055 -4.972 -3.125 1018 64.6% 
t-ratio -2.195 0.813 6.833 2.978 0.641 -0.817 -1.202 
P-value 0.028 0.416 0.000 0.003 0.522 0.414 0.229 
1990 -0.133 1419.3 0.414 6.192 0.116 -2.556 0.475 999 52.7% 
t-ratio -2.045 2.437 2.779 2.390 1.233 -0.344 1.073 
P-value 0.041 0.015 0.005 0.017 0.217 0.731 0.283 
1991 -0.010 903.2 0.525 3.803 0.070 4.586 -1.283 915 63.0% 
t-ratio -0 214 2.403 5.021 2.338 0.740 1.424 -1.222 
P-value 0 830 0.016 0.000 0.019 0 459 0.154 0.222 
1992 0.092 192.8 0.181 6.981 0.006 1.298 -2.321 848 58.0% 
t-ratio 2.130 0.378 1.614 4.104 0.068 0.385 -0.988 
P-value 0.033 0.706 0.107 0.000 0.946 0.701 0.323 
1993 0.133 260.5 0.394 6.891 -0.099 6.104 -2.811 918 54.1% 
t-ratio 2 906 0.627 3.175 3.148 -1.366 1 546 -0.833 
P-value 0.004 0.531 0.001 0.002 0.172 0.122 0.405 
1994 0.030 610.0 0.792 7.312 -0.214 4.390 -1.887 1074 60.6% 
t-ratio 0.578 1.000 3.589 4.242 -2.835 1.224 -0.615 
P-value 0.563 0.317 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.221 0 538 
1995 -0.015 1528.0 0.539 6.748 -0.061 -0.864 -5.446 1074 63.6% 
t-ratio -0.286 3.939 3.144 4.323 -0.811 -0.162 -1.355 
P-value 0.775 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.417 0.871 0.175 
1996 0.100 2547.6 0.431 9.631 -0.030 -2.576 1.868 1100 58.0% 
t-ratio 1.954 3.353 3342 5.480 -0.381 -0.681 2.338 
P-value 0.051 0.001 0.001 0.000 0 704 0.496 0.019 
1997 0.075 1505.0 0.866 7.474 -0.071 -4.089 -3.828 1137 42.9% 
t-ratio 1.048 1.632 3.826 4.191 -0.584 -1.061 -1429 
P-value 0.295 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.559 0.289 0.153 
1998 0.051 1630.0 0.425 8.762 0.218 -6.275 1.482 1047 33.3% 
t-ratio 0.700 1.643 3.201 4.163 1.716 -1.473 1.083 
P-value 0 484 0.100 0 001 0.000 0.086 0.141 0.279 
1999 0 158 1956.0 0.564 6 874 0.197 -3 068 -1.869 930 26.0% 
t-ratio 1510 1.607 3.427 3.165 1.377 -0.428 -0.696 
P-value 0.131 0.108 0.001 0.002 0169 0.669 0.487 
2000 0.221 2087.6 1 671 4.451 -0.018 -10.26 -3.704 825 41.2% 
t-ratio 2.1 16 2.245 8 316 2074 -0 124 -2.015 -1.163 
P-value 0.034 0.025 0000 0 038 O 901 O 044 0 : '45 
(1a1)lc is cuntinucd on the ncxt pagc) 
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2001 0.208 1912.9 0.895 3.493 -0.020 -3.578 -7.184 713 46.6% 
t-ratio 2.331 2.379 4.715 1.477 -0.138 -0.994 -1.076 
P-value 0.020 0.017 0.000 0.140 0.890 0.320 0.282 
2002 0.142 1411.6 0.491 4.789 0.085 4.033 2,691 360 47.3% 
t-ratio 2.956 3.408 4.241 1.556 0.748 1.370 0.705 
P-value 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.121 0.455 0.172 0.481 
Entire 0.060 1337.4 0.711 6.427 0.031 -1.785 -0.836 14245 43.3% period 
t-ratio 3.066 6.369 13.155 12.414 1.019 -1.355 -1.122 
P-value 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.308 0.176 0 262 
White adjusted (hetcroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below the regression 
coefficients. Coefficients which are statistically significant at the 5" io level are highlighted. Industrial and 
yearly samples only include the profit-making firms and exclude the outliers. Outliers are identified on 
the basis of the entire period sample, and are defined as top and bottom 0.5% of sale-deflated MV, I'll f, 
13V and Div. 
*Negative BVs are set to zero. 
** The employed industry SIC abbreviations are as follows: SICO Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; 
SICI Mining; SIC2 - Construction; SIC3 = Food, textile, paper and chemical products (i. e., two-digit 
SIC codes of 20 through 29); SIC4 - Manufacturing (i. e., two-digit SI(' codes of 20 through 29); SICS 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanctuary Services; SIC6 - Wholesasle Trade; SIC7 
Retale trade; SICS Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; SIC9 Services. 
Statistically, there are three industries where earnings have no valuation role: 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (SILO), Finance (SI('8), and Construction (S1(2). 
Recall, that these are the industries with the highest proportion of firms trading below 
book value (see Figure 4.12), implying that the market perceives these industries to 
have the lowest Iuture expected abnormal earnings. Bearing in mind that, in the context 
of the basic valuation model, earnings proxy for the future abnormal earnings, the lack 
of valuation relevance of earnings ill the three industries should not be a surprising 
result. The remaining financial statements value drivers (i. e., dividends and hook value) 
and the control variables also have very different pricing between industries. 
Industry-related differences in the explanatory power of the regressions are even 
more dramatic. In the rlgriculturc, 1, orestrt' and Eishing industry, the basic financial 
statement variables appear to explain 90'/)%, of the cross-sectional variation of the market 
value of equity, while in the SL'rric"es industry the Adjusted Rý is only 3 
The dynamics of' value relevance of financial statement numbers (Navel It ol, 
"Table 4.8) is, in essence, similar to that found in the TA and lagged MV-deflated yearly 
The regressions. c sales-deflated results confirm the previous finding that in the late 
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1990s there has been a substantial decline in the value relevance of financial statement 
numbers. In addition, the BV and PBT remain the two primary value drivers, being 
statistically significant in 15 and 14 out of 16 years, respectively. 
By and large, the sales-deflated regressions reported in Table 4.8 generate 
somewhat wider divergence in the results (across the yearly and industry-related sub- 
samples) than what has been found in the TA-deflated regressions. 
4.4.3 Using a composite scale factor as a deflator 
The analysis in the preceding sections demonstrates that empirical results can be 
substantially influenced by our choice of the scale proxy. Additional tests indicate that 
outliers (variables' extreme values) are also excessively influential because all scaled 
variables appear to have extremely peaked and right-skewed frequency distributions, 
engendering spurious correlations between variables. The analysis suggests that this 
situation is a scaling-driven phenomenon, in that extremely large (small) values of 
deflated variables are the result of extremely small (large) values of the size proxy. This 
is particularly true with regards to deflation by `sales', because sales might be 
disproportionately high/low in some firm-years. Because all variables are sales- 
deflated, regression variables are, in fact, ratios. For this reason there must exist some 
notional interval within which the ratios could be considered to have `normal' values. 
For example, it would be rather out of the ordinary for the MV-to-sales or PBT-to-Sales 
ratio (i. e., deflated MV or deflated PBT, respectively) to equal to 500, or 0.05. 
Deflation, however, does produce numbers of this degree of divergence. 
Furthermore, in a bad year, for instance, a large firm might report extremely low sales 
and very large PBT resulting from disposals, asset sales, etc. Note that in this case not 
only the un-deflated PBT but also the un-defalted equity book value would go up, so 
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that scaling by low sales will `inflate' both PBT and BV. In this case, sales is not 
representative of the true size of the firm. 
Elimination of extreme values (top and bottom 0.5%) of scaled variables might 
trim the long tail(s) yet this only slightly `normalises' frequency distributions and 
makes deflated variables look more proportional, as discussed above. This scale-driven 
problem in data appears to exist whichever scale-proxy is used, though in the TA- 
deflated model specification this problem is less severe. 
I will refer to the above problem as spurious scaling. In general, spurious scaling 
arises when the scale-proxy fails to manifest fairly the true scale of the firm. The 
empirical analysis demonstrates that whichever specific accounting or market variable is 
used as a deflator, it would necessarily generate a certain percentage of spuriously 
scaled firm-years. The good news is that one observation cannot be spuriously scaled 
across all alternative scale proxies. In other words, if TA is a spurious scale proxy for a 
given firm-year, it is likely that Sales or MV will do a better job of reflecting that firm- 
year's fair scale. 
This prompts the creation of a composite scale proxy, which will partially 
diversify away scaling deficiencies inherent in a particular scale proxy. I create a 
composite scale proxy by equally weighting and summing up three alternative scale 
proxies: MV, TA and Sales. The blended scale proxy is therefore: scale = (MV +TA 
+Sales)/3. It is implicit to this blended scale proxy, that every constituent variable 
equally merits for being regarded as a scale proxy. 
The benefits of using this blended scale proxy are: 
1. It recognises the complementary roles of various variables in reflecting the 
true size of the firm; 
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2. It accounts for three broad alternative perceptions of what firm size is, i. e., (i) 
the stock market based perception of size (MV), a balance sheet based perception of 
size (TA), and a product market based perception of size (Sales); 
3. It substantially diversifies away spurious scaling idiosyncrasies specific to a 
single variable-based deflator (see Appendix 4.5 for histograms of frequency 
distributions of the alternatively scaled regression variables); and 
4. It is measured in the same (monetary) units as the un-scaled variables, and 
also serves as a `numeraire' for firm size. 
Sections that follow examine the properties of composite-scaled regressions, for 
positive and negative PBT sub-samples, and yearly and industrial valuation patterns. 
Table 4.9 compares regression results between different sub-samples of profit 
and loss firms. A comparison of model 1 vs. 2, and model 4 vs. 5 indicates that setting 
negative BVs to zero does not change any of the regression parameters in the profit 
firms sub-sample, and only marginally affects the BV coefficient (making it even more 
value relevant), yet leaving unaffected the remaining regression parameters, in the loss 
firms sub-sample. In contrast to the results from the entire sample of profit firms in 
models 1 and 2, model 3 reveals that in dividend-paying profitable firms, dividends are 
positively associated with value and are highly statistically significant, while the BV 
coefficient is lower and statistically less significant. 
When firms report losses, the PBT coefficient has a much lower absolute value 
and level of statistical significance than in the case of profitable firms. This is a fairly 
common finding in the literature. However, this coefficient has a negative sign, which is 
rather unexpected, as this would suggest that the larger the loss, the higher is the firm 
value! Recall, that the same result was found in TA, lagged MV and Sales-deflated 
regressions. For dividend-paying loss-making firms (model 6) the negative PBTs are no 
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longcr in association with firm value, yet dividends appear to he statistically highly 
significant and positively associated with value. 
Table 4.9 
nti' ý. c «*(li. ý)+ai+ai*(BN, Is)Ha, *(1'Bl,: s)+ 
t u: i *ý /(. e)*(PRT 
/s)]+a, *(I)ll'/s)+a, *(Ar/jl'R! s)+ it, 
Profit making firms 
- 
Loss making firms 
-- ------------- Dividend and non- -- Dividend --- Dividend and non- Dividend 
Dividend firms firms Dividend firms firms 
Modell Model2 Model3 Model4 Mode15 Model6 
Intercept 0.640 0.637 0.587 1.040 0.976 0.467 
t-ratio 60.414 60.102 54.874 48.868 44.083 16.548 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Dummy -0.509 -0.512 -0.447 -0.897 -0.930 -0.483 
t-ratio -73.597 -74.501 -63.485 -57.582 -65.831 -27.456 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1/Scale 188.2 181.7 75.5 351.5 300.6 622.5 
t-ratio 2,655 2.543 1.206 7.288 6.935 4.440 
p-value 0.008 0.011 0.228 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BV 0.257 0.267 0.149 0.497 0.672 0.537 
t-ratio 16.636 17.276 9.391 20.797 27.364 14.508 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT 2.031 2.026 2.390 -0.242 -0.193 -0.062 
t-ratio 16.916 16.811 20.473 -3.377 -2.966 -0.596 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.551 
PBT*f(s) 0.041 0.041 0.039 0.043 0.047 -0.002 
t-ratio 4.604 4.531 4.595 4.425 5.055 -0.207 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.836 
DIV 0.391 0.385 2.586 -11.865 -11.769 2.523 
t-ratio 1.400 1.377 8.564 -15.828 -16.215 3.416 
p-value 0.161 0.168 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Adj. ER 0.212 0.206 0.569 0.208 0.237 0.171 
t-ratio 1.686 1.596 5.366 1.737 1.960 2.774 
p-value 0.092 0.111 0.000 0.082 0.050 0.006 
No. of cases 14213 14213 13146 3964 3964 1161 
Adj. R-Square 27.5% 27.5% 30.1% 32.9% 33.2% 37.4% 
While adjusted (hcteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratius and p-values are reported below each regression 
coefficient. C'oef'ficients which are statistically significant at the 5 level or higher are highlighted. 
Models are scaled by the composite scale factor, which is computed as: scale (MV i "I'A i Sales)3 
Models are estimated for profit-making firms and exclude the outliers. I'll 1* flscale) is the unsealed 143 1'. 
where unsealing is computed by multiplying the scale-deflated PI3'I' by the 5th order rout of the scale 
factor. This mitigates the effect of extreme values of the un-deflated raw PU l', and also allows for non- 
linearity in the functional form of the scaled PI3'I' coefficient. Dummy I if market-to-hook ratio is greater 
than unity, and _rru otherwise. Models 1 through 3 relate to profit firm sub-samples. Models 4 through 6 
relate to loss firms sub-samples. Models I. 2,4 and S include di\ idend paying and non-di\ idend firm- 
years, while models 3 and 6 are estimated for dividend-paying firms only. In Models 2,3, i and 6 
negative 13Vs are set to iero. 
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In the loss-firms sub-samples it is the BV variable that has the largest statistical 
significance and positive association with firm value, suggesting that BV (followed by 
dividends in dividend-paying loss making firms) is the major value driver. In profit- 
firms sub-samples, whether dividend-paying or not, it is the PBT which is the major 
valuation factor, while BV and dividends are of second and third-order importance. 
Some other general conclusions can also be drawn irrespective of the firms' 
financial results. Firstly, all results strongly support the theoretical construct, developed 
in Chapter 3, that a positive relation exists between the value of the intercept in an un- 
deflated model and the scale of the firm. The indication of this is the positive value and 
high statistical significance of the intercept in all of the six scale-deflated models above. 
Secondly, regardless of the sign of financial results, the PBT coefficient is not a 
cross-scale constant, but is scale-variant. That is, the PBT coefficient, as indicated by 
the value and level of statistical significance of the PBT*f(s) variable, tends to have 
larger absolute value for firms of larger scale. Thirdly, firms that trade below BV have 
lower valuation than what my model would predict if not account was taken of this 
premium/discount. This is indicated by highly statistically significant negative values of 
the dummy variable. 
The above results are still observable when the entire sample is split into 16 
yearly sub-samples. However, in the yearly regressions, as reported in Table 4.10, some 
additional features become apparent. 
Among the three value drivers (BV, PBT, Div) PBT appears to be the dominant 
valuation factor, with BV and Dividends `lagging' behind. Furthermore, the yearly 
`dynamics' of the PBT valuation seems to reflect the general economic performance of 
the UK economy: high in good years, and low in bad years. 
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1987 0.557 -0.456 710 0.138 2.845 0.006 0.394 0.561 340 22.2% 
t-ratio 6.976 -9.305 2.592 1.179 3.450 0.113 0.173 1.002 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.239 0.001 0.910 0.863 0.317 
1988 0.462 -0.379 216 0.211 3.976 -0.090 1.228 0.130 900 30.2% 
t-ratio 10.331 -11.241 0.647 3.111 8.622 -2.873 0.958 0.423 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.517 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.338 0.672 
1989 0.473 -0.404 390 0.230 2.279 -0.024 4.689 -0.061 971 29.5% 
t-ratio 11.968 -13.666 1.020 3.951 5.582 -0.755 3.101 -0.305 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.308 0.000 0.000 0.451 0.002 0.760 
1990 0.327 -0.365 253 0.402 1.985 0.060 1.511 0.384 966 43.2% 
t-ratio 9.671 -16.438 0.936 9.041 5.451 2.078 1303 2.118 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.349 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.193 0.034 
1991 0.382 -0.377 -58 0.350 1.947 0.087 4.096 0.838 874 46.6% 
t-ratio 12.958 -16.528 -0.311 7.127 4.773 2 584 4.457 3.196 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.756 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.001 
1992 0.444 -0.392 -379 0.222 3.107 0.034 3.563 0.280 789 47.3% 
t-ratio 13.341 -13.970 -2.366 3.811 6.395 0.954 3.423 0.496 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.340 0.001 0.620 
1993 0.510 -0.381 -549 0.085 3.787 0.008 6.056 0.230 861 43.8% 
t-ratio 13.317 -12.370 -2.661 1.385 6.821 0.297 4 822 0.272 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.166 0.000 0.766 0.000 0.786 
1994 0.416 -0.356 -282 0155 4.622 -0.021 6.017 0.926 1000 45.3°/u 
t-ratio 14.019 -13.304 -1.197 2.997 9 755 -0.803 5.712 1.262 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.231 0.003 0.000 0.422 0.000 0.207 
1995 0.365 -0.307 -250 0.080 4.135 -0.021 5.794 -1.476 1014 44.6% 
t-ratio 11.347 -11.302 -0.865 1.566 7.790 -0.770 5.700 -1.331 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.387 0.117 0.000 0.441 0.000 0.183 
1996 0.530 -0.334 -46 0.002 4.408 0.028 2.777 1.008 1023 34.3% 
t-ratio 15.607 -11.019 -0.255 0.037 9.828 0.846 2.305 3.894 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.798 0.970 0.000 0.397 0.021 0.000 
1997 0.667 -0.424 206 -0.072 3.440 0.047 1.197 0.997 1047 25.9% 
t-ratio 16.915 -13.499 0.967 -1.196 7.411 1.359 0.991 2.416 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.232 0 000 0 174 0.321 0.016 
1998 0.770 -0.473 442 -0.086 1.428 0.100 1.873 0.879 950 26.7% 
t-ratio 16.744 -17.741 2.506 -1.454 3.363 3174 1.587 3.070 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.146 0.001 0.002 0113 0.002 
1999 0.884 -0.545 213 0.017 0.596 0.093 -0.347 -0173 839 21.5% 
t-ratio 16.349 -17.215 1.151 0.253 1.175 2.674 -0.294 -0.201 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.800 0.240 0.007 0.769 0 841 
2000 1.053 -0.682 -125 0.216 0.931 0,016 -4.603 0.670 715 27.4% 
t-ratio 18.899 -23.226 -0.716 3.078 1.673 0.443 -3.561 2 031 
P- value 0.000 0.000 0.474 0.002 0.094 0.657 0.000 0 042 
(tahlc is crnntinucd on the next page) 
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2001 0.711 -0.561 212 0.268 1.257 0 066 -0.951 0.073 595 28.6 % 
t-ratio 14.261 -20.132 1.150 4,106 1.723 1 626 -0.778 0 049 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.000 0.085 0.104 0.437 0.961 
2002 0.477 -0.411 776 0.253 1.329 0.095 4.858 0.374 316 424% 
1-ratio 9.031 -12.510 1.851 3.634 2 157 2.167 3300 0 407 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.032 0.031 0.001 0.685 
I Icterosckedasticity-robust (White-adjusted) t-ratius ale reported below coefficients. Coefficients which 
are statistically significant at the 5" level or higher are highlighted. 
All variables in the reported models are dcllated by the composite scale proxy, which is computed as. 
scale (MV I TA I Sales)/3. Observations with missing values for TA or Sales are excluded. 'fop and 
bottom 0.5'%% of all variables are excluded as outliers. Outliers are identified for the entire pooled sample. 
P13"1'*Scale is an unsealed raw P13 1', and is included in regression to indicate whether the regression 
coefficient on P13T in the un-deflated model is a function ofscale. P13T*Seale is computed by inultiplying 
the scale-deflated P13T by the 5"' order root of the scale factor. The 5'1' order root of the scale is used, 
instead of the raw scale, in order to mitigates the possible uverintluential effect of extreme values of 
unsealed P13T, and to allow for non-linearity in the functional fiirm of the scales P13T coefficient. 
Dummy I if market-to-book ratio is greater than unity, and zero otherwise. All yearly regressions include 
only dividend-paying profit firms (positive P1'I'), and negative 13Vs are set to rero. 
Figure 4.22 demonstrates that capitalisation of earnings was low in periods of 
economic distress (1990-91 and 1999-2002) and high in years of strong economic 
growth (1993-1997). 
Figure 4.22 
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Furthermore, during the period 1999-200 1, the most recent period of economic 
downturn, earnings seem to entirely have lost their valuation role, as P13"1' coefficients in 
these years are not statistically significant at the 5`%o level. Association ol'dividends wilh 
firm value is also time-variant, but the link with the t IK general economic pcrförmancc 
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is less obvious. Dividends are highly statistically significant and positively associated 
with value in years 1991-1996, while in more recent years dividends are generally not 
statistically significant, and for the year 2000 dividends show statistically significant 
and negative association with value. Unlike the straightforward valuation role that the 
literature assigns to earnings (this was discussed in Chapter 3), there is no consensus in 
the literature about dividends' valuation role. My empirical evidence indicates that not 
only the degree of association with firm value, but in a more broader cerise the role of 
dividends in equity valuation is changing through time. Further theoretical and 
empirical exploration of this issue might be a useful exercise, yet it is beyond the scope 
of this study. 
While PBT is statistically significant in 13 out of 16 years, BV is significantly 
associated with value only in 9 years. Furthermore, the better the general economic 
outlook of the country, the less value relevant is By. In other words, the results show 
that in `bad' economic years (1990-1992 and 2000-2002), BVs are positively associated 
with value and are statistically significant, while in most of years when economic 
growth was strong (1993,1995-1998) BVs were value-irrelevant. When all three value 
drivers (PBT, BV and Dividends) are examined jointly, it appears that throughout the 16 
year sample period the role of the major value factor(s) have been alternating among 
these variables. 
The dynamics of the explanatory power of yearly regressions shows a distinct 
variation in the joint ability of financial statement data to explain the firm's equity 
market value. In the fist half of the 1990s the explanatory power is substantially higher 
than in the second half of 1990s. This result persists throughout all our model 
specifications and deflation methods, and is also in line with findings of Core et al. 
(2003) regarding the relative importance of financial statement data to firm valuation in 
the periods of `old' and `new' economy. Qualitatively identical results in respect of the 
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regression explanatory power, as well as PBT, BV and dividend valuation are observed 
in TA-deflated and Sales-deflated regressions. 
The yearly regression results support the general valuation characteristics 
observed in the total sample. That is, as it was in the entire sample, all yearly results 
indicate that a positive relation exists between the value of the intercept in an un- 
deflated model and the scale of the firm. The indication of this is the positive value and 
high statistical significance of the intercept in all 16 years. Furthermore, firms that trade 
below BV have lower valuation than what the model would predict if no account was 
taken of this premium/discount. This is indicated by highly statistically significant 
negative values of the dummy variable in all yearly regressions. 
Finally I investigate valuation differences across industries. Figure 4.23, which 
is based on the results reported in Table 4.11, presents clear evidence of sharp 
differences existing across industries in how accounting information maps into the 
firm's value. The overall ability of our scale-deflated accounting-based valuation model 
to explain cross-sectional variation in the firm's value varies substantially across 
industries, and these patters are similar to TA-deflated regressions. 
Relative valuation of PBTs and dividends varies substantially across different 
industries. Thus earnings have lower capitalisation in such `basic' industries as 
`Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing', 'Mining', 'Construction' and, surprisingly, in the 
'Finance, Insurance and Real Estate' sector. PBTs from the Wholesale Trade', 'Retail 
Trade' and 'Transportation, Communications, Electric, etc' sectors have the highest 
capitalisation. 
Results in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.23 are remarkably similar to those where a 
different scale factor, total assets, was used. This reconfirms the robustness of the 
differences in how investors perceive and capitalise earnings of firms operating in 
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dilicrent industrics. 'Flic cross-ind(Istry diffcrcntial pricing of' carnings might provide '111 
cxhlanation with regard to the valuation of shecific busificss Segment Operations 
Table 4.11 
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SIC 0 0.362 -0.465 402 0.622 0.395 -0.284 12.034 -1.101 101 6&9% 
t-ratio 5.354 -9.787 1.187 5.843 0.581 -2.418 3.529 -1.143 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.238 0.000 0.563 0.018 0.001 0.256 
SIC 1 1.132 -0.637 1429 -0.001 0999 -0.061 1.730 1.440 217 29.9% 
t-ratio 7.760 -10.484 1.898 -0.011 1.401 -1.803 0.661 2.048 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.992 0.163 0.073 0.509 0.042 
SIC 2 0.258 -0.331 485 0.558 0.891 -0.002 5.955 0.043 707 49.9% 
t-ratio 8.527 -18.532 1.472 7.093 2.048 -0.056 5.169 0.070 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.141 0.000 0.041 0.955 0.000 0.945 
SIC 3 0.677 -0.441 463 -0.004 1.426 0.106 2.381 0.970 2507 31.6% 
t-ratio 22.809 -25.485 3.058 -0.080 5.262 5.626 3.385 3.036 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.936 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 
SIC 4 0.602 -0.358 -53 -0.034 2.703 0.023 2.471 0.564 3170 34.5% 
t-ratio 27.548 -28.302 -0.476 -0.861 12.310 1.416 3.919 2.792 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.634 0.389 0.000 0.157 0.000 0.005 
SIC 5 0.620 -0.370 796 -0.066 1.964 0.031 6.880 0.371 1129 26.0% 
t-ratio 17.305 -12.866 2.321 -1.134 5.203 1.566 6.803 1.705 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.257 0.000 0.117 0.000 0.088 
SIC 6 0.411 -0.334 258 0.080 2.977 0.077 3.115 0.838 1279 34.8% 
t-ratio 16.683 -14.378 3.252 1.574 7.461 2.521 2.783 2.011 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.116 0.000 0.012 0.005 0.044 
SIC 7 0.381 -0.419 143 0.310 4.110 0.017 3.299 0.632 1478 44.7% 
t-ratio 15.537 -24.116 0.731 9.076 10.852 0.774 3.754 2.410 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.465 0.000 0.000 0.439 0.000 0.016 
SIC 8 0.216 -0.377 2222 0.248 1.013 0.119 9.805 -1.178 183 62.4% 
t-ratio 4.445 -6.296 6.019 2.842 1.124 1.835 4.563 -1.381 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.262 0.068 0.000 0.169 
SIC 9 0.856 -0.564 -243 0.176 1.672 0.109 -1.152 0.486 2415 21.7% 
t-ratio 28.960 -30.140 -2.709 5.268 4.449 2.561 -1.815 1.385 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.070 0.166 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below each regression 
coefficient. Coefficients which are statistically significant at the 5 le el or higher are highlighted. 
Industrial models are scaled by the composite scale fäctor, which is computed as: scale 
(MV+'I'A-ISalcs)/3. All models are estimated for profit-making firms and exclude the outliers. PI3"I'* 
f(scalc) is the unsealed PHI', where unsealing is computed by multiplying the scale-deflated PHI by the 
5th order root of the scale factor. This mitigates the effect of extreme values of the Lill-deflated racy P131', 
and also allows for non-linearity in the functional form of the scaled PHI' coefficient. All regressions 
include only dividend-paying profit firsts (positiyc PHI'), and negative HVs are set to icro. 
* The employed industry SIC abbreviations are as follows: SIC() Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing: 
SICI Mining: SIC2 Construction: SI('i Food, textile, paper and chemical products (i. c., 1"o-digit 
SIC codes of 2O through 29): SI('4 Manufacturing (i. e., two-digit SIC codes of'_) through 29): SI('S 
'transportation, ('onununicalions, Electric, Gas, And Sanctuary Services: SI('O \V'holesaslc'trade: SIC7 
Retale trade: SI('S Finance, Insurance, and Real Istate: SI('9 Services. 
", Valuation of line-of-business segments is addressed in chapter 6. 
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Figure 4.23 
Regression coefficients and R-Squares by Industries 
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* The employed industry SIC abbreviations are as follows: SICO = Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; 
SICI = Mining; SIC2 = Construction; SIC3 = Food, textile, paper and chemical products (i. e., two-digit 
SIC codes of 20 through 29); SIC4 = Manufacturing (i. e., two-digit SIC codes of 20 through 29); SIC5 = 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanctuary Services; SIC6 = Wholesasle Trade; SIC7 
= Retale trade; SIC8 = Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; SIC9 = Services. 
Dividends appear to be the `strongest' valuation factor, as its coefficients are 
highly statistically significant in 8 out of 10 industries, compared to 7 our of 10 
statistically significant industrial earnings coefficients. Furthermore, all statistically 
significant dividend coefficients are positively associated with firm value. Both in TA- 
deflated and in the current model specification dividends paid by 'Services' firms 
appear at the lowest end of association with firm value. Furthermore, although not 
statistically significant, dividends coefficient in this sector appears with a negative sign. 
In contrast to the 'Services' sector, dividends paid by 'Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing' firms have the highest valuation (i. e., highest dividend multiplier), while 
earnings multiplier in this sector is not statistically significant. Further statistical 
analysis (not reported) provide some indication that across the majority of industries 
dividends (in the dividend-paying samples) are at least as value relevant as earnings, 
while book values are less relevant in most of the industries. The dividend-paying 
condition is emphasised because this result is no longer observable when regressions are 
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estimated on industrial samples that pool both dividend-paying and non-dividend firms. 
In the latter case, it is the earnings that become the major value driver. 
The ability of our simple accounting numbers-based model to explain the cross- 
sectional variation in firm value also varies substantially across industries. In some 
economic sectors it appears to explain nearly 70% of the variation in dependent 
variable, while in others the adjusted R-Square is less than 30%. Thus the accounting- 
based valuation model works consistently (across alternative ways of scaling) better for 
'Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing' and 'Finance, Insurance and Real Estate' sectors, 
and worse for the 'Services' sector. This evidence, perhaps, provides a summary 
measure of the reliability of asset numbers, and/or the quality and permanence of 
earnings numbers across different industries. 
Finally, as was the case in the yearly regressions, the positive sign and high 
statistical significance of intercepts in all scale-deflated industrial regressions indicate 
that the intercept in an un-deflated model is not a cross-scale constant, but varies with 
the firm's scale. Industrial regression analysis also reconfirms the previous finding that 
firms trading below BV have lower valuation than what our model would predict if no 
account was taken of this premium/discount. This is indicated by highly statistically 
significant negative values of the dummy variable in all yearly regressions. 
4.4.4 Testing the impact of the outliers and the variables' extreme values 
Across all alternative scale-proxies, deflation by the `blended scale' proxy 
produces the most robust regression parameters when different levels of variables' 
extreme values are marked and eliminated as outliers. Because it is the actual values of 
segment-level earnings coefficients that we will be comparing (to draw segment 
valuation inferences) during the segment-level analysis, the robustness of regression 
parameters, to the researcher's discretion over the choice of a threshold for identifying 
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and eliminating outliers, is of vital importance. 'I'hc `blended scale' proxy is the only 
deflator that produces results which arc by far less sensitive to the elimination of 
di f ercnt percentages of' extreme observations than any other dc flator. 
Table 4.12 reports basic regression results where diflcrent percentages offextreme 
observations are being eliminated from the sample. 
Table 4.12 
nn/s=noo *(1/s)+(Ii +ai *(13V /s")+a,,, ls)+ 
+a,, i 
*[T(s)*(PBT, ls)J+a, *(DII'ls)+a, *(ArljliRls)+ir, 
Percentage of Variables' Extreme Values Eliminated as Outliers 
0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Models Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept 0.679 
t-ratio 42.403 
p-value 0.000 
Dummy -0.490 
t-ratio -50.9 
p-value 0.000 
1/Scale 140.10 
t-ratio 2.212 
p-value 0.027 
BV 0.157 
t-ratio 8.299 
p-value 0.000 
PBT 1.684 
t-ratio 10.912 
p-value 0.000 
PBT*f(s) 0.047 
t-ratio 4.014 
p-value 0.000 
Dividends 1.009 
t-ratio 1.411 
p-value 0.158 
Adj. ER 0.183 
t-ratio 1.160 
p-value 0.246 
No. of cases 13432 
Adj. R2 26.9% 
0.615 0.595 0.587 0.582 0.571 0.556 0.556 
55.300 55.219 54.874 54.541 53.736 53.481 52.894 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
-0.454 -0.449 -0.447 -0.445 -0.442 -0.439 -0.437 
-64.3 -63.6 -63.5 -63.3 -63.0 -63.485 -62.723 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
107.70 88.60 75.50 77.20 55.50 38.10 52.10 
1.747 1.418 1.206 1.222 0.880 0.602 0.828 
0.081 0.156 0.228 0.222 0.379 0.547 0.408 
0.133 0.143 0.149 0.152 0,163 0.183 0.179 
8.419 9.054 9.391 9.476 10.066 11.471 11.014 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2.063 2.269 2.390 2.458 2.583 2.672 2.708 
17.158 19.303 20.473 21.019 22.175 23.104 23.136 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.045 0.042 0.039 0.040 0.038 0.034 0.035 
5.276 4.951 4.595 4.749 4.529 4.144 4.246 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2.816 2.728 2.586 2.457 2.238 2.073 1.897 
9.315 8.939 8.564 8.114 7.458 7.028 6.326 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.539 0.565 0.569 0.584 0.582 0.519 0.486 
4.806 5.255 5.366 5.490 5.655 4.957 4.479 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
13324 13212 13146 13076 12952 12793 12672 
28.7% 29.8% 30.1 %, 30.3% 30.6% 31.3% 31.0% 
White adjusted (hetcroske(iasticity-consistent) 1-ratios and p-values are reported belay each rewression 
coeltieicnt. ('oefficients which are statistically significant at the 5 Icyel or higher are highlighted. All 
regressions are scaled by the composite scale factor. Model I includes all observations, i. e., no cases are 
excluded. Model 2 excludes cases with top and bottom 0.2 extreme values of MV, Piaf, ItV and non- 
/cro Dividends. Model 3 does so for the extreme 0.4",, o('thesc variables' values, etc. 
All regressions itic Iude only dividend-paying profit-making firms, and negative ItVs are set to /CIO. 
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The eight models of Table 4.12 demonstrate that the biggest `jump' in regression 
parameters occurs when the top and bottom 0.2% of firm-years are eliminated as 
outliers, while the effect of subsequent eliminations on regression parameters 
diminishes gradually. There is a slightly increasing (decreasing), yet at a diminishing 
rate, trend of the value of PBT (Dividend) coefficients, when more of extreme cases are 
eliminated. However, this change is more likely to reflect certain valuation 
characteristics of accounting numbers, rather than being an econometric phenomenon3o 
For reasons of comparability with results reported in other studies, all tests reported in 
the further empirical analysis chapters are done with the 0.5% trimming. 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The primary objective of this chapter has been to examine the general 
characteristics of the properties of the operationalised valuation model, when applied to 
firm-level accounting value drivers. In the process of this investigation, a wide range of 
hypotheses and contexts have been empirically tested in order to identify those which 
impact on the empirical relationship between the equity market values and financial 
statement variables. 
Prior to addressing the main objective, I have extensively reviewed and analysed 
(i) the yearly and industry-specific characteristics of the sample employed in this study, 
and (ii) the descriptive statistics of variables used in subsequent regression analysis. 
This descriptive analysis has revealed some important contexts, which substantiate the 
subsequent empirical results related to the primary objective of this chapter. 
30 The existing literature [e. g., Hayn (1995), Collins et al. (1997)] holds that value relevance and pricing 
of earnings is linked to the level of their (ab)normality. That is, the capitalisation and value relevance of 
earnings is higher when earnings are more normal. The elimination of a larger percentage of outliers, 
which include abnormally high/low earnings, increases the proportion of normal earnings left in the 
sample, and, therefore, increases the pricing and value relevance of earnings. Because dividends are more 
informative when other value drivers are perceived to be of a lower persistence (e. g., abnormally high or 
low earnings), the decrease of the value relevance and pricing of dividends can be expected when more 
normal earnings constitute the sample. 
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The final sections of the chapter have dealt with issues of robustness of the 
empirical results, such as, the results' sensitivity to the choice of alternative scale- 
deflators, and/or threshold applied for eliminating the outliers. 
The empirical analysis (and the results) in this chapter is fundamental for taking 
the investigation further on to the segmental level. The results, in its own right, appear 
to tell an interesting story about the contexts affecting the value relevance of specific 
accounting variables. Below I provide a brief summary of the empirical tests' results. 
With regard to the explanatory power of the regression (the Adjusted R-Square), 
results suggest that the operationalised model performs differently across different 
economic sectors and periods. For instance, the explanatory power for the financial 
sector firms is more than twice as high as that of the mining sector. Results also reveal a 
peculiar historical pattern of the R-Square: it had a steadily increasing trend before 
1995, and a sharply declining trend in the second half of the 1990s. The model also 
explains more of the cross-sectional variation in equity market value when (i) firms 
trade at a discount to book value, (ii) firms pay dividends, and (iii) when the reported 
PBTs are positive. 
The value relevance of PBT depends on its sign. The reported losses appear not to 
be value relevant, yet when the PBT is positive, it has a robustly positive and 
statistically significant value association. In addition, when the reported PBT is positive, 
the magnitude of the PBT coefficient appears to be positively related to the size of the 
firm. The capitalisation of the PBT varies substantially across different economic 
sectors, being particularly large in the services and trade-related sectors, and notably 
small in the finance, construction and agriculture related sectors. The capitalisation of 
the PBT has also varied substantially throughout the sample period, yet without a 
particular trend. Results also indicate that the PBT tends to have little or no valuation 
role when the firm trades below its book value. 
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Book value of equity is, in general, a value relevant factor, but the extent of its 
value association (valuation importance) varies considerably across the industries and 
the sample years. It becomes the major value driver when the firm reports losses, and/or 
trades below the book value. However, negative book values have no association with 
value. 
By and large, results indicate that dividends are a key value driver and, in the 
majority of situations, are positively associated with the firm equity value. Dividends 
display a higher association with firm value when firms report negative BVs and/or 
PBTs. However, there are circumstances when dividends appear to play contrasting 
valuation roles: they are positively (negatively) related to the firm value when firms 
trade at a premium (discount) to book value. Finally, results indicate that the role played 
by dividends in equity valuation (or the value association of dividends) varies sharply 
both across the ten industry groups and different years of the sample period. 
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APPENDIX 4.1 
The following Extel reference details, financial statement and market data is collected 
for each company: 
1. Extel reference details 
Extel Number 
Company Name 
Former Name 
Year Final 
Industry (according to FTSE Global Classification System) 
SIC Industry (according to Standard Industrial Classification System) 
Status (dead or live) 
2. Financial Statement Data 
2.1. Firm-level data: 
Sales (i. e. group sales) 
Profit Before Tax (group profit before tax) 
Net Assets (group net assets) 
Total Assets (group total assets) 
Debt (group total debt) 
Total Shareholders' Equity 
Ordinary Shareholders' Equity 
Net Income 
Dividends for the year 
Ordinary Dividends 
Sales Growth 
2.2. Segment-level data 
2.2.1. Profit Before Tax (PBT) by geographical origin of profits: 
PBT - UK 
PBT - Europe (excluding UK) 
PBT - America 
PBT - Asia 
PBT - Middle East and Africa 
PBT - Rest (this is a balancing item that includes intra-group profits, discontinued 
operations, unidentified geographical locations, central cost allocatioin, 
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exceptional charges, etc., and equates group PBT and the sum of segment-level 
PBTs) 
2.2.2. Sales by geographical origin of sales: 
SALES - UK 
SALES - Europe (excluding UK) 
SALES - America 
SALES - Asia 
SALES - Middle East and Africa 
SALES - Rest (this is a balancing item that accounts for intra-group sales, 
discontinued operations, sales from unidentified geographical locations, etc., and 
equates group sales and the sum of segment-level sales) 
2.2.3. Net Assets (NA) by geographical location of assets: 
NA-UK 
NA - Europe (excluding UK) 
NA - America 
NA - Asia 
NA - Middle East and Africa 
NA - Rest (this is a balancing item that reflect intra-group net assets, discontinued 
operations, unidentified geographical locations, unallocated net assets, etc., and 
equates group NA and the sum of segment-level NAs) 
3. Firm-level data: 
Share Price at Period End 
Number of Shares at Balance Sheet date 
Market Capitalization at Balance Sheet date 
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APPENDIX 4.3 
Panel A 
Descriptive statistics on key regression variables when only profit firm-years, 
when total sample is restricted only to profit firm-years. 
Only positive PBT cases, and excluding outliers' 
MV/TA BV/TA PBT/TA PBT 1/TA DIV/TA** 
Mean 1.139 0.458 0.109 50585.284 4.86E-05 0.032 
Median 0.859 0.460 0.095 5232 1.84E-05 0.027 
Standard 0.990 0.196 0.074 197018.1 0.0001 0.052 
Deviation 
Kurtosis 11.854 1.627 2.677 175.232 166.903 8874.419 
Skewness 2.855 -0.490 1.348 10.704 9.401502 85.261 
Minimum 0.023 -0.667 0.001 3 6.52E-09 8.35E-05 
Maximum 8.985 0.955 0.490 6029000 0.003 5.413 
Count 14496 14496 14496 14496 14496 13379 
* outliers are defined as top and bottom 0.5% of MV/TA, BV/TA and PBT/TA values 
** only dividend-paying firm years are included 
Pearson Correlation matrix 
MV/TA BV/TA PBT/TA PBT 1/TA 
MV/TA 1 
BV/TA 0.090 1 
PBT/TA 0.597 0.059 1 
PBT 0.052 -0.073 0.064 1 
1/TA 0.110 0.112 0.079 -0.113 1 
DIV/TA * 0.217 0.048 0.284 0.033 0.045 
* coefficients are computed for only dividend-paying firms 
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Panel B 
Descriptive statistics on key regression variables when only profit firm-years, 
when total sample is restricted only to loss firm-years. 
Only negative PBT cases, and excluding outliers * 
MV/TA BV/TA PBT/TA PBT 1/TA DIV/TA"' 
Mean 1.702 0.369 -0.307 -25927 0.0002 0.017 
Median 0.659 0.421 -0.127 -2325 5.58E-05 0.012 
Standard 3.094 0.569 0.605 280341 0.0006 0.019 
Deviation 
Kurtosis 32.381 51.886 59.918 1504 380.056 65.711 
Skewness 4.837 -5.528 -6.439 -36 15.329 6.188 
Minimum 0.016 -7.576 -8.987 -1.4E+07 5.8E-09 2.63E-05 
Maximum 37.446 0.984 -0.001 -5 0.020 0.272 
Count 4207 4207 4207 4207 4207 1182 
* outliers are defined as top and bottom 0.5% of MV/TA, BV/TA and PBT/TA 
values. 
** only dividend-paying firm years are included 
Pearson Correlation matrix 
MV/TA BV/TA PBT/TA PBT 1/TA 
MV/TA 1 
BV/TA 0.077 1 
PBT/TA -0.236 0.232 1 
PBT 0.026 0.002 0.009 1 
INA 0.307 -0.188 -0.402 0.028 1 
DIV/TA' 0.216 0.011 -0.187 0.012 0.017 
* coefficients are computed for only dividend-paying firms 
Panel C 
Test of significance of difference between variables' mean values in Panels A 
and B. 
Statistical difference between means of two sub-samples' 
MV/TA BV? A PBT/TA PBT 1/TA DIV/TA 
Z-score -11.627^ 9.945A 44.382 ^ 16.555A -15.389A 21.09811 
* the significance of difference between the means of two independent large sample 
is infurred by using the two-tailed z-test to test the following null hypothesis: 
HO: mean (variable 1) - mean (variable 2) =0 
A the null hypothesis is rejected at 11% level. 
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APPF, NI)IN 4.5 
Frequency distribution of deflated MV, PBT, BV and 1)1V variables 
In the graphs that follow the left hand side panels show the scale-dellated variables' 
frequency distributions before the elimination of outliers. The right hand side panels 
show the frequencies after the outliers, the top and bottom 0.5° of cases, have been 
eliminated. 
Exhibit A. composite scale proxy = 1/3*MV+1/3*TA+1/3*Sales 
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Exhibit B: scale proxy = Group Total Assets 
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Exhibit C: scale proxy = Group Sales 
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Exhibit D: scale proxy = one year lagged equity M11V 
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APPENDIX 4.6 
The names of variables used in Appendix 4.6 regressions are: 
BV = book value of equity; 
PBT = Profit Before Tax; 
Div = ordinary dividends; 
PBT*f(mv) = unscaled PBT in lagged MV-scaled models; 
PBT*f(ta) = unsealed PBT in Total Assets-scaled models; 
1/MV=the reciprocal of the scale factor in the one year lagged equity market value- 
scaled regressions; 
1/TA = the reciprocal of the scale factor in the TA-scaled regressions; 
Adj. ER = earnings for ordinary - PBT; 
1/ Dummy = 1, if BV<O, and zero otherwise; 
DumBV is the negative BV interaction term: DumBV=BV, if BV<O, and zero 
otherwise. 
Table 1 
Profit making, dividend 
paying and non-paying firms 
Model I 
Coeff. t-ratio p-value 
Loss making, dividend paying and 
non-paying firms 
Model 2 
Coeff. t-ratio p-value 
Intercept 0.854 46.632 0.000 0.576 10.926 0.000 
Dummy 0.196 3.032 0.002 0.066 0.815 0.415 
1/MV -80.38 -1.150 0.250 1005.1 3.516 0.000 
BV 0.101 5.327 0.000 0.404 7.180 0.000 
DumBV -0.160 -0.564 0.573 -0.543 -5.378 0.000 
PBT 2.103 10.894 0.000 -0.510 -2.920 0.003 
PBT x 
f(mv) -0.048 -3.939 0.000 0.056 2.349 0.019 
DIV 1.587 4.022 0.000 0.754 0.454 0.650 
Adj. ER 0.166 1.223 0.221 -0.254 -2.074 0.038 
No. of 
Cases 12737 3691 
Adj. 
R-square 13.0% 13.3% 
Wald 
p-value ** 0.861 0.669 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to each 
regression coefficient. 
BV = book value of equity; PBT = Profit Before Tax; Div = ordinary dividends; PBT*f(mv) _ 
unscaled PB; 1/MV=the reciprocal of the scale factor (i. e., one year lagged equity market value); 
Adj. ER = earnings for ordinary - PBT; 1/. Dummy = 1, if BV<O, and zero otherwise. DumBV is the 
negative BV interaction term: DumBV=BV, if BV<O, and zero otherwise. 
** Wald p-value shows the level of statistical significance of the sum of the BV and DumBV 
coefficients. Note, that the sum of these two represents the regression estimated coefficient on 
negative By. 
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Table 2 
Yearly regressions 
PBT No. Adj. R- 
Year Intercept 1lTA BV PBT x DIV AdJ. ER of Square f(TA) obs. 
1987 -0.067 1258.1 0.484 5.663 0.101 0.763 -0.716 335 41.4% 
t-ratio -0.492 2.988 1.753 4.191 0.749 0.181 -0.545 
p-value 0.623 0.003 0.080 0.000 0.454 0.856 0.586 
1988 0.058 963.0 0.200 6.682 -0.056 0.534 -0.647 897 58.7% 
t-ratio 1.135 2.515 1.950 11.490 -1.340 0.302 -1.263 
p-value 0.256 0.012 0.051 0.000 0.180 0.763 0.206 
1989 0.151 1047.1 0.085 5.508 0.029 2.222 -0.179 980 46.9% 
t-ratio 2.475 2.131 0.772 8.644 0.505 1.029 -0.472 
p-value 0.013 0.033 0.440 0.000 0.614 0.303 0.637 
1990 -0.007 827.2 0.272 4.426 0.135 -0.129 0.466 985 54.0% 
t-ratio -0.181 2.174 4.044 9.985 3.371 -11.306 1.797 
p-value 0.856 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.072 
1991 0.045 9.9 0.173 3.724 0.117 9.044 0.115 891 55.0% 
t-ratio 0.920 0.034 2.214 5.927 2.060 5.221 0.238 
p-value 0.358 0.973 0.027 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.812 
1992 0.097 -718.8 0.166 6.930 0.034 3.938 0.396 816 57.3% 
t-ratio 1.532 -2.697 1.569 7.232 0.558 1.441 0.322 
p-value 0.126 0.007 0.117 0.000 0.577 0.150 0.747 
1993 0.121 -1255.7 0.038 7.947 -0.068 9.717 -1.733 881 64.0% 
t-ratio 2.283 -4.369 0.418 7.830 -1.279 5.213 -1.063 
p-value 0.022 0.000 0.676 0.000 0.201 0.000 0.288 
1994 0.047 151.8 0.208 5.690 0.001 9.402 -3.683 1016 62.9% 
t-ratio 0.886 0.346 2.001 5.045 0.017 3.963 -1.836 
p-value 0.376 0.729 0.045 0.000 0.987 0.000 0.066 
1995 0.008 77.5 0.080 6.413 0.030 6.537 -3.130 1029 68.9% 
t-ratio 0.176 0.205 0.925 8.186 0.621 3.448 -2.437 
p-value 0.860 0.837 0.355 0.000 0.535 0.001 0.015 
1996 0.069 -60.1 -0.091 9.239 -0.026 8.713 1.894 1037 60.8% 
t-ratio 1.012 -0.184 -0.711 9.814 -0.453 3.550 3.217 
p-value 0.311 0.854 0.477 0.000 0.651 0.000 0.001 
1997 -0.042 438.3 0.047 9.317 -0.057 6.460 -1.082 1047 52.6% 
t-ratio -0.452 0.909 0.289 7.259 -0.661 1.838 -0.579 
p-value 0.651 0.363 0.773 0.000 0.509 0.066 0.562 
1998 0.018 622.1 -0.299 7.909 0.209 6.976 1.673 953 37.6% 
t-ratio 0.158 1.363 -1.394 4.426 1.898 1.233 2.418 
p-value 0.874 0.173 0.163 0.000 0.058 0.218 0.016 
1999 0.248 77.7 -0.153 7.011 0.309 0.367 -0.731 852 22.9% 
t-ratio 1.413 0.160 -0.339 4.173 2.362 0.084 -0.641 
p-value 0.158 0.873 0.735 0.000 0.018 0.933 0.521 
2000 0.238 549.9 0.365 11.111 -0.099 -3.135 0.192 732 16.4% 
t-ratio 1.424 0.725 1.064 4.899 -0.752 -0.818 0.238 
p-value 0.155 0.469 0.287 0.000 0.452 0.413 0.812 
2001 0.057 122.1 0.451 4.147 0.157 3.459 -3.662 602 29.4% 
t-ratio 0.611 0.333 2.458 2.342 1.474 1.273 -1.354 
p-value 0.541 0.739 0.014 0.019 0.141 0.203 0.176 
2002 0.193 -11.6 0.171 4.816 0.098 3.186 -1.448 321 49.7% 
t-ratio 2.458 -0.013 1.348 4.351 1.401 1.306 -0.663 
p-value 0.015 0.989 0.179 0.000 0.162 0.192 0.508 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below each regression 
coefficient. Only profit-making dividend firms are included in yearly sample. 
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Table 4 
Industry Intercept 1/TA PBT PBT`f(TA) DIV Adj. ER No. of Adj. R- 
cases Square 
sic 0 0.146 2143 0.512 -0.171 18.963 -1.688 107 51.90% 
t-ratio 2.401 4.569 0.509 -1.605 6.132 -2.696 
P-value 0.018 0.000 0.612 0.112 0.000 0.008 
SIC 1 0.675 2266 5.027 -0.271 9.740 -0.165 376 30.40% 
t-ratio 10.779 3.367 5.911 -5.093 3.428 -0.861 
P-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.390 
SIC 2 0.179 1392 2.746 0.013 9.256 0.835 733 43.20% 
t-ratio 6.600 4.907 4.319 0.299 5.588 0.892 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.765 0.000 0.373 
SIC 3 0.153 307 5.004 0.148 7.149 0.579 2647 38.10% 
t-ratio 4.244 1.368 8.015 4.046 3.469 0.950 
P-value 0.000 0.171 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.342 
SIC 4 0.162 690 6.436 0.013 4.388 0.070 3299 42.90% 
t-ratio 5.191 2.365 15.583 0.426 3.319 0.154 
P-value 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.670 0.001 0.878 
SIC 5 -0.037 1820 5.546 0.083 14.167 0.606 1204 49.60% 
t-ratio -0.624 1.844 4.678 1.344 5.110 1.379 
P-value 0.533 0.065 0.000 0.179 0.000 0.168 
SIC 6 0.191 579 6.256 0.088 1.616 0.065 1352 41.00% 
t-ratio 4.690 4.518 9.718 1.520 0.982 0.101 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.129 0.326 0.920 
SIC 7 0.136 978 7.204 0.059 4.969 0.772 1563 57.00% 
t-ratio 4.822 2.904 11.719 1.759 4.061 1.897 
P-value 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.079 0.000 0.058 
SIC 8 0.243 3196 3.301 0.128 -0.103 -1.324 361 65.60% 
t-ratio 7.820 9.690 1.953 1.273 -2.726 -0.433 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.052 0.204 0.007 0.665 
SIC 9 0.438 696 5.673 0.435 -2.535 0.121 2880 26.60% 
t-ratio 9.521 2.852 6.679 4.302 -2.021 0.360 
P-value 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.719 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below each regression 
coefficient. Only profit-making dividend paying and non-dividend firms are included in samples. 
Regressions are estimated without the BV variable. 
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Table 5 
Industry Intercept 1/TA BV PBT*f(TA) DIV Adj. ER No. of Adj. R- 
cases Square 
sic 0 0.150 2253 -0.016 -0.131 19.277 -1.767 107 51.80% 
t-ratio 2.064 4.314 -0.107 -1.642 6.803 -2.705 
P-value 0.042 0.000 0.915 0.104 0.000 0.008 
SIC 1 0.263 2701 0.751 0.026 16.538 -0.329 376 26.80% 
t-ratio 1.906 3.450 3.249 0.664 6.760 -1.306 
P-value 0.057 0.001 0.001 0.507 0.000 0.192 
SIC 2 0.053 1815 0.436 0.113 9.439 -1.830 733 43.60% 
t-ratio 1.564 5.673 3.817 3.179 5.333 -1.886 
P-value 0.118 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.059 
SIC 3 0.008 766 0.492 0.349 9.997 -2.767 2647 34.80% 
t-ratio 0.155 2.603 5.157 10.144 4.637 -3.396 
P-value 0.877 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
SIC 4 -0.043 1794 0.523 0.395 8.734 -2.199 3299 36.50% 
t-ratio -1.164 5.759 5.225 13.996 6.623 -2.986 
P-value 0.244 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 
SIC 5 0.118 4082 -0.393 0.328 21.406 0.117 1204 46.90% 
t-ratio 1.698 4.590 -2.278 6.640 9.052 0.202 
P-value 0.089 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.840 
SIC 6 0.160 1011 0.174 0.497 5.969 -2.059 1352 34.30% 
t-ratio 2.963 6.260 1.294 10.628 3.427 -2.327 
P-value 0.003 0.000 0.196 0.000 0.001 0.020 
SIC 7 0.104 2423 0.125 0.445 11.523 -1.152 1563 48.90% 
t-ratio 1.915 5.664 1.271 13.878 9.622 -1.200 
P-value 0.056 0.000 0.204 0.000 0.000 0.230 
SIC 8 -0.017 3377 0.467 0.393 -0.116 -4.699 361 69.20% 
t-ratio -0.432 9.402 7.314 4.678 -4.400 -2.621 
P-value 0.666 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 
SIC 9 0.211 1391 0.470 0.962 0.226 -1.334 2880 25.20% 
t-ratio 3.448 5.719 4.479 14.646 0.171 -1.879 
P-value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.864 0.060 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below each regression 
coefficient. Only profit-making dividend paying and non-dividend firms are included in samples. 
Regressions are estimated without the PBT variable. 
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Table 6 
PBT No. of Adj. R- Industry Intercept 7ITA BV PBT x Adj. ER cases Square f(TA) 
-- - -- SIC 0 0.089 2322 0.415 1.159 0.098 -1.981 107 30.80% 
t-ratio 0.965 2.712 2.289 0.714 0.574 -2.716 
P-value 0.337 0.008 0.024 0.477 0.567 0.008 
SIC 1 0.474 2054 0.404 6.198 -0.212 -0.075 376 28.30% 
t-ratio 3.253 3.312 1.734 6.857 -3.826 -0.492 
P-value 0.001 0.001 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.623 
SIC 2 0.097 1379 0.505 3.547 -0.042 -1.041 733 38.60% 
t-ratio 2.595 5.679 4.324 4.310 -0.854 -0.874 
P-value 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.393 0.382 
SIC 3 0.084 295 0.292 5.862 0.193 0.071 2647 36.00% 
t-ratio 1.660 1.334 2.836 10.191 4.837 0.102 
P-value 0.097 0.182 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.919 
SIC 4 0.101 502 0.275 6.836 0.038 -0.075 3299 42.50% 
t-ratio 2.876 1.644 2.892 16.109 1.254 -0.153 
P-value 0.004 0.100 0.004 0.000 0.210 0.879 
SIC 5 0.213 1256 -0.337 9.237 0.036 0.031 1204 45.70% 
t-ratio 2.852 1.172 -1.897 8.782 0.547 0.052 
P-value 0.004 0.241 0.058 0.000 0.584 0.959 
SIC 6 0.166 549 0.102 6.421 0.097 -0.004 1352 41.00% 
t-ratio 3.204 4.039 0.839 10.480 1.638 -0.006 
P-value 0.001 0.000 0.402 0.000 0.101 0.995 
SIC 7 0.067 734 0.196 8.402 0.056 0.672 1563 56.20% 
t-ratio 1.277 2.157 2.102 15.637 1.580 1.385 
P-value 0.202 0.031 0.036 0.000 0.114 0.166 
SIC 8 0.017 3035 0.436 2.519 0.208 -1.942 361 69.90% 
t-ratio 0.443 8.278 6.488 1.618 1.959 -0.747 
P-value 0.658 0.000 0.000 0.107 0.051 0.456 
SIC 9 0.241 709 0.398 4.957 0.470 -0.052 2880 26.90% 
t-ratio 4.081 2.831 3.867 6.121 4.601 -0.159 
P-value 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.874 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below each regression 
coefficient. Only profit-making dividend paying and non-dividend firms are included in samples. 
Regressions are estimated without the Dividend variable. 
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CHAPTER 5 
VALUATION OF GEOGRAPHICAL SEGMENTS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I analyse empirically the core issue of the thesis - the valuation of 
specific geographical segments reported by UK multi-segment firms. The key purpose 
of this analysis is to find out whether the reporting of specific geographical segments 
communicates useful information to the market and, if so, whether operations reported 
from specific geographic locations have differential association with the market value of 
the firm, hence, differential contribution to the firm value. The results reported in this 
chapter might also provide evidence on the adequacy of the accounting standard SSAP 
25, which spells out the segment reporting requirements in the UK. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 provides details on the country- 
composition of specific geographical regions, disclosure characteristics of specific 
geographical segments, and some descriptive statistics of each segment's specific 
financial statement variables. Section 5.3 investigates empirically (i) how specific 
geographical operations are associated with the firm value, (ii) whether different 
geographical locations are associated with differential contributions to the market value 
of the firm, and (iii) the market's perception of the implications of corporate 
geographical diversification to firm value. Section 5.4 addresses the issue of sensitivity 
of empirical results to the use of alternative deflators, and concludes the chapter. 
5.2 DATA, VARIABLES, AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
5.2.1 Definition of geographical regions 
Segment-level analysis requires delineation of geographical regions. The UK 
GAAP (see SSAP 25) on segment identification and disclosure neither specifies the 
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normative format for the firm's segmental report nor does it stipulate what country or 
geographical regions breakdown shall be used during segment reporting. In terms of 
segment reporting, the firm's management has, therefore, full discretion with regards to 
the regional grouping or disaggregation when reporting the geographical operations. 
The finest level of geographical segment disclosure would imply reporting operations 
from specific countries. However, examination of firms' segmental reports indicates 
that in the majority of cases firms tend to agglomerate their foreign operations into 
multi-country geographical regions such as Europe, America, Asia, etc. 
I collect the geographic segment-level data from the Extel Company Analysis 
database where geographical segment-level data either comes at the specific country 
level (when firms report information by countries) or is collated into broader geographic 
regions (when firms report the agglomerated foreign operations). 
Table 5.1 shows the bottom level of country composition of the broader 
geographic regions utilised by the Extel database to group countries into geographical 
regions, which are also employed in this study. 
There are five primary segments: one domestic (the UK) and four foreign 
segments (Europe, America, Asia and Mid East & Africa). As is evident from Table 
5.1, the Extel database provides the country-level composition of Europe and Asia 
segments, yet for America and Middle East & Africa segments only the sub-regional 
constituents are available71. 
The examination of the frequencies at which specific countries are being disclosed 
in firms' segmental reports indicates that very often firms tend not to report foreign 
operations on a specific country level, but rather agglomerate those operations into 
broader geographical regions. The result of this is that considerably more data points are 
71 It is, for instance, unclear which countries comprise the Middle East and Africa segment. 
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available at the region-level rather than at the single country-level, and this relates to all 
variables (segmental PBTs, Sales, and NAs). 
Table 5.1 Country composition of geographical regions (segments) 
UK Europe America ** Mid East & 
Africa 
Asia 
UK . Austria 
Central America Middle East Australasia 
Benelux . North America . 
Southern Africa Australasia 
Belgium South America . U&O Mid East New Zealand 
Netherlands U&O America* & Africa* U&O* Australasia 
Luxembourg China & Taiwan 
U&O Benelux* China 
Eastern Europe Hong Kong 
Czech Republic Taiwan 
Hungary U&O China & 
Poland Taiwan* 
Russia India 
Slovakia Japan 
U&O East Eur. * Korea 
. France . 
South East Asia 
Germany Indonesia 
Portugal Malaysia 
Greece Philippines 
Italy Singapore 
Ireland Thailand 
Scandinavia Vietnam 
Denmark U&O South East 
Finland Asia* 
Norway U&O Asia* 
Sweden 
U&O Scan- 
dinavia* 
Spain 
Switzerland 
U&O Europe 
* According to the notes in the Extel database, this disclosed item may be classify as U&O either because 
none of the other country headings adequately describe it or because it represents an indivisible 
combination of two or more countries. 
** Country composition of some of America's sub-regions is provided in Extel's notes. Thus, Central 
America includes such countries as Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama; 
South America includes Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay 
and Uruguay. 
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Table 5.2 Frequency of geographic segments reported from specific regions 
Segments Sales * PBT * NA* 
United Kingdom 8471 6091 5901 
Europe 7472 4328 4356 
Austria 10 00 
Benelux 393 279 261 
Eastern Europe 99 60 67 
France 590 316 316 
Germany 628 293 266 
Portugal 896 
Greece 77 12 
Italy 232 49 42 
Ireland 131 65 64 
Scandinavia 236 105 93 
Spain 140 51 49 
Switzerland 23 7 10 
America 5396 3813 3838 
North America 4126 3117 3164 
Latin America 336 194 181 
Central America 16 19 - 
South America 153 176 - 
U&O America 1363 705 674 
Mid East & Africa 1730 666 621 
Asia 3291 1854 1862 
Australasia 1464 816 778 
China & Taiwan 37 61 53 
India 28 12 17 
Japan 167 52 60 
Korea 300 
SE Asia 72 107 103 
U&O Asia 2386 1053 1077 
Numbers in this table summarise the general segment disclosures characteristics of the initial sample of 
firm-years which does not exclude observations with missing financial statement variables and 
observations which will be identified as outliers in further empirical analysis sections. 
* Sales = the turnover from a given geographic region, reported by the firm in the annual report; PBT = 
Profit Before Tax attributable to a specific geographic segment and reported by the firm in the annual 
report; NA = Net Assets associated with a specific geographic segment and reported by the firm in the 
annual report. 
From the frequency of data points per country, reported in Table 5.2, it is obvious 
that it would be very difficult to take the analysis of the core issue of this chapter 
(segments' value contribution) to the country level. Therefore, the analysis in this 
chapter is based on a relatively small number of broader geographical regions; the UK, 
Europe, Asia, America, and Middle East & Africa. 
216 
5.2.2 Disclosure characteristics of geographical segments 
According to SSAP 25, when reporting segments, the firms are expected to 
disclose at least one specific accounting variable, such as (i) segment's sales, (ii) profit 
before taxation, and/or (iii) net assets, for each reportable segment. The numbers 
reported in Table 5.2 suggest that the segmental sales variable tends to be reported 
more frequently than segmental PBTs or NAs, both on the country and regional level. In 
the ideal case the firm would report the comprehensive accounting information (i. e., all 
three accounting items) for each disclosed segment. In practice, however, the choice of 
segment-level accounting variables to be reported is at the management's discretion. 
In the initial sample of 19,213 firm-years some, 11,271 observations (59%) 
indicate the existence of segment disclosures, where at least one of the three variables 
(Sales, PBT or NA) is reported for at least one geographical segment. Table 5.3 
provides some insight into the comprehensiveness of segmental disclosures on the 
geographical region-level. 
Table 5.3 Number of cases per disclosed segment, under different definitions of 
disclosure 
Sales, or Sales " PBT NA " PBT & NA PBT & PBT & NA 
PBT, or NA Sales "` & Sales 
UK 10555 8293 6047 5811 5320 3848 3557 
EU 8815 7340 4283 4310 3924 2875 2714 
America 6595 5315 3812 3827 3484 2622 2466 
Asia 3988 3234 1841 1842 1630 1138 1053 
Mid. East 1948 1684 673 627 586 428 386 
& Africa 
* The segment is considered disclosed if any of the segmental variables (Sales, PBT or NA) is reported. 
** The segment is considered disclosed when the noted segmental variable is disclosed. *** The segment 
is considered disclosed when all noted segmental variables are disclosed simultaneously for that segment. 
Table 5.3 uncovers some interesting segment disclosure characteristics. The table 
indicates that fewer firms simultaneously disclose all three accounting items, that is, 
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have more comprehensive disclosures on the segment level. Take for example the UK 
segment. There are 3,557 firm-years when the UK segment's PBTs, NAs and Sales are 
reported simultaneously; 6,040 firm-years that report segmental PBTs; and 10,555 firm- 
years that report at least one of the three accounting variables for the UK segment. This 
pattern persists across all foreign geographical segments. Another noteworthy feature of 
segment disclosures is the fact that in all geographical segments sales is the most 
frequently reported figure, followed by PBT and NA. 
The above observed disclosure properties are in line with those found by 
Emmanuel and Garrod (1999), who note that a number of UK companies do not publish 
net asset figures for a number of their disclosed segments. That is, despite the explicit 
intention of SSAP 25 to produce more useful data for report users, almost 10% of 
Emmanuel and Garrod's sample companies fail to report segment net asset figures. 
They suggest that this could be willful evasion of required disclosure or, perhaps, a 
symptom of the tension between the internal and external information requirements. 
That is, whilst sales and PBTs may be fairly easily generated in a standard fashion 
consistent with the internal performance measures of the company, the question of 
assets is likely to be much more contentious. 
The in-sample segment reporting frequencies are also indicative of relative 
`popularity' of a specific foreign region as an investment location for the UK 
geographically diversified companies. Whichever proxy for this popularity is used (this 
might be the frequency of reported Sales, or PBTs, or NAs from a given region), the 
Continental Europe segment appear the most popular, as it has the highest number of 
firm-years which report Sales or PBTs or NAs from that segment. The next most 
popular investment location is America, followed by Asia. The Middle East & Africa 
region appears to be the least favorite investment location for the UK companies. 
Judging by the segmental PBT frequencies, Continental Europe has 1.12 times more 
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reported segments than America. American segments are, in turn, twice as numerous as 
those from Asia, and Asia has 2.9 times more segments than Middle East & Africa. 
The reason for making more emphasis on segmental PBTs is because segmental 
PBT is essential for the empirical analysis of this chapter, as segmental sales and net 
assets do not enter the valuation model employed in this study. 
Finally, to complete the picture, I analyse the segment disclosure characteristics 
by years and industrial affiliation of multi-segment firms. Table 5.4 summarises these 
patterns. 
Table 5.4 Disclosure of specific geographic segments' PBTs by years and 
industries. 
Panel A: Yearly frequencies of geographic segment disclosures (based on PBTs)* 
Geographical regions 
UK Europe America Middle 
East & Asia 
Years Africa 
1987 32312 
1988 76734 
1989 66 52 49 17 31 
1990 261 195 189 48 100 
1991 389 282 266 59 135 
1992 429 316 287 62 137 
1993 486 352 310 64 153 
1994 527 385 335 69 172 
1995 531 399 338 65 170 
1996 523 378 333 56 159 
1997 526 378 323 45 159 
1998 510 366 311 41 151 
1999 500 340 296 46 144 
2000 558 347 315 48 142 
2001 509 338 308 40 131 
2002*** 223 152 143 15 52 
Total 6047 4287 3812 678 1841 
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Table 5.4 (continued from the previous page) 
Panel B: Frequencies of geographical segment disclosures by specific Industries * 
Geographical regions 
Middle East & Industries t UK Europe America Africa Asia 
SIC 0 50 30 32 17 45 
SIC 1 272 144 195 67 143 
SIC 2 226 113 115 24 71 
SIC 3 1070 834 738 141 382 
SIC 4 1577 1295 1268 194 503 
SIC 5 481 351 245 37 116 
SIC 6 566 394 266 85 123 
SIC 7 397 212 156 21 69 
SIC 8 88 61 53 0 43 
SIC 9 1316 853 744 92 343 
Total " 6043 4287 3812 678 1838 
Numbers in this table summarise the general segment disclosures characteristics of the initial sample of 
firm-years and do not exclude observations with missing firm-level financial statement variables or 
observations which will be identified as outliers in the empirical analysis sections. * All numbers are 
based on the disclosure of segmental PBTs. ** Differences between the total numbers in Panel A and 
Panel B are due to the missing industrial affiliation info for some firm-years. *** Year 2002 is not 
complete, as it includes only firm-years that reported their results within the first nine months of the year. 
t The US Standard Industrial Classification System (SIC) is employed to categorise the sample firms into 
ten principal industries: SICO = Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; SICI = Mining; SIC2 = Construction; 
SIC3 = Food, textile, paper and chemical products (i. e., two-digit SIC codes of 20 through 29); SIC4 = 
Manufacturing (i. e., two-digit SIC codes of 20 through 29); SICS = Transportation, Communications, 
Electric, Gas, And Sanctuary Services; SIC6 = Wholesale Trade; SIC7 = Retail trade; SIC8 = Finance, 
Insurance, and Real Estate; SIC9 = Services. 
The yearly patterns in Panel A of Table 5.4 indicate that the relative popularity of 
specific foreign regions as investment locations has been stable throughout most of the 
years of the sample period (except the first two years). These yearly patterns reflect the 
previous conclusions drawn from the analysis of Table 5.3. Panel A that segment 
disclosure was very poor in the late-1980s. This is consistent with the accounting 
standards (Companies Act, 1985) that guided the segment disclosure in the UK until 
July 1990 and required only the disclosure of line of business and geographical sales 
and line of business earnings. With the adoption of SSAP 25, in July 1990, the segment 
reporting requirements became more onerous72. 
72 It is also possible that this seemingly nonexistent segment disclosure is partially due to the fact that the 
Extel database only started compiling segment reporting data in the late-1980s, therefore the data 
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The segment reporting frequencies for all segments were increasing in early- 
1990s until the year 1994 and became relatively stable thereafter. Yet somewhat 
declining frequencies of the Asia segment disclosure can be observed after 1994. 
The analysis of segment reporting frequencies by firms that belong to different 
economic sectors is presented in Panel B. These frequencies indicate that the relative 
popularity of specific locations does not change across most industries, and the order of 
popularity is identical to that reported above (i. e., Europe is the most frequent 
investment location, followed by America, then Asia and, finally, Middle East & 
Africa). Only in the case of the Mining industry (SIC1) does the Europe's popularity 
notably fall short of America's. 
5.2.3 Descriptive statistics on disclosed segments 
In this section I analyse the descriptive statistics of segment-level PBTs used in 
the regression analysis sections of this chapter. This implies that all statistics are 
computed for samples where all variables are deflated by the composite scale proxy and 
exclude the outliers. 
Because all segmental PBTs are scale-deflated, the means and medians provide 
some indication of a relative average size of specific geographical operations across the 
cross-section of UK multi-segment firms. The comparison of the measures of central 
tendency (both means and medians) of segment-level PBTs across geographical regions 
suggests that earnings from domestic (UK) operations account, on average, for a much 
bigger share of firms' total earnings than the agglomerated foreign earnings or, indeed, 
the earnings from any single foreign location. Thus, the cross-sectional median of 
positive earnings from UK is 1.9,2.8,4.1,6.2 and 9 times larger than earnings from 
available in the Extel database might not cover all multi-segment firms that where operating and reporting 
geographical segments at that time. 
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non-UK segment, America, Europe, Asia, and Middle East & Africa, respectively (see 
the lower panel of Table 5.5). 
Table 5.5 Descriptive statistics on segment-level PBTs. 
Negative segment-level PBTs 
UK non-UK * Europe America Mid East Asia 
Mean -0.1349 -0.0475 -0.0244 -0.0367 -0.0099 -0.0210 
Median -0.0566 -0.0116 -0.0054 -0.0077 -0.0025 -0.0033 
Standard Deviation 0.2258 0.0931 0.0632 0.0765 0.0195 0.0535 
Coefficient of Variation -1.6736 -1.9586 -2.5835 -2.0870 -1.9590 -2.5453 
Kurtosis 19.2130 20.5117 56.6247 19.5734 5.2141 18.3132 
Skewness -3.8751 -4.0058 -6.5806 -4.0172 -2.5135 -4.1168 
Minimum -1.8351 -0.8195 -0.7593 -0.6314 -0.0763 -0.3462 
Maximum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
No. of cases 745 909 642 706 52 245 
Positive segment-level PBTs 
UK non-UK * Europe America Mid East Asia 
Mean 0.0611 0.0375 0.0197 0.0278 0.0146 0.0161 
Median 0.0548 0.0282 0.0134 0.0196 0.0061 0.0089 
Standard Deviation 0.0392 0.0341 0.0203 0.0268 0.0236 0.0218 
Coefficient of Variation 0.6421 0.9105 1.0286 0.9649 1.6166 1.3557 
Kurtosis -0.1262 2.3588 5.1172 3.1456 16.5791 13.3417 
Skewness 0.6517 1.3977 1.9937 1.5943 3.5925 3.2043 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
Maximum 0.2057 0.2402 0.1314 0.1698 0.1748 0.1766 
No. of cases 4006 3842 2817 2382 487 1186 
Included in descriptive statistics are observations used in the chapter's subsequent regression analysis 
sections, hence all segmental PBTs are deflated by the composite scale factor and the outliers (i. e., top 
and bottom 0.5% of segment-level and firm-level regression variables) are eliminated. Descriptive 
statistics are computed separately for positive segmental PBTs (the upper panel) and for negative 
segmental PBTs (the lower panel). The number of observations varies across segments, as only segments 
with non-zero PBTs are included in the computations (i. e., missing segmental PBTs are NOT treated as 
zeros). * non-UK segment is a synthetic segment that agglomerates all foreign operations. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn when the negative segmental earnings are 
compared (the upper panel of Table 5.5). 
Interestingly, a relationship or association appears to exist between the divergence 
of the (cross-sectional average) size of segments operating in specific geographical 
locations and relative popularity of these locations. That is, segments operating in 
America and Europe are, on average, much larger than those operating in Asia. 
Similarly, the popularity of America and Europe investment locations is much higher 
than that of Asia (see Section 5.2.2). Segments operating in Middle East & Africa are, 
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on average, the smallest, and the region itself represents the least popular investment 
location. These conclusions remain unchanged when segment-level net assets or sales 
are used as indicators of the relative cross-sectional average size of specific 
geographical segments, and are robust to the choice of the measure of central tendency 
(i. e., mean or median). 
Another segment-level descriptive is the frequency of negative earnings reported 
by firms from a specific geographical location. This is a simple measure of profitability 
associated with a specific geographical region that might provide some insight into the 
interpretation of segment valuation regression results later in this chapter. Thus, 23% of 
firm-years with operations in America report losses from that segment. For Europe that 
percentage is 18.6%, for Asia - 17.1%, for UK - 15.7%, yet Middle East & Africa 
has 
the lowest percentage, 9.6% (see Table 5.6). In other words, more often losses are being 
reported from America, followed by Europe, Asia and UK, and less often from Middle 
East & Africa73. 
In the subsequent sections, where the segment valuation is studied, some of the 
regressions are estimated for samples that correspond to profit-making firms only. 
Therefore, I additionally examine what happens to the frequency of negative segmental 
earnings when the sample excludes cases with firm-level losses (see Table 5.6). 
In this sample, only 3.9,11.6,13.9,12.1, and 7.7 percent of earnings reported 
from, respectively, the UK, Europe, America, Asia, and Middle East & Africa segments 
are negative. This suggests that, as one would expect, the percentage of segment-level 
losses are considerably lower in the sample that only includes profit-making firms. 
Furthermore, it is the losses reported from the domestic (UK) region, rather then losses 
reported from foreign locations, which are considerably more strongly associated with 
73 It is difficult to conclude what causes such notable differences between these geographical segments. 
On the one hand the higher/lower occurrence of losses in a given location might reflect the objective 
reality of market conditions in that region. On the other hand, this might be the result of accounting 
manipulations (e. g., transfer pricing) made by managers when reporting segment-level data. 
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the frequency of the firm-level losses. Results in Table 5.6 also suggest that for all 
geographic locations the occurrence of segmental losses is notably lower when only 
dividend paying firms are considered. 
Table 5.6 The percentage (frequency) of negative segmental PBTs in differently 
partitioned samples 
Segmental Sign of No. of Cases Percentage (frequency) of negative segmental PBTs 
variable segmental 
PBT 
Sample I* Sample 2* Sample 3* Sample 4* 
PBT UK + 4887 
1153 19.1% 3.9% 6.8% 2.6% 
PBT EU + 3468 
819 19.1% 11.6% 13.1% 11.0% 
PBT America + 2904 
908 23.8% 13.9% 15.8% 12.9% 
PBT Asia + 1492 
342 18.6% 12.1% 13.3% 11.4% 
PBT Mid. East + 596 
& Africa - 77 11.4% 7.7% 7.5% 7.0% 
* Sample I is the initial total sample; Sample 2 excludes negative firm-level PBT cases; Sample 3 
excludes non-dividend paying cases; Sample 4 excludes negative firm-level PBT and non-dividend 
paying cases. 
Table 5.7 Pair-wise (Pearson) correlations between positive segmental PBTs 
UK Europe America Mid East 
Non-UK * -0.385 - -- 
no. of cases 3478 
Europe -0.233 - -- 
no. of cases 2584 
America -0.234 0.050 -- 
no. ofcases 2215 1791 
Mid East -0.205 0.000 -0.141 - 
no. of cases 427 404 363 
Asia -0.211 0.074 0.108 0.338 
no. of cases 1063 1012 908 356 
The number of cases varies across the pairs of segments because pair-wise correlation is estimated for 
firm-years where both segments have positive PBTs. 
* non-UK segment is a synthetic segment that agglomerates all foreign operations. 
Finally, because the analysis of segment valuation is based on multivariate 
regressions with at least two segment-level profits being included in the regression and 
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multicollinearity might be a concern, it is important to examine the partial correlations 
between segments' PBTs. This information is reported in Table 5.7. 
By and large, the correlation coefficients reported in the table are low, though 
some are statistically significant (not reported). Therefore, multicollinearity is unlikely 
to be a problem when the regressions simultaneously include two segments' PBTs. 
5.3 VALUATION OF DIVERSIFICATION AND SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHICAL 
SEGMENTS 
I test the following valuation relationships, where each, in turn, is tested for 
various time periods, with and without non-dividend paying firms, with and without 
industry and yearly dummies, with and without the market-to-book ratio-related dummy 
variable, and for the entire sample vs. only the profit-making firms: 
1. Valuation of differently defined (based on PBT, NA, Sales, when at least one 
distinct foreign segment is reported, or just the UK one) segment-reporting vs. 
non-reporting firms, after eliminating the segment and firm-level outliers. 
2. Segment valuation of domestic vs. non-UK operations. 
3. Segment valuation of only those firm-years that simultaneously operate in: 
a. UK and Europe, while all other segments are summed up in `rest' 
b. UK and America, while all other segments are summed up in `rest' 
c. UK and Asia, while all other segments are summed up in `rest' 
d. UK and Middle East & Africa, while all other segments are summed up 
in `rest' 
4. Simultaneous disaggregation of the firm's operations into all segmental 
components. 
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5.3.1 Valuation differential between geographically diversified and domestic firms 
I start the analysis by exploring valuation differences between two mutually 
exclusive sub-samples. One sample includes firms whose segmental disclosures indicate 
that the firms are involved in foreign operations. The alternative sample includes firms 
with no financial statement-related evidence of geographical diversification. In terms of 
a broader definition of diversification, the firm might be considered geographically 
diversified if, for at least one distinct foreign segment, it reports one or more segment- 
level data items. That is, for a firm to qualify as geographically diversified it would be 
sufficient to have segmental Sales, or segmental PBT, or segmental NA reported on just 
one specific foreign region. Specific foreign regions are: Europe, America, Asia, Middle 
East and Africa. 
Because the frequency of reporting of the various segment-level accounting items 
varies, one can further restrict the definition of diversification. For example, the most 
restricted definition of geographical diversification would be to require all three 
segment-level accounting variables (i. e., PBT, NA and Sales) to be available for a given 
segment. According to this restricted definition, a firm would be considered as being 
diversified into a specific foreign location only if all three variables are simultaneously 
reported for that segment. 
Essentially, this definition deals with the richness or completeness of the 
information set disclosed by the firm on a specific segment. It might be argued that the 
richness of the disclosed information is essential to investors/market analysts who 
assess the market value of the firm. Firm-level financial statements information, 
specifically earnings, sales and book values are all important constituents of the data set 
used by analysts when deriving the firm's intrinsic value using various valuation 
techniques [see Stowe et al. (2002)]. Assuming that in valuing segments investors apply 
a portfolio of techniques similar to those used for valuing the entire firm, then it could 
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be argued that every piece of the scarce segmental financial statements data (recall that 
according to SSAP 25, for each disclosed segment the firm is required to provide at the 
most three accounting items: PBT, Sales and NA) would also be incrementally 
informative and exploited by analysts to arrive at the most accurate firm/segment value 
estimate. However, earnings have traditionally been the most important value driver in 
accounting-based firm-level valuation models, therefore segmental earnings are, 
similarly, likely to have the key role when assessing the contribution of a given segment 
to the entire value of the firm. One can only speculate if segmental net assets or sales 
can be a good substitute (in the process of valuation) for missing segmental PBT data. 
When only one accounting item such as Sales or NA is reported for a given segment, 
the ability of the investors to assess the value contribution of that segment is likely to be 
undermined or, even worse, made impossible. One might argue that in the latter case the 
segment could be treated as not disclosed. 
In light of the above reasoning, the valuation differences that might exist between 
segment-reporting (diversified) and non-diversified (domestic) firms could be tested by 
using alternative definitions of when the firm is considered as segment-disclosing 
(diversified). Specifically, alternative definitions include: 
Definition 1: the firm is considered geographically diversified if at least one 
accounting item is reported for a specific foreign segment. This will be the least 
restricted definition of a diversified firm. 
Definition 2: the firm is geographically diversified only when the PBT data item 
is available for at least one foreign segment. This is to reflect the possibility that 
such segmental information as NA or Sales might be discarded by 
investors/analysts, in the process of valuation, when the major segmental data 
item, i. e. PBT, is not reported. 
227 
The above theorisation regarding the definition of when the firm shall be 
considered diversified would be important if significant valuation differences could be 
observed between the two sub-samples of firms with alternative definitions of 
diversification. However, the empirical results in Table 5.8 (see Appendix 5.1: Model 
5, and Model 1 vs. 2, Models 3 vs. 4) do not reveal any economically significant 
differential value association of accounting fundamentals between the two sub-samples 
(Tables 5.8 through 5.17 are reported in Appendix 5.1). This result is further reinforced 
in Model 5, which includes a dummy variable and an interaction term for each variable. 
That is, all variables are allowed to vary, depending on whether the observations relates 
to definition 1 or 2. The fact that none of the interaction terms or dummy variables are 
statistically significant at the 5% level suggests that the choice of definition does not 
materially affect valuation associations. 
Having discussed the potential importance of the definition of the term diversified, 
in the sections that follow I compare and contrast valuation characteristics of diversified 
vs. domestic firms in alternatively specified samples. 
When the basic model regression is run for the entire sample, following the 
findings in Chapter 4, all valuation variables are paired with corresponding interaction 
terms to control for discrepancy in coefficients induced by the sign of firm-level 
financial results (profit vs. loss). Because the firm-level analysis in Chapter 4 revealed 
highly statistically significant differences in the overall valuation of firms trading below 
book value, a corresponding dummy (MB dummy=1 if MV<BV, dummy=0 otherwise) 
is also included in all regressions that follow. 
Because both theoretically and in terms of empirical evidence reported in Chapter 
4 the composite scale factor appears to address more appropriately the problem of cross- 
sectional scale difference, all models that follow are scaled by the composite scale 
factor. As a cross-check of the robustness of regression results, all regressions are also 
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estimated with other deflators (such as Total Assets) and results are reported in section 
5.4. 
Table 5.9 (see Appendix 5.1) reports the results from variously specified 
regressions aimed at bringing to light firm-level valuation differences between 
geographically diversified firms and geographically focused (domestic) firms. 
The first six models (Model 1 through 6) are estimated for samples that include 
both profitable and loss-making firms, therefore, they all include a negative PBT 
dummy and corresponding interactions terms for all variables. Models 1 through 4 
reflect firm-level valuation for geographically diversified firms, while models 5 and 6 
are for non-diversified firms. Furthermore, all 12 models in the table could be grouped 
into 6 pairs (model 1&2, model 3&4, etc. ), where the first model of each pair includes 
observations from dividend-paying and non-dividend paying firms, while the second 
model includes only the dividend-paying firms. Note, that econometrically more valid 
inferences about the valuation of dividends could be drawn from the second models, 
i. e., where none of the observations have missing or zero values for dividends. 
Recall that the primary issue of interest in this section is the valuation differences 
between geographically diversified and domestic firms. It is important that this 
comparative analysis is performed between samples that are qualitatively similar in all 
respects but vary only in terms of the characteristic of interest, i. e. diversified vs. non- 
diversified. In empirical terms this implies the identification of differences between the 
following groups of models in Table 5.8: Model 1&2 vs. Model 5&6; Model 7&8 
vs. Model 9& 10; and Model 11 vs. Model 12. Below I analyse these relationships. 
Before analysing key valuation factors (PBT, BV and Dividends) some general 
conclusions are in order. The structure of the intercept in the deflated models is 
presented below. 
1. for profit firms that trade above book value: 
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Intercept = one 
2. for profitable firms that trade below book value: 
Intercept = one + dummy 2 
where dummy 2=1 if PBT>O & MV<_BV and zero otherwise; 
3. for loss-making firms that trade above book value: 
Intercept = one + dummyl 
where dummy 1=1 if PBT: 50 & MV>BV and zero otherwise; 
4. for loss-making firms trading below book value: 
Intercept = one + dummy 3 
where dummy3 =1 if PBT: 50 & MV<_BV; and dummy3 =0 otherwise. 
In all tests, when the firm is profit-making and is trading above book value, the 
intercept has positive value and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The value of 
the intercept is substantially lower, yet still positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level, for profit-making firms trading at a discount to book value and loss-making 
firms trading at a premium to book value. The intercept has the lowest, in absolute 
terms, value and is not statistically significant for loss-making firms trading at a 
discount. Furthermore, the intercept becomes negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level when non-dividend payers are excluded from the loss-making firms trading at 
a discount (model '11 vs model 12). In other words, in the context of the employed 
model, the loss-making firms trading at a discount have the lowest cross-sectional 
relative valuation, while profit-making firms that trade at a premium to book value have 
the highest relative valuation. The remaining two categories of firms, loss-making 
premium firms and profit-making discount firms, appear to be in the middle range of 
valuation. These conclusions conform to the economic intuition. 
In the sections that follow I compare the valuation of PBT, BV and Dividends 
variables, and the relative valuation discount/premium of diversified firms, in a 
230 
consecutive order, between diversified and domestic firms. Sections 5.3.1.1 through 
5.3.1.6 draw on results reported in Table 5.9 (Appendix 5.1), where models 1 through 6 
are estimated on the complete sets of data, while models 7 through 12 are estimated 
separately for two mutually exclusive sub-samples of firms: profit firms and loss firms. 
5.3.2.1 Valuation of BV 
Regardless of the dividend status of the firm, geographically diversified profit- 
making firms have lower value of the BV coefficient than the domestic profit-making 
firms. Examination of regression results in models 1 through 10 presents clear evidence 
that the BV coefficients of domestic profit-making firms are always positive, 
statistically significant at the 1% level and is always substantially higher than that of 
profit-making diversified firms. Furthermore, the analysis of parameters from models 2 
vs. 6, models 4 vs. 6, and models 8 vs. 10 suggests that the BV coefficient is not 
statistically significant (even at the 10% level) when only dividend-paying profit- 
making diversified firms are considered, while domestic dividend-paying profit-makers 
have positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level) BV multiples. 
This conclusion regarding the excess valuation of BVs in domestic firms also 
holds when these models are estimated without the non-dividend firms being excluded 
from the sub-samples and are analysed in terms of diversified vs. domestic firms (see 
model 1 vs. 5 and model 3 vs. 5). 
These patterns, however, vanish when regressions are estimated for loss-making 
firms. In loss-making firms such characteristics of the firm as geographical 
diversification or dividend paying status no longer influence the valuation of BVs. Here, 
BV coefficients are always positive, statistically significant at the 1% level, and have 
higher values than in all alternative regression specifications of profit-making firms. 
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Therefore, one might conclude that regardless of the diversification or dividend 
paying status-related characteristics of the firm, BV is a more important value driver 
when firms are reporting losses. This conforms to the existing in the literature 
theorisation and empirical evidence (see Chapter 2) that the valuation role of BV is 
subject to the sign of the firm's financial results. Another, more important conclusion 
for this research is that BV has higher valuation multiples and is a more value-relevant 
valuation factor for domestic firms. In other words, BV is perceived by the market to be 
a weaker value driver in geographically diversified firms. However, a word of caution 
shall accompany this interpretation of results. In my sample, the geographically 
diversified firms are generally larger than domestic firms. It is possible that this 
differential valuation of BVs is not purely a result of the phenomenon of diversification, 
but rather is a reflection of the firm's size-related differential valuation of BV by 
investors, if investors value small and large companies differently. 
5.3.2.2 Valuation of PBT 
It shall be noted at the outset that in all alternative tests reported in Table 5.9, 
negative PBTs do not have statistically significant (at any acceptable level) associations 
with firm value. In other words, firm-level losses have no information content and are 
value irrelevant. This finding reconfirms the previous results, reported in the Chapter 4, 
and does also conform to prior empirical finding in the related literature (see Chapter 2). 
Positive PBTs, as expected, have positive association with firm value and are 
highly statistically significant (at least at the 0.1% level) regardless of the dividend 
payment or diversification-related characteristics of the firm. The primary issue of 
interest is whether capitalisation of positive PBTs (i. e., profits) is different between 
diversified and domestic firms. The regression estimated PBT coefficients always have 
higher values for firms which are geographically diversified, regardless of the dividend- 
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paying status or the definition (discussed earlier in the chapter) of the term 
'diversification'74. However, these differences are not statistically significant at the 10% 
level. In other words, there is some weak indication of higher capitalisation of profits 
reported by multinational firms. 
Some additional knowledge about the valuation of earnings could be gained from 
the analysis of the PBT*f(s) coefficient. Recall that this variable is modelled to account 
for possible scale-related non-linearity in the PBT coefficient. A positive (negative) sign 
of the PBT*f(s) coefficient would imply that the PBT coefficient is not a cross-scale 
constant, but is likely to have larger (smaller) values for bigger firms. In our 
regressions, the PBT*f(s) coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level for all profit-making diversified firms. For profit-making domestic firms this 
coefficient is negative, and is significant at only the 10% level. In economic terms, these 
results seem to suggest that: (1) investors might apply higher valuation multiples to 
earnings of larger diversified firms; and (2) investors are more likely to apply higher 
valuation multiples to earnings of smaller domestic firms 
75 
. 
Finally, both in diversified and domestic loss-making firms' regressions, this 
coefficient is not statistically different from zero. One would expect this result given the 
prior evidence that negative earnings are, in general, value-irrelevant. 
5.3.2.3 Valuation of Dividends 
In Chapter 3I outlined and discussed major prerequisites for including dividends 
into the basic model and emphasised that the expected value and sign of the regression 
estimated dividend coefficient is subject to alternative hypothesised roles which 
dividends might play in firm valuation. Because there is no clear agreement in the 
empirical accounting literature both in terms of dividend valuation theorisation and 
74 This fact is apparent when contrasting PBT coefficients in corresponding regressions, that is: Models I 
&3 vs. model 5, and Models 2&4 vs. 6. 
75 The second point conforms to what is often referred to in the literature as the small-firm effect. 
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empirical findings, I do not put forward and test a priori specific hypotheses regarding 
the expected sign and magnitude of the dividend multiple. 
Empirical results reported in Table 5.9 (see Appendix 5.1) provide a clear 
indication of the existence of a divergence in dividend valuation between two categories 
of firms: diversified vs. domestic firms. Regardless of the financial results (i. e., profit 
vs. loss) reported by firms, dividend coefficients are always positive and statistically 
significant at least at the 0.3% level for domestic firms. In contrast, for diversified 
firms, both in dividend-paying profit-making and loss-making firms, dividends 
coefficients have substantially lower (yet positive) values and become statistically 
significant only at the 7% level (see models 8& 11). The latter statistically weak yet 
positive valuation of dividends is further eroded when the alternative Definition 2 of 
diversification is applied (see section 5.3.1). Here, dividends are completely value- 
irrelevant in profit-making firms. 
An interesting `anomaly' can be observed, with regards to the valuation 
coefficient of dividends, when dividend-paying and non-dividend diversified firms are 
pooled into one sample (see models 1& 3). Here, the value association of dividends 
turns negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. This is clearly a spurious 
result, as far as valuation of dividends is concerned, in light of statistically significant 
and positive valuation of dividends in dividend-paying firms. Because this sample 
includes firms that do not pay dividends (i. e., the value of dividends for this subset of 
firms is equal to zero), the valuation of dividends in this larger sample shall, other 
things being equal, only reflect the valuation associated with dividends in dividend- 
disclosing firms. This change of the dividend coefficient sign from positive (in 
dividend-paying sample) to negative (in dividend-paying and non-dividend sample) can 
only be possible if. (i) zero vs. non-zero dividend firms have differential valuation, and 
(ii) the very fact that the firm pays (or does not pay) dividends serves as a signal of that 
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differential valuation. In other words, the very dividend status of the firm (i. e., zero vs. 
non-zero dividends firms) might be in correlation with an omitted/unknown valuation 
context (this might be an additional vector of omitted value drivers or, in a more 
general case, intrinsically differential model specification, subject to different settings), 
which might influence the specification of the model. If the omitted/unknown valuation 
context is indeed correlated with the type of firm (i. e., dividend-paying or non- 
dividend), then spurious valuation of dividends in the total sample could be purged by 
including a dummy variable that takes the value of unity for dividend-paying firms, and 
zero for non-dividend firms. 
I re-run all models with this dummy variable being included as an additional 
variable. In these new regressions, dividends no longer have negative and statistically 
significant valuation coefficients, which supports the omitted/unknown valuation 
context theorisation. Furthermore, the coefficient on the dividend-related dummy is 
highly statistically significant and has a negative sign. This suggests that the valuation 
of firms might be subject (i) to their `dividend-paying characteristics' (i. e., dividend- 
paying or non-dividend firms), or (ii) to some intrinsic/true valuation context, which is 
being proxied by the `dividend-paying status' of firms. In the latter case, the employed 
basic model might have an omitted correlated variable (or a set of unaccounted for 
factors, i. e., contexts) problem, with the dividends being highly correlated with the 
omitted contexts. The negative sign of this dummy coefficient suggests that firms whose 
intrinsic valuation context is correlated with the `dividend-paying characteristics' (or 
whose valuation context is in itself the `dividend-paying characteristics') have lower 
valuation. 
Overall, the results suggest that dividends have different valuation roles in 
domestic vs. geographically diversified firms. Dividends have positive and statistically 
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significant association with the value of domestic firms, but have no apparent valuation 
role for diversified companies. 
5.3.1.4 Valuation of diversification: do investors value multi nationality? 
To explore the general valuation properties of the two categories of firms, 
diversified vs. domestic firms, I pool these observations in a single regression and 
include a binary dummy variable, which takes the value of unity if an observation 
comes from a domestic firm, and the value of zero otherwise. No interaction terms are 
included. 
This simple test restricts the regression coefficients of all value drivers to be equal 
across diversified and domestic firms, while the sign of the dummy variable will 
provide a single simple measure of overall valuation differences between the two groups 
of firms. The dummy coefficient in the regressions (not reported), which are estimated 
separately for profit-making (i. e., positive PBT) and loss-making (i. e., negative PBT) 
firms, is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that, on 
average, the domestic firms are valued at a discount relative to internationally 
diversified firms. This result is unchanged even when I control for non-dividend paying 
firms and/or firms trading below book value. 
Because yearly regression analyses in Chapter 4 demonstrate that throughout the 
entire sample period the valuation of firms was changing76, I also test the economic 
period-related robustness of the valuation discount found in domestic firms, by 
repeating previous regressions for two economic sub-periods: the old economy period 
76 It is, however, subject to a debate, what exactly was changing: Is it the intrinsic value of firms that was 
changing, so that the model simply captured these changes? Or, was our model simply reflecting the 
changes in how investors use accounting information in firm valuation, in other words, was our 
accounting-based model merely capturing the dynamics of the value association of basic financial 
statement data? 
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(pre-1996), and the new economy period (post-1996)77. Results indicate that the 
valuation discount of domestic firms was more noticeable during the old economic 
period, as the dummy has a smaller (larger in absolute terms) negative value and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In the new economy period the dummy has a 
larger (smaller in absolute terms) negative value, is significant at the 5% level for non- 
dividend paying firms, and is no longer significant for dividend paying firms. In 
economic terms, this implies that, during the old economic period, investors valued 
diversification higher than in the new economic period. 
One final observation concerns the difference between diversified and domestic 
firms in terms of the overall value relevance of financial statement data. In all matching 
pairs of diversified and domestic firms (see Model 1&3 vs. 5; Model 2&4 vs. 6; Model 
7 vs. 9; Model 8 vs. 10; Model 11 vs. 12 of Table 5.9), the explanatory power of 
regressions is always higher in the domestic firms' sub-samples. Although most of these 
differences of the explanatory power do not exceed five percentage points, these 
patterns remain robust when additional tests were carried out: new economic period vs. 
old economic period; inclusion of industry and yearly fixed effects and other contextual 
dummies. This evidence seems to suggest that the basic firm-level financial statement 
variables (PBT, BV and Dividends) represent a poorer information set for more 
complex and (on average) larger geographically diversified firms, compared to domestic 
firms. 
5.3.2 Incremental information content of segment disclosures 
As noted in the literature review chapter, there is an implicit or, often, explicit 
contention in the literature on segment disclosure and value relevance of segmental 
information that information reported on the segment-disaggregated level has, or should 
n This definition of economic periods was suggested by Core et al. (2003) in their study of time-related 
changes in value association of financial statement data. 
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have, incremental usefulness for producing more accurate estimates of the entire firm's 
future performance. In other words, segment-disaggregated accounting data would 
communicate at least as much information as the corresponding firm-level data. 
Assuming that: 
(a) to produce more accurate forecasts of the firm's future performance, and 
ultimately, to come up with a better justified estimate of the firm's intrinsic value, 
investors/market analysts go beyond the simple firm-level numbers and use a richer set 
of publicly available information (which includes both firm and segment-level disclosed 
information and comes at no additional costs); and 
(b) the stock market reacts to analysts' valuations/recommendations by adjusting 
the firm's market value accordingly; 
then the firm's market value should be more strongly associated with disaggregated 
information, than simple firm-level data. It follows that in the context of the 
operationalised model used in this study, the replacement of a firm-level value driver 
with its segment-disaggregated components might increase the regressions' explanatory 
power relative to that where firm-level values were used. This differential explanatory 
power between the segment-disaggregated and firm-level regressions constitutes the 
incremental information content. It shall be noted, however, that even when conditions 
(a) and (b) are in place, disaggregation will not necessarily release incremental 
information, unless the disaggregated information possesses some specific 
characteristics. 
Some theoretical studies, reviewed in Chapter 2, have come up with specific 
analytical framework of preconditions that make disaggregation incrementally 
informative. I am, however, unaware of empirical studies that investigate the validity of 
these theories. Due to the specifics of my data set, it is also impossible to test or check 
for the existence of these preconditions in my study. Therefore, I do not develop or test 
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specific preconditions-related hypothesis, but rather follow a tentative (ad hoc) 
approach to detect the existence or non-existence of incremental information associated 
with disaggregation of firm-level data. 
I also test the information effects of basic, intermediate and finest-level 
disaggregation. The basic disaggregation implies separating the firm-level PBT of the 
geographically diversified firm into two segmental components: PBT from the domestic 
operations (i. e., PBT UK), PBT from a generic foreign segment (PBT NONUK), and a 
residual PBT component (PBT Rest), to allow for the incompleteness in the segment- 
level reporting. For the first intermediate-level disaggregation, I split the firm-level PBT 
into: PBT UK, PBT Europe and PBT Rest. The next intermediate-level disaggregation 
implies: PBT UK, PBT Europe, PBT America and PBT Rest. This series of consecutive 
desaggreations is continued up to the finest-level, which includes the PBTs from each 
specific geographical region. The above tests represent a narrow definition of 
disaggregation as they, as a matter of fact, address the incremental information content 
of disaggregation of firm-level earnings into the segmental earnings. 
5.3.2.1 Data 
Because disaggregation is done on the basis of available segment-level PBT 
information, the new initial sample shall include only those firm-years that report 
segmental earnings for at least one foreign segment. Recall that when no segment data- 
related restriction is imposed the initial composite-scale-deflated sample includes 
18,752 observations78. However, only 5,658 observations remain in the sample when 
the segment-level data availability restriction is imposed, and this now constitutes the 
new initial sample for the geographical segment analysis79. This sample is further 
reduced in the actual tests due to the elimination of both firm-level and, additionally, 
78 The size of this sample will vary depending on the choice of the scale proxy. 
79 That is, there are only 5658 firm-years with segmental PBTs available for any of the following foreign 
geographical segments: America, Europe, Asia, Middle East & Africa. 
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segmental-PBT outliers. Segmental-PBT outliers are defined as top and bottom 0.5% of 
a reported segment's PBT values. 
The first test addresses the incremental information content of the disaggregation 
of firm-level PBT into domestic operations' PBT, PBT from a generic foreign segment, 
and PBT Rest. The generic foreign segment PBT is the sum of PBTs of all four specific 
foreign segments: America, Europe, Asia, Middle East & Africa. PBT Rest accounts for 
the difference between the firm-level PBT and the agglomerated segment-level PBTs, 
and includes such PBT-related components as: intra-group operations, discontinued 
operations, central costs, exceptional charges, associated companies, net interest 
expense and other miscellaneous items. 
Of 5,658 observations, the domestic segment's PBTs are not disclosed in 721 
cases, which are eliminated. This reduces the size of the testable sample to 4,937 firm- 
years. The elimination of firm-level outliers and outliers identified separately for PBT 
UK and PBT NONUK, leaves the sample with 4,764 observations. Of this sample, 
about 3,800 cases have positive firm-level PBT, meaning that some 20% of the segment 
information containing sample comes from the loss-making firms. This percentage is 
similar to the proportion of loss making firms in the entire initial sample of 19,213 
cases. 
5.3.2.2 Results: Profit making firms 
In the analysis that follows I separately test the incremental information content of 
disaggregation for profit firms (Table 5.10 Panel A) and loss-making firms (Table 5.10 
Panel B). 
In the tests that involve all profit-making firms, the statistically significant 
increase of 1.7 percentage points of the explanatory power of Model 2 relative to that of 
Model 1 from 25.3% to 27% (an F-test that this change is not statistically significant is 
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rejected at the 1% level) suggests that intermediate disaggregation (where consolidated 
earnings are replaced with the sum of PBTs from the UK, the foreign generic segment 
and the rest of PBT) does `release' incremental information. A successive finest-level 
disaggregation of the generic foreign segment PBT into the PBTs relating to specific 
geographical segments, Model 2 vs. Model 3, is also associated with incremental 
information. The increase of R-square in Model 3 relative to that of Model 2 is very 
marginal (0.6 percentage points) yet the F-tests shows that this increase is statistically 
significant at the I% level. 
One might hypothesise that information contained in dividends suppresses 
possible information gains from reporting segment-disaggregated profits. Should this be 
true, successive disaggregation of the firm-level PBT into segmental components shall 
not result in increasing explanatory power of regressions and dividends shall have 
statistically significant association with firm value. Therefore, I repeat all the above 
tests for only dividend-paying profit-making firms (Models 4 through 6, Table 5.10). 
The above hypothesis can confidently be discarded, as all successive 
disaggregations (Models 4 through 6) increase the regressions' explanatory power, 
while dividends appear completely irrelevant to valuation. Although the improvements 
in the explanatory power both in Models 4 vs. 5, and Models 5 vs. 6, are trivial (1.3 and 
0.6 percentage point respectively), the F-tests indicate that these increases are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Summarising the above results, one can affirm that more detailed disaggregation 
of consolidated earnings of profit-making firms does communicate incremental 
information to the market. Also is noteworthy the fact that the increase in adjusted-R2 is 
larger in the first phase of disaggregation, where consolidated profits are replaced with 
three constituent components (i. e., PBT UK, PBT NONUK, PBT Rest), and is smaller 
when already intermediately disaggregated profits (i. e., those three constituent 
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components) are further replaced with finer-split six components (PBT UK, PBT 
Europe, PBT America, PBT Asia, PBT Mid. East&Africa, PBT Rest). This evidence 
seems to suggest that the informativeness of disaggregation is a diminishing function of 
the fineness of disaggregation. In other words, each successive finer disaggregation 
would be releasing less information. 
5.3.2.3 Results: Loss making firms 
Similarly interesting are the results when the information effect of disaggregation 
is examined for the loss-making firms. Disaggregation in the context of loss-making 
non-dividend paying firms appears even more informative than for profit-making 
firms. The comparison of Models 7 vs. 8 in Panel B of Table 5.10 suggests that the 
explanatory power of the simple consolidated-level model is 5.5 percentage points 
lower than when the firm-level earnings are disaggregated into domestic earnings (PBT 
UK), the generic foreign segment's earnings (PBT NONUK) and the balancing earnings 
component (PBT Rest). 
This increase in information content is highly statistically significant (at the 
0.001% level). Yet again the finest disaggregation of Model 9 further releases 
incremental information relative to the information content of intermediately- 
disaggregated Model 8. Although the latter increase in the adjusted-R2 is quite marginal 
(1.2 percentage points), it is still statistically significant at the 1% level. This changing 
pattern of the adjusted-R2 is similar to that observed in profit-making firms and is yet 
another indication of the existence of declining marginal informativeness of segment 
disaggregation. 
In-depth investigation of Models 7 through 9 offers some insights into the reasons 
that make disaggregation more informative in the context of loss-making firms 
compared to that of profitable firms. Valuation of the firm-level earnings (Model 7) 
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reflects the value irrelevance of firm-level losses and the enhanced value-relevance of 
book values in loss-reporting firms, which is also found to be the case when the entire 
sample's valuation properties were analysed in Chapter 4. This empirical result is also 
consistent with the literature on value-relevance of losses, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
When a geographically diversified firm reports consolidated losses, it is still 
possible that some of its segments are profitable. In fact, this situation is of a frequent 
occurrence in my sample of diversified firms (see Table 5.6) When this information is 
disclosed, the market has the opportunity to apply differential multiples to positive and 
negative segment-level earnings, as it does for the consolidated earnings. Compared 
with a single-number summary of the firm's performance (the consolidated losses) the 
segment-level disclosure of earnings communicates to investors an unequivocally richer 
information set about the source(s) of firm-level losses and relative strengths of the 
firms different geographical constituent elements. 
This reasoning is verified by the results of Models 8 and 9, where positive and 
negative segmental earnings have clearly differential valuation. As was the case with 
the valuation of firm-level losses, negative segment-level earnings also appear value 
irrelevant, while the coefficients on the segments' positive earnings are nearly always 
statistically significant80. 
5.3.3 Joint and pair-wise valuation of specific segments 
The previous two sections address the issues of divergence in the valuation of 
geographically diversified vs. domestic firms, and incremental usefulness of 
segmentally disaggregated information, which pave the way for analysing the core issue 
of my study - valuation of specific segments. 
80 These statistically significant coefficients on positive segmental earnings, however, have the 
unexpected negative sign. This seems to suggest that profit-making segments of loss-making firms are 
negatively associated with firm value, which is contraintuitive. 
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Because this analysis is the core subject of the entire study, it is important that all 
previously identified non-segmental but valuation-affecting contexts are properly 
controlled for in the models addressing the issue of the valuation of specific 
geographical segments. More specifically, in a sample that represents a large cross- 
section of firms-years pooled over time, an explicit account shall be taken of at least the 
following effects: 
" industries and yearly fixed effects; 
" the negative firm-level-earnings effect; 
" the valuation premium (discount) of firms trading above (below) book value 
effect; and 
" the dividend paying status of the firm. 
Econometrically, controlling for the above factors will help reduce the error terms 
of the estimated regressions, which, in turn, will result in lower standard errors and 
higher efficiency of the estimated regression coefficients of the key variables of interest. 
In the sections that follow I analyse the regression results that test the divergence 
of valuation of the following segments: 
1. UK vs. a generic foreign segment (i. e., the sum of non-UK segments) 
2. UK vs. Europe 
3. UK vs. America 
4. UK vs. Asia 
5. UK vs. Middle East & Asia 
6. UK vs. Europe vs. America vs. Asia vs. Middle East & Africa. 
Additionally, different partitions of relevant samples and different contexts are 
used to analyse the sensitivity of the conclusions. All results reported in sections 5.3.3.1 
through 5.3.3.4 reflect the averaged out valuation differential for the period of 14 
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years, from 1989 to 2002. Possible time-related changes in the relative valuation of 
domestic and foreign segments are studied separately in section 5.3.4 of this chapter. 
5.3.3.1 Testing the valuation differences between domestic (UK) vs. foreign 
operations 
The tests of the valuation differential between the domestic and specific foreign 
segment operations are performed for samples with available data on UK PBTs and 
non-UK PBTs. In its complete specification form all regressions include industry and 
yearly fixed effects, a binary dummy variable that controls for the dividend status of the 
firm (dividend-paying vs. non-dividend) and another binary dummy variable that 
accounts for whether the firm trades above or below its book value. To put the analysis 
in perspective, I start off with the simplest `stripped-off' version of the model (where no 
fixed effects, dummies or segmentally disaggregated PBTs are included) and then 
sequentially append it with fixed effects, dummies and segmentally disaggregated 
profits. 
Panel A of Table 5.11 (see Appendix 5.1) reports the results of 5 sequentially 
appended models. The sample for which all five models are estimated includes all 
profit-making segment-reporting firm-years, after the elimination of firm-level and 
segment-level outliers. 
Model 1 represents the simplest specification, where the variation of the 
dependent variable is being explained by a simple set of firm-level valuation factors. 
The notable feature of this model is its relatively low explanatory power, just about 
16%. An additional test (where this regression omits the PBT variable) indicates that 
out of this 16%, 11.5% is attributed to the PBT value driver, while all remaining 
variables (BV, Dividends, and the adjustment terms) jointly explain less than 4.5%. 
Overall, these results suggest that the stripped-off model has a relatively low ability to 
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explain the cross-sectional variation in scale-deflated equity market value, and the firm- 
level profits is the key determinant of value. 
Model 2 is an appended version of model 1 that includes a dummy variable to 
accounts for whether the firm trades above or below (and, equal to) its book value81. 
This modification sharply increases the explanatory power of the regression, with the 
adjusted-R2 increasing from 15.9% to 25.3%. Furthermore, the dummy variable itself 
receives the largest statistical level of significance among all the regression variables 
and has a negative sign, reconfirming an earlier result that firms trading below book 
value have lower market valuation relative to finns trading at a premium to book value. 
In other words, when all regression coefficients are forced to be constant across the two 
categories of firms (those trading above BV vs. those trading below BV), the regression 
would overestimate (underestimate) the market value of the firms trading below BV 
(above BV). However, these results shall not be surprising as they conform to those 
from the analysis of the entire initial sample, presented in Chapter 4. I also split the 
sample of geographically diversified firms into premium-firms and discount-firms sub- 
samples and estimate separate basic regressions. The results produce patterns similar to 
those observed in the total initial sample: the value association of basic value drivers 
(BV, PBT, Dividends) varies strikingly between the premium and discount firms. This 
means that, ideally, the model's specification could have been improved by allowing for 
all coefficients to vary depending on the premium/discount characteristic of the 
diversified firm. However, due to the reasons outlined in the Chapter 4, I choose not to 
over-complicate the model and, therefore, only include a binary dummy variable that 
signifies the premium/discount type of the firm82. 
81 About 13% of the profit-making segment-reporting firm-years trade at a discount to the By. For the 
loss-making sub-sample this percentage is equal to 27%. 
82 This is, of course, a limitation, as all coefficients are effectively being forced to be cross-sectional 
constants across premium and discount firms. However, this decision comes as a trade-off between this 
limitation and, on the other hand, the risk of being left to work with an extremely parameterised model 
with potentially serious econometric problems and difficulties in interpreting the results. 
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Model 3 differs from Model 2 only in that it includes a dummy (that takes the 
value of one when the firm is dividend-paying, and zero otherwise) to purge the 
dividend coefficient. As discussed in Section 5.3.1.3 this dummy captures the average 
differential valuation effect that is associated with an `omitted' context or model 
misspecification that correlates with the dividend status of the firm83. Consistent with its 
intended role and the previous results reported in Section 5.3.1.3, this dummy purges 
the dividend coefficient, which no longer has a statistically significant negative 
association with firm value. It also indicates that firms that pay dividends have a lower 
average value than the zero-dividend firms. 
Model 3 is upgraded to Model 4 by including nine binary dummy variables that 
correspond to nine of the ten industrial affiliations of the firms in the sample. Because 
each firm in the sample is affiliated with only one of the ten specific industries, the 
inclusion of all ten binary dummies would generate perfect colinearity. Therefore, only 
nine industrial dummies are included while, other things being equal, the regression 
intercept could be interpreted as a proxy for the omitted industry's dummy. Overall, the 
inclusion of industrial fixed effects notably improves the explanatory power of the 
regression, by about 4 percentage points (from 25.8% to 30%), yet leaves the value 
drivers' coefficients similar to those of model 3. In other words, the differential 
valuation effect of discount vs. premium firms remains highly significant, indicating 
that it is not an industry-drawn phenomenon. 
Finally, Model 5 controls for all previously identified influential contexts by 
incorporating industry and yearly fixed effects, the dividend status dummy and the 
market premium/discount dummy. Regression coefficients in Model 5 are virtually 
identical to those of Model 4, yet the final set of controlling dummy variables further 
improves the explanatory power of the regression by 2.4 percentage points, to 32.4%. 
83 Recall that dividend status of the firm might itself be the underlying context. 
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All the following regressions, with geographically disaggregated PBTs, are 
estimated on the basis of model 5, that is, with the complete set of control variables. 
Panel B of Table 5.11 reports the results from regressions where consolidated profits 
are decomposed into profits from the domestic segment (PUK), generic foreign segment 
(PNONUK), and a balancing item (PREST), which represents the difference between 
consolidated profits and the sum of the two segments' profits. Model 1 in Panel B is a 
segmentally disaggregated version of Model 5 in Panel A. The explanatory power of 
this model is improved by 1.5 percentage point and although this change has a rather 
trivial economic significance, it is statistically significant at the 1% level (based on the 
F-test). 
A cursory inspection of the results reveals that all components of the 
disaggregated firm-level profit are highly statistically significant and, more importantly, 
the PUK coefficient is statistically higher than that of PNONUK. The Wald test shows 
that the difference between the PUK and PNONUK coefficients is statistically 
significant at the 0.1% level. This implies that, overall, investors attach a higher 
multiple to earnings from domestic operations compared to earnings from agglomerated 
foreign operations. Also is important the fact that profits that encompass all non- 
segment operations (PREST) have statistically significant differential value relevance. 
This, perhaps, shall not be surprising when taking into account that PREST is a sum- 
total of such potentially valuation-relevant items as profits from discontinued 
operations, intra-group operations, exceptional charges, net interest expense, and other 
items. 
It shall be recognised, however, that because Model 1 (of Panel B) is estimated for 
a cross-section of firms-years data pooled over 16 years, it fixates the values of PUK, 
PNONUK and PREST coefficients through the entire sample period and, consequently, 
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the divergence of value contributions associated with these segments. This issue of the 
dynamics of the relationships is investigated in more detail in section 5.3.4. 
In its current specification, Model 1 ignores that segments might, in turn, be 
profit-making or loss-making. Within the sample of 3,798 firm-years, used in model 1, 
in 139 (384) cases profits reported from the UK (non-UK) segment have a negative 
sign. Chapter 4 provides strong evidence of differential valuation of positive and 
negative firm-level earnings. If investors perceive firm-level losses as transitory and, 
therefore, value irrelevant, then similar logic might underpin the valuation of segment- 
level losses. Model 2 in Panel B addresses this possibility by including two interaction 
terms, one for negative profits from the UK segment, and the other for negative profits 
from the non-UK segment. Regression results demonstrate that similar to the value- 
irrelevance of consolidated earnings, the segment-level losses are also value irrelevant. 
The results of Wald tests (which are used to test the following restrictions on regression 
coefficients: PUK coefficient + DPUK coefficient = 0; and PNONUK coefficient + 
DPNONUK coefficient = 0) suggest that coefficients on losses reported from either the 
UK or non-UK segments are not statistically significant. Because of the dampening 
effect of value irrelevance of negative segmental earnings, the coefficients on segmental 
earnings in Model 1 are lower (higher) than coefficients on positive (negative) 
segmental earnings in Model 2. The segregation of positive and negative segmental 
earnings in Model 2 also has an information effect, which is reflected in the increased 
R2 of Model 2. Although this increase is marginal, and economically insignificant, it is 
significant statistically at the 1% level (based on the F-test). 
Model 3 is a replication of Model 2 on a sample that excluded non-dividend 
paying firms. This is done primarily to test the sensitivity of dividends valuation in 
differently partitioned samples and the robustness of the higher valuation of domestic 
vs. foreign earnings. Models 3 and 2 produce qualitatively identical results in terms of 
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segments' earnings valuation, as Wald tests suggest that in Model 3 the coefficients on 
segment-level negative earnings are not statistically different from zero. 
Model 4 is intended to shed some light on the valuation properties of segmental 
earnings for loss-making firms. The analysis in Chapter 4 suggests that, in loss-making 
firms, earnings have no value relevance while book value and dividends become the 
primary value drivers. Models 2 and 3 demonstrate that similar to the value-irrelevance 
of firm-level negative earnings, negative earnings reported from specific geographical 
segments also appear value-irrelevant, while positive segmental earnings are positively 
associated with the value of the entire firm. However, because models 2 and 3 only 
include firms that are profitable on the consolidated-level, I also test the valuation of 
positive and negative segmental earnings when those are reported by loss-making firms 
(see model 4). 
Results from Model 4 are somewhat unexpected and difficult to interpret. It 
appears that disaggregated segment-level positive earnings are negatively associated 
with the firm value (i. e., coefficients on positive segmental earnings are all negative and 
are statistically significant at the 1% level), while negative segmental earnings are value 
irrelevant. Although this negative value association of segmental positive earnings is 
conter-intuitive, disaggregation of consolidated firm-level negative earnings into 
segmental components improves the explanatory power of the regression by a 
statistically significant five percentage points. Furthermore, the value of the coefficient 
on non-UK PBT is statistically lower (Wald test is significant at the 1% level) than UK 
PBT coefficient, suggesting that UK operations are less value-destructive than non-UK 
operations. 
One of the possible explanations for this negative association might be that the 
model misspecifies the hypothesised linkage between the equity market value of the 
firm and financial statements information when the firm is incurring losses on the 
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consolidated level. If segmental profits are highly negatively correlated with variables 
that are the main intrinsic value drivers (and are positively associated with firm value) 
but are omitted from the regression, then negative valuation of segment-level positive 
earnings would simply capture this omitted variable effect. With no clear indication of 
what might cause this result, this argument shall be viewed as only one of many 
possible explanations of the observed idiosyncratic valuation effect. 
In the final model, Model 5, I pool profit-making and loss-making firms and 
estimate the overall valuation divergence of UK vs. non-UK segments. Confirming 
previous findings from separately studied profit-making and loss-making firms, in the 
pooled sample UK earnings have, on average, higher valuation relative to non-UK 
earnings, and negative segmental earnings are not associated with the value of the firm. 
However, in this total sample the actual coefficients on positive segmental profits are 
lower than in the profit-making firms' sample, reflecting the negative valuation of 
positive segmental earnings in loss-making firms. 
5.3.3.2 Testing the valuation of UK vs Continental Europe segments 
In the tests of the valuation differential between the domestic and Europe segment 
operations, firm-level earnings are split into the following segmental components: UK 
(PUK), Europe (PEU), Rest of the World (PROW), and Rest of earnings (PREST). 
Compared to the tests in section 5.3.3.1, here the non-UK sector is segregated into 
Europe (EU) and the Rest of the World (ROW). This disaggregation specifically tests 
relative valuation contributions associated with specific geographical segments: UK and 
Europe. In Panel A of Table 5.12 (see Appendix 5.1), where I repeat the five models 
reported in Panel B of Table 5.11, the firm-level PBT is disaggregated into UK, Europe 
and -ROW components. It appears that the patterns of relative valuation of UK vs. 
Europe segments are qualitatively identical to the valuation of UK vs. non-UK 
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segments. Across all samples and model specifications, the UK segment appears more 
valuable than the Europe segment. Furthermore, Europe and ROW operations seem to 
have identical valuation (Wald test for the difference of PEU and PROW is not 
statistically significant). The fact that the disaggregation of non-UK operations into 
Europe and ROW does not identify any differences between the two, explains why the 
explanatory power of models 1 through 5 in Panel A of Table 5.12 and corresponding 
models in Panel B of Table 5.11 are identical. 
A potentially important caveat is in order. The models in Table 5.12 Panel A are 
estimated for samples that might contain missing/non-reported Europe segmental 
earnings for some observations. In other words, all observations come from firms that 
are geographically diversified, yet not necessarily into the Europe region. Because the 
primary issue of interest is the relative valuation of UK vs. Europe, one might argue that 
tests shall only include those firm-years that simultaneously operate in both 
geographical locations: UK and Europe. Therefore, in Panel B of Table 5.12 I replicate 
the 5 models reported in Panel A for the sub-samples of those firms that simultaneously 
report UK and Europe profits. There are, obviously, fewer firm-years in all new sub- 
samples. Thus the elimination of firm-years that do not specifically report Europe 
operations reduces the sub-samples of profit-making firms by a quarter and loss-making 
firms by a third. 
The results of tests in Panel B are, however, identical to those of Panel A, which 
adds to the robustness of the previous conclusions regarding the higher valuation of 
domestic (UK) operations relative to Europe operations. Also confirmed is the previous 
finding that EU and ROW operations have identical valuations (as indicated by Wald 
tests). This explains why disaggregation of non-UK operations into EU and ROW does 
not improve the explanatory power of the regressions. 
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There is one puzzling result, which I find difficult to interpret: both in Panel A 
and Panel B the valuation of negative earnings reported from the Europe geographical 
location by profit-making firms is positively and often statistically significantly 
associated with firm value84. This effect, however, disappears in the total sample (that 
pools profit-making and loss-making firms) where valuation of negative Europe 
earnings becomes value irrelevant. 
5.3.3.3 Testing the valuation of UK vs America segments 
To identify any valuation divergence that might exist between the UK and 
America segment, the firm's earnings are disaggregated into the following geographical 
components: UK (PUK), America (PAMER), and Rest of the World (ROW). In other 
words, the non-UK earnings are now being disaggregated into earnings from America 
and the Rest of the World. In Panel A of Table 5.13 (see Appendix 5.1) regressions are 
estimated for samples that might contain missing/non-reported American segmental 
earnings for some observations. 
To test the sensitivity of inferences to the exclusion of firm-years that do not 
operate in America, I re-run all 5 regressions for firms that simultaneously operate in 
both UK and America segments (see Panel B of Table 5.13). The elimination of firm- 
years that do not specifically report operations from America reduces the sub-samples of 
profit-making firms by some 34% and loss-making firms by 38%. Regardless of the 
definition of samples (i. e., Panel A or Panel B), regression results unequivocally suggest 
that there exists a statistically significant (at least at the 5% level, according to the Wald 
test) valuation differential between the domestic (UK) and American operations. 
Domestic operations are always more valuable than operations from the region of 
America. Similar to the findings in sections 5.3.3.1 and 5.3.3.2, the value association of 
84 Additional testing (not reported) indicates that this result is likely to be driven by few largest losses 
reported from the Europe segment, which still remain in the sample after the elimination of outliers. 
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segment-level earnings depends on their sign: positive segmental earnings are positively 
and statistically significantly associated with firm value while negative segmental 
earnings tend to be value-irrelevant. In the previous section, where I compare the 
valuation of UK and EU segments, there was an anomalous finding of positive value 
association of segment-level losses when these are reported by loss-making firms. This 
result is also present in the current tests. What causes this effect remains unclear. 
5.3.3.4 Testing the valuation of UK vs. Asia segments 
The aim of this section is to assess the relative valuations associated with the 
domestic (UK) and a generic segment that encompasses the entire geographical region 
of Asia. Similar to the tests that involved other specific foreign segments, this test 
disaggregates foreign earnings into earnings reported from the Asia segment and the 
Rest of the World. In Panel A of Table 5.14 (see Appendix 5.1), regressions are 
estimated for samples of firms that report segment-disaggregated profits, but do not 
necessarily operate in Asia. 
The examination of regression results reported in Panel A suggests that domestic 
operations are more valuable than those reported from the Asia segment. This valuation 
differential is similar to those already found in previous sections, with regards to such 
foreign locations as Europe and America. Also similar to findings reported in sections 
5.3.3.1 through 5.3.3.3 is the value-irrelevance associated with negative segmental 
earnings and the anomalous negative valuation of positive segmental earnings reported 
by firms incurring losses on the corporate level. Nevertheless, results of Model 5 (Panel 
A), where loss and profit-making firms are pooled in one sample, still suggest that 
domestic operations have higher overall valuation than those of Asia. 
The tests reported in Panel A shall be interpreted with caution, as there might be a 
caveat to using samples where not all included firm-years have operations in the Asia 
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segment. Therefore, in Panel B of Table 5.14 I repeat the Panel A's tests but restrict the 
samples only to include firm-years that specifically report the Asia segment, that is, 
these firms simultaneously operate in both the UK and Asia geographical areas. This 
reduces the size of sub-samples of profit-making firms by 68% and loss-making firms 
by 75%. 
In models 1 through 3 of Panel B the value of UK segmental earnings coefficients 
are higher then those of Asia. These divergences, however, are not statistically 
significant (Wald test P-value is above the 10% level in all tests). This is, perhaps, due 
to the generally higher standard errors associated with the estimated segmental PBT 
coefficients (as compared to those reported in models of Tables 5.11 through 5.13), 
resulting in the Wald test failing to distinguish these segments' valuation. The general 
patterns of valuation of negative segmental earnings in profit-making firms and positive 
segmental earnings in loss-making firms is identical to those observed in sections 
5.3.3.1 through 5.3.3.3. 
5.3.3.5 Testing the valuation of UK vs. Middle East & Asia segments 
In this section I test the valuation divergence of domestic and Middle East & 
Africa by means of disaggregating the firm-level PBT into corresponding segmental 
components. The models in Panel A of Table 5.15 (see Appendix 5.1) are estimated for 
samples that are not restricted to the firm-years with available earnings for the Middle 
East & Africa segment; while models in Panel B of Table 5.15 are estimated for firm- 
years that specifically report earnings from that foreign geographical location. 
In all models of Panel A, coefficients on earnings reported from the Middle East 
and Africa segment are not statistically significant, while those reported from the UK 
and ROW are segments positive and highly statistically significant. Unlike all previous 
tests, which dealt with such foreign segments as Europe, America and Asia, in the 
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current tests positive earnings reported from the domestic segment no longer have 
higher valuation than earnings reported from the ROW. 
Regression results are somewhat unexpected in the restricted samples - models 1 
through 5 of Panel B- where none of the `fundamental' valuation factors (BV and 
Dividend) and PBT's segmental components qualifies as value relevant at the 5% level 
of significance. This is despite the relatively high explanatory power and overall 
statistical significance of the regressions. Positive earnings reported from the domestic 
segment by profit-making firms are value relevant at only the 10% level of significance, 
while earnings from the Middle East & Africa segment have negative coefficient, albeit 
not significant statistically. 
I further explore the lack of value-relevance of the basic value drivers by re- 
running all regressions without fixed effects and dummies. The explanatory power of 
the models now drops by about 20 to 25 percentage points but renders the BV and PBT 
coefficients - in the consolidated version of the model - statistically significant at least 
at the 5% level. Disaggregating the firm-level PBT into segmental components further 
increases the explanatory power by about 10 percentage points. Additionally, the 
earnings from the UK and ROW segments show positive and statistically significant 
association while value, while earnings from Middle East & Africa appear with a 
negative and statistically not significant coefficient. 
A tentative conclusion might be that the inclusion of a large number of fixed 
effects and dummies `overcontrols' the model and suppresses the association between 
the segment-level variables and firm value. 
5.3.3.6 Simultaneous tests of relative valuation of all geographical segments 
Sections 5.3.3.1 through 5.3.3.5 have examined the pair-wise valuation 
differentials between the domestic vs. a specific foreign segment. In the current section 
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the firm-level PBT is disaggregated, within one model, into the segmental components 
from all five geographical regions. This approach has benefits and shortcomings. On the 
benefit side is the fact that it allows the comparison of all pair-wise combinations of 
segments' earnings coefficients, which are estimated within a single regression. 
Furthermore, this complete disaggregation is likely to generate more accurate (purged) 
earnings coefficients for a given segment, as all other segments are controlled for. 
However, this approach might also have a problem. Strictly speaking, in order to 
conclude whether for a generic firm earnings coefficients from segment A are more/less 
valuable than those from segment B, all firm-years in the sample shall have both 
numbers available. In a hypothetical extreme cases, if the regression includes a cross- 
section of firms where none of the firm-years simultaneously operate in both segments, 
the divergence between these segments' earnings coefficient might prove statistically 
significant/insignificant but will have little economic meaning. That is, how can we 
conclude that operations in segment A are more valuable than those in segment B, if 
none of the firms in the sample operate in both segments simultaneously? 
Table 5.16 (see Appendix 5.1) reports results from four models with fully 
segment-disaggregated PBTs. Model 1 is estimated for profit-making firms without the 
fixed yearly and industry effects, while Model 2 is estimated with these fixed effects. 
Although in drawing valuation inferences I predominantly focus on the profit-making 
firms (Models 1 and 2), I also report Model 3 (without fixed effects) and Model 4 (with 
fixed effects), which are estimated for the entire sample in order to conclude on the 
sensitivity of results to the inclusion of loss-making firms. 
In each of the four models, the Wald test is used to assess the level of statistical 
significance of differences between two segments' earnings coefficients. This involves 
applying Wald tests to ten pairs of segments (i. e., all possible paired combinations of 
segments): 
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" UK vs. Europe; 
" UK vs. America; 
" UK vs. Asia; 
" UK vs. Middle East & Africa; 
" Europe vs. America; 
" Europe vs. Asia; 
" Europe vs. Middle East & Africa; 
" America vs. Asia; 
" America vs. Middle East & Africa; 
" Asia vs. Middle East & Africa. 
The inclusion of fixed effects into the models does not, by and large, affect the 
inferences derived from Wald tests for at least 8 out of 10 pairs. In Models 1 and 2 the 
Wald tests indicate that domestic operations are statistically more valuable than 
operations from Europe, Asia and Middle East & Africa. This agrees with the previous 
findings reported in sections 5.3.3.2,5.3.3.4 and 5.3.3.5. However, in contrast to the 
findings in section 5.3.3.3, here the domestic and American operations have virtually 
identical valuation. Similar to the UK segment, operations in America have higher 
valuation than those from Europe, Asia and Middle East & Africa85. The valuation of 
Europe is statistically indistinguishable from that of Asia, while Middle East & Africa 
has the lowest valuation with respect to all other geographical regions. Moreover, 
earnings from the segment of Middle East & Africa are not statistically significant. 
Conclusions from Models 3 and 4 are broadly similar to those from Models 1 and 
2. Foreign operations, (in model 4 this also relates to America) have lower valuation 
ss Although the coefficient on earnings reported from Asia is substantially smaller than that of America, 
the difference between the two is not statistically significant at the 10% level when the model is estimated 
with fixed effects. 
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than the domestic segment. In terms of relative valuation, America is next to the UK, as 
it has statistically higher earnings coefficient than Europe and Middle East & Africa. 
America's earnings coefficient is also higher than that of Asia, yet this difference is not 
statistically significant. With respect to other segments, Asia and Europe are in the 
middle range of valuation, yet further examination of results might indicate that Asia is 
slightly higher valued than Europe. Models 3 and 4 provide further evidence of the 
lowest valuation of the Middle East & Africa geographical location. Not only has this 
segment the lowest valuation, but its earnings coefficients in models 3 and 4 are 
negative (and statistically significant at the 6% level), suggesting that operations in that 
segment might even destroy value. 
Overall, the results obtained from both test designs (i. e., from models testing UK 
vs. a specific foreign segment, and from a model that simultaneously tests the valuation 
differences among all segments) lead to similar conclusions, and can be summarised as 
follows. The segmental operations reported from the UK and America geographic 
regions are in the top end of valuation; Asia and UK are in the middle range; and Middle 
East & Africa is at the bottom end of valuation. 
5.3.4 Dynamics of relative value contribution associated with specific segments 
The analyses in the various parts of section 5.3.3 were based on the assumption 
that the segments' differential valuation is persistent through time. In other words, 
segmental earnings coefficients were set to be constant throughout the entire sample 
period of 16 years. In chapter 3I discuss factors that might determine segment-level 
earnings coefficients and instigate the market's differential valuation of earnings from 
specific geographical segments. Among the most important of these factors are the 
differences between the various geographical regions in terms of. 
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1. factors of risk associated with the political, economic and business environment, 
as perceived by the UK stock market; 
2. expected rates of economic growth; 
3. segments' risk-return characteristics; 
4. expected changes in the regions' (foreign) currency/pound sterling exchange 
rates; 
5. the perceived persistence of profits earned from a specific segment; and 
6. differences in profit margins. 
The valuation of earnings from a specific segment reflects the collective influence 
of the above factors. As characteristics of these factors vary across geographical 
locations, different segments will have different valuations. As in none of the 
geographical regions these factors are likely to have remained stable over the entire 
sample period, one would expect (1) the valuation of segment-level earnings per se, and 
(2) the earnings' valuation differential for different segments, to vary over time. The 
firm-level yearly analysis of chapter 4 reveals the time-related changing patterns of the 
key valuation factors. In the tests that follow I investigate the issue of the time-related 
changing nature of segment-level valuation by splitting the entire sample into variously 
defined economic sub-periods. 
The decision about the periods' boundaries is discretionary. As a starting point I 
use the definition of economic periods used by Core et al. (2003) who split their sample 
into the pre-1996 period (the old economy) and post-1996 period (the new economy) 
and demonstrate empirically that the value association of different valuation factors has 
changed substantially over these two periods. However, because any categorisation of 
economic periods is bound to be discretionary, I also test an alternative time split86, with 
86 Ideally, one would estimate a separate regression for each of the 16 years. However, splitting the 
segment-disclosing sample into 16 years produces inappropriately small yearly samples with insufficient 
number of data points for some of the segments. 
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roughly similar number of observations per period: pre-1994,1994-1997, and 1998- 
2002. 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 5.17 (see Appendix 5.1) report results from the 
two-period time split and three-period splits respectively, and the Wald test is used to 
test the level of statistical significance of the divergence between any two segments' 
earnings coefficients. 
In the old economic period (Models 1 and 3 of Panel A), earnings from the 
domestic (UK) segment and America appear to have statistically and economically 
indistinguishable valuation coefficients, which are, in turn, statistically higher (see Wald 
tests' P-values) than those of all remaining foreign geographical segments87. The next 
most valuable segments are Asia and Europe. The fact that Asia's coefficients tend to 
exceed those of the Europe (yet this difference is not statistically significant) and falls 
short of that of America and UK only at a marginally statistically significant (4%) level, 
indicate that Asia might be somewhat higher up than Europe in the league of segments' 
valuation. Finally, the Middle East & Africa segment's earnings coefficients are not 
different from zero statistically and are statistically lower than all other segments' 
earnings coefficients. The order of relative valuation of geographical segments during 
the old economic period is, therefore, as follows: 
Highest valuation: America and UK; 
Medium valuation: Asia and Europe; 
Lowest valuation: Middle East & Africa. 
In terms of segment valuation, the new economic period (Models 2 and 4 of Panel 
A) differs from the old period in at least two respects: 
1. the relative valuation of segments is substantially less distinguishable; and 
B7 When the model does not include fixed effects (Model 1) America's earnings coefficient exceeds that 
of UK, yet this difference has neither statistical nor economical significance. 
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2. the regression estimated values of segmental earnings' coefficients have 
radically smaller values. 
With regards to the first point, none of the Wald tests are significant at the 1% 
level; only one (three) out of ten tests in Modell (in Model 4) is significant at the 5% 
level; and only three out of ten tests in Model 2 and Model 4 are significant when the 
10% level is used. It is the domestic (UK) location that is valued at a premium relative 
to all foreign regions. In Model 2, with no fixed effects, it is only the UK and America 
segments whose earnings coefficients are positive and statistically different from zero at 
the 1% level. In the Model 4, with yearly and industrial fixed effects, the UK earnings 
coefficient is still significant, but none of the foreign segments' earnings coefficients are 
statistically different from zero, even at the 10% level. In other words, the UK 
operations still remain the most valuable and value relevant. 
With regard to the second point, it shall be noted that in the new economy period 
the segmental earnings coefficients are several times smaller than in the old economy, 
even when statistically different from zero. This conforms to patterns, reported in 
Chapter 4, of the time-related characteristics of firm-level earnings coefficients. 
A thinner split of the sample period into three time periods (Models 1 though 3 of 
Panel B) indicates that the changes in relative valuation and value relevance of specific 
segments' earnings, as revealed from the preceding analysis, were taking place 
gradually. Thus in the pre-1994 period, earnings reported from America clearly has the 
highest valuation as this segment's earnings coefficient is always larger, both 
statistically and economically, than those of other geographical segments. The UK 
coefficient has the next highest value, surpassing those of Asia, Europe and Middle East 
& Africa, yet statistically this difference is only significant for the latter two regions. 
The third-largest coefficient relates to Asia, but its valuation superiority is statistically 
significant only when compared to the Middle East & Africa. Finally, earnings from 
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Middle East & Africa appear to have the lowest valuation of all regions (in fact the 
coefficient is negative) and has virtually no association with the firm value. 
In the middle period (1994-1997) it is the domestic segment that has the highest 
earnings coefficient, which is statistically larger than America's, Europe's, Asia's and 
Middle East & Africa's coefficients, at least at the 10%, 5%, 10% and 1% level, 
respectively. America's earnings coefficient has the second-highest value, but its 
difference from the Asia's and Europe's coefficients is significant neither in economic 
nor statistical terms. Finally, the Middle East & Africa is the only value-irrelevant 
segment, which is similar to the result from the pre-1994 period. 
The post-1997 period is the most peculiar in terms of segment-level earnings 
valuation. It appears that none of the segmental earnings are value-relevant in their own 
right and no differential valuation exists between the earnings reported from different 
geographical locations. Furthermore, of all key value drivers (book value, dividends and 
disaggregated earnings) included in the model, only dividends have statistically 
significant association with value. The unusually low explanatory power of the model 
might be a reflection of this fact8ß. 
Summarising the results obtained from the analysis of different periods, two 
conclusions might be drawn: 
1. the disaggregation of firm-level earnings into geographical components has 
markedly different information content in different periods; and 
2. the relative valuation of operations reported from specific geographical regions 
changes with time. 
A conclusion of a more general nature is that apart from the time-related 
variability of segments' valuation, changes in other regression parameters are also 
obvious. Thus, (1) the explanatory power of the regressions steadily declined over the 
88 Further investigation of what causes the observed phenomenon of time-related deterioration in value 
relevance (or valuation role) of financial statement variables is beyond the scope of my research. 
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three economic periods; (2) the value association of such financial statement data as 
firm/segment-level earnings and book values declined over time; and (3) the value 
association of dividends evolved from being positive and highly statistically significant 
in the pre-1994 period, to value-irrelevant in the middle period (1994-1997), and, 
finally, to being negative and statistically significant for the post-1997 period. 
5.4 ISSUES OF ROBUSTNESS AND SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The bulk of the empirical analysis in this chapter has been carried out by utilising 
the composite scale-deflated financial statement and market variables. In chapter 4I 
argued that in light of the lack of consensus in the literature on what financial variable is 
the `best' scale proxy, the use of a composite scale proxy offers a compromise. This is 
because the composite scale proxy, which encapsulates more than one single-variable 
scale proxy, diversifies away some of the problems which arise when a single-variable 
scale deflator is used for samples wherein firms differ across all dimensions. The 
analysis in chapter 4 has demonstrated empirically that (i) regression parameters are 
more stable to the definition and treatment of outliers, and (ii) the deflated financial and 
market variables have more close-to-normal distributions, when the composite scale 
proxy was used as a deflator. The stability of regression parameters (which is best 
achieved when the composite scale proxy is used) is of key importance in Chapter 5, 
because the differential valuation of specific geographic segments is identified by 
means of comparing the values of segments' PBT coefficients. 
Nevertheless, to make the analysis complete and, perhaps, more comparable to 
other studies in this area, one might need to cross-check the sensitivity of the main 
results to the use of alternative deflators. This implies re-scaling of variables and 
repeating the main regressions/tests with the re-scaled variables. Group Total Assets, 
one year lagged equity Market Value and, finally, group Sales are chosen as alternative 
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deflators. These results are reported in Appendix 5.2 and are discussed, in brief, in the 
sections that follow89. 
By and large, the firm-level conclusions, which are based on general regression 
characteristics (or valuation properties of the models) are similar, regardless of the 
choice of the deflator (i. e., Composite scale proxy, Total Assets, one year lagged equity 
market value, and Sales). Across all deflators, the patterns of the time-related changes in 
the combined value relevance of financial statement information are qualitatively 
identical. Thus, the explanatory power of regressions that have been estimated over 
three different time periods (pre-1994,1994-1997, and 1998-2002), and two different 
time periods (pre-1996, and 1996-2002), have a clear declining trend for all types of 
deflators (see Table 5.16, in Appendix 5.1, and Tables 5.16S, 5.16T and 5.16M, in 
Appendix 5.2). 
The explanatory power of most of the TA and Sales-scaled regressions is notably 
higher than that of the corresponding lagged MV-scaled regressions. This result is not 
unexpected, bearing in mind that the lag MV-deflated model is a quasi return-earnings 
type of specification90. The composite deflated models have, on average, somewhat 
lower explanatory power than the corresponding TA and Sales deflated models, yet 
have substantially higher explanatory power than that of the lagged MV-deflated 
models. 
In addition, in terms of the adjusted R2, the relative performance of the models 
across differently partitioned samples are similar for all deflators. Across all deflators, 
the models explain more of the cross-sectional variation in equity market value when (i) 
firms trade at a discount to book value, (ii) firms pay dividends, (iii) when the reported 
g9 The numbering of the tables in Appendix 5.2 is identical to that of the corresponding tables in 
Appendix 5.1, but end with letters 'S', when the deflator is Sales, 'MV', when the deflator is lagged-MV, 
and 'TA', when the deflator is Total Assets. 
90 This has been discussed in more details in Chapter 4 
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PBTs are positive, and (iv) when observations relate to the first half of the sample 
period. 
The valuation role (or value relevance) of key value drivers, in the context of the 
employed model, appears to be immune to the choice of deflator. In the profit-making 
samples, PBT is always positively and statistically significantly related to value, and 
appear to be the key value driver. Negative PBTs are, by and large, value irrelevant. 
Regardless of the deflator, when positive, the book value of equity is, usually, 
statistically significantly and positively associated with value in the loss-making sub- 
sample. In the profit-making samples this association is, frequently, negative and not 
statistically significant. Negative BV have no valuation relevance. Dividends are in 
positive and statistically significant association with the value of the domestic firms, but 
have no valuation role for geographically diversified firms. Furthermore, when the 
entire sample period is split into two or three sub-periods, across all alternatively 
deflated models, dividends have positive (negative) value association for the period(s) 
covering the early-1990s (late-1990s). Deflation by alternative scale proxies does not 
impact on such firm-level conclusions as: 
" dividend paying firms are valued at a discount relative to none-paying firms 
" firms that trade at a discount to equity book value have lower valuation relative to 
firms trading at a premium. 
Finally, the segment-level valuation is found to be more sensitive to the choice of 
deflator. When the firm-level financial results are disaggregated into two broad 
segments, domestic and foreign, the domestic segment always comes out as more 
valuable, across all tested alternative deflators (see Models 2 and 5 in Tables 5.10, 
5.10M, 5.10T, 5.10S, of Appendix 5.2)91. When these tests are repeated with the 
aggregate foreign operations being further split into specific regions, the UK operations 
91 In some tests, however, this difference is not statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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come out as the most valuable in the composite scale-deflated and the TA-deflated tests. 
In the majority of lagged MV-deflated tests the most valued regions are America and 
the UK. In the Sales-deflated tests the results are less conclusive (see Models 3 and 6 in 
Tables 5.10,5.10M, 5.1OT, 5.1OS)92. 
Similar deflation-related low stability of segments' relative valuation can be 
found, when the segments' valuation differential is tested over different economic 
periods (see Tables 5.17,5.17M, 5.17T, 5.17S). 
By and large, the deflation-related instability of segments' relative valuation can 
be attributed to several factors. Firstly, because the number of missing values is 
different for different scale proxies, the resulting deflated samples are not identical in 
terms of size. 
Secondly, outliers are identified and eliminated by applying the 0.5% cut-off rule 
to all scale-deflated firm and segment-level variables, included in the regression. This, 
in aggregate, eliminates about 3% of a sample. However, the 3% of observations, which 
are treated as outliers in, for instance, the Sales-deflated sample, are not the same 
observations as the 3% of outlier observations in the TA-deflated sample. In other 
words, differently deflated samples are not entirely identical in terms of the included 
observations. 
Finally, the firm-level and, to a greater extent, segment-level regression 
parameters in Sales and lagged MV-deflated models are substantially more sensitive to 
the choice of outliers' cut-off percentage than the results from the composite-scale 
deflated model. Results from the composite-scale deflated tests become sufficiently 
robust after the elimination of less than 0.5% of the top and bottom values of each of the 
regression variables. To achieve a similar robustness for the single-variable deflated 
regressions, at least the 1% or higher cut off rule should be applied. 
92 In some tests, however, this difference is not statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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I consider (i) the robustness of the results to the treatment of outliers, and (ii) the 
importance to limit the loss of observations, as sufficient reasons for relying on the 
results from the composite-deflated models when drawing conclusions (see below) 
about segments' relative valuation and value implication of geographic diversification. 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Results indicate that, overall, geographically diversified firms are valued at a 
premium in relation to domestic firms. Similar to the findings by Garrod and Rees 
(1998), I find that investors attach significantly higher multiples to earnings reported by 
diversified firms. This result persists both for the `old' and `new' economic periods. At 
the same time, a significantly higher and positive capitalisation of dividends is observed 
for domestic firms, while dividends appear neutral for the valuation of diversified f inns. 
On the segmental level, when all foreign operations are amalgamated in one 
generic foreign segment and compared with the domestic (UK) segment, the UK-based 
operations appear the most valuable. When the generic foreign segment is disaggregated 
into specific foreign segments, the UK operations no longer dominate segment 
valuation. 
During the early economic periods (pre-1994 or pre-1996) segmental profits from 
America have the highest capitalisation, followed by the domestic (UK) segment. 
However, during a more recent economic period (1994-1997) the UK segment is 
associated with the highest contribution to firm value. In the most recent economic 
period (1998-2002) the earnings information reported from most of the foreign 
segments appear value-irrelevant. Throughout all periods segmental operations (i. e., 
profits) from the Middle East & Africa are associated with the lowest valuation and, 
sometimes have negative association with the firm value. This time-related change in 
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the relative valuation of segments' operations possibly reflects the changing economic 
prospects of different regions of the world. 
In addition, one can observe some sort of association between the valuation of a 
specific geographic segment and the degree of popularity of that geographical region as 
an investment location for UK firms. Thus, Middle East and Africa is found to be the 
least contributing to the value of the firm segment and it is the most rare investment 
location for the UK multi-segment firms. Asia is the region with the next-lowest relative 
segmental valuation and popularity as investment location. Among foreign segments 
America and Europe are associated with the higher value contribution and are more 
`popular' locations of foreign investments by UK multinationals 
By and large, empirical tests reported throughout the chapter suggest that 
segment-level accounting data communicates value relevant information, which is often 
incremental to the consolidated-level data. 
93 This might be a result of firms being aware of the market's favorable/unfavorable valuation of specific 
geographical segments and aligning their foreign investment decisions accordingly. It might also be 
possible that firms simply chose not to disclose (whenever possible) segments which are perceived by the 
market as value reducing. 
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APPENDIX 5.1 
All regressions reported in Appendix 5.1 are deflated by the composite 
scale factor. Composite scale factor (scale) = (MV+TA+Sale)/3. 
All regressions reported in Appendix 5.1 and 5.2 are estimated for 
samples that exclude the outliers. Outliers are defined as the top 
and/or bottom 0.5% of each variable included in regression. 
In the tables that follow the following names or acronyms have been 
used to represent regression variable 
Name used in 
regression 
Variable description 
BV Scale-deflated Book value of ordinary equity 
PBT Scale-deflated Profit Before Tax 
MV Scale-deflated Market Value of ordinary equity 
DIV Scale-deflated Dividends for ordinary shareholders 
TA Total Assets of the company 
Sales Group turnover 
Adj. ER Adjustment term = earnings for ordinary shareholders -- PBT 
Scale Composite scale factor = (MV+TA+Sales)/3 
1/Scale; 1/MV; 
1/Sale; and 1/TA 
Are the reciprocals of Scale, one year lagged-MV, Sales, and TA, 
respectively. 
PBT*f(size) An instrumental variable designed to capture firm size-related non- 
linearity of the PBT coefficient. PBT*f(size proxy)=PBT*size"(0.2). 
PUK Scale-deflated PBT reported form UK segment 
PNUK Scale-deflated PBT reported form non-UK segment 
PAMER Scale-deflated PBT reported form America segment 
PEU Scale-deflated PBT reported form Europe segment 
PAFR Scale-deflated PBT reported form Mid. East&Africa segment 
PASIA Scale-deflated PBT reported form Asia segment 
PRIEST The difference between the group-level PBT and the sum of 
segment-level PBTs 
PROW PBT of rest of the world (depending on the context of the test) 
DBV Interaction term for By, when PBT is negative 
DDIV Interaction term for DIV, when PBT is negative 
DPBT Interaction term for negative PBT 
DAdj. ER Interaction term for Adj. ER, when PBT is negative 
DPBT*F(size) Interaction term for DPBT*f(size), when PBT is negative 
DPUK Interaction term for negative PUK 
DPNUK Interaction term for negative PNUK 
DPAMER Interaction term for negative PAMER 
270 
DPEU Interaction term for negative PEU 
DPAFR Interaction term for negative PAFR 
DPASIA Interaction term for negative PASIA 
DPREST Interaction term for negative PREST 
DPROW Interaction term for negative PROW 
1/Scale dummy Interaction term for 1/scale, when PBT is negative 
NEGMV Dummy variable: NEGMV=1 if MV<BV, otherwise NEGMV=O. 
NEGMVPBT Dummy variable: NEGPBTMV=1 if MV<BV and PBT<O, otherwise 
NEGPBTMV=O. 
DUMDIV Dummy variable: DUMDIV=1 if the firm pays dividends, otherwise 
DUMDIV=O. 
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Table 5.9 
Total sample 
Diversified firms Domestic firms 
Definitionl' Definition2* 
dividend and only dividend and only dividend and only 
non-dividend dividend non-dividend dividend non-dividend dividend 
firms firms firms* firms* firms firms 
model I model 2 model 3 model 4 models model 6 
Intercept 0.715 0.684 0.692 0.680 0.562 0.505 
t-ratio 44.846 41.069 33.767 31.694 40.231 36.580 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
dummy 1 0.307 -0.175 0.274 -0.220 0.351 -0.099 
t-ratio 8.603 -3.994 5.779 -4.012 10.265 -2.661 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 
dummy 2 -0.504 -0.432 -0.485 -0.427 -0.514 -0.453 
t-ratio -48.677 -39.663 -33.794 -27.609 -55.453 -48.806 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
dummy 3 -0.654 -0.666 -0.610 -0.682 -0.543 -0.564 
t-ratio -21.593 -18.282 -14.700 -15.211 -18.724 -21.572 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1/scale 297.3 -46.5 706.7 22.4 122.0 46.9 
f-ratio 2.828 -0.464 4.062 0.101 1.730 0.606 
P-value 0.005 0.642 0.000 0.920 0.084 0.545 
1/scale dummy 97.7 227.7 -137.7 135.6 226.1 891.4 
t-ratio 0.632 0.850 -0.590 0.314 2.586 4.858 
P-value 0.528 0.395 0.555 0.754 0.010 0.000 
BV 0.135 -0.001 0.132 0.007 0.452 0.284 
t-ratio 5.457 -0.020 4.097 0.195 24.238 14.674 
P-value 0.000 0.984 0.000 0.845 0.000 0.000 
DBV 0.539 0.527 0.533 0.528 0.070 0.276 
t-ratio 12.873 8.499 9.747 6.654 1.751 5.617 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.080 0.000 
PBT 2.350 2.758 2.274 2.705 2.044 2.441 
t-ratio 14.101 16.108 10.053 11.337 12.390 14.595 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DPBT -2.515 -2.937 -2.518 -2.896 -2.305 -2.095 
t-ratio -13.417 -14.814 -10.124 -10.450 -11.791 -3.854 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT*f(scale) 0.067 0.053 0.085 0.068 -0.030 -0.022 
t-ratio 5.641 4.491 5.904 4.560 -2.370 -1.789 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.074 
DPBT'(scale) -0.022 -0.043 -0.032 -0.056 0.083 -0.028 
t-ratio -1.332 -2.688 -1.586 -2.443 4.187 -0.420 
P-value 0.183 0.007 0.113 0.015 0.000 0.675 
DIV -1.151 0.789 -1.355 -0.053 1.737 4.291 
t-ratio -2.934 1.825 -2.709 -0.097 4.255 9.748 
P-value 0.003 0.068 0.007 0.923 0.000 0.000 
DIV dummy -12.414 1.007 -10.475 3.660 -12.158 -1.114 
t-ratio -11.592 0.902 -7.849 2.516 -10.567 -1.078 
P-value 0.000 0.367 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.281 
Adj. ER 0.865 0.920 0.986 0.966 -0.032 0.237 
f-ratio 5.598 5.598 5.349 5.045 -0.530 1.801 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.596 0.072 
dAdj. ER -0.535 -0.744 -0.769 -0.764 0.184 -0.087 
t-ratio -2.332 -3.412 -3.161 -3.118 1.175 -0.593 
P-value 0.020 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.240 0.553 
No. of cases 9539 7474 5496 4500 8638 6833 
Adj. R-S uare 29.60% 32.58% 28.32% 30.35% 31.05% 36.36% 
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Table 5.9 (continued from the previous page... ) 
Profit firms only Loss firms only 
diversified firms domestic firms Diversified domestic 
dividend and only dividend and only 
non-dividend dividend non-dividend dividend 
dividend dividend 
firms firms firms firms firms firms 
model? model8 model9 model 10 model ll model 12 
Intercept 0.715 0.684 0.562 0.505 0.509 0.406 
t-ratio 44.846 41.069 40.231 36.580 12.537 11.725 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
dummy 2 -0.504 -0.432 -0.514 -0.453 
t-ratio -48.677 -39.663 -55.453 -48.806 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
dummy 3 -0.491 -0.465 
t-ratio -22.173 -16.046 
P-value 0.000 0.000 
1/scale 297.3 -46.5 135.7 47.0 181.1 930.0 
t-ratio 2.828 -0.464 1.827 0.607 0.730 5.592 
P-value 0.005 0.642 0.068 0.544 0.466 0.000 
BV 0.135 -0.001 0.382 0.283 0.526 0.567 
t-ratio 5.457 -0.020 20.034 14.477 9.418 11.814 
P-value 0.000 0.984 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT 2.350 2.758 2.161 2.443 -0.179 0.349 
t-ratio 14.101 16.108 12.997 14.589 -1.787 0.674 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.074 0.501 
PBT*f(scale) 0.067 0.053 -0.024 -0.022 0.009 -0.049 
t-ratio 5.641 4.491 -1.896 -1.782 0.848 -0.761 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.075 0.397 0.447 
DIV -1.151 0.789 1.998 4.296 1.796 3.101 
t-ratio -2.934 1.825 4.868 9.742 1.744 3.066 
P-value 0.003 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.081 0.002 
Adj. ER 0.865 0.920 -0.016 0.238 0.176 0.155 
t-ratio 5.598 5.598 -0.251 1.806 1.229 2.326 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.802 0.071 0.219 0.021 
No. of cases 7296 6737 6917 6409 737 424 
Ad'. R-S uare 26.42% 28.93% 30.70% 33.53% 31.08% 48.72% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below each regression 
coefficient. 
dummy 1=1 if PBT<O & MV>BV; and dummyl =0 otherwise 
dummy 2=1 if PB7>0 & MV<BV; and dummy2 =0 otherwise 
dummy 3=I if PBT<0 & MV<BV; and dummy3 =0 otherwise 
* Definition) = when the firms is considered geographically diversified if at least one of the three 
accounting items (PBT, Sales, or NA) is reported for a foreign segment. Definition2 = when the firm is 
considered geographically diversified only when the segmental PBT is reported for a foreign segment. 
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Table 5.11 Panel A (continued from the previous page... ) 
Coeff. 
Model 4 
t-ratio P-value Coeff. 
Model 5 
t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.629 9.946 0.000 0.298 2.279 0.023 
NEGMV -0.432 -29.336 0.000 -0.414 -26.073 0.000 
DUMDIV -0.104 -2.683 0.007 -0.093 -2.401 0.016 
SICI 0.311 5.243 0.000 0.308 4.951 0.000 
SIC2 -0.142 -2.890 0.004 -0.147 -2.811 0.005 
SIC3 0.109 2.353 0.019 0.104 2.108 0.035 
SIC4 0.098 2.149 0.032 0.087 1.782 0.075 
SIC5 0.080 1.623 0.104 0.060 1.148 0.251 
SIC6 0.063 1.302 0.193 0.050 0.974 0.330 
SIC7 0.100 2.064 0.039 0.086 1.658 0.097 
SIC8 -0.006 -0.088 0.930 -0.017 -0.246 0.806 
SIC9 0.279 5.855 0.000 0.266 5.257 0.000 
Y2 0.102 1.205 0.228 
Y3 0.035 0.865 0.387 
Y4 0.021 0.750 0.454 
Y5 0.050 2.199 0.028 
Y6 0.048 2.552 0.011 
Y7 0.053 3.269 0.001 
Y8 0.043 3.022 0.003 
Y9 0.032 2.579 0.010 
Y10 0.035 3.081 0.002 
Y11 0.031 2.947 0.003 
Y12 0.027 2.833 0.005 
Y13 0.027 3.092 0.002 
Y14 0.026 3.120 0.002 
Y15 0.020 2.562 0.010 
Y16 0.020 2.793 0.005 
1/Scale 311.6 1.431 0.152 357.3 1.708 0.088 
BV" 0.064 1.817 0.069 0.061 1.753 0.080 
PBT 2.400 9.573 0.000 2.511 9.992 0.000 
PBT"f(scale) 0.074 4.420 0.000 0.078 4.692 0.000 
DIV 0.664 1.164 0.244 0.707 1.231 0.218 
Ad . ER 0.934 4.911 
0.000 0.777 3.856 0.000 
No. of cases 3795 3795 
Ad . R-s uare 30.01% 
32.37% 
All models are estimated for samples that include dividend paying and non-dividend firms. White 
adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to regression coefficients. 
Model 1 is the most basic specification. Model 2 includes the NEGMV dummy variable: NEGMV=1 if 
MV<BV, and NEGMV=O, otherwise. Model 3 includes an additional dummy variable DUMDIV: 
DUMDIV=1 if firm pays dividends, and DUMDIV=O, otherwise. 
SIC1 through SIC9 are the industry dummy variables. A give industry dummy takes the value of 1, if the 
firm's principal operations belong to that industry, and zero, otherwise. Y2 through Y16 are the yearly 
dummy variable, corresponding to one of the 16 sample-period years. A given year dummy takes the 
value of 1 for observations related to that year, and zero otherwise. 
Model 4 is estimated with industry fixed effects. Model 5 includes both industry and yearly fixed effects. 
** Negative BVs are set to zero. 
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Panel B: splitting the sample period into three economic sub-periods 
Coeff. 
pre-1994 
Model I 
t-ratio P-value 
1994-1997 (inclusive) 
Model 2 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. 
post-1997 
Model 3 
t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.767 8.003 0.000 0.593 8.986 0.000 0.942 13.478 0.000 
NEGMV -0.356 14.383 0.000 -0.390 12.082 0.000 -0.541 22.291 0.000 
DUMDIV -0.281 -3.376 0.001 -0.094 -1.466 0.143 -0.033 -0.553 0.580 
1/scale -785.3 -2.409 0.016 736.1 3.007 0.003 778.3 2.217 0.027 
BV** 0.165 2.725 0.006 0.057 0.941 0.347 0.096 1.559 0.119 
PUK 3.725 8.584 0.000 4.657 11.487 0.000 0.546 1.101 0.271 
DPUK 0.328 0.249 0.803 -8.068 -2.202 0.028 -2.058 -1.673 0.094 
PEU 2.337 3.638 0.000 3.592 5.799 0.000 -0.448 -0.602 0.547 
DPEU 0.708 0.244 0.807 6.747 3.305 0.001 1.708 1.172 0.241 
PAMER 4.703 7.570 0.000 3.983 7.065 0.000 0.148 0.238 0.812 
DPAMER -6.074 -1.865 0.062 -1.444 -0.647 0.518 -6.254 -5.344 0.000 
PASIA 2.852 4.308 0.000 3.562 5.209 0.000 -0.639 -0.762 0.446 
DPASIA -0.252 -0.121 0.904 -2.441 -0.677 0.498 -0.340 -0.059 0.953 
PAFR -0.622 -0.668 0.504 0.746 0.827 0.408 -0.946 -1.000 0.317 
DPAFR 19.333 1.513 0.130 121.368 3.000 0.003 20.438 2.393 0.017 
PREST 4.240 7.391 0.000 3.362 6.241 0.000 0.439 0.859 0.390 
PBT'f(scale) -0.012 -0.494 0.622 0.073 3.126 0.002 0.110 3.447 0.001 
DIV 2.859 3.148 0.002 0.221 0.221 0.825 -3.585 -3.450 0.001 
ADJER 0.764 2.882 0.004 0.899 2.122 0.034 0.485 1.555 0.120 
No. of cases 1161 1489 1145 
Adj. R- 
Square 38.77% 32.76% 21.65% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to regression 
coefficients. 
** Negative BVs are set to zero. Models are estimated for profit-making firm-years and without fixed 
effects. 
Wald test of the significance of valuation differential between two segments 
Model I Modelt Model 3 
Compared segments P-value P-value P-value 
UK vs Europe 0.007 0.031 0.104 
UK vs America 0.038 0.098 0.330 
UK vs Asia 0.128 0.075 0.110 
UK vs 
Mid. East&Africa 0.000 0.000 0.082 
Europe vs America 0.000 0.532 0.424 
Europe vs Asia 0.503 0.968 0.840 
Europe vs 
Mid. East&Africa 0.001 0.004 0.617 
America vs Asia 0.009 0.554 0.329 
America vs 
Mid. East&Africa 0.000 0.001 0.237 
Asia vs 
Mid. East&Africa 0.001 0.008 0.786 
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APPENDIX 5.2 
Appendix 5.2 reports regressions which are scaled by alternative scale- 
proxies. 
Tables 5.10TA, 5.12-5.15TA and 5.17TA report regressions scaled by 
Group Total Assets. 
Tables 5. lOSale, 5.12-5.15Sale and 5.17Sale report regressions scaled 
by Group Sales. 
Tables 5.10MV, 5.12-5.15MV and 5.17MV report regressions scaled by 
the one year lagged equity market value. 
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Table 5.10M (lagged MV-deflated model) 
Profit-making firms 
Dividend payin g and non-dividend firms 
Consolidated level Intermedi ate disaggregation Fine disaggregation 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.815 26.041 0.000 0.793 26.059 0.000 0.809 26.407 0.000 
NEGMV -0.634 -14.760 0.000 -0.637 -15.037 0.000 -0.634 -13.725 0.000 
1/MV 2267.5 3.352 0.001 2476.9 3.816 0.000 2235.2 3.184 0.001 
BV 0.229 4.496 0.000 0.246 4.967 0.000 0.234 4.498 0.000 
PBT 2.637 7.575 0.000 
PUK 1.841 6.707 0.000 2.758 7.492 0.000 
DPUK -1.824 -1.485 0.138 -0.969 -0.712 0.476 
PNUK 1.368 4.615 0.000 
DPNUK 0.128 0.090 0.928 
PEU 2.104 4.028 0.000 
DPEU 0.967 0.699 0.484 
PAMER 2.861 5.494 0.000 
DPAMER -1.141 -0.709 0.478 
PASIA 1.941 3.859 0.000 
DPASIA -0.666 -0.216 0.829 
PAFR 2.408 1.637 0.102 
DPAFR 2.425 0.238 0.812 
PREST -1.184 -4.188 0.000 0.411 1.067 0.162 1.411 3.067 0.002 
PBT'f(mv) -0.004 -0.162 0.871 0.072 4.286 0.000 0.000 -0.012 0.990 
DIV -0.977 -1.301 0.193 -0.824 -1.071 0.284 -1.116 -1.466 0.143 
ADJER 0.589 1.562 0.118 0.518 1.724 0.085 0.548 1.536 0.124 
No. of 
cases 3752 3752 3752 
Adj. R- 
Square 24.5% 24.0% 24.6% 
Wald test of the significance of valuation differential between two segments 
Compared Segments 
UK vs Non-UK 
UK vs Europe 
UK vs America 
UK vs Asia 
UK vs Mid. East & Afica 
Europe vs America 
Europe vs Asia 
Europe vs Mid. East & Afica 
America vs Asia 
America vs Mid. East & Afica 
Asia vs Mid. East & Afica 
Model 2 
p-value 
0.1327 
Model 3 
p-value 
0.129 
0.785 
0.039 
0.819 
0.121 
0.765 
0.845 
0.081 
0.769 
0.779 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 5.10M (continued from the previous page) 
Dividend paying firms only 
Consolidated level Intermediate disaggregatlon Fine disaggregation 
Mode14 Model5 Mode16 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.827 29.008 0.000 0.791 27.426 0.000 0.782 26.955 0.000 
NEGMV -0.618 -14.332 0.000 -0.610 -14.687 0.000 -0.602 -15.022 0.000 
1/MV 1508.7 2.649 0.008 1414.7 2.452 0.014 1373.6 2.317 0.020 
BV 0.253 4.361 0.000 0.240 4.235 0.000 0.263 4.608 0.000 
PBT 2.880 8.280 0.000 
PUK 3.235 9.120 0.000 3.288 9.200 0.000 
DPUK -1.406 -1.765 0.078 -1.152 -1.532 0.126 
PNUK 2.882 8.261 0.000 
DPNUK 0.600 0.485 0.627 
PEU 3.135 8.862 0.000 
DPEU 0.569 0.451 0.652 
PAMER 3.443 7.383 0.000 
DPAMER 0.397 0.308 0.758 
PASIA 2.505 4.937 0.000 
DPASIA -2.872 -0.910 0.363 
PAFR 1.430 3.313 0.001 
DPAFR 8.673 1.750 0.080 
PREST -1.260 1.850 0.083 1.732 4.579 0.000 1.866 4.905 0.000 
PBT'f(mv) -0.044 -2.576 0.010 -0.016 -0.972 0.331 -0.025 -1.409 0.159 
DIV 0.367 0.499 0.618 -0.636 -0.813 0.416 -0.927 -1.158 0.247 
AMER 1.056 3.990 0.000 1.162 4.554 0.000 1.035 4.077 0.000 
No. of cases 3535 3535 3535 
Adj. R- 
S uare 23.4% 24.9% 25.3% 
Wald test of the significance of valuation differential between two segments 
Compared segments 
UK vs Non-UK 
UK vs Europe 
UK vs America 
UK vs Asia 
UK vs Mid. East & Afica 
Europe vs America 
Europe vs Asia 
Europe vs Mid. East & Afica 
America vs Asia 
America vs Mid. East & Afica 
Asia vs Mid. East & Afica 
Models 
p-value 
0.1332 
Model6 
P -value 
0,667 
0.652 
0.061 
0.000 
0.502 
0.216 
0.000 
0.074 
0.000 
0.026 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 5.10T (TA-deflated model) 
Profit-making firms 
Dividend paying and non-dividend firms 
Consolidated level Intermediate dlsaggregatlon Fine disaggregatlon 
Modell Mode12 Model3 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.227 5.163 0.000 0.059 1.200 0.230 0.043 0.854 0.393 
NEGMV -0.436 -12.17 0.000 -0.391 -11.14 0.000 -0.369 -10.495 0.000 
1/TA 2066.8 4.108 0.000 1645.5 3.036 0.002 1713.4 3.356 0.001 
BV 0.177 1.686 0.092 0.226 1.995 0.046 0.255 2.202 0.028 
PBT 8.466 11.612 0.000 
PUK 9.512 12.804 0.000 9.445 12.720 0.000 
DPUK -17.291 -4.799 0.000 -17.108 -4.665 0.000 
PNUK 7.673 9.304 0.000 
DPNUK -8.364 -3.455 0.001 
PEU 8.772 7.651 0.000 
DPEU -7.190 -2.028 0.043 
PAMER 7.687 7.848 0.000 
DPAMER -8.844 -3.352 0.001 
PASIA 5.995 4.741 0.000 
DPASIA -16.064 -1.939 0.052 
PAFR 3.319 2.144 0.032 
DPAFR -11.921 -0.894 0.371 
PREST 5.320 6.131 0.000 4.915 5.971 0.000 4.845 5.777 0.000 
PBT"f(TA) 0.059 1.201 0.230 0.144 2.906 0.004 0.149 2.948 0.003 
DIV -0.764 -0.486 0.627 -2.174 -1.384 0.166 -2.621 -1.599 0.110 
ADJER 0.663 1.698 0.090 1.019 3.089 0.002 0.955 2.898 0.004 
No. of cases 3840 3840 3840 
Adj. R- 
Square 356% 38.5% 38.8% 
Wald test of the significance of valuation differential between two segments 
Compared Segments 
UK vs Non-UK 
UK vs Europe 
UK vs America 
UK vs Asia 
UK vs Mid. East & Afica 
Europe vs America 
Europe vs Asia 
Europe vs Mid. East & Afica 
America vs Asia 
America vs Mid. East & Afica 
Asia vs Mid. East & Afica 
Model 2 
p-value 
0.0005 
Model3 
-vap lue 
0.501 
0.014 
0.002 
0.000 
0.384 
0.067 
0.001 
0.175 
0.006 
0.144 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to regression 
coefficients. 
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Model 5.10T (continued from the previous page) 
Dividend firms only 
Consolidated level Intermediate di aggregation Fine disaggregation 
Mode14 Model5 Mode16 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.176 3.761 0.000 0.022 0.435 0.664 0.002 0.029 0.977 
NEGMV -0.352 -10.51 0.000 -0.310 -9.196 0.000 -0.281 -8.365 0.000 
1/TA 301.1 0.515 0.607 281.7 0.479 0.632 23.3 0.039 0.969 
BV 0.046 0.450 0.653 0.114 1.028 0.304 0.148 1.290 0.197 
PBT 8.892 11.127 0.000 
PUK 9.995 12.357 0.000 10.031 12.352 0.000 
DPUK -8.426 -4.307 0.000 -7.912 -3.990 0.000 
PNUK 8.168 9.026 0.000 
DPNUK -3.712 -1.357 0.175 
PEU 9.710 7.750 0.000 
DPEU -6.806 -1.997 0.046 
PAMER 7.879 7.867 0.000 
DPAMER -3.176 -0.841 0.400 
PASIA 8.075 5.228 0.000 
DPASIA -20.522 -2.392 0.017 
PAFR 2.199 2.551 0,011 
DPAFR -30.166 -1.675 0.094 
PREST 4.842 5.512 0.000 4.825 5.394 0.000 
PBT-f(TA) 0.034 0.656 0.512 0.124 2.373 0.018 0.123 2.305 0.021 
DIV 1.842 1.087 0.277 -0.931 -0.531 0.595 -1.327 -0.735 0.462 
AMER 0.682 1.554 0.120 0.709 1.794 0.073 0.681 1.732 0.083 
No. of cases 3592 3592 3592 
Adj. R- 
Square 39.7% 41.8% 42.2% 
Wald test of the significance of valuation differential between two segments 
Compared Segments 
UK vs Non-UK 
UK vs Europe 
UK vs America 
UK vs Asia 
UK vs Mid. East & Afica 
Europe vs America 
Europe vs Asia 
Europe vs Mid. East & Afica 
America vs Asia 
America vs Mid. East & Afica 
Asia vs Mid. East & Afica 
Model 5 
p-value 
0.0008 
Model 6 
p-value 
0.756 
0.002 
0.140 
0.000 
0.146 
0.356 
0.000 
0.890 
0.000 
0.000 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 5.10S (Sales-deflated model) 
Profit-making firms 
Dividend paying and non-dividend firms 
Consolidated level Intermediate disaggregation Fine disaggregation 
Modell Model 2 Mode13 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.280 4.259 0.000 0.251 3.900 0.000 0.186 3.175 0.001 
NEGMV -1.369 -8.165 0.000 -1.366 -8.100 0.000 -1.323 -7.836 0.000 
1/sale 2316.3 1.462 0.144 1503.2 1.098 0.272 101.1 0.153 0.878 
BV 1.609 6.063 0.000 1.571 5.889 0.000 1.606 6.056 0.000 
PBT 8.591 2.946 0.003 
PUK 8.949 2.922 0.003 9.887 3.249 0.001 
DPUK -13.193 -2.651 0.008 -11.541 -2.310 0.021 
PNUK 7.117 3.052 0.002 
DPNUK -7.671 -1.134 0.257 
PEU 10.123 4.296 0.000 
DPEU -50.948 -1.814 0.070 
PAMER 11.341 4.363 0.000 
DPAMER -5.180 -1.173 0.241 
PASIA 2.030 0.795 0.427 
DPASIA 10.182 0.773 0.440 
PAFR 6.730 1.917 0.055 
DPAFR -76.041 -7.123 0.000 
PREST 6.041 2.550 0.011 6.899 2.931 0.003 
PBT"f(sale) -0.025 -0.263 0.792 0.016 0.179 0.858 -0.066 -0.789 0.430 
DIV -11.70 -2.249 0.024 -11.92 -2.091 0.037 -13.42 -2.261 0.024 
ADJER 4.520 2.009 0.045 4.465 2.103 0.036 3.275 1.765 0.078 
No. of cases 3865 3865 3865 
Adj. R- 
Square 35.3% 35.8% 37.6% 
Wald test of the significance of valuation differential between two segments 
Compared Segments 
UK vs Non-UK 
UK vs Europe 
UK vs America 
UK vs Asia 
UK vs Mid. East & Afica 
Europe vs America 
Europe vs Asia 
Europe vs Mid. East & Afica 
America vs Asia 
America vs Mid. East & Afica 
Asia vs Mid. East & Afica 
Model 2 
p -value 
0.270 
Model 3 
p-value 
0.919 
0.326 
0.006 
0.122 
0.584 
0.000 
0.255 
0.000 
0.052 
0.190 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 5.10S (continued from the previous page) 
Dividend firms only 
Consolidated level Intermediate disaggregation Fine disaggregation 
Model4 Model4 Models 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.130 3.063 0.002 0.120 2.736 0.006 -0.001 -0.017 0.987 
NEGMV -0.938 -7.987 0.000 -0.934 -8.090 0.000 -0.414 -9.303 0.000 
1/sale 336.6 0.203 0.839 174.2 0.104 0.917 4507.2 1.577 0.115 
BV 1.198 5.170 0.000 1.196 5.145 0.000 -0.413 -0.568 0.570 
PBT 6.572 4.465 0.000 
PUK 6.263 4.129 0.000 10.402 7.263 0.000 
DPUK 2.523 0.562 0.574 -7.695 -2.035 0.042 
PNUK 7.973 5.182 0.000 
DPNUK -5.975 -1.085 0.278 
PEU 15.158 8.098 0.000 
DPEU -20.930 -2.959 0.003 
PAMER 10.781 5.393 0.000 
DPAMER 0.389 0.042 0.966 
PASIA 14.358 5.618 0.000 
DPASIA -20.560 -3.242 0.001 
PAFR 3.201 1.437 0.151 
DPAFR -25.460 -0.275 0.783 
PREST 3.033 2.371 0.018 2.976 1.563 0.118 
PBT'f(sale) 0.017 0.229 0.819 -0.007 -0.094 0.925 -0.027 -0.299 0.765 
DIV -4.977 -1.611 0.107 -4.333 -1.417 0.157 1.235 0.418 0.676 
ADJER -1.004 -1.412 0.158 -0.769 -1.121 0.262 1.004 1.237 0.216 
No-of 
cases 3613 3613 3613 
Adj. R- 
Square 47.1% 47.3% 31.1% 
Wald test of the significance of valuation differential between two segments 
Compared Segments 
UK vs Non-UK 
UK vs Europe 
UK vs America 
UK vs Asia 
UK vs Mid. East & Afica 
Europe vs America 
Europe vs Asia 
Europe vs Mid. East & Afica 
America vs Asia 
America vs Mid. East & Afica 
Asia vs Mid-East & Afica 
Mode14 
p-value 
0.022 
Models 
p-value 
0.022 
0.737 
0.110 
0.003 
0.085 
0.775 
0.000 
0.210 
0.002 
0.003 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 5.12-5.15M (Lagged MV-deflated model) 
UK vs EU 
Model 1 
Intercept 1.058 
t-test 8.263 
p-value 0.000 
NEGMV -0.426 
t-test -12.354 
p-value 0.000 
DUMDIV -0.211 
t-test -1.717 
p-value 0.086 
1IIagMV 1850 
t-test 3.467 
p-value 0.001 
BV " 0.063 
t-test 2.200 
p-value 0.028 
PUK 3.716 
t-test 8.566 
p-value 0.000 
DPUK -2.803 
t-test -2.636 
p-value 0.008 
PEU 2.838 
t-test 6.221 
p-value 0.000 
DPEU 0.082 
t-test 0.058 
p-value 0.954 
PREST'" 2.300 
t-test 5.032 
p-value 0.000 
DPREST 1.172 
t-test 1.712 
p-value 0.087 
PBT'f(mv) -0.034 
t-test -1.635 
p-value 0.102 
DIV 1.038 
t-test 1.177 
p-value 0.239 
ADJER 0.757 
t-test 2.514 
p-value 0.012 
No-of cases 2794 
Adj. R-Square 19.6% 
Wald p-value 0.035 
UK vs America 
Model 2 
Intercept 1.157 
t-test 8.523 
p-value 0.000 
NEGMV -0.42 
t-test -11.85 
p-value 0.000 
DUMDIV -0.31 
t-test -2.340 
p-value 0.019 
1/IagMV 2523 
t-test 1.895 
p-value 0.058 
BV* 0.068 
t-test 1.252 
p-value 0.211 
PUK 3.329 
t-test 7.102 
p-value 0.000 
DPUK 0.480 
t-test 0.197 
p-value 0.844 
PAMER 3.206 
t-test 4.560 
p-value 0.000 
DPAMER -0.48 
t-test -0.254 
p-value 0.800 
PREST" 1.442 
t-test 2.942 
p-value 0.003 
DPRESTAM 1.329 
t-test 2.015 
p-value 0.044 
PBT"f(mv) -0.016 
t-test -0.463 
p-value 0.643 
DIV 0.254 
t-test 0.324 
p-value 0.746 
ADJER 0.251 
t-test 0.629 
p-value 0.530 
2482 
Adj. R-Square 19.8% 
Wald p-value 0.771 
UK vs Asia 
Model 3 
Intercept 0.959 
t-test 14.321 
p-value 0.000 
NEGMV -0.388 
t-test -11.629 
p-value 0.000 
DUMDIV -0.016 
t-test -0.222 
p-value 0.824 
1AagMV 210 
t-test 0.583 
p-value 0.560 
BV* -0.405 
t-test -2.679 
p-value 0.007 
PUK 2.598 
t-test 6.178 
p-value 0.000 
DPUK -3.090 
t-test -3.222 
p-value 0.001 
PASIA 2.539 
t-test 5.968 
p-value 0.000 
DPASIA -3.313 
t-test -1.056 
p-value 0.291 
PREST" 1.221 
t-test 3.057 
p-value 0.002 
DPRESTAS 0.363 
t-test 0.525 
p-value 0.600 
PBT*f(mv) -0.029 
t-test -1.412 
p-value 0.158 
DIV 1.032 
t-test 0.901 
p-value 0.368 
ADJER -0.061 
t-test -0.391 
p-value 0.695 
1195 
Adj. R-Square 13.3% 
Wald p-value 0.896 
UK vs MId. East & Afr. 
Model 4 
Intercept 0.901 
t-test 5.556 
p-value 0.000 
NEGMV -0.624 
t-test -3.501 
p-value 0.001 
DUMDIV -0.185 
t-test -1.104 
p-value 0.270 
1/IagMV 3014 
t-test 1.918 
p-value 0.056 
BV* 1.048 
t-test 0.213 
p-value 0.832 
PUK 3.238 
t-test 3.841 
p-value 0.000 
DPUK -2.113 
t-test -0.991 
p-value 0.322 
PAFR 3.575 
t-test 1.587 
p-value 0.113 
DPAFR 1.643 
t-test 0.172 
p-value 0.863 
PREST'" 2.985 
t-test 2.608 
p-value 0.009 
DPRESTAF -1.373 
t-test -0.881 
p-value 0.379 
PBT'i(mv) -0.016 
t-test -0.426 
p-value 0.670 
DIV 3.015 
t-test 2.047 
p-value 0.041 
ADJER 0.830 
t-test 0.482 
p-value 0.630 
468 
Adj. R-Square 22.8% 
Wald p-value 0.861 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below regression 
coefficients. 
Samples include dividend paying and non-dividend profit-making firms, and exclude cases where a given 
foreign segment PBT is missing. 
* negative BVs are set to zero. 
** PREST is the difference between the group-level PBT and the sum of the UK and the given foreign 
segment's PBT. 
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Table 5.12-5.15T (TA-deflated model) 
UK vs EU 
Model I 
UK vs America 
Model 2 
UK vs Asia 
Model 3 
UK vs MId. East & Afr. 
Model 4 
Intercept 0.500 Intercept 0.599 Intercept 0.453 Intercept 0.444 
t-ratio 3.598 t-ratio 5.612 t-ratio 4.127 t-ratio 4.261 
p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000 
NEGMV -0.323 NEGMV -0.392 NEGMV -0.404 NEGMV -0.370 
1-ratio -8.692 t-ratio -11.640 t-ratio -8.524 t-ratio -6.302 
p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000 
DUMDIV -0.409 DUMDIV -0.426 DUMDIV -0.236 DUMDIV -0.076 
t-ratio -3.167 t-ratio -3.903 t-ratio -2.373 t-ratio -0.633 
p-value 0.002 p-value 0.000 p-value 0.018 p-value 0.527 
1/TA -372.76 1/TA 3034.47 1/TA 496.38 1/TA 1136.52 
t-ratio -0.704 t-ratio 3.116 t-ratio 0.626 t-ratio 3.018 
p-value 0.481 p-value 0.002 p-value 0.531 p-value 0.003 
BV' 0.022 BV' -0.292 BV' -0.771 BV* -4.674 
t-ratio 0.076 t-ratio -0.992 t-ratio -0.949 t-ratio -0.644 
p-value 0.939 p-value 0.321 p-value 0.343 p-value 0.520 
PUK 9.497 PUK 8.513 PUK 9.977 PUK 7.430 
t-ratio 10.629 t-ratio 9.700 t-ratio 9.532 t-ratio 4.104 
p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000 
DPUK -17.99 DPUK -20.53 DPUK -10.10 DPUK -14.68 
t-ratio -3.756 t-ratio -3.677 t-ratio -3.487 t-ratio -2.406 
p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000 p-value 0.017 
PEU 8.454 PAMER 7.319 PASIA 5.970 PAFR 3.171 
t-ratio 6.511 t-ratio 6.778 1-ratio 3.594 t-ratio 1.388 
p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000 p-value 0.166 
DPEU -8.087 DPAMER -7.073 DPASIA -14.209 DPAFR -7.535 
t-ratio -2.115 t-ratio -2.851 t-ratio -1.705 t-ratio -0.586 
p-value 0.034 p-value 0.004 p-value 0.088 p-value 0.558 
PREST ** 3.340 PREST ** 4.595 PREST " 4.405 PREST ** 2.289 
t-ratio 2.821 t-ratio 4.098 t-ratio 2.954 t-ratio 1.562 
p-value 0.005 p-value 0.000 p-value 0.003 p-value 0.119 
DPREST 4.151 DPREST 4.247 DPREST 5.690 DPREST 0.221 
t-ratio 3.031 t-ratio 3.362 t-ratio 3.106 t-ratio 0.098 
p-value 0.002 p-value 0.001 p-value 0.002 p-value 0.922 
PBT'f(TA) 0.217 PBT*f(TA) 0.102 PBT'f(TA) 0.064 PBT'f(TA) 0.144 
t-ratio 3.555 t-ratio 1.855 t-ratio 0.791 t-ratio 2.245 
p-value 0.000 p-value 0.064 p-value 0.429 p-value 0.025 
DIV -0.525 DIV 3.391 DIV 2.846 DIV -3.890 
t-ratio -0.264 t-ratio 1.622 t-ratio 1.357 t-ratio -1.142 
p-value 0.792 p-value 0.105 p-value 0.175 p-value 0.254 
Adj. ER 0.537 Adj. ER 1.003 Adj. ER -0.199 Adj. ER 0.930 
t-ratio 1.238 t-ratio 2.320 t-ratio -0.406 t-ratio 0.328 
p-value 0.216 p-value 0.020 p-value 0.685 p-value 0.743 
No. of cases 2863 2512 1220 477 
Adj. R- Adj. R- Adj. R- 
Adj. R-Square 39.3% Square 41.2% Square 35.3% Square 45.4% 
Wald p- Wald p- Wald p- 
Wald -value 0.3658 value 0.0976 value 0.0069 value 0.0143 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below regression 
coefficients. Samples include dividend paying and non-dividend profit-making firms, and exclude cases 
where a given foreign segment PBT is missing. 
* negative BVs are set to zero. 
** PREST is the difference between the group-level PBT and the sum of the UK and the given foreign 
segment's PBT. 
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Table 5.12-5.15S (Sales-deflated model) 
UK vs EU 
Model I 
UK vs America 
Model 2 
UK vs Asia 
Model 3 
UK vs MId. East & Afr. 
Model 4 
Intercept 1.630 Intercept 1.247 Intercept 1.332 Intercept 0.372 
t-ratio 2.516 t-ratio 2.986 t-ratio 1.365 t-ratio 2.017 
p-value 0.012 p-value 0.003 p-value 0.172 p-value 0.044 
NEGMV -0.795 NEGMV -0.579 NEGMV -0.677 NEGMV -0.352 
t-ratio -5.471 t-ratio -9.950 t-ratio -5.179 t-ratio -4.506 
p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000 
DUMDIV -1.640 DUMDIV -1.091 DUMDIV -1.126 DUMDIV -0.305 
t-ratio -2.489 t-ratio -2.692 t-ratio -1.124 t-ratio -1.377 
p-value 0.013 p-value 0.007 p-value 0.261 p-value 0.169 
1/Sales 3527.7 1/Sales 4412.2 1/Sales 9597.7 1/Sales 935.3 
t-ratio 1.188 t-ratio 2.095 t-ratio 1.190 t-ratio 1.972 
p-value 0.235 p-value 0.036 p-value 0.234 p-value 0.049 
BV* 0.560 BV " 0.084 BV " -4.570 BV* -20.21 
t-ratio 0.721 t-ratio 0.129 t-ratio -1.908 t-ratio -1.612 
p-value 0.471 p-value 0.898 p-value 0.056 p-value 0.108 
PUK 22.317 PUK 10.982 PUK 11.917 PUK 1.575 
t-ratio 3.649 t-ratio 4.587 t-ratio 1.985 t-ratio 0.216 
p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000 p-value 0.047 p-value 0.829 
DPUK -14.84 DPUK -23.74 DPUK -1.61 DPUK -12.58 
t-ratio -1.989 t-ratio -2.517 t-ratio -0.182 t-ratio -1.720 
p-value 0.047 p-value 0.012 p-value 0.856 p-value 0.086 
PEU 20.563 PAMER 12.553 PASIA 10.399 PAFR -0.425 
t-ratio 5.661 t-ratio 4.720 t-ratio 2.755 1-ratio -0.093 
p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000 p-value 0.006 p-value 0.926 
DPEU -65.58 DPAMER -12.20 DPASIA -0.76 DPAFR -24.92 
t-ratio -1.580 t-ratio -4.365 t-ratio -0.058 t-ratio -0.629 
p-value 0.114 p-value 0.000 p-value 0.953 p-value 0.530 
PREST" 10.966 PREST'" 4.652 PREST" 5.291 PREST'" -6.943 
t-ratio 2.760 t-ratio 1.819 t-ratio 1.091 t-ratio -0.610 
p-value 0.006 p-value 0.069 p-value 0.275 p-value 0.542 
DPRESTEU 11.173 DPRESTAM 5.398 DPRESTAS 4.895 DPRESTAF 8.389 
t-ratio 1.881 t-ratio 2.129 t-ratio 0.778 t-ratio 0.868 
p-value 0.060 p-value 0.033 p-value 0.436 p-value 0.386 
PBT'f(sale) -0.119 PBT*f(sale) -0.029 PBT'f(sale) 0.020 PBT*f(sale) 0.346 
t-ratio -0.791 t-ratio -0.290 t-ratio 0.093 t-ratio 1.099 
p-value 0.429 p-value 0.772 p-value 0.926 p-value 0.272 
DIV -10.606 DIV 2.754 DIV 4.122 DIV 11.166 
t-ratio -1.621 t-ratio 0.793 t-ratio 0.719 t-ratio 1.174 
p-value 0.105 p-value 0.428 p-value 0.472 p-value 0.241 
ADJER 7.191 ADJER 1.925 ADJER 3.892 ADJER -8.010 
t-ratio 2.094 t-ratio 0.958 t-ratlo 1.060 t-ratio -1.126 
p-value 0.036 p-value 0.338 p-value 0.289 p-value 0.261 
No. of cases 2897 2541 1207 478 
Adj. R-Square 21.0% 28.5% 16.6% 40.0% 
Wald p-value 0.690 0.216 0.756 0.572 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below regression 
coefficients. Samples include dividend paying and non-dividend profit-making firms, and exclude cases 
where a given foreign segment PBT is missing. 
* negative BVs are set to zero. 
** PREST is the difference between the group-level PBT and the sum of the UK and the given foreign 
segment's PBT. 
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Table 5.17M (lagged MV-deflated model) 
Panel A: The sample period is split into two sub-periods (pre-1996 and post-1995) 
Old economy period (I. e., before New economy period (I. e., 1996 
1996) onwards) 
Model I Model 2 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff, t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.827 6.502 0.000 0.972 10.880 0.000 
NEGMV -0.573 -14.083 0.000 -0.775 -11.650 0.000 
DUMDIV -0.213 -1.710 0.087 -0.040 -0.441 0.659 
1/MV 2066.7 2.467 0.014 1268.2 2.818 0.005 
BV" 0.201 4.487 0.000 0.415 5.274 0.000 
PUK 3.930 8.649 0.000 1.851 4.992 0.000 
DPUK 1.750 1.028 0.304 -2.393 -1.833 0.067 
PEU 3.138 5.172 0.000 2.113 4.787 0.000 
DPEU 0.637 0.336 0.737 0.855 0.560 0.576 
PAMER 4.657 6.060 0.000 1.933 4.111 0.000 
DPAMER -0.882 -0.649 0.517 -1.172 -0.557 0.577 
PASTA 2.996 4.229 0.000 0.981 1.453 0.146 
DPASIA -1.900 -1.040 0.298 -0.719 -0.185 0.853 
PAFR 1.112 1.834 0.067 3.871 1.757 0.079 
DPAFR 1.002 0.094 0.925 -9.550 -0.761 0.447 
PREST 2.315 3.832 0.000 1.453 3.638 0.000 
PBT'f(mv) -0.019 -0.507 0.612 -0.007 -0.309 0.757 
DIV 0.732 0.783 0.433 -2.761 -2.631 0.009 
ADJER 0.094 0.227 0.821 1.129 4.794 0.000 
No. of cases 2099 2175 
Ade . R-Square 
36.9% 19.9% 
Wald test of the significance of valuation differential between two segments 
Model I Model 2 
Compared segments P-value P-value 
UK vs Europe 0.083 0.468 
UK vs America 0.223 0.812 
UK vs Asia 0.099 0.128 
UK vs Mid. East & Africa 0.000 0.357 
Europe vs America 0.011 0.700 
Europe vs Asia 0.832 0.073 
Europe vs Mid. East & 
Africa 0.001 0.436 
America vs Asia 0.010 0.118 
America vs Mid. East & 
Africa 0.000 0.372 
Asia vs Mid. East & Africa 0.005 0.235 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to regression 
coefficients 
** negative BVs are set to zero. 
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Panel B: splitting the sample period into three economic sub-periods 
Pre-1994 
Model I 
Intercept 
NEGMV 
DUMDIV 
1/MV 
BV" 
PUK 
DPUK 
PEU 
DPEU 
PAMER 
DPAMER 
PASTA 
DPASIA 
PAFR 
DPAFR 
PREST 
PBT'f(mv) 
DIV 
ADJER 
No. of cases 
Adj. R- 
Square 
CoeH. t-ratio 
0.854 4.092 
-0.584 -11.367 
-0.273 -1.352 
2511.7 2.479 
0.179 3.441 
3.713 6.138 
-2.035 -1.649 
2.096 2.516 
2.268 0.973 
4.520 4.687 
-1.022 -0.474 
2.798 3.958 
1.783 0.575 
0.640 0.863 
-11.003 -0.468 
1.739 2.363 
0.000 0.005 
1.657 1.659 
0.293 0.974 
1154 
38.0% 
P" 
value 
0.000 
0.000 
0.176 
0.013 
0.001 
0.000 
0.099 
0.012 
0.330 
0.000 
0.635 
0.000 
0.565 
0.388 
0.640 
0.018 
0.996 
0.097 
0.330 
1994-1997 (Inclusive) 
Model 2 
P- 
Coeff. t-ratlo value 
0.946 8.635 0.000 
-0.651 -6.779 0.000 
-0.168 -1.513 0.130 
2045.7 2.072 0.038 
0.267 3.373 0.001 
3.049 5.239 0.000 
3.879 2.205 0.027 
2.921 3.831 0.000 
1.200 0.522 0.602 
3.420 5.166 0.000 
-2.957 -1.059 0.289 
1.624 1.718 0.086 
1.526 0.623 0.533 
6.065 1.925 0.054 
9.481 1.940 0.052 
2.441 4.067 0.000 
0.001 0.023 0.982 
-0.473 -0.289 0.772 
1.744 2.761 0.006 
1454 
28.2% 
Post-1997 
Model 3 
P- 
CoeN. t-ratio value 
0.900 8.008 0.000 
-0.722 -10.635 0.000 
0.036 0.320 0.749 
578.6 1.350 0.177 
0.443 4.659 0.000 
1.610 2.776 0.006 
-3.343 -2.740 0.006 
1.474 1.936 0.053 
-0.269 -0.129 0.897 
1.345 2.147 0.032 
-1.887 -0.848 0.396 
1.323 1.888 0.059 
-5.290 -1.282 0.200 
0.428 0.706 0.480 
-12.623 -0.669 0.503 
1.005 1.920 0.055 
-0.003 -0.087 0.930 
-2.581 -1.959 0.050 
0.967 3.172 0.002 
1144 
17.6% 
Models are estimated for profit-making firm-years and without fixed effects. 
Wald test of the significance of valuation differential between two segments 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 
Compared segments P-Value P-Value P-Value 
UK vs Europe 0.026 0.825 0.846 
UK vs America 0.313 0.470 0.536 
UK vs Asia 0.120 0.047 0.620 
UK vs Mid. East&Africa 0.000 0.366 0.015 
Europe vs America 0.005 0.482 0.858 
Europe vs Asia 0.413 0.130 0.849 
Europe vs Mid. East&Africa 0.079 0.367 0.137 
America vs Asia 0.066 0.021 0.975 
America vs Mid. East&Africa 0.000 0.422 0.094 
Asia vs Mid. East&Africa 0.002 0.216 0.184 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to regression 
coefficients. 
** negative BVs are set to zero. 
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Table 5.17T (TA-deflated model) 
Panel A: The sample period is split into two sub-periods (pre-1996 and post-1995 
Old economy period (i. e., before 
1996) 
Model I" 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
New economy period (i. e., 1996 
onwards) 
Model 2* 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.531 6.425 0.000 0.551 4.132 0.000 
NEGMV -0.275 -9.284 0.000 -0.476 -10.695 0.000 
DUMDIV -0.432 -5.346 0.000 -0.373 -2.935 0.003 
1/TA 1788.3 3.159 0.002 2649.1 2.804 0.005 
BV"" 0.197 0.803 0.422 -0.731 -1.543 0.123 
PUK 7.841 14.288 0.000 9.545 8.580 0.000 
DPUK 1.416 0.434 0.665 -17.350 -4.181 0.000 
PEU 6.893 10.157 0.000 8.960 6.904 0.000 
DPEU -2.159 -0.526 0.599 -1.717 -0.457 0,647 
PAMER 7.841 10.090 0.000 7.342 5.284 0.000 
DPAMER -11.547 -2.509 0.012 -6.307 -1.994 0.046 
PASIA 9.789 5.939 0.000 4.000 2.488 0.013 
DPASIA -8.944 -2.116 0.034 -11.115 -1.022 0.307 
PAFR 2.994 2.393 0.017 2.491 1.350 0.177 
DPAFR -15.467 -2.946 0.003 18.775 1.003 0.316 
PREST 7.927 8.783 0.000 3.355 3.125 0.002 
PB1'f(ta) 0.015 0.410 0.682 0.228 3.114 0.002 
DIV 5.679 4.323 0.000 -4.953 -1.850 0.064 
ADJER 0.385 1.128 0.259 0.743 1.297 0.195 
No. of cases 2146 2228 
Ad . R-S uare 
56.6% 31.7% 
Wald test of the significance of valuation differential between two segments 
Model I 
Compared segments P-value 
UK vs Europe 0.040 
UK vs America 0.999 
UK vs Asia 0.195 
UK vs Mid. East & Africa 0.000 
Europe vs America 0.173 
Europe vs Asia 0.073 
Europe vs Mid. East & Africa 0.001 
America vs Asia 0.224 
America vs Mid. East & Africa 0.000 
Asia vs Mid. East & Africa 0.001 
Model 2 
P-value 
0.529 
0.036 
0.000 
0.000 
0.228 
0.004 
0.000 
0.042 
0.010 
0.456 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to regression 
coefficients. 
** negative BVs are set to zero. 
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Panel B: splitting the sample period into three economic sub-periods 
Coeff. 
Pre-1994 
Model 1 
t-ratio 
P- 
value 
1994-1997 (Inclusive) 
Model 2 
P- 
Coeff. t-ratio value Coeff. 
Post-1997 
Model 3 
t-ratio 
P- 
value 
Intercept 0.573 4.815 0.000 0.411 3.017 0.003 0.401 1.966 0.049 
NEGMV -0.284 -7.438 0.000 -0.287 -6.460 0.000 -0.460 -7.010 0.000 
DUMDIV -0.451 -4.000 0.000 -0.358 -2.691 0.007 -0.221 -1.217 0.224 
1iTA 1939.2 1.299 0.194 719.2 1.582 0.114 1597.6 2.236 0.025 
BV" 0.199 0.515 0.607 0.267 1.487 0.137 -1.729 -2.354 0.019 
PUK 7.200 8.121 0.000 10.723 12.836 0.000 9.354 5.154 0.000 
DPUK -2.233 -0.872 0.383 -25.53 -4.570 0.000 -9.673 -2.555 0.011 
PEU 6.052 4.326 0.000 8.088 9.538 0.000 11.265 3.728 0.000 
DPEU -6.866 -1.795 0.073 3.789 0.860 0.390 -11.83 -1.673 0.094 
PAMER 8.042 6.888 0.000 9.143 8.112 0.000 5.476 2.546 0.011 
DPAMER -19.68 -2.245 0.025 -5.087 -1.736 0.083 -6.303 -1.670 0.095 
PASTA 5.507 4.353 0.000 7.447 3.606 0.000 5.067 1.841 0.066 
DPASIA 0.528 0.120 0.905 -8.009 -1.229 0.219 -32.83 -1.273 0.203 
PAFR 2.482 1.448 0.148 5.304 2.153 0.031 3.459 2.147 0.032 
DPAFR -33.11 -1.107 0.268 -10.10 -1.510 0.131 -9.349 -0.297 0.766 
PREST 6.068 5.105 0.000 7.110 7.237 0.000 3.162 1.733 0.083 
PBT"f(ta) 0.017 0.304 0.761 0.030 0.647 0.518 0.283 2.509 0.012 
DIV 4.378 2.850 0.004 0.724 0.386 0.699 -5.700 -1.392 0.164 
ADJER 0.336 0.993 0.321 0.108 0.123 0.902 1.240 1.664 0.096 
No. of cases 1178 1488 1174 
Ad'. R-S uare 52.8% 55.5% 29.0% 
Wald test of the significance of valuation differential between two segments 
Model I 
Compare segments P-value 
UK vs Europe 0.232 
UK vs America 0.269 
UK vs Asia 0.070 
UK vs Mid. East & Africa 0.003 
Europe vs America 0.082 
Europe vs Asia 0.697 
Europe vs Mid. East & 
Model 2 
P-value 
0.001 
0.085 
0.084 
0.024 
0.347 
0.740 
Model 3 
P-value 
0.450 
0.013 
0.077 
0.000 
0.056 
0.085 
Africa 0.041 0.249 0.001 
America vs Asia 0.020 0.424 0.874 
America vs Mid. East & 
Africa 0.001 0.133 0.196 
Asia vs Mid. East & Africa 0.126 0.481 0.499 
UK vs Europe 0.007 0.014 0.672 
UK vs America 0.003 0.095 0.067 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to regression 
coefficients. 
** negative BVs are set to zero. 
306 
Table 5.17S (Sales-deflated model) 
Panel A: The sample period is split into two sub-periods (pre-1996 and post-1995 
Old economy period (i. e., before 
1996) 
Model I" 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
New economy period (i. e., 1996 
onwards) 
Model 2" 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.572 3.893 0.000 1.471 2.789 0.005 
NEGMV -0.363 -8.391 0.000 -0.938 -6.688 0.000 
DUMDIV -0.533 -3.752 0.000 -1.627 -2.947 0.003 
1/sale 2524.3 5.056 0.000 4198.2 1.510 0.131 
BV" 0.870 3.014 0.003 -0.553 -0.428 0.669 
PUK 9.738 4.554 0.000 25.759 4.747 0.000 
DPUK 1.253 0.330 0.742 -16.633 -2.348 0.019 
PEU 10.500 4.426 0.000 30.852 5.494 0.000 
DPEU -34.424 -2.181 0.029 -56.311 -1.714 0.086 
PAMER 9.964 4.259 0.000 25.607 5.351 0.000 
DPAMER -33.833 -2.971 0.003 -2.236 -0.371 0.710 
PASIA 12.656 4.792 0.000 18.023 3.535 0.000 
DPASIA -13.408 -3.180 0.001 2.368 0.215 0.830 
PAFR -2.206 -0.803 0.422 10.321 1.114 0.265 
DPAFR -5.618 -1.472 0.141 12.444 0.313 0.754 
PREST 7.111 2.934 0.003 16.481 3.710 0.000 
PBT'f(sale) -0.080 -1.558 0.119 -0.395 -2.296 0.022 
DIV 6.550 1.975 0.048 -13.834 -1.832 0.067 
ADJER 3.315 1.089 0.276 7.536 2.212 0.027 
No. of cases 2165 2232 
Adi. R-S uare 55.4% 25.7% 
Wald test of the significance of valuation differential between two segments 
Model I 
Compared segments P-Value 
UK vs Europe 0.470 
UK vs America 0.753 
UK vs Asia 0.023 
UK vs Mid. East & Africa 0.001 
Europe vs America 0.669 
Europe vs Asia 0.190 
Europe vs Mid. East & Africa 0.001 
America vs Asia 0.046 
America vs Mid. East & Africa 0.002 
Asia vs Mid. East & Africa 0.000 
Model 2 
P-value 
0.286 
0.954 
0.107 
0.081 
0.293 
0.016 
0.037 
0.101 
0.083 
0.444 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to regression 
coefficients 
** negative BVs are set to zero. 
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Panel B: splitting the sample period Into three economic sub-periods 
Coeff. 
Pre-1994 
Model I 
t-ratio -value 
1994-1997(inclusive) 
Model 2 
Coeff. t-ratio -value Coeff. 
Post-1997 
Model 3 
t-ratio -value 
Intercept 0.610 2.042 0.041 0.654 2.200 0.028 1.867 2.040 0.041 
NEGMV -0.372 -5.799 0.000 -0.583 -4.264 0.000 -1.058 -4.896 0.000 
DUMDIV -0.656 -2.283 0.022 -0.751 -2.220 0.026 -1.714 -1.871 0.061 
1/sale 1521.51 0.540 0.589 1989.00 1.985 0.047 1329.84 0.477 0.634 
BV" 1.182 2.577 0.010 1.726 2.688 0.007 -1.869 -1.110 0.267 
PUK 11.414 3.426 0.001 22.663 3.571 0.000 22.834 2.535 0.011 
DPUK -4.677 -1.364 0.173 -2.820 -0.322 0.747 -18.41 -2.676 0.007 
PEU 16.607 3.549 0.000 28.289 4.529 0.000 16.979 3.711 0.000 
DPEU -76.84 -1.503 0.133 -5.506 -0.552 0.581 -67,74 -1.366 0.172 
PAMER 12.958 3.526 0.000 24.643 3.942 0.000 20.590 3.266 0.001 
DPAMER -44.40 -2.951 0.003 -14.38 -0.881 0.378 -1.185 -0.137 0.891 
PASIA 15.505 4.543 0.000 27.534 3.297 0.001 6.924 1.937 0.053 
DPASIA -12.31 -0.908 0.364 -24.251 -2.910 0.004 3.474 0.262 0.794 
PAFR 5.512 1.037 0.300 11.476 1.448 0.148 18.253 2.740 0.006 
DPAFR -22.92 -0.226 0.821 15.736 0.172 0.863 -35.66 -1.020 0.308 
PREST 7.382 1.942 0.052 15.910 3.087 0.002 14.068 1.896 0.058 
PBT'f(sale) -0.208 -1.747 0.081 -0.483 -3.132 0.002 -0.238 -0.860 0.390 
DIV 7.319 1.670 0.095 -11.57 -1.057 0.290 . 13.58 -1.361 0.173 
ADJER 5.710 1.690 0.091 5.190 1.016 0.310 5.961 1.561 0.118 
No. of cases 1186 1493 1186 
Adj. R- 
Square 56.8% 32.8% 18.3% 
Wald test of the significance of valuation differential between two segments 
Model I 
Compared segments p-value 
UK vs Europe 0.035 
UK vs America 0.109 
UK vs Asia 0.005 
UK vs Mid. East&Africa 0.033 
Europe vs America 0.153 
Europe vs Asia 0.681 
Europe vs 
Mid. East&Africa 0.000 
America vs Asia 0.144 
America vs 
Mid. East&Africa 0.007 
Asia vs 
Mid. East&Africa 0.003 
Model 2 
p-value 
0.199 
0.490 
0.446 
0.020 
0.459 
0.891 
0.021 0.781 
0.665 0.007 
0.014 0.672 
0.095 0.067 
Model 3 
p-value 
0.367 
0.573 
0.033 
0.521 
0.428 
0.016 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to regression 
coefficients. 
All models are estimated for profit-making firm-years and without fixed effects. 
** negative BVs are set to zero. 
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CHAPTER 6 
VALUATION OF LINE-OF-BUSINESS SEGMENT 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I extend the analysis of Chapter 5 by investigating the value 
relevance of line-of-business segment information disclosed by already geographically 
diversified multi-segment firms. More specifically, the empirical investigation of this 
chapter addresses the following questions: 
" whether the basic accounting information is differentially associated to the firm 
value across two categories of multi-segment firms: firms that disclose geographic 
segments only vs. those that simultaneously disclose geographic and line-of-business 
information; 
" whether specific industrial segments of firms operating in more than one line-of- 
business are differentially association with the value of the firm, that is, have 
differential value contributions. 
It is important to emphasise that this chapter specifically deals with firms which 
are diversified across both geographic and industrial dimensions. This approach, to 
some extent, facilitates the cross-examination of the valuation effects associated with 
both types of corporate diversification. 
The' chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the process of data 
collection and methods used for classifying the reported business segments into specific 
industries/economic sectors. It also analyses the business segment-level descriptive 
statistics. Section 6.3 reports, describes and analyses various business segment-level 
tests and results. Section 6.4 provides further evidence on the robustness of the 
empirical results, and summarises the main findings of this chapter. 
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6.2. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
6.2.1 Data Collection and Segment Identification Issues 
To identify industrially multi-segment firms, I follow the approach adopted in 
Chapter 5. That is, the firm's disclosure or non-disclosures of segment-level accounting 
numbers, contained in the financial statements, is used to identify whether the firm is 
diversified industrially and, if yes, whether it is diversified into specific lines of 
business. 
Until June 1990 segment disclosure requirements in the UK were governed by the 
Companies Act 1985, where companies were only required to disclose turnovers by (a) 
Class of business and (b) Geographical market. Thereafter, the Act was superseded by 
SSAP 25, which adds the requirement to disclose both Profit/Loss before tax and Net 
Assets by Class of business and Geographical market. 
Similar to the analysis in Chapter 5, in this chapter I identify the line-of-business 
segment reporting firms on the basis of the availability or disclosure of the segment- 
level accounting data, specifically the PBTs. Before proceeding to the analysis of 
descriptive statistics, it is necessary to summarise the process of data collection, as it 
required considerable manual work and investigative efforts. 
Several technical problems have been encountered during the collection and 
sorting of data on firms' business segments. 
First of all, unlike geographic segment data, line-of-business segment information 
for the UK firms is not readily available, in the required electronic format, from Extel 
Company Analysis database. Therefore, the required information is collated manually 
from the sample companies' financial reports contained in the Extel Company Analysis 
database. 
Secondly, similar to the situation with geographic segment disclosures, when 
disclosing the line-of-business segments, the reported accounting information is often 
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incomplete. Only rarely do firms simultaneously report all three accounting data items 
required by SSAP 25 (i. e., PBT, NA and Sales) for each disclosed line-of-business 
segment and year when financial statements are available in Extel. This incomplete 
segment information might present a problem when determining which firms should be 
categorised as industrially diversified. This problem arises when line-of-business PBTs 
are not reported for a given firm-year but other segment-level accounting data, such as 
NAs and Sales, are reported94. Because of missing segmental PBTs such firm-years are 
excluded from the analysis. In other words, only firm-years with available segmental 
PBTs are included in the sample. Hence, firm-years with missing segmental PBTs, yet 
available NAs and/or Sales, are implicitly considered as not diversified9s 
In the process of data collection it became clear that firms are often inconsistent in 
grouping and reporting their line-of-business segmental operations. For example, on a 
number of occasions the line-of-business segment reports include geographic regions as 
specific line-of-business96. These firm-years are excluded from the sample because 
geographical segment valuation was the subject of Chapter 5 and the present chapter 
specifically focuses on the industrial segments. 
Another problem that complicates line-of-business data collection, categorisation 
and subsequent empirical analysis, is the idiosyncrasy across the sample firms in terms 
of line-of-business segment identification. Different firms categorise and report their 
line-of-business operations in different ways. In a way, this flexibility or discretion to 
define and report business segments is implied in SSAP 25. Thus, in reporting line-of- 
business accounting data, some 450 geographically diversified firms use more than 800 
different line-of-business segment names/labels. Typically, these segment names/labels 
9a The source of this problem - whether it is due to firms submitting incomplete segmental reports or 
whether it is due to inaccuracies/errors in the Extel database - is unknown. 95 This assumption is restrictive but necessary because in the employed regression model value 
contributions associated with specific business segments are inferred from the values of the segments' 
PBT coefficient. 
96 This might happen when the firm groups all its operations (albeit from different lines-of-business) 
performed in a foreign location into one business unit and report it as a geographical unit. 
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themselves do not convey information sufficient for categorising these segments into 
specific economic sectors or industries. 
The categorisation of line-of-business operations into specific economic sectors is 
necessary for the subsequent empirical analysis of segment valuation. Industrial 
affiliation of a reported line-of-business can be identified only by examining individual 
companies' annual reports. Therefore, to identify the nature of each reported line-of- 
business segment, I analyse the content of the textual information contained in various 
sections of the firms' annual reports (e. g., chairman's statements, operations' review, 
etc. ). Annual reports are accessed online, using the firms' official web sites. If this 
information is not available online, I access the brief summaries of firms' operations 
reported by such online business information sources as 
http: //briefings. ft. com/company/, www. business. com, www. corporateinformation. com, 
etc. 
The content analysis of business disclosures of the sample firms suggests that 
firms can be categorised into several categories, depending on the segment disclosure 
styles. Within the first category are the firms whose business segments reflect 
operations that relate to different industries or economic sectors. In this case it could be 
said that the firm is industrially diversified. 
In the second category are the firms whose business segments are organised and 
reported to reflect specific product lines within a single industry or economic sector. In 
this case, the firm can not be considered industrially diversified. In the third category 
are the firms whose all lines-of-business relate to the same industry, yet cater to 
different segments of the product/services market or types of customers. That is, the 
line-of-business segments might be organised by type of customers being served. There 
are also firms whose line-of-business segment reporting style is a combination of the 
previously listed categories. 
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It is obvious that when dealing with the second and third categories, there are 
virtually unlimited number of possible types/names of line-of-business segments. In 
practice, this considerably complicates the categorisation of the plethora of line-of- 
business segments (reported by the cross-section of firms) into a few distinct and 
mutually exclusive specific lines-of-business. This problem becomes particularly 
difficult given that the emphasis of this chapter is on the relative valuation of operations 
associated with specific economic sectors. Recall that the primary objective of this 
chapter is to examine the market's perception of the relative value contributions 
associated with specific line-of-business operations of (geographically diversified) 
firms, and more specifically, with operations from specific industries/economic sectors. 
Another technical problem is that the financial statement numbers reported in the 
Extel files occasionally have different scaling within the cross-section of sample firms 
or even within a single firm. For example, for one finm the financial numbers might be 
reported in GBP millions, while for another firm these numbers might be stated in 
thousands. Similar scaling problems often exist within a single firm across different 
years. When such cases were identified rescaling was performed. 
The analysis of segment reports and the textual information in the annual reports 
of the sample firms revealed that many companies frequently changed their reported 
lines-of-business over the sample period. These changes usually took place in three 
ways: 
1. changes in the number of reported line-of-business segments over a period of 
several years; 
2. changes in the names of the previously reported line-of-business segments; 
and/or, 
3. changes in the composition of the firm's line-of-business segment reports. 
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The first case usually relates to situations where the firm enters into new line-of- 
business (through organic growth, acquisitions, mergers, etc. ) or stops operating in 
some of its previously reported lines-of-business. This type of segment reporting change 
does not complicate the data collection and segment identification process. 
Some segment identification problems arise in the second case, where firms 
change the names/labels of specific line-of-business operations. The difficulty is that 
without analysing the content of the firm's annual reports, it is not possible to conclude 
whether the reporting of a new line-of-business reflects the emergence of new area of 
operations within the firm, or is simply a result of the alteration of the previously 
existing segment's name. Non-availability, for a number of sample firms, of annual 
reports from earlier years of the sample period adds to the problem of tracing the name 
changes and, in general, of segment identification. 
The third case is, perhaps, the most complicated of the three. It reflects the 
reorganisation and revision (by the firm's management) of how the information about 
the firm's segment-level operations is disclosed by the firm. Here the firm might split a 
previously reported single segment into two new reported segments. For example, a 
single reported segment 'Precision Engineering & Electronic Systems' can be reported 
as such for some years, and then be split and reported as two different segments. 
Similarly, two previously separately reported segments might then be agglomerated and 
reported under one heading. The latter might complicate the classification of the new 
segment within a particular industry/line of business if, for example, the initial two 
segments belonged to two completely different economic sectors/industries. Note, that 
the physical structure of the firm's operations remains unchanged. Yet again, in all these 
cases the process of segment identification and classification requires analysing the 
content of the firm's annual reports for each year when there was a structural change in 
the segmental report. 
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Having examined some of the major difficulties associated with the use of the 
line-of-business segments' reports, it is also necessary to touch upon the procedures of 
segment categorisation by economic sectors. 
After collecting the raw line-of-business segmental data, I examine the nature of 
business involvement of a specific segment within each firm and match the names of 
segments with the 'best-fitting' economic sectors. For this purpose I use two alternative 
economic sector classification systems: (1) the Financial Time Stock Exchange Global 
Classification System (UK FTSE GCS), and (2) the United States Standard Industrial 
Classification codes (US SIC)97. The systems have somewhat different organisation, yet 
have been equally widely used in the international capital markets. Therefore, for the 
reasons of completeness of this study, in the empirical analysis sections of this chapter I 
will be reporting segment valuation results based on two alternative systems of 
segments' industrial classification. Regardless of the choice of the system, the process 
of segment classification by economic sectors bears a considerable degree of discretion, 
as in many cases it is not possible to relate the firm's specific segment to a particular 
industry. To attach the firm's segment to an industry and minimise the subjectivity of 
judgment I refer, as a starting point, to the firm's primary and secondary industry 
information contained in the Extel database. 
For many firm-years the names of some business segment, used by the firm, 
appear to match the name of the entire firm's industry group. In this straightforward 
case the content analysis of the firm's annual reports becomes unnecessary and the 
segment is simply considered to belong to the economic sector of the entire firm. For 
example, if the entire firm belongs to the 'Beverages' economic sector, and one of its 
reported business segments is labelled as 'Brewers', then that segment will be classified 
into the 'Beverages' economic sector. However, if another segment of the same firm is 
97 The detailed structures of FTSE and SIC systems are presented in the relevant empirical analysis 
sections of the chapter. 
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labels as 'Restaurants and Pubs', it is necessary to cross-check its business substance 
with the annual report, because this business segment might better relate to the 'Leisure 
and Hotels' economic sector, which is different from the 'Beverages' economic sector. 
In many cases the cross-checks with annual reports are also necessary when the name of 
one segment matches the name of some specific economic sector, yet the firm belongs 
to another economic sector. For example, the segment name 'Transport', reported by an 
'Automobiles and Parts' economic sector firm perfectly matches the name of the 
economic sector 'Transport'. Yet in reality, the segment name 'Transport' could mean 
the manufacturing of vehicles and, therefore, should be categorised into the 
'Automobiles and Parts' economic sector. In such cases, only the content analysis of 
relevant sections of the firm's annual reports would shed light on the true industrial 
affiliation/belonging of a segment. 
6.2.2 Segment Industrial Classification and disclosure characteristics 
As was previously mentioned, for the completeness of analyses, in the empirical 
sections of this chapter two alternative systems of industry/economic sector 
classification (UK FTSE GCS and US SIC codes) are used to identify the industrial 
affiliation of a given business segment. Both systems have unique structural 
peculiarities that would impact upon the (pattern of) industrial distribution of the 
sample's line-of-business segments and the interpretation of segments' valuation 
results. The following two sub-sections examine both systems in more detail. 
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6.2.2.1 The US Standard Industrial Classification System and segment disclosure 
statistics 
The US Standard Industrial Classification system consists of nine primary 
divisions, where each division has its unique one-digit SIC code98. Furthermore, each 
division includes several major groups with a two-digit SIC code attached to each 
group. There are more than 70 two-digit SIC major groups/industries. This hierarchy 
extends up to the four-digit codes level. The analysis would have certainly benefited if it 
was possible to use the finest level (i. e., four-digit) SIC codes. However, in the context 
of the model and test design employed in this study, and in light of the insufficient 
number of segments associated with the two-digit SIC groups, it is not feasible to take 
the empirical analysis beyond the one-digit SIC codes. The primary one-digit SIC 
divisions are: 
A. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
B. Mining 
C. Construction 
D. Manufacturing 
E. Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 
F. Wholesale Trade 
G. Retail Trade 
H. Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 
I. Services 
The composition of these primary divisions, in terms of the number of two-digit 
industries, varies considerably. Divisions A, B, C and F have the smallest numbers (i. e., 
five or less) of two-digit industries, while the division D is the largest and includes 20 
9s Details of the structure of the SIC system can be found on the official web site of the U. S. Department 
of Labour (see: http: //www. osha. gov/pls/imis/sic_manual. html). 
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two-digit manufacturing industries. It is, therefore, not surprising that the majority of 
the sample fine' business segments belong to the Manufacturing division. 
To be included in the sample, the geographically diversified firm must report at 
least one specific business segment for a given year. Some 2,169 geographically 
diversified firm-years meet this requirement and report 6,342 specific business 
segments in total, suggesting that on average 2.9 (6342/2169=2.92) segments are 
reported for each firm-year99. In other words, an average sample firm operates in three 
lines-of-business. 
However, further analysis of the industrial affiliations of these segments, based on 
the one-digit SIC codes, reveals that firms are much more focused. This is because, 
although being reported under different headings, the majority of business segments 
reported by a fine-year often belong to the same one-digit SIC code. In many instances 
all business segments reported by a firm-year belong to one SIC one-digit industry 
code. In other words, the firm might report different line-of-business segments and be 
considered industrially diversified under the two or three-digit SIC codes, yet remain 
industrially focused in terms of the one-digit SIC codes. 
As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, data problems and the test design limit 
the level of SIC codes that could be used to categorise the segments. Therefore, I 
amalgamate different business segments when they belong to the same one-digit SIC 
code. This results in 3096 one-digit SIC segments being identified within the sample of 
2013 firm-years, making firms look substantially less diversified. That is, firms on 
average, report 1.54 (3295/2169=1.54) segments in any year. 
Table 6.1 reveals further particulars of in-sample segment disclosures. 
99 Of these 6342 segments, I was not able to identify either two- or one-digit SIC industry codes for some 
150 business segments. 
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Table 6.1 
Panel A. Frequency of segment types reported In each year 
One-digit SIC Industry-of the reported business segments 
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1991 0 0 0 2 0 2 3 1 1 9 
1992 0 1 2 10 2 5 2 1 5 28 
1993 1 1 5 26 4 12 6 3 12 70 
1994 5 5 21 153 29 48 24 32 63 380 
1995 6 5 21 201 44 63 37 35 84 496 
1996 6 5 20 201 41 56 35 38 85 487 
1997 6 9 20 200 44 52 34 35 97 497 
1998 5 8 19 185 42 51 41 29 91 471 
1999 6 7 21 162 40 43 40 31 95 445 
2000 1 3 11 70 25 18 25 13 47 213 
Total 36 44 140 1210 271 350 247 218 580 3096 
* Numbers are based on the primary sample which does not exclude the outliers. 
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FTSE 0 0 0 0 73 5 109 38 20 63 308 
FTSE 1 0 44 90 237 19 41 4 60 50 545 
FTSE 2 0 0 33 478 26 48 1 28 41 655 
FTSE 3 0 0 0 112 0 15 11 0 6 144 
FTSE 4 36 0 7 123 12 68 26 12 7 291 
FTSE 5 0 0 10 165 161 62 156 75 325 954 
FTSE 6 0 0 0 1 5 2 11 6 3 28 
FTSE 7 0 0 0 0 41 5 0 13 6 65 
FTSE 8^ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FTSE 9 0 0 0 21 2 0 0 4 79 106 
Total 36 44 140 1210 271 350 247 218 580 3096 
* Numbers are based on the primary sample which does not exclude the outliers. 
** FTSE GCS is used as the basis for firms' classified into industries. FTSE 0- Resources; FTSE I- 
Basic Industries; FTSE 2= General Industrials; FTSE 3= Cyclical Consumer Goods; FTSE 4- Non- 
Cyclical Consumer Goods; FTSE 5= Cyclical Services; FTSE 6- Non-Cyclical Services; FTSE 7- 
Utilities; FTSE 8 Financials; FTSE 9= Information Technology. 
A There are no observations in this sector, because the FTSE-based financial firms are not included in the 
sample. 
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The table shows that nearly 39% of all reported business segments operate in the 
Manufacturing industries. The next most frequently reported industry of segments' 
operations is Services (18.7%). This is in sharp contrast with Mining, and Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fishing industries with less than 1.5% of segments operating in these 
sectors. This uneven distribution of segment's industrial affiliation is, however, not 
inconsistent with the industrial distribution of the sample firms (see Chapter 4 for 
details). 
The yearly break-down of segment reporting frequencies in Panel A of Table 6.1 
reveals the non-static pattern of segment disclosures. From 1991 through 1995, in each 
consecutive year there were more reported segments across all lines-of-business. Using 
the available data it is difficult to identify the cause of this growth. It is possible that 
firms had been gradually or, for some reason, reluctantly reacting to the adoption in year 
1991 of a new segment reporting standard (SSAP 25). The cause, however, might also 
be of a technical origin, reflecting the compilation of data by Extel Company Analysis. 
The pattern would also be consistent with a conjecture that firms were increasing the 
level of industrial diversification in the first half of the 1990s, hence, more reported 
segments. It is, however, difficult to defend this hypothesis as the numbers reported in 
Panels A and C of Table 6.2 (see Section 6.2.2.2 below) indicate that the level of 
industrial diversification had been decreasing. 
Panel B of Table 6.1 provides further insight into the relationships between the 
reported segments and the principal industry of the segment reported firm. Because 
firms' industries are identified using the FTSE GCS system and the segments' 
industries are based on the SIC system, Panel B also provides some indication of the 
level of association between these two industry classification systems. 
The reported patterns indicate that there is little relation between the firms' 
principal industry and the types of business segments these firms report. For example, it 
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is not unusual for firms with principal operations in the `Basic Industries' sector to 
report segments in such sectors as 'Mining', 'Construction', 'Manufacturing', 
'Finance', 'Services', 'Wholesale Trade', etc. Similar spread of segment-level 
industries is observed when the firm's principal operations are in the 'Non-Cyclical 
Consumer Goods' industry. Perhaps, the most focused are the firms with principal 
operations in the 'IT' and 'Utilities' sectors. Such firms report segments from only four 
different industries. It is also noteworthy that the `Utilities' sector firms do not operate 
in the most frequently reported segment industry, Manufacturing. 
Despite this wide segment-level industry spread of firms operating in a given 
principal industry, one could still identify one dominant segment for each firm-industry. 
Principal industry of the firm Dominant segment-level industry 
Resources Wholesale Trade 
Basic Industries Manufacturing 
General Industrials Manufacturing 
Cyclical Consumer Goods Manufacturing 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods Manufacturing 
Cyclical Services Services 
Non-Cyclical Services Retail Trade 
Utilities Transportation, Communications, Electric, 
Gas & Sanitary Services 
Financials 
Information Technology Services 
The above revealed associations between the two systems of industrial 
classification might provide a benchmark for comparing the segmental relative 
valuation results reported in Section 3.2 with those reported in Section 3.3. 
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6.2.2.2 The FTSE Global Classification System and segment disclosure statistics 
Similar to the US SIC system, the UK FTSE Global Classification System also has 
a hierarchical structure and includes ten basic economic groups, 37 sectors and about 
100 sub-sectors1oo 
To investigate the value contributions associated with business segments operating 
in specific economic sectors each reported business segment needs to be categorised 
according to the FTSE economic groups. The empirical analysis would have certainly 
benefited if it was possible to go beyond the ten economic groups and use finer 
categorisation, such as economic sectors and sub-sectors. This, however, is unfeasible, 
taking into account the problem of limited data and the test design. The ten basic 
economic groups comprising the FTSE GCS system are: 
0 Resources 
1 Basic Industries 
2 General Industries 
3 Cyclical Consumer Goods 
4 Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
5 Cyclical Services 
6 Non-Cyclical Services 
7 Utilities 
8 Financials 
9 IT 
To be included in the sample the firm-year must report at least one business 
segment per reported year. There are 2,176 such firm-years. Because of missing firm- 
level data, some 189 firm-years are eliminated, reducing the sample to 1987 
observations. Analogous to the approach used in SIC-based analysis, for a given firm- 
100 Details of the structure of the FTSE Global Classification System can be found on the official web site 
of FTSE Group (see: http: //www. ftse. com). 
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year I amalgamate separately reported business segments that belong to the same FTSE 
GCS economic groups. This results in 3,036 FTSE-based segments, making the average 
number of segments per firm-year equal to 1.53 (i. e., 3036/1987=1.53). This number is 
virtually identical to that obtained when the SIC codes were used and indicates that 
sample firms have, on average, low level of industrial diversification. 
Table 6.2 
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Table 6.2 (continued from the previous page) 
Panel C. Yearly and Industrial structure of the sample firms* 
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294 
115 
1987 
* Numbers are based on the primary sample which does not exclude the outliers. ** FTSE GCS is used as 
the basis for firms' classified into industries. FTSE 0= Resources; FTSE I= Basic Industries; FTSE 2= 
General Industrials; FTSE 3= Cyclical Consumer Goods; FTSE 4- Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods; 
FTSE 5= Cyclical Services; FTSE 6= Non-Cyclical Services; FTSE 7= Utilities; FTSE 8 Financials; 
FTSE 9= Information Technology. 
Panels A and B of Table 6.2 reveal that patterns of uneven distribution of 
segments' industrial affiliation are similar yet less pronounced than those reported in 
Pales A and B of Table 6.1. The two most frequently reported business segments relate 
to 'Cyclical Services' and 'General Industrials' industries and account for 29% and 
21% of all reported segments, respectively. In contrast, less than 2% of segments 
operate in such industries as 'Resources', 'Utilities' and 'Non-Cyclical Services'. This 
uneven distribution of segment's industrial affiliation is, however, consistent with the 
industrial distribution of the sample firms (see Panel C of Table 6.2). 
Yearly distributions of segments reported in Panel A of Table 6.1 show identical 
patterns to those found in Panel A of Table 6.2. That is, across all FTSE GCG 
industries the numbers of disclosed segments were growing up until 1995, and largely 
remained unchanged in the following years. Possible explanations for this pattern have 
already been discussed in Section 6.2.2.1 of this chapter. 
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Panel B of Table 6.2 provides further details on the relationships between the 
industrial affiliation of reported segments and the principal industry of the segment 
reporting firm. Because both the firms and reported segments are classified using the 
FTSE GCS system, one might expect close association between the firm's principal 
industry and the most frequently reported industry for its segments. Indeed, between 
55% to 66% of segments, reported by a firm with principal activities in a given industry, 
belong to that industry101. It should also be noted that for the majority of firms' 
principal industries the remaining 45% to 34 % of reported segments are relatively well 
spread between the remaining industries. That is, there are no obvious relationships 
between the principal industry of firms and non-principal industry segments reported by 
firm. 
6.2.3 Variables' Descriptive Statistics 
This section deals with the descriptive statistics of business segments' PBTs, 
based on the final samples used in the subsequent regression analysis sections of this 
chapter. All statistics, therefore, are computed for segment-level PBT variables which 
have been scale-deflated (by the composite scale proxy) and trimmed to exclude the 
outliers (i. e., top and bottom 0.5% of each regression variable). In the table that follows 
the descriptive statistics are computed separately for positive and negative segment- 
level PBTs. This is to allow comparability between different industrial segments that 
report profits (or losses). To expose the relationships between the firm-level and 
segment-level negative earnings, all descriptives are computed for two samples: the 
total sample and the sub-sample that excluded observations with firm-level losses (see 
Table 6.3 in Appendix 6.1). 
101 For example, there are in total 57 business segments reported by the Resources sector firms. Of this 
number, 32 segments (i. e., 56%) operate in the Resources sector and the remaining 25 segments (i. e., 
44%) operate in other industries (see Panel B of Table 6.2). 
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Because all segmental PBTs are scale-deflated (and the scale proxy is computed as 
the average of equity market value, total assets and sales) the means and medians 
provide some measure of the average size of a specific industry segment relative to 
other industry segments. In the Panel A of Table 6.3 (Appendix 6.1) segments' 
industries are based on the FTSE industry classification system. The comparison of the 
median and mean values across segments suggests that earnings reported from segments 
in the 'Non-Cyclical Services' account for a bigger share of firms' total earnings than 
those of any other segment, while 'Utilities' and 'Financials' industries are associated 
with the smallest segments. 
In the Panel B of Table 6.3 (Appendix 6.1) segments' industries are based on the 
US SIC one-digit codes. Segments operating in 'Mining' and 'Manufacturing' 
industries are the largest while those associated with 'Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing', 'Finance, Insurance and Real Estate' and 'Transportation, Communications, 
etc. 'are the smallest segments. 
Among the important segment-level PBT characteristics is the frequency of 
reported negative segmental PBTs. When compared across lines-of-business it provides 
a simple measure of relative successfulness of specific segmental operations. It might 
also provide some insight into the interpretation of segments' relative valuation results, 
reported in the empirical sections of this chapter. 
Information presented in Table 6.4 reveals that segments differ substantially in 
terms of frequency of reporting negative results. In as much as 32%, 20% and 13% of 
cases, segments operating in 'Resources', 'Information Technology' and 'Financial' 
sectors, respectively, report losses. This contrasts with percentages which are below 9% 
for the remaining seven out ten FTSE-based industries (see upper panel of Table 6.4). 
326 
Similar divergences are found across the US SIC-based business segments. Thus, 
42% of segment-firm-years operating in the `Mining' industry report losses, while for 
the remaining eight segments this percentage does not exceed 12.5%. 
Table 6.4 
Industry of 
the 
segment 
FTSE 0 
FTSE1 
FTSE 2 
FTSE 3 
FTSE 4 
FTSE 5 
FTSE 6 
FTSE 7 
FTSE 8 
FTSE 9 
SIC A 
SIC B 
SIC C 
SIC D 
SIC E 
SIC F 
SIC G 
SIC H 
SIC I 
Segments classified on the basis of FTSE GCS 
Total sample' 
Number of 
positive 
segmental 
PBTs 
Segments classified on the basis of US SIC codes 
Number of 
positive 
segmental 
PBTs 
Number of 
negative 
segmental 
PBTs 
% Of 
negative 
PBTs In 
total 
23 11 32.35% 23 3 11.54% 
461 23 4.75% 424 10 2.30% 
584 41 6.56% 529 14 2.58% 
217 15 6.47% 193 5 2.53% 
288 18 5.88% 262 5 1.87% 
787 55 6.53% 728 18 2.41% 
44 4 8.33% 44 3 6.38% 
59 2 3.28% 56 2 3.45% 
196 29 12.89% 179 23 11.39% 
78 19 19.59% 67 7 9.46% 
30 
19 
119 
1104 
243 
311 
210 
182 
479 
Number of 
negative 
segmental 
PBTs 
% of 
negative 
PBTs in 
total 
Profit-making firm-years 
0 
4 
7 
18 
7 
15 
9 
12 
23 
2 
14 
17 
64 
16 
29 
27 
20 
65 
6.25% 28 
42.42% 18 
12.50% 111 
5.48% 1002 
6.18% 232 
8.53% 277 
11.39% 198 
9.90% 166 
11.95% 423 
0.00% 
18.18% 
5.93% 
1.76% 
2.93% 
5.14% 
4.35% 
6.74% 
5.16% 
* Based on final samples used in regression analysis and exclude outliers (i. e., top and bottom 0.5% of 
each firm or segment-level variable). 
The majority of regression results reported in Section 6.3 of this chapter relate to 
samples that exclude firm-level loss-making firms. Therefore Table 6.4 additionally 
reports frequencies of segmental losses for samples that exclude observations with firm- 
level losses. As one might expect, the frequency of segmental losses is substantially 
lower across all segments. These results suggest that, as one would expect, the 
percentages of segment-level losses are considerably lower in the sample that only 
includes profit-making firms. In relative terms, nevertheless, segments that have higher 
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frequency of losses in the full sample have higher frequency of losses in the new sample 
as well. 
6.3. ANALYSIS OF SEGMENTS' VALUATION AND LINE-OF-BUSINESS 
DIVERSIFICATION 
6.3.1 Firm-level empirical results 
To assess the relative value contributions associated with specific business 
segments, I follow the methodology used in the Chapter 5, and measure the relative 
valuation of business segments by comparing the values of regression-estimated 
segmental earnings coefficients. 
It should be reminded that the working sample in this chapter is smaller than that 
of Chapter 5 because it only includes firm-years that are diversified across geographic 
and business dimensions (i. e., simultaneously report geographic and business segment 
data). Restricting the sample to firms which are diversified across both geographic and 
industrial dimensions would reflect the combined valuation effects, associated with both 
types of corporate diversification. There also exists another (technical) reason for 
restricting the sample to firm-years which are diversified across both dimensions. The 
line-of-business data are primarily collected and compiled manually. Given the time 
constraints of my research, it would not be possible to collect and compile the required 
data for the entire (initial) sample. The sample size might vary, depending on the choice 
of economic sector classification system (FTSE GCS vs. UK SIC). 
To alleviate the scale-related problems discussed in Chapter 3, all OLS regressions 
are estimated in a scale-deflated form and after the outliers are eliminated102. The 
elimination of outliers reduces the sample to 1919 f irm-years. 
102 The primary deflator used in this study is a composite size proxy, computed as follows: 
deflator=(MV+TA+Sales)/3. Outliers are defined as top and bottom 0.5% of observations for each scale- 
deflated variable included in the regression. Results of the robustness checks, with alternative scale 
deflators, are reported in Section 6.4. 
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The analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 reveal that a number of contexts and factors can 
affect regression results and, hence, segment valuation inferences. Of such factors and 
contexts, that need to be taken into account when running regressions in this chapter, 
are: 
" the sign of firm-level and segment-level earnings; 
" the dividend paying status of the firm; 
" the premium/discount of the market value of the firm relative to the book 
value; and 
" industry and yearly effects. 
In regressions that test value relevance and valuation of business segments, I do 
not control for specific characteristics of geographical diversification of firms, because: 
1. all firms included in this analysis are, by definition, geographically diversified; 
and, more importantly, 
2. firms do not report business vs. geographic segment information in a matrix 
format. 
Before addressing the core issue of this chapter, the valuation of specific business 
segments, I start off with the basic firm-level model and investigate two issues: the 
influence of the above listed contexts on the firm-level regression parameters, and the 
incremental information content of the business segment disclosures. 
Table 6.5 (see Appendix 6.1) reports the basic regression results for alternatively 
defined samples. Model 1 is estimated for the entire sample and does not control for any 
of the above listed effects. Although the estimated coefficient of three basic value 
drivers (PBT, BV and Div) are all statistically significant at least at the 5% level, the 
PBT coefficient has an unexpected (negative) sign and the regression explanatory power 
is relatively low, at 15.6%. To isolate the effect of losses, Model 2 is estimated for 
profit-making firms only. In this model the PBT has the expected sign and is highly 
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statistically significant. The explanatory power of this model is 21.6%, substantially 
higher than in Model 1. Model 3 is estimated for profit-making firms but excludes the 
non-dividend paying firms. Model 3 and Model 2 have similar regression coefficients 
for all key value drivers yet the latter has somewhat higher explanatory power (23.3%). 
Model 4 and 5 are estimated to assess the performance of the basic valuation 
model when the firms report negative consolidated results. None of these regressions 
appear statistically significant at the 1% level and none of the key valuation factors' 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, Model 5 is not 
statistically significant even at the 10% level. The conclusion, therefore, is that in the 
given sample, the employed basic valuation model fails to explain even a fraction of the 
cross-sectional variation of the market value of equity when firms report firm-level 
losses. Therefore, the analysis that follows will primarily relate to profit-making firms, 
unless otherwise specified. 
Table 6.6 (see Appendix 6.1) reports the results of regressions (estimated for 
profit-making firms) which are being gradually appended with dummies to control for 
the market value premium/discount, fixed yearly and industry effects. 
Models 1 and 2 in Table 6.6 are the extensions of Models 2 and 3 of Table 6.5, in 
the sense that they include the market value premium/discount dummy. Consistent with 
previous results reported in Chapter 5, the premium/discount dummy coefficient is 
highly statistically significant, has a negative value, yet does not affect the PBT 
coefficients. Furthermore, similar to previous findings, the inclusion of this dummy 
improves the explanatory power of the regressions by about 5% points. The 
interpretation of this result is the same as in Chapter 5: firms that trade at a discount to 
book value have, on average, lower valuation than firms trading at a premium. 
Models 3 and 4 of Table 6.6 are estimated with industry dummies. Although six 
out of eight yearly dummies are not statistically significant, they, nevertheless, notably 
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improve the explanatory power of the regressions (by about 7% points). In these models 
the values of PBT, Div and BV value association coefficients are slightly different from 
those in models 1 and 2, yet the qualitative inferences remain unchanged. 
Finally, the inclusion of yearly dummies alone or in conjunction with the market 
premium and industry dummies (as in models 5 and 6 of Table 6.6) has no impact 
either on the explanatory power of the regressions, or the estimated coefficients. This is 
despite the statistical significance (at the 5% level) of 5 out of 9 yearly dummies. 
Therefore, I do not employ yearly dummies in the segment-level tests reported later in 
this chapter. 
The examination of results in Table 6.6 and Table 6.5 (models 2 and 3) reveals 
commonalities with results reported in similar tests of Chapter 5. These include: 
" in the context of the employed model, firms trading at a discount to book 
value have lower cross-sectional relative valuation than firms trading at a premium; 
" in profit-making firms the BV is negatively (yet not always statistically 
significantly) associated with the firm value; 
" regardless of the number of dummies included, the PBT always has 
positive and statistically significant association with value, and its coefficient is 
always higher for the dividend-paying firms; 
" dividends are also positively associated with value, and have higher 
valuation coefficient in regressions that exclude non-dividend firm-years; 
" robust statistical significance and positive sign of the PBTS coefficient, 
throughout all relevant models reported in Chapters 5 and 6, indicates that the PBT 
value association coefficient is not a cross-scale constant, but rather is positively 
correlated with the scale of the firm; 
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" finally, in all tests the explanatory power of models that exclude non- 
dividend firm-years is marginally yet persistently higher than in models that do not 
exclude such firm-years. 
6.3.2 Segmental Valuation using FTSE GCS 
In the previous section I examined general characteristics of the model's 
performance when the consolidated data were used. In this section I examine the 
performance of the model and the issue of relative valuation of specific line-of-business 
operations associated with specific FTSE GCS economic groups. To do this I use two 
alternative, yet complementary, test designs. In the first instance the firm-level PBT of 
the basic valuation model is replaced with its segment-level PBT components. In the 
second type of test design, the firm-level model is amended with segment-level PBT 
components. These methods are complementary in the sense that they help address 
different technical problems associated with regression estimation process. 
Simple disaggregation of the firm-level earnings into segmental counterparts 
maintains the equivalence of the disaggregated and the firm-level models. However, 
because of the low quality of the business segment data (either due to inconsistencies in 
the segment reporting practices of the UK firms, which might reflect inadequacy of the 
segment reporting requirements contained SSAP 25, or flaws and errors in the Extel 
database, or the impossibility to correctly identify the industrial characteristic of a 
specific business segment), in a substantial proportion of the sample the sum of 
segmental PBTs, in a given firm year, deviates considerably from the firm-level PBT. 
Furthermore, more often than not these deviations are very large and could not be 
merely attributed to such specific non-segmental components of the firm-level PBTs as 
PBT from discontinued operations, or other items. This results in a situation where the 
residual (non-segment) component of the firm-level PBT often accounts for a larger 
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share of the firm-level PBT than do all business segments taken together, which affects 
the robustness of segment-level PBT coefficients. 
In the alternative test the basic model is appended with segment level PBTs. Isere, 
the model specification is: 
my = a0,, +a,,,,, * (l I s) + a, * by + a2 * pbt + b, * pbt, + a3 * pbt *f (size) + a4 * div +u 
where pbt; is the profit before tax, reported from segment i. 
The shortcoming of this approach is the departure of the appended model from 
the basic theoretical model. The good news, however, is that it is no longer necessary to 
include in the regression the non-segment component of the firm-level PBT. Inferences 
regarding the relative valuation of specific segments can be drawn either by comparing 
the coefficients of segmental PBTs added to the regression or by comparing a given 
segment's PBT coefficient with the firm-level PBT coefficient. Furthermore, the latter 
could also reveal how the capitalisation of a specific segment's earnings compares to 
the cross-sectionally average capitalisation of earnings of the sample firms. 
6.3.2.1 Test results based on disaggregation 
I start off with models 1 and 2, reported in Table 6.6 (Appendix 6.1), and replace 
the firm-level PBT with its business segment-level components. Table 6.7 (Appendix 
6.1) reports the results from segment-disaggregated models. In Model 1 of Table 6.7, a 
disaggregated version of Model 1 of Table 6.6, the firm-level PBT is replaced by ten 
segment-level components. This simple disaggregation improves the explanatory power 
of the regression by a notable 6 percentage points, suggesting that business segment 
reporting has incremental value relevance. Although all ten segmental PBT coefficients 
have the expected (positive) sign, only four of them are statistically significant. Of all 
segments, the PBT9 has the highest valuation coefficient, which is statistically larger 
than all other statistically significant segmental coefficients. In other words, segments 
333 
operating in the 'IT' economic sector are perceived to be creating more value. The 
'Cyclical Services' economic sector is the next most valuable line-of-business, followed 
by the 'General Industries' line-of-business. 
Model 1 does not control for the possibility that some of the segmental PBTs 
might be negative. It is often the case that firms report positive consolidated financial 
results, yet on the segmental level they might report losses for a specific segment. From 
the firm-level analysis in Chapter 4 and geographic segment-level analysis in Chapter 5, 
it is known that the market attaches different values to positive and negative earnings. 
Therefore, to allow for non-linearities in the line-of-business segment PBT coefficients, 
the model is appended with ten interaction terms, corresponding to the ten segments. 
Results are reported in Model 2 of Table 6.7 and suggest that neither the segmental 
PBT coefficients nor the remaining value drivers' coefficients are affected. This is 
because the number of negative segmental PBTs per reported segment is very small and 
does not influence the segmental PBT coefficients. Table 6.8 (see below) shows the 
frequency of firm-years with positive and negative segmental PBTs, by segments' 
economic sector, in the profit-making sample. 
These small numbers of negative segmental PBTs also explain the incongruity of 
the regression estimated interaction terms' coefficients 103. 
Models 3 and 4 of Table 6.7 repeat Models I and 2, respectively, and are 
estimated for the dividend-paying sub-sample. The values of the estimated segmental 
PBT coefficients are higher than in Models 1 and 2, yet all previous qualitative 
inferences remain unaffected' 04 
103 Statistically, for most of the lines-of-business, there are not enough negative segmental PBT data 
points to allow robust estimation of the interaction terms' coefficients. 
04 Models I and 3 have also been re-estimated with negative segmental PBTs set to zero. This, however, 
did not change the results. 
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Table 6.8 
Single-industry and Multi-industry Multi-industry firm-years only * 
firm-years 
Economic Total ** Positive Negative Total Positive Negative 
sectors segmental segmental segmental segmental 
PBTs PBTs PBTs PBTs 
0. Resources 26 23 3 21 19 2 
1. Basic 434 424 10 276 269 7 Industries 
2. General 543 529 14 355 341 14 Industries 
3. Cyclical 
Consumer 198 193 5 133 128 5 
Goods 
4. Non-Cyclical 
Consumer 267 262 5 181 176 5 
Goods 
5. Cyclical 746 728 18 367 350 17 Services 
6. Non-Cyclical 47 44 3 36 33 3 Services 
7. Utilities 58 56 2 41 39 2 
8. Financials 202 179 23 196 173 23 
9. IT 74 67 7 44 38 6 
* Single-industry firms are those that report multiple business segments, yet all business segments are in 
one industry. Multi-industry firms are those multi-segment firms whose reported segments operate in 
different industries. 
** Total numbers are lower than those reported in Table 6.3 because they exclude outliers and reflect 
only the firm-years that report firm-level positive earnings. 
The observed low statistical significance of segmental PBTs might be due to 
several reasons. On a technical level, the relatively small number of non-zero data 
points per line-of-business combined with the large number of regression coefficients 
being estimated precludes robust estimation of the PBT coefficients. On an economic 
level, the lack of statistically significant value association of segmental profits might 
indicate that the market does not value earnings information from specific lines-of- 
business, suggesting that this information is, in general, of low quality and unreliable. 
Because this information is produced (disclosed) in accordance with SSAP25's segment 
reporting requirements, one might conclude that SSAP25 is not adequate, as far as the 
value relevance of business segment information is concerned. An alternative 
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explanation of the observed low value relevance of the segmental information is that the 
FTSE GCS economic classification system, used for classifying business operations by 
economic sectors, fails to categorise operations in economically distinguishable 
categories. However, even this point can be related back to the issue of inadequacy of 
SSAP25. This is because SSAP25 does not require companies to disclose specific 
(FTSE, SIC-based or any other classification system-based) economic sectors/industries 
in which the reported business segments belong. 
The examination of the economic substance of the ten FTSE GCS economic 
groups (i. e., industries making up a given economic group) does not reveal much of the 
logic of the composition of the economic groups. Some economic groups, for example, 
include under the same umbrella functionally dissimilar industries, while some 
functionally similar operations are classified into different economic groups. For 
example, the 'Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods' economic group encapsulates such 
completely different, in economic substance, sub-sectors/industries as 'Brewers' and 
'Health Maintenance Organisations', and 'Non-Cyclical Services' group is comprised 
of two dissimilar sectors: 'Food and Drug Retailers', and 'Telecommunication 
Services'. On the other hand, such (operationally and economically) closely related 
industries as 'Telecommunication Services' and 'Internet and Computer Services' are 
categorised into 'Non-Cyclical Services' and 'IT' economic groups respectively. 
Therefore, it might be difficult to substantiate the regression-estimated segmental PBT 
coefficients. 
Because the primary objective of my study is the identification of value 
contributions associated with segments operating in specific lines-of-business, it might 
be useful to agglomerate some of the FTSE GCS economic groups into larger sectors, 
based on the similarity of the economic substance of industries included in a given 
economic group. The term 'similarity of economic substance' entails subjective 
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judgement and requires some clarification. In the context of this study, the similarity of 
different lines-of-business is inferred from the closeness of definitions and descriptions 
of the economic sectors and sub-sectors comprising each of the 10 major FTSE GCS 
economic groups. Results reported in the sections that follow reflect several alternative 
agglomerations (where several initial economic groups are agglomerated into larger 
sectors). 
Based on the similarity of definitions of economic activities, I agglomerate the 
least technologically advanced `traditional' industries, that is, 'Basic Industries', 
'Resources' and 'Utilities', into one sector. Respectively, the PBTs of these three lines- 
of-business (i. e., PBTO, PBT1 and PBT7) are agglomerated into one PBT item, 
PBT017. Similarly, 'Cyclical Consumer Goods' and 'Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods' 
are combined into one segment which appears in regressions as PBT34. The most 
technologically advanced `new' industries, 'Non-Cyclical Services' and 'IT', are also 
agglomerated into one segment, PBT69. This reduces the number of economic sectors 
to six. 
The Table 6.9 (Appendix 6.1) reports regression results with agglomerated 
segments. All four regressions reported in Table 6.9 are in agreement with those 
reported earlier, confirming the previous findings that specific lines-of-business have 
different relative valuation. Segments operating in the 'traditional' industries (i. e., 
represented by PBT017) have the lowest association with the equity market value, and 
hence could be thought of as being perceived by the market as having the lowest 
relative contribution to the value of the firm. In fact, the PBT017 coefficient is only 
significant at the 1% level in samples that exclude non-dividend firms (Models 3 and 4). 
In Model 2, estimated for the sample that includes non-dividend firms, the PBT017 
coefficient is significant only at the 10% level. 
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Somewhat surprising is the relative valuation of segments operating in the 
financial sector. In relative terms the financial segments have statistically 
indistinguishable valuation from that of segments operating in the `traditional' 
industries. In other words, the financial operations are at the bottom of the line-of- 
business segment valuation ranking. It should be noted, that because the FTSE GCS- 
based financial firms are excluded from the sample, this result is representative of 
financial segments of the non-financial firms only. 
The PBT coefficient related to segments operating in 'Cyclical' and 'Non-Cyclical 
Consumer Goods' sectors is statistically significant (at the 1% level) yet its value is the 
second-lowest. 
Segments operating in the 'General Industries' economic group are in the middle 
of the valuation ranking, and this result is robust to different samplings. The second 
most valued segmental operations belong to the 'Cyclical Services' economic group. 
This group encompasses such sector firms as General Retailers, Leisure and Hotel 
companies, Media and Entertainment firms and support services. Finally, the most 
valuable segment operations are those related to the Iii-Tech economic group, which is 
an agglomeration of such economic sub-sectors as Telecommunication Services, IT 
Hardware and Software, and Food and Drug retailers. 
The results of the Wald tests, which are used to test the pair-wise restriction of the 
equality of two specific segments' PBT coefficients, indicate that all segments are 
perceived to have value contributions which are statistically different from each other. 
Based on the empirical results, specific lines-of-business can be arranged in the 
order from the least to most valuable as follows: 
1. Traditional Industries (include: 'Basic Industries', 'Resources' and 'Utilities'); 
2. Finance-related lines-of-business; 
3. 'Cyclical' and 'Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods ; 
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4. 'General Industrials ; 
5. 'Cyclical Services' (include: General Retailers, Leisure and Hotels, Media and 
Entertainment and Support services); 
6. Hi-Tech group (includes: Telecommunication Services, IT Hardware and 
Software, Food and Drug Retailers). 
Summarising the above results of segments' relative valuation, one could reach a 
general conclusion that the services and technologically highly advanced new sector 
segments are perceived by the market as contributing more value than segments 
operating in traditional or low-tech industries. One rather contra-intuitive finding is the 
low relative valuation of segments operating in the financial sectors. 
Similar to the findings of the geographic segment analysis, reported in Chapter 5, 
the evidence of differential valuation role played by dividends in the firm-level and 
disaggregated models is also found in the present chapter, where the line-of-business 
disaggregation is analysed. It appears that dividends have incremental information 
content (and are positively related to value) when the model is presented on the firm- 
level. However, when earnings are disaggregated into their constituent geographic or 
line-of-business components, the dividends coefficient looses its statistical significance. 
This implies that segment-disaggregated earnings present a better summary of value- 
relevant information, substituting the information conveyed by dividends. 
Finally, the comparison of the Adjusted R2 across Models 1 and 2 (of Table 6.6), 
Models 1 through 4 (of Table 6.7) and Models 1 through 4 (of Table 6.9) suggests that 
disaggregation of the firm-level data into business segment components has information 
content and improves the explanatory power of the regressions by 5 to 7 percentage 
'os points 
105 Similar results on the information content of disaggregation are obtained in the alternatively scaled 
regressions (see Tables 6.6TA and 6.7TA in Appendix 6.2). 
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By and large, it can be concluded that segment-level information, reported from 
specific lines-of-business, is value relevant and has differential pricing. 
6.3.2.2 Test results based on appending the model 
The relative value contributions of segments operating in specific industries are 
inferred by comparing segments' PBT coefficients with the cross-sectional average 
value of the firm-level PBT coefficient. This is because the PBT coefficient in the firm- 
level regression reflects the cross-sectionally average capitalisation of firm-level PBTs. 
If the market attaches differential valuation (and, hence, capitalisation) to a specific 
segment's PBT, compared to the cross-sectional value of the firm-level PBT, then the 
PBT coefficients of the line-of-business segments, added into the regression, should be 
statistically different from zero. A positive (negative) industrial PBT coefficient would 
indicate that PBT from that industry has higher (lower) capitalisation than the cross- 
sectional average PBT coefficient. Furthermore, relative valuation of given two lines-of- 
business could be inferred by testing the statistical significance of the divergence of 
their PBT coefficients. 
Table 6.10 through 6.12 (see Appendix 6.1) summarise the results. Tests in 
Tables 6.10 and 6.11, which are based on the appending of the firm-level model with 
just one segment's PBT, are identical in all respects except that regressions in Table 
6.11 are estimated for samples that exclude firm-years where all reported segments 
operate in a single industry. Results in Tables 6.10 and 6.11 provide strong evidence 
that profits reported from segments operating in the 'Basic Industries' ('IT) sector have 
substantially lower (higher) capitalisation than the in-sample (cross-sectional average) 
capitalisation of the firm-level profits. 
Differential valuation of different industrial segments could also be tested more 
directly, by simultaneously including all ten segments' PBTs into the basic model and 
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employing the Wald test for testing the equality of all possible pairs of segmental PBT 
coefficients. Panel A of Table 6.12 reports the test results for two samples of firm- 
years: firm-years whose all reported business segments belong to a single industry; and 
firm-years that report segments from at least two different industries. These results do 
not change any of the previous conclusions: different business segment operations have 
differential valuation, and the 'IT' ('Basic Industries) sector is perceived to be 
substantially more (less) valuable then all remaining business operations. 
Although some of the remaining eight segments' PBT multipliers are statistically 
different from one another and relative to the firm-level earnings' multiplier, the 
inferences are less robust. If one begins the analysis with an a priori belief that the 
FTSE GCS classification system adequately classifies business operations into 
industries/sectors which are materially distinguishable from one another in terms of 
perceived risks, returns, growth opportunities, cyclicality and, hence, valuation-wise 
then the failure to identify valuation differentials across many lines-of-business might 
suggest the opposite. However, this might also be due to relatively small number of data 
points per industrial segment. In either case, one is likely to obtain better robustness by 
agglomerating some of the qualitatively similar industrial operations. Therefore I 
agglomerate some of the segments, as described in the Section 6.3.2.1, and repeat the 
tests. 
Panel B of Table 6.12 report regression and Wald test results. As was expected, 
these results are more robust, with regards to the relative valuation of segmental 
operations, and are nearly identical to those obtained from the disaggregated mode test 
design (see Section 6.3.2.1). The relative valuation of business operations by FTSE 
GCS economic sectors can be summarised as follows (in the order from the least to the 
most valuable sector): 
1. 'Resources'; 'Basic Industries'; 'Utilities'. 
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2. 'Cyclical Consumer Goods ; 'Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods'. 
3. 'General Industrials ; 'Non-Cyclical Services'; 'Financials'. 
4. 'IT' and 'Cyclical Services'. 
With regard to relative pricing of specific lines-of-business, results in Tables 6.10 
through 6.12 reconfirm previous conclusions, where model-disaggregation test design 
was used. Furthermore, the comparison of the Adjusted R2 across Models I and 2 (of 
Table 6.6) and Models I through 11 (of Table 6.10) suggests that earnings information 
related to different lines-of-business segments have differential information content. 
That is, the inclusion of a specific business segment's earnings, into the firm-level 
regression, has differential impact on the Adjusted R2. For the majority of business 
segments, this impact is minuscule and often statistically insignificant, while for 
segments operating in the IT or Cyclical Services sectors, this impact is large and 
statistically significant. 
6.3.3 Segmental Valuation using the US SIC codes 
In this section I examine the relative valuation of firms' line-of-business 
operations associated with specific industries, based on the US Standard Industrial 
Classification codes. Methodologically this task is addressed in a similar way as in the 
Section 6.3.2, where two complementary empirical test designs where used. That is, in 
the first type of test design the firm-level financial result is disaggregated into the 
constituent business segment-level components. The second type of test design entails 
appending the firm-level model with segmental PBTs. 
6.3.3.1 Test results based on disaggregation 
Table 6.7 (Appendix 6.1) reports the results from segment-disaggregated models 
using the first type of test design. In Models 1 and 3 of Table 6.13 (Appendix 6.1), 
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which are the disaggregated versions of Models 1 and 3 of Table 6.7, the firm-level 
PBT is replaced by ten segment-level components. This simple disaggregation improves 
the explanatory power of the regressions by a statistically significant 4 percentage point, 
suggesting that information conveyed by specific segments' reported earnings is of 
incremental value relevance. Unlike the results where segments were classified using 
the FTSE GCS (see Table 6.7 in Appendix 6.1), here all ten segmental PBT 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level and have the expected (positive) 
sign. 
To purge the estimated segments' coefficients from the dampening effect of 
differential (i. e., lower) valuation of segment-level losses, Models 1 and 3 of Table 6.13 
need to be appended with ten interaction terms corresponding to the negative segmental 
PBTs106 In the appended Models 2 and 4, the coefficients of segment-level positive 
earnings are, as expected, slightly higher than in Models 1 and 3 and have yet higher 
level of statistical significance. Five out of ten interaction terms come with theoretically 
expected negative coefficients and the rest are positive. However, due to insufficient 
numbers of cases with segment-level losses reported per line-of-business, most of the 
interaction terms are not statistically significant, their signs lack robustness107 and, 
therefore could, by and large, be disregarded in the process of analysis. 
I use the Wald test to assess the statistical significance of the differential between 
the PBT coefficients of any two segments. Because there are ten lines-of-business in 
total, there would be 45 pair-wise combinations of segments. Wald test results are 
reported below the corresponding tables in Appendix 6.1. 
Despite the sample and specification differences associated with Models I through 
4 of Table 6.13, the results of specific segments' relative valuations are statistically 
106 The interaction term assumes the value of 0 if the segment's PBT is positive, and the value of the 
segment's PBT otherwise. 
10 Nine out of ten interaction terms have less than 16 non-zero observations, which is less than the 
number of regression parameters (28 in total) that have to be estimated! 
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robust. However, with regards to two particular segments (operating in the 'Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fishing' and 'Mining' industries) the results shall not be taken at face 
value. This is because the number of non-zero data points for these segments barely 
exceeds the number of regression estimated coefficients. 
The examination of other segments' results reveals the following relations. 
Segments operating in the 'Services' industry are statistically more valuable than all 
remaining segments. The next two most valuable and valuation-wise indistinguishable 
segment industries are 'Finance, Insurance and Real Estate' and 'Transportation, 
Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services'. It is noteworthy that the latter 
industry is essentially a services sector. In light of the top valuation of the other services 
industry 'Services', one might conclude that, in general, segments operating in services 
sectors are perceived as contributing more to the value of the firm. 
'Manufacturing' is the third most valued line-of-business. Segments operating in 
'Wholesale Trade' and 'Retail Trade' have statistically identical valuation and are 
valued below those operating in the 'Manufacturing' industry. This difference, 
however, is not statistically significant at the 1% level. Finally, segments in 
'Construction' have the lowest valuation of all sectors and, according to the Wald test's 
p-values, in all cases these differentials are statistically significant at least at the 1% 
level. 
On the whole, the above results suggest the following order for the line-of- 
business relative valuation: 
Economic sectors based on the US SIC system. 
Most valued: " Services; 
" Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and 
Sanitary Services; 
" Finance, Insurance and Real Estate. 
Medium valued: " Manufacturing 
" Retail Trade 
" Wholesale Trade 
Least valued: " Construction 
Inconclusive: " Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishin ; Mining 
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6.3.3.2 Test results based on appending the basic model with segment data 
Methodologically this section replicates the analysis presented in Section 6.3.2.2 
by using an alternative to FTSE GCS system of industry categorisation - the US SIC 
codes. 
Test results are reported in Tables 6.14 through 6.16 (see Appendix 6.1). Tests in 
Table 6.14 are based on the sample of multi-segment firms irrespective of whether 
these segments belong to a single one-digit SIC code or come from different one-digit 
SIC codes. Table 6.15 repeats these tests for a sub-sample of firms that operate 
segments in at least two different one-digit SIC code industries. Models 2 through 10, in 
Tables 6.14 and 6.15, are the basic firm-level models which are being appended with 
one segmental PBT at a time, while the firm-level model in Table 6.16 is appended 
with all segmental PBTs. This is done to evaluate the robustness of results. 
Segment valuation results are consistent across the tests reported in Tables 6.14 
through 6.16 and, in general, are qualitatively identical to those where model- 
disaggregation approach was used (Section 6.3.3.1). Drawing on the results from the 
Wald tests, it is possible to conclude that segments operating in 'Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing' and 'Construction' are perceived by the market as the least value-creating, 
while the most valuable segment operations are associated with 'Services ; and 
'Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services' industries. 
'Manufacturing', 'Retail' and 'Wholesale Trade' industry segments are in the middle 
range of valuation. 
It shall be noted that the number of non-zero observations from segments 
operating in three basic industries ('Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing ; Construction; 
and, particularly, 'Mining) is insufficient (see Tables 6.17) for generating reliable 
segmental PBT coefficients. Therefore, based on the prior tests that did not reveal 
significant differences across the parameters of these economic sectors (particularly 
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between the 'Construction' and 'Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing'), I agglomerate 
these segments and re-run the test. The statistically highly significant and negative value 
of the PBT coefficient corresponding to the new agglomerated segment (see Table 
6.18) indicates that it has lower capitalisation relative to that of the cross-sectional 
average firm-level PBT. This result along with the fact that relative valuation of the 
remaining segments is unaffected reassures previous conclusions on segments' relative 
valuation. 
Finally, to assess the impact on the segments' relative valuation of such firm- 
specific contexts as the profitability of the firm (profit-making vs. loss-making) or the 
dividend-paying status of the firm, I re-run all above tests for differently partitioned 
sub-samples and, where necessary, with the model being appended with dummies and 
interaction terms. Results (not reported) indicated that virtually none of the segment 
valuation relationships are affected by contexts. Segments that have previously been 
identified as the most (least) `valuable' remain as such regardless of whether the firm is 
incurring losses or reporting positive profits on the consolidated level, or whether it 
pays dividends or not. 
Analyses in Section 6.3.3 demonstrate that, by and large, the results and 
conclusions remain robust to various test specifications. Furthermore, the conclusions 
with regard to differential valuation of specific business segments show notable 
compatibility between the two alternative systems of industrial classification (SIC vs. 
FTSE GCS). In addition, similar to conclusions drawn from the FTSE-based tests, the 
SIC-based results indicated that the earnings information related to different lines-of- 
business segments have differential information content. That is, the inclusion of a 
specific business segment's earnings, into the firm-level regression, has differential 
impact on the Adjusted R2. This impact is large and statistically significant for segments 
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operating in the Services related industries, while for the majority of other lines-of- 
business, this impact is small and often statistically insignificant. 
6.4 ISSUES OF ROBUSTNESS, AND THE SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
In this section I summarise the obtained empirical results and examine the issue of 
their robustness to the use of alternative deflators. 
The sample of business-segment reporting firms, used in this chapter, is 
substantially smaller than the entire sample, which has been used in Chapter 4 for the 
consolidated-level analysis. Nevertheless, the key firm-level test results, such as the 
pricing of the firm-level earnings, book values and dividends, as well as the valuation 
implications of specific contexts, remain unchanged across both samples. Therefore, I 
do not re-cite them in this section, but proceed with providing the summary of the 
business segment-level valuation results. 
There is considerable variation of the value relevance of segmental earnings 
among business segments operating in different industries. It is somewhat difficult to 
summarise the conclusions on the relative valuation of specific line-of-business 
segments, because two different industry classification systems (SIC and FTSE GCS) 
have been used to categorise business segments' operations. Correspondingly, two sets 
of tests have been performed. 
Nevertheless, when the content of a specific industry in the SIC system is 
qualitatively similar to the content of an industry in the FTSE GCS system, the segment 
valuation results seem to lead to similar conclusions. For example, segments operating 
in the SIC's services-related industries, and segments operating in the FTSE GCS's 
services-related industries, have similar value relevance and relative valuation. 
In all tests, profits reported by segments operating in the IT sector have the highest 
pricing. In addition, the IT segmental profit coefficient is always positive and has the 
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highest level of statistical significance. This indicates that investors perceive the IT 
segmental information as being highly value relevant. Segmental profits, associated 
with the services-related operations, have the second-highest pricing and value 
relevance, after the IT sector. 
Segments operating in the `old' or less knowledge-intensive sectors, such as 
Mining, Basic Industries (e. g., construction and building materials; chemicals; steel and 
other metals; forestry and paper), and Utilities, are associated with the lowest relative 
contribution to the equity market value of the firm. 
Somewhat surprising is the result related to the pricing of profits, reported from 
the financial sector segments. The valuation of financial segments is statistically 
indistinguishable from segments operating in the `old' industries. In other words, the 
financial segments' operations appear to be at the bottom of the line-of-business 
segment valuation ranking. 
Segments operating in the remaining economic sectors (such as General 
Industrials and Cyclical and Non-Cyclical Goods) are in the middle range of relative 
valuation. 
Another interesting finding relates to contextual pricing of dividends. Dividends 
are positively priced and have incremental information content in the firm-level model. 
However, when earnings are disaggregated into segmental elements, the dividends 
coefficient loses its statistical significance. This implies the segment-disaggregated 
earnings represent a better summary of value-relevant information, substituting the 
information contained in dividends. 
The above summarised results are found to be robust to alternative model 
specifications, with regard to definition of scale. Appendix 6.2 reports tests results 
where models are deflated by alternative scale proxies: Group Total Assets; Group 
Sales; and, One year lagged market capitalisation. 
348 
The segment valuation results from all alternative deflations, reported in 
Appendix 6.2, are qualitatively similar to those that are based on the composite 
deflated-models. Although such general regression parameters, as the adjusted R- 
Square, the magnitude of earnings, dividends and book value coefficients are influenced 
by the choice of the deflator (which, nevertheless, conforms with the previous findings 
of Chapter 4), the relative pricing of the specific line-of-business segments remains 
remarkably robust across all deflators. More specifically, regardless of the choice of a 
deflator, the segments which are classified (according to either the SIC or FTSE GSC 
system) into the services-related or knowledge-intensive sectors, have the statistically 
highest valuation. In addition, earnings reported from these segments have the highest 
value relevance (information content), as is indicated by the impact their inclusion has 
on the explanatory power of the regression. In the similar way, segments operating in 
the low-tech `old' industries have the lowest valuation and value association. 
The fact that segmental earnings information has very marginal value relevance 
for the majority of lines-of-business (either in terms of FTSE GCS or SIC system), 
seems to suggest that either the business segment reporting requirements in the UK (i. e., 
SSAP25) are not entirely adequate or, indeed, investors do not price differentially the 
business segments which have different industrial characteristics. 
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APPENDIX 6.1 
All regressions reported in Appendix 6.1 are deflated by the composite 
scale factor. Composite scale factor (scale) = (MV+TA+Sale)/3. 
All regressions reported in Appendix 6.1 and 6.2 are estimated for 
samples that exclude the outliers. Outliers are defined as the top 
and/or bottom 0.5% of each variable included in regression. 
In the tables that follow the following names or acronyms have been 
used to represent regression variable 
Name used in 
regression 
Variable description 
1. Consolidated firm-level variables 
BV Scaled Book value of ordinary equity 
PBT Scaled Profit Before Tax 
MV Scaled Market Value of ordinary equity 
DIV Scaled Dividends for ordinary shareholders 
TA Total Assets of the company 
Sales Group turnover 
Adj. ER Adjustment term = earnings for ordinary shareholders -- PBT 
Scale Composite scale factor = (MV+TA+Sales)/3 
PBT*f(size) An instrumental variable designed to capture firm size-related non- 
linearity of the PBT coefficient. PBT*f(size proxy)=PBT*size"(0.2). 
DBV Interaction term for By, when PBT is negative 
DDIV Interaction term for DIV, when PBT is negative 
DPBT Interaction term for negative PBT 
DAdj. ER Interaction term for Adj. ER, when PBT is negative 
DPBT*F(size) Interaction term for DPBT*f(size), when PBT is negative 
1/Scale; 1/MV; 
1/Sale; and 1/TA 
Are the reciprocals of Scale, one year lagged-MV, Sales, and TA, 
respectively. 
D 1/Scale Interaction term for 1/scale, when PBT is negative 
2. Segment-level variables: segments' industrial affiliation Is 
classified according to the FTSE economic sector 
classification system 
PBTO Scaled PBT reported form segments in Resources economic sector 
PBT1 Scaled PBT reported form segments In Basic Industries economic 
sector 
PBT2 Scaled PBT reported form segments in General Industries 
economic sector 
PBT3 Scaled PBT reported form segments In Cyclical Consumer Goods 
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economic sector 
PBT4 Scaled PBT reported form segments In Non-Cyclical Consumer 
Goods economic sector 
PBT5 Scaled PBT reported form segments in Cyclical Services economic 
sector 
PBT6 Scaled PBT reported form segments in Non-Cyclical Services 
economic sector 
PBT7 Scaled PBT reported form segments in Utilities economic sector 
PBT8 Scaled PBT reported form segments in Financials economic sector 
PBT9 Scaled PBT reported form segments in Information Technology 
economic sector 
PBT017 =PBTO+PBT1+PBT7 
PBT34 =PBT3+PBT4 
PBT69 =PBT6+PBT9 
DPBTO Interaction term for negative PBTO 
DPBT1 Interaction term for negative PBT1 
DPBT2 Interaction term for negative PBT2 
DPBT3 Interaction term for negative PBT3 
DPBT4 Interaction term for negative PBT4 
DPBT5 Interaction term for negative PBT5 
DPBT6 Interaction term for negative PBT6 
DPBT7 Interaction term for negative PBT7 
DPBT8 Interaction term for negative PBT8 
DPBT9 Interaction term for negative PBT9 
DPBT017 Interaction term for negative PBT017 
DPBT34 Interaction term for negative PBT34 
DPBT69 Interaction term for negative PBT69 
PREST The difference between the group-level PBT and the sum of 
segment-level PBTs 
DPREST Interaction term for negative PREST 
3. Segment-level variables: segments' Industrial affiliation Is 
classified according to the SIC Industry classification system 
PBTA Scaled PBT reported form segments in Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing 
PBTB Scaled PBT reported form segments in Mining 
PBTC Scaled PBT reported form segments in Construction 
PBTD Scaled PBT reported form segments in Manufacturing of basic 
goods 
PBTDA Scaled PBT reported form segments in Manufacturing of complex 
goods 
PBTE Scaled PBT reported form segments in Transportation, 
Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 
PBTF Scaled PBT reported form segments in Wholesale Trade 
PBTG Scaled PBT reported form segments In Retail Trade 
PBTH Scaled PBT reported form segments In Finance, Insurance and 
Real Estate 
PBTI Scaled PBT reported form segments In Services 
PBTABC = PBTA + PBTB + PBTC 
PBTD1 =PBTD + PBTDa 
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DPBTA Interaction term for negative PBTA 
DPBTB Interaction term for negative PBTB 
DPBTC Interaction term for negative PBTC 
DPBTD Interaction term for negative PBTD 
DPBTDA Interaction term for negative PBTDA 
DPBTE Interaction term for negative PBTE 
DPBTF Interaction term for negative PBTF 
DPBTG Interaction term for negative PBTG 
DPBTH Interaction term for negative PBTH 
DPBTI Interaction term for negative PBTI 
DPBTABC Interaction term for negative PBTABC 
DPBTD1 Interaction term for negative PBTD1 
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Table 6.3 
Panel A. Segments' industries are based on the FTSE GCS 
Total sample: Positive segment-level PBTs 
ON cti Yb tp f. co Ch 
Industry ti ýýýý 
LL 
Mean 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
No. of 
cases 
0.476 0.445 0.460 0.480 0.439 0.441 0.554 0.268 0.375 0.437 
0.434 0.384 0.419 0.464 0.422 0.387 0.519 0.168 0.289 0.374 
0.267 0.276 0.283 0.253 0.267 0.283 0.249 0.187 0.248 0.283 
0.120 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.135 0.112 0.112 0.113 
0.954 0.997 0.999 0.979 0.999 1.000 0.925 0.811 0.995 0.977 
23 461 584 217 288 787 44 59 196 78 
Total sample: Negative segment-level PBTs 
(14 cv) v to co N co 0) 
ýýý LU ýý 
ýýý 
Mean -0.408 -0.401 -0.417 -0.390 -0.266 -0.380 -0.301 -0.353 -0.406 -0.429 
Median -0.399 -0.272 -0.325 -0.252 -0.219 -0.324 -0.256 -0.353 -0.334 -0.241 
Standard 0.235 0.286 0.275 0.281 0.156 0.209 0.202 0.277 0.257 0.340 Deviation 
Minimum -0.915 -0.967 -0.984 -0.992 -0.688 -0.849 -0.553 -0.549 -0.995 -0.988 
Maximum -0.120 -0.112 -0.111 -0.115 -0.119 -0.118 -0.137 -0.157 -0.114 -0.117 
No. of 11 23 41 15 18 55 42 29 19 
cases 
Profit-making firm-years sub-sample: Positive segment-level PBTs 
>. O ý. NMahO^ Co O 
. 7? ýýýýýýh ti 
c LL Li l~L t~L LL LL fLL LL 
Mean 0.476 0.446 0.459 0.479 0.432 0.441 0.554 0.259 0.379 0.442 
Median 0.434 0.385 0.420 0.462 0.403 0.384 0.519 0.165 0.294 0.389 
Standard 0.267 0.277 0.286 0.257 0.267 0.284 0.249 0.188 0.251 0.277 
Deviation 
Minimum 0.120 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.135 0.112 0.112 0.113 
Maximum 0.954 0.997 0.999 0.979 0.999 1.000 0.925 0.811 0.995 0.977 
No. of 23 424 529 193 262 728 44 56 179 67 
cases 
Profit-making firm-years sub-sample: Negative segment-level PBTs 
ýwww Cl) wwwwww 
_ýýýuýýýýýý 
Mean -0.270 -0.500 -0.352 -0.375 -0.290 -0.320 -0.216 -0.353 -0.417 -0.336 
Median -0.248 -0.531 -0.327 -0.252 -0.240 -0.284 -0.139 -0.353 -0.336 -0.141 
Standard 0.144 0.321 0.221 0.349 0.181 0.168 0.136 0.277 0.258 0.331 
Deviation 
Minimum -0.424 -0.967 -0.919 -0.992 -0.572 -0.648 -0.373 -0.549 -0.995 -0.968 
Maximum -0.138 -0.122 -0.111 -0.142 -0.119 -0.118 -0.137 -0.157 -0.114 -0.126 
No. of 3 10 14 55 18 32 23 7 
cases 
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Panel B. Segments' industries are based on the US SIC codes 
Total sample: Positive segment-level PBTs 
Industry SIC A SIC B SIC C SIC D SIC E SIC F SIC G SIC H SIC I 
Mean 0.355 0.607 0.372 0.500 0.352 0.401 0.402 0,337 0,386 
Median 0.331 0.686 0.352 0.423 0.252 0.339 0.355 0.268 0.330 
Standard 
Deviation 0.259 0.280 0.240 0.365 0.258 0.269 0.273 0.259 0.266 
Minimum 0.000 0.132 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 0.947 0.991 0.954 1.935 0.960 0.987 0.977 0.995 0.988 
No. of 
cases* 30 19 119 1104 243 311 210 182 479 
Total sample: Negative segment-level PBTs 
Industry SIC A SIC B SIC C SIC D SIC E SIC F SIC G SIC H SIC I 
Mean -0.199 -0.309 -0.359 -0.370 -0.382 -0.290 -0.372 -0.278 -0.333 
Median -0.199 -0.256 -0.247 -0.304 -0.280 -0.236 -0.269 -0.230 -0.233 
Standard 
Deviation 0.281 0.245 0.291 0.252 0.302 0.210 0.279 0.236 0.267 
Minimum -0.398 -0.799 -0.933 -0.967 -0.962 -0.688 -0.993 -0.876 -0.992 
Maximum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of 
cases 2 14 17 64 16 29 27 20 65 
Profit-making firm-years sub-sample: Positive segment-level PBTs 
Industry SIC A SIC B SIC C SIC D SIC E SIC F SIC G SIC H SIC I 
Mean 0.338 0.627 0.374 0.503 0.359 0.393 0.407 0.343 0.384 
Median 0.255 0.702 0.352 0.421 0.254 0.328 0.355 0.274 0.313 
Standard 
Deviation 0.255 0.275 0.238 0.372 0.259 0.269 0.274 0.260 0.268 
Minimum 0.000 0.132 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 0.947 0.991 0.954 1.935 0.960 0.982 0.977 0.995 0.988 
No. of 
cases 28 18 111 1002 232 277 198 166 423 
Profit-making firm-years sub-sample: Negative segment-level PBTs 
Industry SIC A SIC B SIC C SIC D SIC E SIC F SIC G SIC H SIC I 
Mean -0.241 -0.255 -0.385 -0.371 -0.226 -0.276 -0.203 -0.357 
Median - -0.200 -0.179 -0.338 -0.248 -0.172 -0.224 -0.159 -0.225 
Standard 0.132 0.309 0.251 0.317 0.202 0.273 0.185 0.308 
Deviation 
Minimum -0.424 -0.933 -0.967 -0.962 -0.688 -0.669 -0.594 -0.992 
Maximum - -0.138 0.000 0.000 -0.116 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of cases -47 18 7 15 9 12 23 
The number of observations varies across specific business segments because only segments with non- 
zero PBTs are included in computations (i. e. missing segmental PBTs are NOT treated as zeros). 
354 
Tables 6.5 through 6.12 report regressions where the FTSE GCS 
industry classification system has been used for categorising business 
segment operations 
Table 6.5 
All firms Profit-making firms Loss-making firms 
Div & non- Dividend Div & non- Dividend 
div. firms firms only div. firms firms only 
Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Models 
Intercept 0.781 0.661 0.674 0.668 0.699 
t-ratio 25.287 19.023 18.769 7.874 6.237 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1/Scale 0.897 0.894 0.143 0.932 1.567 
t-ratio 3.140 1.815 0.349 2.011 1.733 
P-value 0.002 0.070 0.727 0.045 0.085 
BV -0.292 -0.382 -0.448 0.192 -0.296 
t-ratio -6.113 -8.037 -9.515 1.402 -1.640 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.162 0.103 
PBT -0.521 1.853 2.153 0.331 1.519 
t-ratio -2.336 4.733 5.855 0.618 2.546 
P-value 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.537 0.012 
PBT'f(scale) 0.660 0.646 0.578 0.000 -0.375 
t-ratio 8.696 7.120 6.777 0.001 -2.127 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.999 0.035 
DIV 3.122 2.017 2.454 -3.826 1.429 
t-ratio 3.780 2.394 2.748 -1.937 0.609 
P-value 0.000 0.017 0.006 0.054 0.544 
Adj. ER 0.137 1.037 1.117 -0.021 -0.533 
t-ratio 0.278 2.915 3.332 -0.030 -0.455 
P-value 0.781 0.004 0.001 0.976 0.650 
No. of cases 1919 1676 1619 244 144 
Adj. R-S uare 156% 21.6% 23.3% 2.8% " 0.2% "' 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below each regression 
coefficient. 
* R-square is significant only at 5% level 
** R-square is not significant at 10% level 
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Table 6.10 
Profit-making firms 
Basic model 
Modell 
PBT seg xa 
PBTO 
Mode12 
PBT seg x  
PBT1 
Mode13 
PBT seg xw 
PBT2 
Mode14 
PBT seg x  
PBT3 
ModelS 
Intercept 0.647 0.645 0.653 0.648 0.656 
t-ratio 19.183 19.232 19.505 18.834 19.175 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NEGMV -0.358 -0.354 -0.365 -0.358 -0.356 
t-ratio -15.368 -15.595 -15.836 -15.361 -15.396 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1/Scale 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
t-ratio 1.912 1.810 1.793 1.913 1.865 
p-value 0.056 0.070 0.073 0.056 0.062 
BV -0.113 -0.127 -0.081 -0.113 -0.118 
t-ratio -2.074 -2.365 -1.535 -2.037 -2.174 
p-value 0.038 0.018 0.125 0.042 0.030 
PBT 1.834 1.877 1.897 1.823 1.846 
t-ratio 4.963 5.046 5.196 4.839 4.998 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT seg x - -0.420 -1.658 0.002 -1.330 
t-ratio - -0.579 -9.108 0.010 -4.891 
p-value - 0.563 0.000 0.992 0.000 
DPBT seg x - -53.305 7.655 1.774 1.805 
t-ratio - -3.553 1.075 1.005 0.163 
p-value - 0.000 0.282 0.315 0.871 
PBT"f(scale) 0.575 0.578 0.574 0.574 0.556 
t-ratio 6.507 6.426 6.558 6.414 6.284 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DIV 1.073 1.142 1.268 1.074 1.299 
t-ratio 1.314 1.415 1.583 1.306 1.602 
p-value 0.189 0.157 0.113 0.192 0.109 
Adj. ER 0.985 0.989 0.957 0.981 0.982 
t-ratio 3.116 3.098 3.160 3.096 3.128 
p-value 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
No. of cases 1676 1676 1676 1676 1676 
Adj. R-S uare 26.92% 27.66% 28.73% 26.85% 27.30% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below each regression 
coefficient. 
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Table 6.10 (continued from the previous page... ) 
PBTsegx= 
PBT4 
ModeI6 
PBTsegx  
PBT5 
Modell 
PBTsegxa 
PBT6 
Mode18 
PBTsegxm 
PBT7 
Model9 
PBTsog x  
PBT8 
Modell0 
PBTsegx  
PBT9 
Modo111 
Intercept 0.647 0.618 0.647 0.644 0.648 0.625 
t-ratio 19.170 18.192 19.119 18.482 19.097 19.346 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NEGMV -0.358 -0.358 -0.359 -0.357 -0.359 -0.351 
t-ratio -15.318 -15.656 -15.453 -15.332 -15.337 -15.580 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1/Scale 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
t-ratio 1.916 1.712 1.930 1.918 1.916 1.878 
p-value 0.055 0.087 0.054 0.055 0.055 0.060 
BV -0.113 -0.083 -0.111 -0.106 -0.110 -0.090 
t-ratio -2.080 -1.600 -2.036 -1.862 -1.987 -1.716 
p-value 0.038 0.110 0.042 0.063 0.047 0.086 
PBT 1.825 1.378 1.776 1.815 1.827 1.533 
t-ratio 4.937 3.736 4.741 4.892 4.940 4.110 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT seg x -0.114 1.459 -0.690 -0.301 -0.321 3.360 
t-ratio -0.391 7.383 -0.822 -1.118 -0.732 4.185 
p-value 0.696 0.000 0.411 0.264 0.464 0.000 
DPBT seg x -2.230 -3.675 98.180 3.534 12.363 -6.544 
t-ratio -0.046 -1.004 7.095 1.288 0.907 -2.316 
p-value 0.963 0.315 0.000 0.198 0.364 0.021 
PBT'f(scale) 0.578 0.635 0.593 0.583 0.577 0.618 
t-ratio 6.539 7.340 6.486 6.483 6.485 6.984 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DIV 1.096 0.879 1.101 1.113 1.043 1.741 
t-ratio 1.336 1.122 1.338 1.357 1.278 2.136 
p-value 0.181 0.262 0.181 0.175 0.201 0.033 
Adj. ER 0.984 1.039 1.001 0.998 0.992 1.043 
t-ratio 3.101 3.773 3.182 3.175 3.151 3.545 
p-value 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 
No. of cases 1676 1676 1676 1676 1676 1676 
Adj. R- 
S uare 26.84% 29.75% 26.92% 26.85% 26.89% 29.11% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below each regression 
coefficient. 
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Table 6.11 
Profit-making firms 
basic model 
Modell 
PBT seg x  
PBTO 
Mode12 
PBT seg xw 
PBT1 
Mode13 
PBT seg x  
PBT2 
Model4 
PBT seg x  
PBT3 
Model5 
Intercept 0.558 0.558 0.597 0.560 0.558 
t-ratio 12.874 12.785 13.472 12.416 12.628 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NEGMV -0.381 -0.381 -0.359 -0.381 -0.380 
t-ratio -12.532 -12.522 -11.841 -12.593 -12.500 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1/Scale 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 
t-ratio 1.766 1.765 1.272 1.736 1.760 
p-value 0.077 0.078 0.203 0.083 0.078 
BV 0.060 0.062 0.036 0.059 0.059 
t-ratio 0.852 0.860 0.519 0.827 0.832 
p-value 0.394 0.390 0.604 0.408 0.405 
PBT 2.044 2.039 2.384 2.061 2.053 
t-ratio 4.231 4.216 5.134 4.205 4.229 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT seg x 0.000 -0.021 -0.241 -0.013 -0.004 
t-ratio 0.000 -0.239 -6.181 -0.356 -0.088 
p-value 0.000 0.811 0.000 0.722 0.930 
DPBT seg x 0.000 -0.011 0.602 -0.008 -0.083 
t-ratio 0.000 -0.072 7.048 -0.076 -0.784 
p-value 0.000 0.942 0.000 0.939 0.433 
PBT'f(scale) 0.377 0.378 0.302 0.373 0.375 
t-ratio 3.971 3.989 3.244 3.875 3.929 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
DIV 1.993 1.991 2.278 2.046 2.012 
t-ratio 1.671 1.661 1.979 1.695 1.675 
p-value 0.095 0.097 0.048 0.090 0.094 
Adj. ER 0.808 0.803 1.002 0.812 0.814 
t-ratio 1.215 1.201 1.521 1.218 1.228 
-value 0.224 0.230 0.128 0.223 0.220 
No. of cases 708 
Adj. R- 
S uare 33.64% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below each regression 
coefficient. 
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Table 6.11 (continued from the previous page... ) 
PBT seg x  
PBT4 
ModeI6 
PBT seg x  
PBT5 
Mode17 
PBT seg x  
PBT6 
ModelB 
PBT seg x  
PBTT 
Mode19 
PBT seg x  
PBT8 
Mode110 
PBT seg x  
PBT9 
Modelli 
Intercept 0.562 0.556 0.552 0.557 0.547 0.525 
t-ratio 12.892 11.998 12.862 12.818 12.355 13.010 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NEGMV -0.378 -0.380 -0.380 -0.383 -0.381 -0.361 
t-ratio -12.318 -12.379 -12.516 -12.352 -12.472 -12.549 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1/Scale 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 -0.2 
t-ratio 1.765 1.767 1.726 1.761 1.982 -0.452 
p-value 0.078 0.077 0.084 0.078 0.048 0.651 
BV 0.062 0.060 0.059 0.066 0.057 0.090 
t-ratio 0.881 0.854 0.839 0.907 0.808 1.404 
p-value 0.378 0.393 0.401 0.365 0.419 0.160 
PBT 2.017 2.045 2.151 2.046 2.081 1.844 
t-ratio 4.189 4.235 4.461 4.225 4.346 3.880 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT seg x -0.052 0.004 0.171 -0.106 0.049 0.733 
t-ratio -1.178 0.107 1.521 -0.754 0.872 4.250 
p-value 0.239 0.915 0.128 0.451 0.383 0.000 
DPBT seg x 0.173 -0.024 0.701 0.103 -0.261 -0.696 
t-ratio 0.772 -0.141 3.892 0.526 -1.550 -2.294 
p-value 0.440 0.888 0.000 0.599 0.121 0.022 
PBT'f(scale) 0.385 0.377 0.342 0.380 0.368 0.387 
t-ratio 4.069 3.963 3.514 3.965 3.900 4.127 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DIV 1.984 2.010 2.266 1.983 2.140 2.735 
t-ratio 1.665 1.659 1.889 1.665 1.783 2.443 
p-value 0.096 0.097 0.059 0.096 0.075 0.015 
Adj. ER 0.774 0.810 0.913 0.824 0.794 0.759 
t-ratio 1.147 1.217 1.447 1.240 1.191 1.168 
-value 0.251 0.223 0.148 0.215 0.234 0.243 
No. of cases 
Adj. R- 
S uare 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below each regression 
coefficient. 
* Samples include only multi-industry firms (i. e., when firms report segments from different industries). 
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Table 6.12 
Profit-making firms 
Panel A 
Single and multi-Industry firms Only multi-Industry firms* 
Model I Model 2 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.681 18.342 0.000 0.584 10.370 0.000 
NEGMV -0.339 -15.160 0.000 -0.343 -11.511 0.000 
1/Scale 0.438 0.862 0.389 -0.264 -0.851 0.395 
BV -0.054 -1.070 0.284 0.067 1.010 0.312 
PBT 1.391 3.877 0.000 2.244 4.864 0.000 
PBTO -0.004 -0.044 0.965 0.033 0.430 0.667 
PBT1 -0.296 -10.289 0.000 -0.247 -5.317 0.000 
PBT2 -0.092 -3.525 0.000 -0.009 -0.230 0.818 
PBT3 -0.166 -4.666 0.000 -0.057 -1.079 0.281 
PBT4 -0.112 -2.558 0.011 -0.095 -1.897 0.058 
PBT5 -0.028 -0.841 0.401 -0.039 -0.811 0.418 
PBT6 -0.136 -1.391 0.164 0.113 0.883 0.377 
PBT7 -0.273 -1.961 0.050 -0.177 -1.243 0.214 
PBT8 -0.079 -1.494 0.135 -0.008 -0.132 0.895 
PBT9 0.767 5.503 0.000 0.628 3.629 0.000 
DPBTO -1.389 -0.837 0.402 -0.060 -0.315 0.752 
DPBT1 0.555 4.024 0.000 0.600 6.000 0.000 
DPBT2 0.202 2.070 0.038 0.021 0.194 0.846 
DPBT3 -0.046 -0.424 0.671 -0.110 -0.799 0.424 
DPBT4 0.223 1.080 0.280 0.353 1.256 0.209 
DPBT5 0.156 1.274 0.203 0.035 0.212 0.832 
DPBT6 1.381 6.187 0.000 0.958 4.205 0.000 
DPBT7 0.479 2.537 0.011 0.377 1.799 0.072 
DPBT8 0.020 0.110 0.912 -0.101 -0.502 0.616 
DPBT9 -0.659 -2.372 0.018 -0.514 -1.829 0.067 
PBT*f(scale) 0.619 6.905 0.000 0.302 3.151 0.002 
DIV 2.455 3.218 0.001 3.307 2.992 0.003 
Ad'. ER 0.987 3.709 0.000 1.019 1.607 0.108 
No. of cases 1676 731 
Adj. R-S uare 33.88% 39.24% 
* Samples include only multi-industry firms (i. e., when firms report segments from different industries). 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to the regression 
coefficients. 
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Wald test of the significance of valuation differential between each pair of specific 
segments Included In Model I and Model I 
Modell Model2 
Compared segments p-value p-value 
PBTO vs PBTI 0.001 0.002 
PBTO vs PBT2 0.285 0.591 
PBTO vs PBT3 0.060 0.306 
PBTO vs PBT4 0.230 0.137 
PBTO vs PBT5 0.771 0.384 
PBTO vs PBT6 0.285 0.587 
PBTO vs PBT7 0.087 0.177 
PBTO vs PBT8 0.421 0.646 
PBTO vs PBT9 0.000 0.001 
PBT1 vs PBT2 0.000 0.000 
PBT1 vs PBT3 0.001 0.001 
PBTI vs PBT4 0.000 0.007 
PBT1 vs PBT5 0.000 0.000 
PBTI vs PBT6 0.105 0.007 
PBT1 vs PBT7 0.871 0.631 
PBT1 vs PBT8 0.000 0.000 
PBTI vs PBT9 0.000 0.000 
PBT2 vs PBT3 0.069 0.428 
PBT2 vs PBT4 0.676 0.096 
PBT2 vs PBT5 0.082 0.541 
PBT2 vs PBT6 0.655 0.361 
PBT2 vs PBT7 0.196 0.244 
PBT2 vs PBT8 0.822 0.984 
PBT2 vs PBT9 0.000 0.000 
PBT3 vs PBT4 0.287 0.516 
PBT3 vs PBT5 0.001 0.759 
PBT3 vs PBT6 0.768 0.216 
PBT3 vs PBT7 0.447 0.418 
PBT3 vs PBT8 0.148 0.468 
PBT3 vs PBT9 0.000 0.000 
PBT4 vs PBT5 0.130 0.373 
PBT4 vs PBT6 0.824 0.150 
PBT4 vs PBT7 0.257 0.570 
PBT4 vs PBT8 0.626 0.192 
PBT4 vs PBT9 0.000 0.000 
PBT5 vs PBT6 0.275 0.253 
PBT5 vs PBT7 0.085 0.356 
PBT5 vs PBT8 0.414 0.648 
PBT5 vs PBT9 0.000 0.000 
PBT6 vs PBT7 0.407 0.124 
PBT6 vs PBT8 0.605 0.405 
PBT6 vs PBT9 0.000 0.018 
PBT7 vs PBT8 0.201 0.274 
PBT7 vs PBT9 0.000 0.000 
PBT8 vs PBT9 0.000 0.001 
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Table 6.12 (continued from the previous page... ) 
Panel B (some of the business segments are agglomerated) 
Single and multi-industry firms Only multi-industry flrms" 
Model 1 Model 2 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.699 18.447 0.000 0.619 10.615 0.000 
NEGMV -0.342 -14.781 0.000 -0.352 -11.394 0.000 
1/Scale 0.646 1.357 0.175 0.011 0.038 0.969 
BV -0.070 -1.380 0.168 0.058 0.868 0.385 
PBT 1.610 4.448 0.000 2.364 4.852 0.000 
PBT017 -0.283 -9.975 0.000 -0.271 -5.956 0.000 
PBT2 -0.097 -3.668 0.000 -0.027 -0.674 0.500 
PBT34 -0.170 -5.226 0.000 -0.137 -3.045 0.002 
PBT5 -0.040 -1.218 0.223 -0.071 -1.485 0.138 
PBT69 0.353 3.587 0.000 0.331 3.027 0.002 
PBT8 -0.097 -1.904 0.057 -0.045 -0.744 0.457 
DPBT017 0.446 2.820 0.005 0.622 6.220 0.000 
DPBT2 0.114 1.143 0.253 -0.018 -0.162 0.871 
DPBT34 0.260 0.880 0.379 0.192 0.697 0.486 
DPBT5 0.199 1.526 0.127 0.142 0.831 0.406 
DPBT69 -0.121 -0.513 0.608 -0.079 -0.360 0.719 
DPBT8 0.106 0.540 0.589 0.001 0.006 0.995 
PBT'f(scale) 0.547 6.209 0.000 0.248 2.296 0.022 
DIV 2.237 2.892 0.004 3.141 2.657 0.008 
Adj. ER 0.970 3.680 0.000 0.548 0.742 0.458 
No. of cases 1673 708 
Adj. R-S uare 31.83% 39.07% 
* Samples include only multi-industry firms (i. e., when firms report segments from different industries). 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to the regression 
coefficients. 
Wald test of the significance of valuation differential between each pair of specific 
segments Included In Model I and Model 2 
Modell Model2 
Compared segments p-value p-value 
PBT017 vs PBT2 0.000 0.000 
PBT017 vs PBT34 0.002 0.007 
PBT017 vs PBT5 0.000 0.000 
PBT017 vs PBT69 0.000 0.000 
PBT017 vs PBT8 0.001 0.001 
PBT2 vs PBT34 0.059 0.026 
PBT2 vs PBT5 0.113 0.341 
PBT2 vs PBT69 0.000 0.002 
PBT2 vs PBT8 0.997 0.757 
PBT34 vs PBT5 0.003 0.239 
PBT34 vs PBT69 0.000 0.000 
PBT34 vs PBT8 0.207 0.134 
PBT5 vs PBT69 0.000 0.001 
PBT5 vs PBT8 0.342 0.686 
PBT69 vs PBT8 0.000 0.004 
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Tables 6.13 through 6.18 report regressions where the SIC system has 
been used for categorising business segment operations. 
Table 6.13 
Profit-making firms 
Dividend & non-Div firms 
Controlling for segment-level losses 
Model 1 Model 2 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.635 18.303 0.000 0.650 18.181 0.000 
NEGMV -0.367 -15.563 0.000 -0.362 -15.461 0.000 
1/Scale 1148.540 2.122 0.034 977.222 1.743 0.081 
BV -0.095 -1.764 0.078 -0.116 -2.151 0.032 
PBTA 1.863 4.891 0.000 1.910 4.931 0.000 
PBTB 2.087 5.399 0.000 2.200 5.704 0.000 
PBTC 1.477 3.939 0.000 1.501 3.939 0.000 
PBTD 1.903 5.041 0.000 1.943 5.072 0.000 
PBTDA 1.887 5.034 0.000 1.928 5.075 0.000 
PBTE 1.991 5.188 0.000 2.032 5.222 0.000 
PBTF 1.784 4.712 0.000 1.818 4.736 0.000 
PBTG 1.842 4.731 0.000 1.897 4.807 0.000 
PBTH 1.991 5.088 0.000 1.991 5.040 0.000 
PBTI 2.162 5.787 0.000 2.202 5.811 0.000 
PREST 1.974 5.279 0.000 2.015 5.316 0.000 
DPBTA * 0.000 ... ... 0.000 ... ... 
DPBTB -4.575 -3.068 0.002 
DPBTC 1.027 1.852 0.064 
DPBTD 0.339 1.992 0.046 
DPBTDA 0.363 1.575 0.115 
DPBTE -0.140 -0.394 0.694 
DPBTF 0.689 1.941 0.052 
DPBTG -0.846 -9.262 0.000 
DPBTH -0.221 -0.324 0.746 
DPBTI -0.533 -1.271 0.204 
PBT"f(scale) 0.144 6.009 0.000 0.140 5.830 0.000 
DIV 0.188 2.942 0.003 0.175 2.773 0.006 
Adj. ER 1.060 3.669 0.000 1.067 3.717 0.000 
No. of cases 1661 1661 
Adj. R-S uare 30.20% 30.91% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to the regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 6.13 (continued from the previous page... ) 
Dividend firms onl 
Controlling for segment-level losses 
Model 3 Model 4 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.655 17.946 0.000 0.672 17.997 0.000 
NEGMV -0.353 -15.316 0.000 -0.347 -15.145 0.000 
1/Scale 490.282 1.573 0.116 16.899 0.046 0.963 
BV -0.198 -3.818 0.000 -0.221 -4.342 0.000 
PBTA 2.244 6.499 0.000 2.375 6.846 0.000 
PBTB 2.598 7.359 0.000 2.809 8.206 0.000 
PBTC 1.920 5.528 0.000 2.017 5.767 0.000 
PBTD 2.384 6.866 0.000 2.503 7.183 0.000 
PBTDA 2.361 6.847 0.000 2.482 7.174 0.000 
PBTE 2.474 6.987 0.000 2.596 7.314 0.000 
PBTF 2.266 6.503 0.000 2.385 6.823 0.000 
PBTG 2.302 6.391 0.000 2.426 6.711 0.000 
PBTH 2.567 7.267 0.000 2.634 7.402 0.000 
PBTI 2.612 7.625 0.000 2.732 7.950 0.000 
PREST 2.440 7.120 0.000 2.562 7.445 0.000 
DPBTA " 0.000 ... ... 0.000 ... 
DPBTB -5.472 -5.322 0.000 
DPBTC 1.484 4.755 0.000 
DPBTD 0.257 1.475 0.140 
DPBTDA 0.339 1.190 0.234 
DPBTE -0.161 -0.428 0.668 
DPBTF 0.430 1.294 0.196 
DPBTG -0.741 -2.887 0.004 
DPBTH 0.406 1.136 0.256 
DPBTI -0.390 -0.754 0.451 
PBT-f(scale) 0.125 5.714 0.000 0.117 5.304 0.000 
DIV 0.201 2.922 0.003 0.189 2.768 0.006 
Ad' ER 1.234 4.915 0.000 1.246 5.021 0.000 
No. of cases 1593 1593 
Ad. R-S uare 31.61% 32.50% 
* Only only positive PBTO are reported from this segment. 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to the regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 6.14 
Profit-making firms 
Basic model 
Modell 
PBT seg xw 
PBTA 
Model 2 
PBT seg xa 
PBTB 
Model 3 
PBT seg xa 
PBTC 
Model 4 
PBT seg x  
PBTD1 
Model 5 
Intercept 0.611 0.611 0.611 0.618 0.638 
t-ratio 19.363 19.378 19.075 19.560 18.680 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NEGMV -0.374 -0.371 -0.373 -0.357 -0.379 
t-ratio -15.957 -15.576 -16.039 -14.841 -16.180 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
I /Scale 1343.5 1336.2 1281.8 1293.3 1294.1 
t-ratio 2.393 2.377 2.251 2.298 2.333 
p-value 0.017 0.017 0.024 0.022 0.020 
BV -0.104 -0.103 -0.111 -0.108 -0.103 
t-ratio -1.933 -1.915 -2.062 -2.012 -1.928 
p-value 0.053 0.056 0.039 0.044 0.054 
PBT 1.985 1.993 2.014 2.082 2.033 
t-ratio 5.437 5.444 5.489 5.679 5.601 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT seg x - -0.108 0.076 -0.435 -0.079 
t-ratio - -0.911 1.023 -7.228 -3.797 
p-value - 0.363 0.306 0.000 0.000 
DPBT seg x - - -1.584 0.480 0.406 
t-ratio - - -1.047 3.067 2.604 
p-value - - 0.295 0.002 0.009 
PBT'f(scale) 0.141 0.140 0.141 0.136 0.138 
t-ratio 5.962 5.913 5.927 5.764 5.849 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DIV 0.186 0.184 0.185 0.191 0.180 
t-ratio 2.804 2.770 2.790 2.893 2.710 
p-value 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.007 
Adj. ER 1.073 1.068 1.076 1.102 1.083 
t-ratio 3.678 3.643 3.678 3.827 3.837 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of cases 1661 1661 1661 1661 1661 
Adj. R- 27.27% 27.24% 27.41% 28.48% 27.78% 
S uare 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below the regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 6.14 (continued from previous page... ) 
PBT seg xm 
PBTE 
Model 6 
PBT seg xm 
PBTF 
Model 7 
PBT seg xm 
PBTß 
Model 8 
PBT seg xm 
PBTH 
Model 9 
PBT seg xm 
P8T1 
Model 10 
Intercept 0.607 0.629 0.616 0.615 0.572 
t-ratio 19.232 19.627 19.256 19.466 19.669 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NEGMV -0.374 -0.371 -0.376 -0.372 -0.372 
t-ratio -15.918 -15.726 -16.060 -15.864 -16.090 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
l /Scale 1368.9 1315.4 1344.8 1351.1 1252.5 
t-ratio 2.432 2.350 2.399 2.405 2.310 
p-value 0.015 0.019 0.016 0.016 0.021 
BV -0.108 -0.107 -0.103 -0.097 -0.078 
t-ratio -2.008 -1.994 -1.916 -1.807 -1.483 
p-value 0.045 0.046 0.055 0.071 0.138 
PBT 2.062 1.964 1.904 1.924 1.962 
t-ratio 5.637 5.382 5.124 5.226 5.419 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT seg x 0.115 -0.202 -0.094 -0.134 0.228 
t-ratio 1.981 -4.940 -1.803 -2.552 4.530 
p-value 0.048 0.000 0.071 0.011 0.000 
DPBT seg x -0.092 0.314 -0.243 0.287 -0.558 
t-ratio -0.582 1.681 -0.725 0.887 -1.672 
p-value 0.561 0.093 0.468 0.375 0.095 
PBT-f(scale) 0.136 0.140 0.146 0.144 0.146 
t-ratio 5.761 5.942 6.090 6.053 6.300 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DIV 0.182 0.180 0.188 0.187 0.190 
t-ratio 2.743 2.759 2.843 2.794 2.942 
p-value 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.003 
Adj. ER 1.071 1.048 1.092 1.091 1.081 
t-ratio 3.696 3.577 3.749 3.776 3.745 
value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of cases 1661 1661 1661 1661 1661 
Adj. R- 
S uare 27.36% 27.94% 27.36% 27.36% 28.63% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below the regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 6.15 
Profit-making firms 
Basic model 
Modell 
PBT seg x  
PBTA 
Model 2 
PBT seg x  
PBTB 
Model 3 
PBT seg xw 
PBTC 
Model 4 
PBT seg x  
PBTD1 
Model 5 
Intercept 0.526 0.527 0.530 0.534 0.526 
t-ratio 14.383 14.445 14.101 14.563 13.478 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NEGMV -0.311 -0.305 -0.310 -0.285 -0.310 
t-ratio -10.471 -10.016 -10.399 -9.377 -10.459 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1/Scale 1599.1 1558.3 1447.0 1436.0 1714.4 
t-ratio 2.833 2.746 2.500 2.526 3.115 
p-value 0.005 0.006 0.012 0.012 0.002 
BV -0.165 -0.163 -0.170 -0.170 -0.164 
t-ratio -2.434 -2.396 -2.472 -2.564 -2.400 
p-value 0.015 0.017 0.013 0.010 0.016 
PBT 2.766 2.786 2.764 3.055 2.770 
t-ratio 6.246 6.256 6.174 6.827 6.260 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT seg x - -0.114 0.075 -0.442 0.006 
t-ratio - -0.891 1.474 -8.006 0.262 
p-value - 0.373 0.141 0.000 0.794 
DPBT seg x - 0.000 -0.412 0.483 0.215 
t-ratio - 0.000 -1.314 3.615 1.318 
p-value - 0.000 0.189 0.000 0.187 
PBT"f(scale) 0.153 0.151 0.153 0.141 0.153 
t-ratio 5.817 5.730 5.778 5.402 5.816 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DIV 0.192 0.188 0.190 0.196 0.186 
t-ratio 2.662 2.597 2.623 2.722 2.570 
p-value 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.010 
Adj. ER 1.516 1.506 1.527 1.583 1.561 
t-ratio 2.856 2.817 2.868 2.919 2.952 
-value 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 
No. of cases 846 846 846 846 846 
Adj. R- 
S uare 38.96% 38.93% 38.86% 41.00% 38.94% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below the regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 6.15 (continued from the previous page... ) 
PBT seg x PBT seg xý PBT seg xý 
PBTE PBTF PBTG 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
PST segx  
PBTH 
Model 9 
PBT sog xa 
PBTI 
Model 10 
Intercept 0.516 0.542 0.533 0.532 0.511 
t-ratio 14.375 14.448 14.167 14.368 14.166 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NEGMV -0.306 -0.310 -0.314 -0.312 -0.310 
t-ratio -10.297 -10.357 -10.602 -10.485 -10.535 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1/Scale 1866.0 1630.2 1541.0 1677.4 1569.5 
t-ratio 3.420 2.973 2.677 2.856 2.731 
p-value 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.006 
BV -0.186 -0.166 -0.166 -0.158 -0.157 
t-ratio -2.740 -2.472 -2.456 -2.336 -2.388 
p-value 0.006 0.013 0.014 0.019 0.017 
PBT 2.956 2.760 2.671 2.694 2.729 
t-ratio 6.741 6.257 5.975 6.025 6.202 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT seg x 0.269 -0.134 -0.089 -0.094 0.157 
t-ratio 3.904 -2.906 -1.413 -1.689 2.896 
p-value 0.000 0.004 0.158 0.091 0.004 
DPBT seg x -0.352 0.106 -0.303 0.169 -0.198 
t-ratio -1.255 0.569 -0.883 0.495 -1.501 
p-value 0.210 0.570 0.377 0.621 0.133 
PBT-f(scale) 0.142 0.152 0.159 0.157 0.155 
t-ratio 5.504 5.810 5.973 5.898 5.984 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DIV 0.171 0.187 0.198 0.193 0.183 
t-ratio 2.398 2.633 2.797 2.612 2.557 
p-value 0.016 0.008 0.005 0.009 0.011 
Adj. ER 1.602 1.481 1.552 1.549 1.597 
t-ratio 2.953 2.934 2.923 2.918 3.157 
p-value 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 
No. of cases 846 846 846 846 846 
Adj. R- 
S uare 40.25% 39.36% 39.13% 38.97% 39.55% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below the regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 6.16 
Profit-making firms 
Intercept 
NEGMV 
1/Scale 
BV 
PBT 
PBTA 
PBTB 
PBTC 
PBTD1 
PBTE 
PBTF 
PBTG 
PBTH 
PBTI 
DPBTB 
DPBTC 
DPBTD1 
DPBTE 
DPBTF 
DPBTG 
DPBTH 
DPBTI 
PBT'f(scale) 
DIV 
Adj. ER 
No. of cases 
Adj. R-Square 
Single and multiple Industry firms 
Model I 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value I 
Multiple Industry firms 
Model 2 
CoeN. t-ratio P-value 
0.647 19.124 0.000 0.552 13.079 0.000 
-0.350 -14.599 0.000 -0.268 -8.707 0.000 
1092.790 1.993 0.046 1536.540 2.609 0.009 
-0.095 -1.806 0.071 -0.185 -2.811 0.005 
2.008 5.360 0.000 3.015 6.705 0.000 
-0.122 -0.967 0.333 -0.185 -1.330 0.184 
0.151 1.690 0.091 0.157 2.152 0.031 
-0.457 -7.351 0.000 -0.444 -7.428 0.000 
-0.081 -3.627 0.000 0.006 0.204 0.838 
0.040 0.646 0.518 0.207 2.902 0.004 
-0.190 -4.511 0.000 -0.112 -2.328 0.020 
-0.115 -2.160 0.031 -0.096 -1.460 0.144 
-0.118 -2.234 0.026 -0.068 -1.178 0.239 
0.164 3.278 0.001 0.110 1.999 0.046 
-1.641 -1.095 0.274 -0.414 -1.325 0.185 
0.366 2.274 0.023 0.392 2.854 0.004 
0.444 2.749 0.006 0.278 1.599 0.110 
0.107 0.699 0.484 -0.174 -0.679 0.497 
0.255 1.439 0.150 0.052 0.273 0.785 
-0.093 -0.276 0.782 -0.214 -0.635 0.525 
0.371 1.321 0.187 0.177 0.578 0.563 
-0.462 -1.436 0.151 -0.095 -0.720 0.472 
0.143 5.985 0.000 0.142 5.433 0.000 
0.179 2.816 0.005 0.157 2.210 0.027 
1.139 4.148 0.000 1.797 3.429 0.001 
1661 846 
31.0% 42.7% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to the regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 6.17 
Multi-industry firms-year observations Single and multi-Industry firm-years 
Segments (no. of cases=838)* (no, of cases. 1661)" 
Pbtab 43 39 48 43 
Pbtabc 134 125 159 148 
pbtdl 570 554 1017 999 
Pbtfg 354 335 450 431 
Pbteh 311 293 387 368 
Pbta 27 27 29 29 
Pbtb 16 12 19 14 
Pbtc 95 90 115 109 
Pbtd 433 421 670 656 
Pbtda 329 315 539 525 
Pbte 175 169 241 234 
Pbtf 234 219 286 271 
Pbtg 161 152 205 196 
Pbth 170 157 180 167 
Pbti 276 256 452 430 
* Samples exclude loss-making firms and outliers 
Table 6.18 
-makin! firms 
Single and multiple Indust ry firms Multiple Industry firms 
Model I Model 2 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.633 18.830 0.000 0.526 12.447 0.000 
NEGMV -0.356 -14.711 0.000 -0.281 -9.180 0.000 
I/Scale 1206.720 2.230 0.026 2004.450 3.838 0.000 
BV -0.075 . 1.427 0.154 -0.155 -2.367 0.018 
PBT 2.015 5.391 0.000 3.018 6.648 0.000 
PBTABC * -0.251 -4.753 0.000 -0.231 -3.933 0.000 
PBTD1 -0.080 -3.575 0.000 0.009 0.321 0.749 
PBTE 0.051 0.837 0.402 0.226 3.183 0.001 
PBTF -0.195 -4.643 0.000 -0.115 -2.417 0.016 
PBTG -0.109 -2.050 0.040 -0.080 -1.209 0.226 
PBTH -0.133 -2.513 0.012 -0.087 -1.532 0.126 
PBTI 0.161 3.199 0.001 0.104 1.873 0.061 
DPBTABC* -0.152 -0.452 0.651 0.133 1.091 0.275 
DPBTDI 0.448 2.781 0.005 0.281 1.641 0.101 
DPBTE 0.031 0.173 0.863 -0.280 -0.907 0.365 
DPBTF 0.257 1.461 0.144 0.049 0.258 0.797 
DPBTG -0.101 -0.302 0.762 -0.235 -0.702 0.483 
DPBTH 0.395 1.403 0.160 0.196 0.642 0.521 
DPBTI -0.463 -1.436 0.151 -0.099 -0.744 0.457 
PBT'f(scale) 0.142 5.975 0.000 0.142 5.368 0.000 
DIV 0.188 2.922 0.003 0.170 2.367 0.018 
Ad ER 1.099 3.921 0.000 1.700 3.296 0.001 
No. of cases 1661 846 
Ad . R-S uare 
30.3% 41.9% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to the regression 
coefficients. 
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APPENDIX 6.2 
Appendix 6.2 reports regressions which are scaled by alternative scale- 
proxies. 
Tables 6.7TA, 6.10TA, 6.13TA and 6.14TA report regressions scaled 
by Group Total Assets. 
Tables 6.7Sale, 6.1OSale, 6.13Sale and 6.14Sale report regressions 
scaled by Group Sales. 
Tables 6.7MV, 6.10MV, 6.13MV and 6.14MV report regressions scaled 
by the one year lagged equity market value. 
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Table 6.7TA (TA-deflated model) 
Profit-making firms 
Dividend & non-Dividend firms 
Controlling for segment-level losses 
Model 1 Model 2 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.051 0.950 0.342 0.030 0.553 0.580 
NEGMV -0.375 -8.770 0.000 -0.367 -9.037 0.000 
1/TA 2.498 2.066 0.039 2.510 2.078 0.038 
BV 0.289 2.134 0.033 0.287 2.167 0.030 
PBTO 2.578 1.105 0.269 2.389 1.008 0.313 
PBT1 2.403 3.166 0.002 2.404 3.161 0.002 
PBT2 4.389 6.222 0.000 4.371 6.167 0.000 
PBT3 3.484 4.405 0.000 3.493 4.424 0.000 
PBT4 4.638 5.012 0.000 4.604 4.965 0.000 
PBT5 6.282 7.890 0.000 6.265 7.865 0.000 
PBT6 4.795 3.094 0.002 4.699 3.011 0.003 
PBT7 1.892 1.886 0.059 2.031 2.005 0.045 
PBT8 2.316 1.771 0.076 2.298 1.661 0.097 
PBT9 10.512 6.522 0.000 10.807 6.576 0.000 
PREST 1.049 1.299 0.194 0.627 0.779 0.436 
DPBTO -13.219 -0.693 0.489 
DPBT1 -8.102 -1.488 0.137 
DPBT2 -4.539 -1.740 0.082 
DPBT3 7.047 0.182 0.855 
DPBT4 -73.349 -1.384 0.166 
DPBT5 -6.973 -1.779 0.075 
DPBT6 157.536 4.359 0.000 
DPBT7 22.080 1.549 0.121 
DPBT8 14.311 1.112 0.266 
DPBT9 -20.587 -2.422 0.015 
PBT'f(ta) 0.938 4.719 0.000 0.998 5.026 0.000 
DIV 4.040 3.093 0.002 4.081 3.144 0.002 
Ad'. ER 0.527 1.195 0.232 0.730 1.815 0.070 
No. of cases 1670 1670 
Adj. R-S uare 49.2% 49.6% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to the regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 6.7TA (continued from the previous page... ) 
Dividend firms only 
Controlling for segment-level losses 
Model 3 Model 4 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.068 1.234 0.217 0.051 0.913 0.361 
NEGMV -0.357 -8.617 0.000 -0.353 -8.601 0.000 
1/TA 0.184 0.160 0.873 0.051 0.043 0.968 
BV 0.205 1.674 0.094 0.211 1.718 0.086 
PBTO 4.455 1.838 0.066 4.336 1.760 0.078 
PBT1 3.797 5.508 0.000 3.835 5.513 0.000 
PBT2 5.616 9.114 0.000 5.641 9.075 0.000 
PBT3 4.848 6.841 0.000 4.890 6.881 0.000 
PBT4 6.086 7.378 0.000 6.107 7.380 0.000 
PBTS 7.607 10.962 0.000 7.657 10.994 0.000 
PBT6 6.440 4.441 0.000 6.401 4.378 0.000 
PBT7 3.402 3.726 0.000 3.573 3.869 0.000 
PBT8 4.351 3.291 0.001 4.117 2.884 0.004 
PBT9 12.613 7.030 0.000 12.944 7.074 0.000 
PREST 2.142 2.881 0.004 1.804 2.477 0.013 
DPBTO -40.677 -2.545 0.011 
DPBTI -8.665 -1.481 0.139 
DPBT2 -5.725 -2.421 0.015 
DPBT3 4.380 0.118 0.906 
DPBT4 -71.439 -1.370 0.171 
DPBT5 -11.368 -4.954 0.000 
DPBT6 143.462 4.247 0.000 
DPBT7 23.143 1.498 0.134 
DPBT8 25.543 4.689 0.000 
DPBT9 -14.518 -4.745 0.000 
PBT'f(ta) 0.715 4.111 0.000 0.758 4.379 0.000 
DIV 3.072 2.313 0.021 2.966 2.236 0.025 
Adj. ER 0.672 1.596 0.110 0.818 2.114 0.035 
No. of cases 1612 1612 
Ad'. R-S uare 51.5% 51.7% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to the regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 6.7S (Group Sales-deflated model) 
Profit-making firms 
Dividend & non-Div firms 
Controlling for segment-level losses 
Model I Model 2 
Coeff. t-ratlo P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.073 2.444 0.015 0.066 2.153 0.031 
NEGMV -0.449 -9.607 0.000 -0.448 -9.551 0.000 
1/Sale 0.887 1.217 0.224 0.877 1.172 0.241 
BV 0.441 4.530 0.000 0.439 4.353 0.000 
PBTO 7.529 2.771 0.006 7.541 2.778 0.005 
PBTI 3.611 4.060 0.000 3.658 4.054 0.000 
PBT2 5.973 7.489 0.000 6.012 7.440 0.000 
PBT3 4.449 4.636 0.000 4.544 4.687 0.000 
PBT4 6.360 5.771 0.000 6.405 5.777 0.000 
PBT5 7.018 7.571 0.000 7.032 7.511 0.000 
PBT6 7.386 3.311 0.001 7.372 3.237 0.001 
PBT7 1.801 1.773 0.076 1.803 1.750 0.080 
PBT8 2.168 1.883 0.060 2.442 1.871 0.061 
PBT9 14.730 5.554 0.000 14.863 5.358 0.000 
PREST 2.791 3.166 0.002 2.730 3.083 0.002 
DPBTO 5.871 0.500 0.617 
DPBT1 -10.060 -1.564 0.118 
DPBT2 -2.192 -0.627 0.531 
DPBT3 -8.644 -0.328 0.743 
DPBT4 -81.507 -1.516 0.129 
DPBT5 -0.285 -0.024 0.981 
DPBT6 7.030 0.266 0.791 
DPBT7 7.965 0.795 0.426 
DPBT8 -29.423 -0.746 0.456 
DPBT9 -12.079 -2.506 0.012 
PBT'f(sale) 0.353 2.205 0.027 0.361 2.260 0.024 
DIV 4.877 3.194 0.001 4.891 3.160 0.002 
Ad'. ER 0.732 1.083 0.279 0.798 1.159 0.246 
No. of cases 1671 1671 
Ad'. R-S uare 52.3% 52.2% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to the regression 
coefficients. 
378 
Table 6.7S (continued from the previous page... ) 
Intercept 
NEGMV 
1/Sale 
BV 
PBTO 
PBT1 
PBT2 
PBT3 
PBT4 
PBT5 
PBT6 
PBT7 
PBT8 
PBT9 
PREST 
DPBTO 
DPBT1 
DPBT2 
DPBT3 
DPBT4 
DPBT5 
DPBT6 
DPBT7 
DPBT8 
DPBT9 
PBT"f(sale) 
DIV 
Ad'I. ER 
Dividend firms only 
Controlling for segment-level losses 
Model 3 Model 4 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
0.061 1.922 0.055 0.056 1.698 0.089 
-0.453 -8.322 0.000 -0.447 -8.270 0.000 
1.820 0.986 0.324 1.910 0.873 0.383 
0.383 3.119 0.002 0.375 2.971 0.003 
8.103 3.080 0.002 8.055 3.113 0.002 
4.110 4.365 0.000 4.126 4.218 0.000 
6.361 7.574 0.000 6.384 7.363 0.000 
4.997 5.012 0.000 5.047 4.950 0.000 
6.735 5.946 0.000 6.744 5.814 0.000 
7.426 7.656 0.000 7.426 7.438 0.000 
7.933 3.508 0.000 7.883 3.411 0.001 
2.306 2.155 0.031 2.287 2.063 0.039 
2.629 2.126 0.033 2.701 1.907 0.056 
16.661 4.897 0.000 16.812 4.845 0.000 
3.228 3.488 0.000 3.066 3.274 0.001 
13.954 0.448 0.654 
-4.437 -0.717 0.473 
-2.838 -0.837 0.403 
-10.077 -0.361 0.718 
-81.626 -1.461 0.144 
-14.085 -1.794 0.073 
7.346 0.247 0.805 
3.989 0.393 0.694 
30.497 3.441 0.001 
-13.669 -2.609 0.009 
0.402 2.530 0.011 0.426 2.645 0.008 
4.064 2.405 0.016 3.959 2.333 0.020 
0.959 1.419 0.156 1.011 1.499 0.134 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to the regression 
coefficients 
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Table 6.7MV (One year lagged MV-deflated model) 
Profit-making firms 
Dividend & non-Div firms 
Controlling for segment-level losses 
Model 1 Model 2 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.828 20.533 0.000 0.817 20.199 0.000 
NEGMV -0.503 -14.018 0.000 -0.502 -14.063 0.000 
1/MV 0.159 0.868 0.385 0.194 1.003 0.316 
BV 0.260 5.339 0.000 0.264 5.394 0.000 
PBTO 1.695 3.125 0.002 1.673 3.104 0.002 
PBT1 1.286 3.524 0.000 1.279 3.510 0.000 
PBT2 1.523 4.494 0.000 1.506 4.507 0.000 
PBT3 1.417 3.145 0.002 1.426 3.162 0.002 
PBT4 1.706 4.218 0.000 1.729 4.281 0.000 
PBT5 2.376 6.409 0.000 2.416 6.528 0.000 
PBT6 2.390 2.704 0.007 2.344 2.639 0.008 
PBT7 1.629 3.400 0.001 1.688 3.535 0.000 
PBT8 2.029 2.280 0.023 2.029 2.014 0.044 
PBT9 7.871 5.332 0.000 8.425 5.491 0.000 
PREST 1.523 4.493 0.000 1.505 4.505 0.000 
DPBTO 7.911 1.681 0.093 
DPBT1 -0.235 -0.098 0.922 
DPBT2 -2.662 -2.583 0.010 
DPBT3 -27.522 -9.228 0.000 
DPBT4 0.575 0.026 0.979 
DPBT5 5.408 1.791 0.073 
DPBT6 98.680 4.404 0.000 
DPBT7 11.318 1.198 0.231 
DPBT8 8.944 4.276 0.000 
DPBT9 -8.618 -4.905 0.000 
PBrf(mv) 0.053 0.611 0.541 0.073 0.843 0.399 
DIV -0.165 -0.180 0.857 -0.035 -0.038 0.969 
Ad'. ER 0.589 1.761 0.078 0.761 2.532 0.011 
No. of cases 1331 1331 
Ad'. R-S uare 23.1% 23.7% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to the regression 
coefficients. 
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Model 6.7MV (continued from the previous page... ) 
Dividend firms only 
Controlling for segment-level losses 
Model 3 Model 4 
Coeff. t-ratlo P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.832 19.647 0.000 0.817 19.261 0.000 
NEGMV -0.494 -13.775 0.000 -0.494 -13.812 0.000 
1/MV 0.288 0.753 0.452 0.314 0.749 0.454 
BV 0.231 4.595 0.000 0.233 4.631 0.000 
PBTO 1.733 2.483 0.013 1.687 2.400 0.016 
PBT1 1.118 2.903 0.004 1.116 2.877 0.004 
PBT2 1.426 4.016 0.000 1.393 3.968 0.000 
PBT3 1.286 2.624 0.009 1.300 2.608 0.009 
PBT4 1.501 3.574 0.000 1.524 3.607 0.000 
PBT5 2.227 5.687 0.000 2.274 5.756 0.000 
PBT6 2.272 2.540 0.011 2.226 2.472 0.013 
PBT7 1.544 3.069 0.002 1.613 3.219 0.001 
PBT8 1.801 1.997 0.046 1.755 1.722 0.085 
PBT9 8.478 4.432 0.000 9.158 4.645 0.000 
PREST 1.426 4.014 0.000 1.392 3.967 0.000 
DPBTO 6.822 1.017 0.309 
DPBT1 0.061 0.024 0.981 
DPBT2 -2.689 -2.568 0.010 
DPBT3 -28.128 -9.081 0.000 
DPBT4 -2.528 -0.115 0.908 
DPBT5 1.653 0.842 0.400 
DPBT6 106.397 4.459 0.000 
DPBT7 9.409 1.001 0.317 
DPBT8 8.650 4.042 0.000 
DPBT9 -9.612 -4.440 0.000 
PBT"f(mv) 0.085 0.946 0.344 0.111 1.240 0.215 
DIV 0.203 0.205 0.838 0.411 0.418 0.676 
Adj. ER 0.599 1.737 0.082 0.787 2.616 0.009 
No. of cases 1287 1287 
Ad'. R-S uare 21.8% 22.6% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to the regression 
coefficients 
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Model 6.7MV (continued from the previous page... ) 
Wald test of the significance of valuation differential between each pair of specific 
segments included in Model 2 and Model 4 
Mode12 Model4 
Compared segments p -value p-value 
PBTO vs PBT1 0.381 0.330 
PBTO vs PBT2 0.691 0.602 
PBTO vs PBT3 0.614 0.523 
PBTO vs PBT4 0.905 0.782 
PBTO vs PBT5 0.099 0.314 
PBTO vs PBT6 0.436 0.561 
PBTO vs PBT7 0.976 0.902 
PBTO vs PBT8 0.717 0.948 
PBTO vs PBT9 0.000 0.000 
PBT1 vs PBT2 0.337 0.252 
PBTI vs PBT3 0.624 0.561 
PBT1 vs PBT4 0.081 0.110 
PBTI vs PBT5 0.000 0.000 
PBT1 vs PBT6 0.169 0.152 
PBTI vs PBT7 0.178 0.116 
PBT1 vs PBT8 0.404 0.475 
PBT1 vs PBT9 0.000 0.000 
PBT2 vs PBT3 0.799 0.777 
PBT2 vs PBT4 0.405 0.622 
PBT2 vs PBT5 0.000 0.000 
PBT2 vs PBT6 0.287 0.291 
PBT2 vs PBT7 0.581 0.522 
PBT2 vs PBT8 0.570 0.695 
PBT2 vs PBT9 0.000 0.000 
PBT3 vs PBT4 0.353 0.501 
PBT3 vs PBT5 0.001 0.002 
PBT3 vs PBT6 0.257 0.254 
PBT3 vs PBT7 0.478 0.427 
PBT3 vs PBT8 0.516 0.625 
PBT3 vs PBT9 0.000 0.000 
PBT4 vs PBT5 0.010 0.005 
PBT4 vs PBT6 0.452 0.390 
PBT4 vs PBT7 0.904 0.800 
PBT4 vs PBT8 0.744 0.801 
PBT4 vs PBT9 0.000 0.000 
PBT5 vs PBT6 0.927 0.952 
PBT5 vs PBT7 0.028 0.056 
PBT5 vs PBT8 0.677 0.576 
PBT5 vs PBT9 0.000 0.000 
PBT6 vs PBT7 0.406 0.441 
PBT6 vs PBT8 0.786 0.684 
PBT6 vs PBT9 0.000 0.001 
PBT7 vs PBT8 0.713 0.878 
PBT7 vs PBT9 0.000 0.000 
PBT8 vs PBT9 0.000 0.001 
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Table 6.10TA (TA-deflated model) 
Profit-making firms 
Basic model 
Modell 
PBT seg x  
PBTO 
Mode12 
PBT seg xm 
PBT1 
Mode13 
PBT seg x  
PBT2 
Mode14 
PBT seg xa 
PBT3 
ModelS 
Intercept 0.203 0.238 0.267 0.242 0.248 
t-ratio 3.467 4.268 4.784 4.267 4.368 
p-value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NEGMV -0.393 -0.404 -0.417 -0.403 -0.404 
t-ratio -8.036 -9.000 -9.186 -8.804 -8.857 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1/TA 2.996 2.881 2.782 2.843 2.852 
1-ratio 2.527 2.422 2.328 2.371 2.393 
p-value 0.012 0.015 0.020 0.018 0.017 
BV -0.023 -0.032 0.023 -0.048 -0.038 
t-ratio -0.143 -0.224 0.157 -0.322 -0.257 
p-value 0.886 0.822 0.875 0.747 0.797 
PBT 5.527 5.199 5.161 5.476 5.252 
t-ratio 7.415 7.261 7.298 7.174 7.375 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT seg x - -1.022 -2.757 -0.557 -1.328 
t-ratio - -0.521 -8.605 -1.654 -2.823 
p-value - 0.602 0.000 0.098 0.005 
DPBT seg x - -3.094 13.141 -2.715 19.947 
t-ratio - -0.169 1.067 -2.174 0.511 
p-value - 0.866 0.286 0.030 0.609 
PBT'f(ta) 0.385 0.512 0.521 0.461 0.489 
t-ratio 1.908 2.575 2.674 2.319 2.496 
p-value 0.056 0.010 0.008 0.020 0.013 
DIV 7.735 6.381 6.432 6.543 6.505 
t-ratio 4.470 4.055 4.136 4.179 4.134 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adj. ER 0.345 0.343 0.367 0.390 0.342 
t-ratio 0.567 0.552 0.614 0.631 0.551 
p-value 0.571 0.581 0.539 0.528 0.582 
No. of cases 1670 1670 1670 1670 1670 
Adj. R-S uare 40.0% 40.0% 41.2% 40.0% 40.1% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below the regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 6.10TA (continued from the previous page... ) 
PBT seg x- 
PBT4 
Mode16 
PBT seg xm 
PBTS 
Mode17 
PBT seg xa 
PBT6 
Model8 
PBT seg xm 
PBT7 
Model9 
PBT seg x  
PBT8 
Mode110 
PBT seg x  
PBT9 
Modelli 
Intercept 0.241 0.187 0.244 0.241 0.242 0.214 
t-ratio 4.234 3.466 4.275 4.234 4.258 3.863 
p-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NEGMV -0.403 -0.420 -0.401 -0.394 -0.404 -0.366 
t-ratio -8.800 -9.379 -8.781 -8.683 -8.831 -8.649 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1/TA 2.869 2.743 2.862 2.865 2.869 2.721 
t-ratio 2.409 2.236 2.400 2.411 2.412 2.346 
p-value 0.016 0.025 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.019 
BV -0.041 0.130 -0.051 -0.029 -0.035 -0.050 
t-ratio -0.277 0.915 -0.343 -0.196 -0.233 -0.347 
p-value 0.782 0.360 0.731 0.845 0.816 0.729 
PBT 5.242 4.127 5.311 5.161 5.210 4.314 
t-ratio 7.435 5.739 7.374 7.221 7.332 6.169 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT seg x 0.051 2.474 1.519 -2.044 -1.484 6.862 
t-ratio 0.085 5.844 1.084 -4.083 -1.369 4.490 
p-value 0.932 0.000 0.278 0.000 0.171 0.000 
DPBT seg x -22.827 -5.321 238.687 30.949 1.841 -13.822 
t-ratio -0.674 -1.240 5.558 5.959 0.150 -1.487 
p-value 0.500 0.215 0.000 0.000 0.881 0.137 
PBT"f(ta) 0.499 0.617 0.471 0.524 0.511 0.655 
t-ratio 2.558 3.214 2.329 2.666 2.607 3.424 
p-value 0.011 0.001 0.020 0.008 0.009 0.001 
DIV 6.328 5.417 6.389 6.353 6.321 8.140 
t-ratio 4.021 3.800 4.072 4.044 4.017 5.410 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adj. ER 0.344 0.406 0.366 0.380 0.359 0.656 
t-ratio 0.554 0.717 0.597 0.615 0.578 1.188 
p-value 0.580 0.473 0.551 0.539 0.563 0.235 
No. of cases 1670 1670 1670 1670 1670 1670 
Ad'. R-S uare 39.9% 42.7% 40.0% 40.0% 39.9% 43.7% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below the regression 
coefficients 
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Table 6.10Sales (Group Sales-deflated model) 
Profit-making firms 
PBT seg xs 
PBTO 
Modell 
PBT seg xa 
PBT1 
Mode12 
PBT seg xm 
PBT2 
Mode13 
PBT seg x  
PBT3 
Model 
PBT sog xm 
PBT4 
ModolS 
Intercept 0.178 0.207 0.174 0.186 0.166 
t-ratio 5.882 6.792 5.762 6.042 5.435 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NEGMV -0.549 -0.557 -0.553 -0.552 -0.557 
t-ratio -9.479 -9.469 -9.317 -9.343 -9.438 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1/Sale 1.232 1.134 1.229 1.220 1.189 
t-ratio 1.276 1.198 1.261 1.259 1.237 
p-value 0.202 0.231 0.207 0.208 0.216 
BV 0.398 0.408 0.399 0.398 0.415 
t-ratio 3.806 3.926 3.792 3.801 4.000 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT 6.872 6.915 7.023 6.912 7.057 
t-ratio 7.244 7.370 6.825 7.280 7.542 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT seg x 2.296 -2.680 -0.239 -1.902 1.205 
t-ratio 0.947 -8.175 -0.561 -3.749 1.525 
p-value 0.344 0.000 0.575 0.000 0.127 
DPBT seg x 21.274 0.510 -2.224 -3.062 7.222 
t-ratio 1.558 0.051 -1.206 -0.149 0.232 
p-value 0.119 0.959 0.228 0.881 0.816 
PBT'f(sale) -0.081 -0.097 -0.096 -0.088 -0.132 
t-ratio -0.439 -0.550 -0.507 -0.487 -0.755 
p-value 0.661 0.583 0.612 0.626 0.450 
DIV 4.238 4.620 4.343 4.405 4.155 
t-ratio 2.511 2.852 2.629 2.670 2.556 
p-value 0.012 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.011 
Adj. ER 0.220 0.119 0.195 0.202 0.201 
t-ratio 0.243 0.131 0.212 0.220 0.223 
p-value 0.808 0.896 0.832 0.826 0.824 
No. of cases 1671 1671 1671 1671 1671 
Adj. R-S uare 41.7% 42.4% 41.5% 41.6% 41.6% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below the regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 6.10Sale (continued from the previous page... ) 
PBTsegxa 
PBT5 
Mode16 
PBTsegxm 
PBT6 
Modell 
PBTsegxu 
PBT7 
Modele 
PBTtog x  
PBT8 
Model9 
PBTtog x  
PBT9 
Modell0 
Intercept 0.176 0.166 0.106 0.166 0.152 
t-ratio 6.312 5.495 3.431 5.443 5.385 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
NEGMV -0.524 -0.552 -0.525 -0.553 -0.512 
t-ratio -8.867 -9.355 -9.354 -9.367 -9.845 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1/Sale 1.173 1.270 1.190 1.261 1.147 
t-ratio 1.183 1.291 1.298 1.298 1.285 
p-value 0.237 0.197 0.194 0.194 0.199 
BV 0.359 0.403 0.514 0.413 0.401 
t-ratio 3.504 3.835 4.921 3.910 4.048 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT 5.905 6.947 6.494 6.850 5.712 
t-ratio 6.194 7.270 6.961 7.234 6.583 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT seg x 2.307 2.279 -3.724 -1.903 9.420 
t-ratio 5.812 1.075 -7.959 -3.085 3.605 
p-value 0.000 0.282 0.000 0.002 0.000 
DPBT seg x -17.434 128.231 41.992 -35.615 -6.559 
t-ratio -1.559 4.943 3.921 -0.971 -2.054 
p-value 0.119 0.000 0.000 0.331 0.040 
PBT'f(sale) 0.044 -0.091 0.107 -0.061 0.048 
t-ratio 0.247 -0.496 0.612 -0.341 0.285 
p-value 0.805 0.620 0.541 0.733 0,776 
DIV 3.823 4.587 5.719 4.557 6.400 
t-ratio 2.480 2.760 3.482 2.744 3.974 
p-value 0.013 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000 
Adj. ER 0.279 0.269 0.721 0.198 0.269 
t-ratio 0.326 0.298 0.846 0.216 0.320 
-value 0.744 0.766 0.398 0.829 0.749 
No. of cases 1671 1671 1671 1671 1671 
Adj. R-S uare 43.7% 41.6% 43.2% 41.7% 46.5% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below the regression 
coefficients 
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Table 6.10MV (One year lagged MV-deflated model) 
Profit-making firms 
basic 
model 
Modell 
PBT seg xm 
PBTO 
Mode12 
PBT seg xm 
PBT1 
Mode13 
PBT seg xm 
PBT2 
Mode14 
PBT seg xw 
PBT3 
ModelS 
PBT seg x  
PBT4 
Model6 
Intercept 0.907 0.906 0.903 0.903 0.906 0.907 
t-ratio 22.135 22.004 22.076 21.968 22.157 22.115 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NEGMV -0.500 -0.500 -0.507 -0.498 -0.497 -0.500 
t-ratio -13.554 -13.562 -13.690 -13.456 -13.510 -13.562 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1/MV 0.160 0.171 0.120 0.151 0.190 0.159 
t-ratio 0.884 0.923 0.670 0.843 1.011 0.878 
p-value 0.377 0.356 0.503 0.399 0.312 0.380 
BV 0.223 0.224 0.238 0.221 0.221 0.223 
t-ratio 4.480 4.476 4.845 4.441 4.458 4.491 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT 2.045 2.036 2.117 2.073 2.053 2.041 
t-ratio 6.027 5.970 6.128 6.095 6.048 6.033 
p-value - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT seg x - -0.097 -0.687 0.000 -0.395 -0.059 
t-ratio - -0.233 -3.593 -0.309 -1.455 -0.263 
p-value - 0.816 0.000 0.758 0.146 0.792 
DPBT seg x - 6.021 3.207 -3.017 -24.171 46.357 
t-ratio - 1.829 1.144 -2.575 -9.675 1.649 
p-value - 0.067 0.253 0.010 0.000 0.099 
PBT"f(mv) -0.044 -0.041 -0.037 -0.039 -0.049 -0.043 
t-ratio -0.544 -0.507 -0.464 -0.485 -0.609 -0.534 
p-value 0.586 0.612 0.643 0.627 0.542 0.593 
DIV -1.143 -1.141 -1.019 -1.147 -1.004 -1.130 
t-ratio -1.282 -1.281 -1.143 -1.286 -1.107 -1.258 
p-value 0.200 0.200 0.253 0.199 0.268 0.208 
Adj. ER 0.590 0.589 0.611 0.624 0.591 0.588 
t-ratio 1.719 1.711 1.799 1.834 1.725 1.705 
p-value 0.086 0.087 0.072 0.067 0.084 0.088 
No. of cases 1331 1331 1331 1331 1331 1331 
Adj. R- 
S uare 15.5% 15.4% 16.0% 15.5% 15.6% 15.4% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below the regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 6.10MV (continued from the previous page... ) 
PBT seg x= 
PBT5 
Mode17 
PBT seg x- 
PBT6 
Model8 
PBT seg x- 
PBT7 
Mode19 
PBT Beg x  
PBT8 
ModellO 
PBT Beg x  
PBT9 
Modelll 
Intercept 0.881 0.906 0.907 0.907 0.854 
t-ratio 20.678 22.096 21.685 22.109 22.171 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NEGMV -0.503 -0.500 -0.501 -0.500 -0.499 
t-ratio -13.408 -13.548 -13.552 -13.345 -14.533 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1/MV 0.126 0.161 0.160 0.154 0.220 
t-ratio 0.689 0.891 0.885 0.852 1.230 
p-value 0.491 0.373 0.376 0.394 0.219 
BV 0.235 0.220 0.222 0.221 0.247 
t-ratio 4.757 4.427 4.363 4.347 5.447 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT 1.773 2.063 2.048 2.078 1.711 
t-ratio 5.295 6.015 5.983 6.067 5.173 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT seg x 0.704 0.709 0.061 0.360 6.451 
t-ratio 3.588 0.934 0.213 0.491 4.283 
p-value 0.000 0.351 0.832 0.623 0.000 
DPBT seg x -2.149 84.929 4.717 5.008 -7.701 
t-ratio -0.345 4.818 2.209 2.493 -4.596 
p-value 0.730 0.000 0.027 0.013 0.000 
PBT'f(mv) 0.017 -0.051 -0.045 -0.052 0.021 
t-ratio 0.212 -0.622 -0.548 -0.647 0.267 
p-value 0.832 0.534 0.584 0.518 0.789 
DIV -1.083 -1.086 -1.143 -1.163 -0.114 
t-ratio -1.235 -1.215 -1.279 -1.307 -0.128 
p-value 0.217 0.224 0.201 0.191 0.898 
Adj. ER 0.656 0.606 0.590 0.583 0.582 
t-ratio 2.013 1.782 1.720 1.697 1.739 
-value 0.044 0.075 0.085 0.090 0.082 
No. of cases 1331 1331 1331 1331 1331 
Adj. R-S uare 16.5% 15.5% 15.4% 15.4% 22.1% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below the regression 
coefficients 
388 
Table 6.13TA (TA -deflated model) 
Profit-making firms 
Dividend & non-Div firms 
Controlling for segment-level losses 
Model I Model 2 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.228 4.016 0.000 0.203 3.543 0.000 
NEGMV -0.359 -8.676 0.000 -0.356 -8.786 0.000 
1/TA 2.483 2.485 0.013 2.329 2.283 0.022 
BV -0.104 -0.926 0.354 -0.099 -0.886 0.376 
PBTA 1.982 1.716 0.086 2.171 1.914 0.056 
PBTB 8.188 2.130 0.033 8.342 2.059 0.039 
PBTC 0.462 0.501 0.616 0.545 0.592 0.554 
PBTD 4.325 5.732 0.000 4.294 5.694 0.000 
PBTDA 4.540 6.239 0.000 4.521 6.221 0.000 
PBTE 5.766 6.025 0.000 5.702 5.972 0.000 
PBTF 5.138 6.080 0.000 5.090 6.041 0.000 
PBTG 4.959 5.329 0.000 4.929 5.301 0.000 
PBTH 4.834 3.072 0.002 4.507 2.879 0.004 
PBTI 7.736 8.327 0.000 7.856 8.389 0.000 
PREST 3.164 3.660 0.000 2.837 3.269 0.001 
DPBTB -7.160 -1.599 0.110 
DPBTC -7.718 -1.476 0.140 
DPBTD 0.876 0.387 0.699 
DPBTDA -3.359 -1.976 0.048 
DPBTE -2.347 -0.893 0.372 
DPBTF -4.354 -0.836 0.403 
DPBTG -5.930 -2.048 0.041 
DPBTH 0.782 0.043 0.966 
DPBTI -9.911 -3.473 0.001 
PBT"f(ta) 0.762 3.629 0.000 0.815 3.847 0.000 
DIV 5.754 3.588 0.000 5.911 3.653 0.000 
Ad'. ER 0.562 1.045 0.296 0.644 1.241 0.215 
No. of cases 1670 1670 
Adj. R-S uare 44.88% 45.14% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to the regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 6.13TA (continued from the previous page... ) 
Div firms only 
Controlling for segment-level losses 
Model 3 Model 4 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.217 3.400 0.001 0.203 3.162 0.002 
NEGMV -0.359 -8.036 0.000 -0.363 -8.235 0.000 
1/TA 0.735 0.708 0.479 0.419 0.402 0.688 
BV -0.092 -0.586 0.558 -0.088 -0.567 0.570 
PBTA 2.343 2.052 0.040 2.589 2.283 0.022 
PBTB 9.684 2.596 0.009 10.083 2.557 0.011 
PBTC 1.359 1.410 0.159 1.485 1.537 0.124 
PBTD 5.570 7.805 0.000 5.607 7.839 0.000 
PBTDA 5.719 8.304 0.000 5.771 8.374 0.000 
PBTE 7.075 7.763 0.000 7.080 7.780 0.000 
PBTF 6.401 7.900 0.000 6.417 7.932 0.000 
PBTG 6.304 6.904 0.000 6.359 6.963 0.000 
PBTH 6.953 4.310 0.000 6.446 4.050 0.000 
PBTI 9.008 9.525 0.000 9.113 9.597 0.000 
PREST 4.454 5.663 0.000 4.322 5.403 0.000 
DPBTB -10.356 -2.478 0.013 
DPBTC -3.742 -1.362 0.173 
DPBTD -0.188 -0.077 0.939 
DPBTDA -4.786 -2.625 0.009 
DPBTE -1.880 -0.765 0.444 
DPBTF -10.350 -1.689 0.091 
DPBTG -19.511 -3.352 0.001 
DPBTH 14.446 0.674 0.500 
DPBTI -10.730 -1.870 0.061 
PBT'f(ta) 0.558 2.824 0.005 0.579 2.915 0.004 
DIV 4.668 2.694 0.007 4.750 2.726 0.006 
Ad'. ER 0.720 1.354 0.176 0.809 1.547 0.122 
No. of cases 1600 1600 
Adj. R-S uare 45.82% 45.81% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to the regression 
coefficients 
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Table 6.13Sale (Group Sale-deflated model) 
Profit-making firms 
Dividend & non-Div firms 
Controlling for segment-level losses 
Model 1 Model 2 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.129 2.971 0.003 0.117 2.742 0.006 
NEGMV -0.536 -7.097 0.000 -0.526 -7.336 0.000 
1/Sale 1.415 1.239 0.216 0.348 0.336 0.737 
BV 0.473 3.165 0.002 0.437 2.921 0.003 
PBTA 4.600 2.506 0.012 5.114 2.749 0.006 
PBTB 9.966 3.018 0.003 11.285 3.179 0.001 
PBTC -0.229 -0.156 0.876 0.008 0.005 0.996 
PBTD 5.827 3.632 0.000 6.107 3.792 0.000 
PBTDA 5.032 4.453 0.000 5.266 4.695 0.000 
PBTE 2.993 2.228 0.026 3.148 2.309 0.021 
PBTF 5.180 4.283 0.000 5.417 4.493 0.000 
PBTG 5.176 3.398 0.001 5.629 3.715 0.000 
PBTH 4.562 1.621 0.105 6.384 2.521 0.012 
PBTI 8.583 6.004 0.000 9.118 6.507 0.000 
PREST 3.505 3.205 0.001 3.434 3.090 0.002 
DPBTB -6.230 -1.975 0.048 
DPBTC -13.384 -1.063 0.288 
DPBTD -4.182 -1.237 0.216 
DPBTDA -4.147 -1.962 0.050 
DPBTE -0.437 -0.064 0.949 
DPBTF -0.899 -0.181 0.856 
DPBTG -9.822 -0.625 0.532 
DPBTH -12.144 -2.218 0.027 
DPBTI -10.513 -1.580 0.114 
PBT'f(sale) 0.116 2.019 0.044 0.117 2.023 0.043 
DIV 4.125 2.031 0.042 4.059 2.020 0.043 
Ad'. ER 0.169 0.211 0.833 0.164 0.205 0.838 
No. of cases 1670 1670 
Ad'. R-S uare 40.5% 40.8% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to the regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 6.13Sale (continued from the previous page... ) 
Dividend firms only 
Controlling for segment-level losses 
Model 3 Model 4 
Coeff. t-ratio P-value Coeff. t-ratio P-value 
Intercept 0.096 2.607 0.009 0.097 2.554 0.011 
NEGMV -0.491 -7.634 0.000 -0.496 -7.388 0.000 
1/Sale 1.147 0.704 0.481 0.441 0.271 0.786 
BV 0.323 2.081 0.037 0.319 1.918 0.055 
PBTA 4.897 2.847 0.004 5.224 2.932 0.003 
PBTB 11.241 3.539 0.000 12.328 3.770 0.000 
PBTC 0.512 0.328 0.743 0.598 0.372 0.710 
PBTD 6.991 4.294 0.000 7.141 4.333 0.000 
PBTDA 6.112 5.349 0.000 6.255 5.433 0.000 
PBTE 4.426 3.251 0.001 4.563 3.302 0.001 
PBTF 6.352 5.105 0.000 6.489 5.174 0.000 
PBTG 6.021 4.193 0.000 6.229 4.260 0.000 
PBTH 9.204 3.487 0.000 8.762 3.210 0.001 
PBTI 10.210 7.012 0.000 10.380 6.953 0.000 
PREST 4.371 3.817 0.000 4.439 3.858 0.000 
DPBTB -6.379 -2.433 0.015 
DPBTC -3.312 -0.529 0.597 
DPBTD -5.203 -1.502 0.133 
DPBTDA -6.144 -3.117 0.002 
DPBTE -1.157 -0.163 0.870 
DPBTF -3.807 -0.549 0.583 
DPBTG -10.199 -0.621 0.534 
DPBTH 19.588 0.657 0.511 
DPBTI -1.187 -0.189 0.850 
PBT"f(sale) 0.101 1.693 0.090 0.097 1.629 0.103 
DIV 3.958 1.726 0.084 3.827 1.631 0.103 
Adj. ER 0.470 0.592 0.554 0.485 0.609 0.542 
No. of cases 1601 1601 
Ad. R-S uare 43.3% 43.1% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported next to the regression 
coefficients. 
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Model 6.13Sale (continued from the previous page... ) 
Wald test of the significance of valuation differential between each pair of specific 
segments included in Model 2 and Model 4 
Model 2 Model4 
segments p-value p-value 
PBTA VS PBTB 0.098 0.039 
PBTA VS PBTC 0.004 0.006 
PBTA VS PBTD 0.554 0.224 
PBTA VS PBTDA 0.924 0.487 
PBTA VS PBTE 0.223 0.656 
PBTA VS PBTF 0.851 0.405 
PBTA VS PBTG 0.763 0.515 
PBTA VS PBTH 0.607 0.161 
PBTA VS PBTI 0.018 0.002 
PBTB VS PBTC 0.005 0.002 
PBTB VS PBTD 0.158 0.131 
PBTB VS PBTDA 0.092 0.068 
PBTB VS PBTE 0.022 0.019 
PBTB VS PBTF 0.102 0.082 
PBTB VS PBTG 0.128 0.075 
PBTB VS PBTH 0.235 0.387 
PBTB VS PBTI 0.556 0.574 
PBTC VS PBTD 0.000 0.000 
PBTC VS PBTDA 0.000 0.000 
PBTC VS PBTE 0.003 0.000 
PBTC VS PBTF 0.000 0.000 
PBTC VS PBTG 0.000 0.000 
PBTC VS PBTH 0.003 0.001 
PBTC VS PBTI 0.000 0.000 
DPBT VS PBTDA 0.316 0.291 
PBTD VS PBTE 0.001 0.007 
PBTD VS PBTF 0.422 0.442 
PBTD VS PBTG 0.610 0.289 
PBTD VS PBTH 0.893 0.485 
PBTD VS PBTI 0.015 0.011 
PBTDA VS PBTE 0.002 0.018 
PBTDA VS PBTF 0.804 0.703 
PBTDA VS PBTG 0.648 0.971 
PBTDA VS PBTH 0.585 0.279 
PBTDA VS PBTI 0.000 0.000 
PBTE VS PBTF 0.003 0.014 
PBTE VS PBTG 0.002 0.033 
PBTE VS PBTH 0.069 0.035 
PBTE VS PBTI 0.000 0.000 
PBTF VS PBTG 0.814 0.751 
PBTF VS PBTH 0.643 0.327 
PBTF VS PBTI 0.000 0.000 
PBTG VS PBTH 0.698 0.259 
PBTG VS PBTI 0.004 0.001 
PBTH VS PBTI 0.202 0.500 
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Table 6.13MV (continued from the previous page... ) 
Wald test of the significance of valuation differential between each pair of specific 
segments included in Model 2 and Model 4 
Model 2 Model4 
SEGMENTS p-value p-value 
PBTA VS PBTB 0.109 0.089 
PBTA VS PBTC 0.641 0.940 
PBTA VS PBTD 0.462 0.441 
PBTA VS PBTDA 0.040 0.0474 
PBTA VS PBTE 0.074 0.079 
PBTA VS PBTF 0.135 0.151 
PBTA VS PBTG 0.237 0.280 
PBTA VS PBTH 0.079 0.079 
PBTA VS PBTI 0.001 0.002 
PBTB VS PBTC 0.142 0.075 
PBTB VS PBTD 0.170 0.143 
PBTB VS PBTDA 0.545 0.462 
PBTB VS PBTE 0.464 0.401 
PBTB VS PBTF 0.383 0.318 
PBTB VS PBTG 0.367 0.288 
PBTB VS PBTH 0.919 0.848 
PBTB VS PBTI 0.946 0.896 
PBTC VS PBTD 0.569 0.121 
PBTC VS PBTDA 0.001 0.000 
PBTC VS PBTE 0.012 0.002 
PBTC VS PBTF 0.077 0.022 
PBTC VS PBTG 0.242 0.133 
PBTC VS PBTH 0.097 0.054 
PBTC VS PBTI 0.000 0.000 
DPBT VS PBTDA 0.001 0.001 
PBTD VS PBTE 0.020 0.028 
PBTD VS PBTF 0.122 0.161 
PBTD VS PBTG 0.346 0.452 
PBTD VS PBTH 0.130 0.136 
PBTD VS PBTI 0.000 0.000 
PBTDA VS PBTE 0.646 0.694 
PBTDA VS PBTF 0.385 0.409 
PBTDA VS PBTG 0.411 0.365 
PBTDA VS PBTH 0.567 0.551 
PBTDA VS PBTI 0.016 0.036 
PBTE VS PBTF 0.680 0.668 
PBTE VS PBTG 0.627 0.552 
PBTE VS PBTH 0.467 0.468 
PBTE VS PBTI 0.018 0.039 
PBTF VS PBTG 0.880 0.815 
PBTF VS PBTH 0.376 0.369 
PBTF VS PBTI 0.009 0.021 
PBTG VS PBTH 0.358 0.321 
PBTG VS PBTI 0.029 0.038 
PBTH VS PBTI 0.814 0.895 
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Table 6.14TA (TA-deflated model) 
Profit-making firms 
Basic model 
Model I 
PBT seg x= 
PBTA 
Model 2 
PBT seg xý 
PBTB 
Model 3 
PBT seg x 
PBTC 
Model 4 
PBT seg x  
PBTD 
Model 5 
PBT seg x  
PBTDa 
Model6 
PBT seg xý 
PBTE 
Model 7 
Intercept 0.350 0.350 0.359 0.360 0.359 0.354 0.342 
t-ratio 6.320 6.323 6.428 6.489 6.451 6.391 6.131 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NEGMV -0.376 -0.369 -0.377 -0.366 -0.382 -0.379 -0.381 
t-ratio -8.267 -8.155 -8.377 -8.141 -8.335 -8.376 -8.353 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1lTA 3.444 3.436 3.375 3.411 3.424 3.415 3.468 
t-ratio 3.248 3.233 3.130 3.196 3.223 3.193 3.278 
p-value 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
BV -0.349 -0.346 -0.368 -0.341 -0.342 -0.354 -0.349 
t-ratio -2.844 -2.806 -3.058 -2.784 -2.786 -2.900 -2.837 
p-value 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 
PBT 5.350 5.376 5.346 5.446 5.418 5.499 5.453 
t-ratio 6.636 6.645 6.607 6.712 6.634 6.587 6.773 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT seg x - -2.979 3.594 -4.299 -0.826 -0.675 1.554 
t-ratio - -2.333 0.961 -6.719 -2.163 -1.803 2.300 
p-value - 0.020 0.336 0.000 0.031 0.071 0.021 
DPBT seg x - - -4.266 -3.192 4.973 -0.933 0.491 
t-ratio - - -1.017 -0.673 1.665 -0.579 0.211 
p-value - - 0.309 0.501 0.096 0.563 0.833 
PBT'f(ta) 0.480 0.473 0.484 0.465 0.461 0.462 0.440 
t-ratio 2.378 2.335 2.366 2.299 2.267 2.281 2.220 
p-value 0.017 0.020 0.018 0.021 0.023 0.023 0.026 
DIV 6.818 6.787 6.647 6.718 7.175 7.002 6.757 
t-ratio 4.296 4.266 4.132 4.228 4.556 4.451 4.251 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adj. ER 0.546 0.543 0.556 0.605 0.529 0.554 0.522 
t-ratio 0.915 0.908 0.934 1.020 0.896 0.909 0.878 
p-value 0.360 0.364 0.350 0.308 0.370 0.363 0.380 
No. of cases 1670 1670 1670 1670 1670 1670 1670 
Adj. R- 40.3% 40.3% 40.5% 40.7% 40.4% 40.4% 40.4% 
Square 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below the regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 6.14TA (continued from previous page... ) 
Intercept 
t-ratio 
p-value 
NEGMV 
t-ratio 
p-value 
1/TA 
BV 
t-ratio 
p-value 
t-ratio 
p-value 
PBT 
t-ratio 
p-value 
PBT seg x 
t-ratio 
p-value 
DPBT seg x 
t-ratio 
p-value 
PBT*f(ta) 
t-ratio 
p-value 
DIV 
t-ratio 
p-value 
Adj. ER 
t-ratio 
p-value 
PBT seg x= 
PBTF 
Model 8 
PBT seg x= 
PBTG 
Model 9 
PBT seg x 
PBTH 
Model 10 
PBT seg xm 
PBTI 
Model 11 
PBT seg xn 
PBTABC" 
Model 12 
PBT sop xa 
PBTD1 " 
Model 13 
0.350 0.348 0.349 0.264 0.355 0.367 
6.292 6.287 6.297 4.954 6,433 6.633 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
-0.377 -0.374 -0.377 -0.370 -0.359 -0.385 
-8.258 -8.193 -8.381 -8.836 -7.710 -8.468 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3.445 3.442 3.447 2.596 3.388 3.333 
3.249 3.239 3.248 2.526 3.139 3.072 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.002 0.002 
-0.349 -0.357 -0.349 -0.129 -0.344 -0.358 
-2.839 -2.906 -2.828 -1.167 -2.827 -2.981 
0.005 0.004 0.005 0.243 0.005 0.003 
5.343 5.369 5.346 3.666 5.314 5.500 
6.543 6.654 6.617 4.855 6.579 6.473 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.106 0.587 -0.026 3.791 -2.600 -0.917 
0.174 1.077 -0.020 5.476 -2.171 -2.626 
0.862 0.282 0.984 0.000 0.030 0.009 
0.893 -14.702 -13.302 -7.855 1.519 0.233 
0.158 -6.534 -0.644 -2.924 0.729 0.117 
0.874 0.000 0.519 0.003 0.466 0.907 
0.481 0.466 0.481 0.764 0.484 0.465 
2.374 2.280 2.379 3.814 2.396 2.267 
0.018 0.023 0.017 0.000 0.017 0.023 
6.817 6.883 6.846 7.268 7.039 7.608 
4.285 4.342 4.300 4.703 4.490 4.908 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.554 0.518 0.548 0.537 0.607 0.558 
0.929 0.866 0.918 0.942 1.029 0.926 
0.353 0.387 0.358 0.346 0.304 0.355 
No. of cases 1670 1670 1670 1670 1670 1670 
Adj. R- 40.2% 40.3% 40.2% 44.0% 40.6% 40.7% 
Square 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below the regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 6.14Sale (Group Sale-deflated model) 
ofit-making sample 
Basic model 
Modell 
PBT seg x= 
PBTA 
Model 2 
PBT seg x= 
PBTB 
Model 3 
PBT seg xý 
PBTC 
Model 4 
PBT seg xý 
PBTD 
Model 5 
PBT seg x  
PBTDa 
Model6 
PBT seg xý 
PBTE 
Model 7 
Intercept 0.221 0.221 0.234 0.228 0.209 0.227 0.186 
t-ratio 5.846 5.850 6.134 6.016 5.034 5.949 5.125 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NEGMV -0.582 -0.581 -0.582 -0.562 -0.578 -0.583 -0.569 
t-ratio -7.463 -7.366 -7.506 -7.227 -7.450 -7.494 -7.576 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1/Sale 2.001 2.000 1.823 1.967 2.018 1.988 1.857 
t-ratio 1.574 1.571 1.567 1.546 1.582 1.563 1.477 
p-value 0.116 0.116 0.117 0.122 0.114 0.118 0.140 
BV 0.364 0.364 0.368 0.357 0.372 0.356 0.425 
t-ratio 2.661 2.661 2.694 2.606 2.701 2.555 2.928 
p-value 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.011 0.003 
PBT 6.280 6.281 6.024 6.460 6.201 6.371 6.117 
t-ratio 5.314 5.313 5.031 5.449 5.389 5.225 5.180 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT seg x - -0.237 4.564 -4.949 0.791 -0.489 -1.676 
t-ratio - -0.133 1.181 -6.497 0.948 -0.967 -3.057 
p-value - 0.894 0.238 0.000 0.343 0.334 0.002 
DPBT seg x - - -1.801 -6.015 -1.727 -1.916 -0.544 
t-ratio - - -0.476 -0.515 -0.548 -0.867 -0.068 
p-value - - 0.634 0.606 0.584 0.386 0.946 
PBTf(sale) 0.008 0.008 0.028 -0.001 0.010 0.006 0.026 
t-ratio 0.145 0.144 0.479 -0.014 0.190 0.101 0.453 
p-value 0.885 0.886 0.632 0.989 0.849 0.919 0.651 
DIV 3.958 3.957 3.364 4.061 3.795 4.011 4.939 
t-ratio 1.917 1.916 1.587 1.989 1.818 1.939 2.441 
p-value 0.055 0.055 0.113 0.047 0.069 0.053 0.015 
Adj. ER -0.253 -0.254 -0.191 -0.200 -0.213 -0.251 -0.137 
t-ratio -0.267 -0.268 -0.203 -0.212 -0.226 -0.263 -0.148 
p-value 0.789 0.789 0.839 0.832 0.821 0.793 0.883 
No. of cases 1670 1670 1670 1670 1670 1670 1670 
Adj. R- 36.3% 36.3% 36.6% 36.7% 36.3% 36.3% 36.6% 
Square 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below the regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 6.14Sale (continued from the previous page... ) 
PBT seg xc 
PBTF 
Model 8 
PBT seg x= 
PBTG 
Model9 
PBT seg x= 
PBTH 
Model 10 
PBT seg x  
PBTI 
Model I 
PBT seg x= 
PBTABC" 
Model 12 
PBT seg x  
PBTD1" 
Model 13 
Intercept 0.222 0.217 0.221 0.190 0.220 0.215 
t-ratio 5.834 5.599 5.837 5.401 5.853 4.993 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NEGMV -0.582 -0.581 -0.580 -0.558 -0.578 -0.580 
t-ratio -7.439 -7.411 -7.377 -7.586 -7.066 -7.477 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1/Sale 2.001 1.965 1.813 1.369 2.184 2.008 
t-ratio 1.573 1.540 1.432 1.101 1.659 1.579 
p-value 0.116 0.124 0.152 0.271 0.097 0.114 
BV 0.365 0.359 0.367 0.382 0.364 0.370 
t-ratio 2.651 2.605 2.528 3.019 2.654 2.613 
p-value 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.003 0.008 0.009 
PBT 6.281 6.364 6.290 4.542 6.239 6.220 
t-ratio 5.316 5.328 5.321 3.884 5.192 5.267 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT seg x 0.039 0.737 -1.013 4.353 -0.212 0.217 
t-ratio 0.068 1.033 -0.495 4.432 -0.095 0.363 
p-value 0.946 0.302 0.621 0.000 0.925 0.717 
DPBT seg x 7.604 -19.599 -8.953 -7.833 3.368 -0.803 
t-ratio 1.080 -3.578 -2.282 -1.152 1.362 -0.292 
p-value 0.280 0.000 0.023 0.249 0.173 0.771 
PBTf(sale) 0.008 0.003 0.005 0.075 0.010 0.010 
t-ratio 0.138 0.046 0.097 1.311 0.172 0.176 
p-value 0.890 0.963 0.923 0.190 0.864 0.860 
DIV 3.950 4.019 4.122 5.136 4.058 3.896 
t-ratio 1.913 1.942 2.014 2.543 1.962 1.855 
p-value 0.056 0.052 0.044 0.011 0.050 0.064 
dj. ER -0.246 -0.248 -0.253 -0.195 -0.246 -0.244 
t-ratio -0.260 -0.263 -0.267 -0.218 -0.260 -0.259 
p-value 0.795 0.792 0.789 0.827 0.795 0.796 
No. of cases 1670 1670 1670 1670 1670 1670 
Adj. R-S uare 36.2% 36.3% 36.4% 39.2% 36.3% 36.2% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below the regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 6.14MV (One year lagged MV-deflated model) 
Profit-making firms 
Basic 
model 
Modell 
PBT seg x 
= PBTA 
Model2 
PBT seg x 
= PBTB 
Model3 
PBT seg x 
  PBTC 
Model 4 
PBT sog x 
  PBTD 
Model5 
PUT seg x 
  PBTDa 
Mode16 
PBT seg x 
  PBTE 
Model7 
Intercept 0.925 0.922 0.926 0.920 0.935 0.918 0.927 
t-ratio 22.832 22.605 22.893 22.425 23.009 22.297 22.792 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NEGMV -0.512 -0.508 -0.511 -0.511 -0.511 -0.511 -0.512 
t-ratio -14.209 -14.312 -14.165 -14.183 -14.189 -14.312 -14.169 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1/MV 216.226 192.026 237.066 199.792 207.239 155.448 236.588 
t-ratio 0.931 0.834 0.953 0.863 0.889 0.691 1.005 
p-value 0.352 0.405 0.341 0.388 0.374 0.489 0.315 
BV 0.233 0.239 0.232 0.238 0.234 0.235 0.226 
t-ratio 4.949 4.997 4.880 5.013 5.003 4.978 4.719 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT 2.065 2.098 2.042 2.141 2.100 2.035 2.108 
t-ratio 6.077 6.158 5.941 6.076 6.172 5.850 6.211 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT seg x 0.000 -1.035 0.670 -0.561 -0.645 0.262 0.434 
t-ratio 0.000 -1.632 0.568 -2.145 -3.358 1.189 1.514 
p-value 0.000 0.103 0.570 0.032 0.001 0.235 0.130 
DPBT seg 0.000 0.000 -0.144 -0.762 2.301 -2.654 2.651 
t-ratio 0.000 0.000 -0.108 -0.410 4.603 -2.441 0.434 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.914 0.682 0.000 0.015 0.664 
P13T'f(mv) -0.024 -0.026 -0.022 -0.024 -0.027 -0.020 -0.028 
t-ratio -1.053 -1.146 -0.969 -1.079 -1.223 -0.878 -1.234 
p-value 0.292 0.252 0.333 0.280 0.221 0.380 0.217 
DIV -1.297 -1.286 -1.312 -1.333 -1.010 -1.365 -1.350 
t-ratio -1.439 -1.427 -1.451 -1.474 -1.125 -1.522 -1.495 
p-value 0.150 0.154 0.147 0.140 0.261 0.128 0.135 
Adj. ER 0.600 0.586 0.608 0.621 0.578 0.620 0.598 
t-ratio 1.807 1.756 1.837 1.875 1.754 1.889 1.807 
p-value 0.071 0.079 0.066 0.061 0.079 0.059 0.071 
No. of 
cases 1344 1344 1344 1344 1344 1344 1344 
Adj. R- 
S uare 15.1% 15.1% 15.0% 15.1% 15.5% 15.2% 15.1% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below the regression 
coefficients. 
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Table 6.14MV (continued from the previous page... ) 
PBT seg x= 
PBTF 
Model 8 
PBT seg x  
PBTG 
Model 9 
PBT seg x= 
PBTH 
Model 10 
PBT seg x0 
PBTI 
Model 11 
PBT seg x  
PBTABC" 
Model 12 
PBT sog x  
PBTD1" 
Model 13 
Intercept 0.928 0.922 0.924 0.894 0.917 0.929 
t-ratio 22.841 22.732 22.819 22.428 22.241 22.194 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NEGMV -0.513 -0.509 -0.512 -0.507 -0.509 -0.513 
t-ratio -14.240 -14.213 -14.150 -14.288 -14.298 -14.190 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1/MV 225.023 194.241 204.272 33.125 213.635 189.882 
t-ratio 0.947 0.841 0.880 0.145 0.874 0.818 
p-value 0.344 0.401 0.379 0.885 0.382 0.413 
BV 0.235 0.225 0.227 0.258 0.244 0.231 
t-ratio 4.977 4.787 4.598 5.603 5.080 4.860 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT 2.080 2.068 2.076 1.677 2.146 2.143 
t-ratio 6.109 6.099 6.045 4.898 6.002 6.091 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PBT seg x 0.071 0.031 0.627 1.326 -0.539 -0.180 
t-ratio 0.211 0.068 0.708 4.560 -2.054 -0.997 
p-value 0.833 0.946 0.479 0.000 0.040 0.319 
DPBT seg x 6.380 -9.375 -4.434 -3.315 1.075 -3.203 
t-ratio 6.413 -5.363 -0.709 -5.661 1.915 -2.870 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.479 0.000 0.055 0.004 
P8T-f(mv) -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.003 -0.025 -0.026 
t-ratio -1.088 -1.071 -1.078 -0.134 -1.126 -1.163 
p-value 0.276 0.284 0.281 0.893 0.260 0.245 
DIV -1.379 -1.144 -1.261 -0.989 -1.309 -1.208 
t-ratio -1.517 -1.285 -1.396 -1.130 -1.452 -1.347 
p-value 0.129 0.199 0.163 0.259 0.147 0.178 
Adj. ER 0.624 0.587 0.600 0.640 0.607 0.614 
t-ratio 1.903 1.767 1.811 1.986 1.829 1.855 
p-value 0.057 0.077 0.070 0.047 0.067 0.064 
No. ofcases 1344 1344 1344 1344 1344 1344 
Adj. R- 
S uare 15.1% 15.4% 15.0% 16.9% 15.1% 15.2% 
White adjusted (heteroskedasticity-consistent) t-ratios and p-values are reported below the regression 
coefficients. 
401 
CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH METHODS 
This study comprises an empirical investigation of the value relevance and 
pricing of specific firm-level and segment-level financial statement information 
reported by UK multi-segment firms in the annual reports. In the UK, the accounting 
standards specify that firms which are geographically or industrially diversified disclose 
some basic financial information on each material segment. The issue of usefulness of 
the segment-level reporting for security valuation and, hence, the value relevance of this 
information, is one of the focal concerns of this study. The investigation focuses on 
whether the operations of a cross-section of UK multi-segment firms, reported from 
segments operating in specific geographic locations or industries, are perceived by 
investors to have differential association with (or relative contributions to) the equity 
market value of the entire firm. In addition, this study concerns the issues of value 
relevance and pricing of specific consolidated or firm-level accounting information. It 
also identifies and explores factors and contexts that impact on these relationships. The 
study seeks to provide the empirical evidence on: 
(i) the relationships (in terms of value relevance and pricing) between the firm's 
equity market value and firm-level financial statement information, such as 
contemporaneous equity book value, earnings and dividends; 
(ii) the existence (or the lack of it) of relationships between the firm's segment- 
level financial information and the entire firm's equity market value; and 
(iii) the relative valuation patterns of segments with specific geographic or line- 
of-business profiles. 
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Alongside the segment-related results, this study provides further empirical 
evidence on the broader issues, including: (i) the value relevance of consolidated 
financial statement information reported by UK publicly traded firms over the period 
from 1987 to 2002; (ii) the adequacy of the UK segment reporting accounting standard 
SSAP 25; and (iii) the quality of segment disclosures in the UK. A brief summary of 
finding is presented in section 7.2. 
The study adopts the positivist methodology, in that it mainly relies on the 
empirical knowledge as the primary reliable and valid form of knowledge. To some 
extent, the basic valuation model, employed in this study for capturing the empirics of 
the relationships in question, represents a fusion of valuation frameworks developed and 
utilised in earlier studies [e. g., Edwards and Bell (1961), Peasnell (1981,1982), Ohlson 
(1989,1995), Rees (1997), Garrod and Rees (1998), Wysocki (1998)]. 
In its basic analytical form, the employed consolidated-level valuation model 
expresses the equity market value of the firm as a linear function of thee value drivers: 
equity book value, earnings for ordinary, and dividends for ordinary shareholders. 
When transformed into the regression format, to allow the empirical testing of the firm- 
level relationships, this model is deflated by a scale proxy and appended with additional 
control and dummy variables. To investigate the segment-level relationships, the 
earnings for ordinary variable is further disaggregated into its segment-level elements. 
This approach allows the testing of the difference in value contribution of earnings from 
different geographic or industrial segments. 
7.2 MAIN FINDINGS 
Empirical findings reported in this study can be divided into three sections: (i) 
firm-level valuation; (ii) geographic segment valuation; and (iii) business segment 
valuation. 
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7.2.1 Firm-level results 
The behaviour of the explanatory power of the valuation model, which is a 
measure of the composite value relevance of the firm-level value drivers, appears to be 
distinctively influenced by such factors as the firms' industry and time periods. For 
example, the accounting numbers reported by firms operating in the Financial sector 
explain twice as much of the cross-sectional variation of equity market value as similar 
information reported by firms operating in the Services sector. 
The composite value relevance of accounting numbers has not been stable 
throughout the sample period (1987-2002). By and large, the results suggest that the 
value drivers included in the model have become gradually more value relevant over the 
first half of reported period. In the second half, however, there has been a sharp reversal 
of this trend, with the value relevance reaching the all times' low in year 1999. 
Among other contexts, affecting the combined informativeness of the value 
drivers is the sign of the reported earnings and book values. In general, the explanatory 
power of the regression is lower when firms report losses (i. e., negative earnings) and/or 
negative book value. This suggests that the negative financial results are perceived by 
the market to have lower degree of persistence. Finally, the value relevance of the 
accounting numbers is higher for firms that trade at a discount to book value, and when 
the dividend paying firms are compared to the non-dividend firms. 
The value relevance and pricing of specific value drivers is found to be highly 
contextual. For example, negative earnings are not capitalised, while positive earnings 
are always positively related to value. Furthermore, the magnitude of the earnings 
coefficient varies across the industries, being particularly large in the services and trade- 
related sectors, and much smaller in the finance, construction and agriculture related 
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sectors. Another interesting finding is that reported profits tend to have little or no 
valuation role for firms trading at a discount to book value. 
For firms that report losses the book value of equity becomes the most value 
relevant factor, and serves as the value anchor. In the normal circumstances, however, 
book value appears to be the least important value driver, and becomes completely 
irrelevant when it has a negative sign (i. e., when the firm is in financial distress). 
Contrary to the predictions of the dividend displacement theory, results indicate 
that dividends are positively priced. In situations where firms report losses and/or 
negative book values, dividends become the key value driver. However, there are 
circumstances when dividends play contrasting roles: they are positively (negatively) 
priced when firms trade at a premium (discount) to book value. In addition, there is 
some indication that the pricing of dividends can vary sharply across industries. There 
has also been some peculiar reversal in the pricing of dividends over the sample period. 
7.2.2 Geographic segment valuation results 
Overall, the results suggest that the geographically diversified firms are valued 
at a premium in relation to domestic firms. The stock market appears to price the 
earnings reported by the diversified firms higher than those reported by domestic 
companies. However, a significantly higher and positive capitalisation of dividends is 
observed for the domestic firms, while dividends paid by multinationals appear value- 
irrelevant. 
When the firm-level financial results are disaggregated into two broad 
geographical segments, domestic and foreign, the domestic segment has always a higher 
pricing. However, when the generic foreign segment is disaggregated into specific 
foreign segments, no longer the UK segment remains the highest relative contributor to 
the value of the firm. 
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Results indicate that the relative pricing of operations reported from different 
geographic locations has not been static. During the early economic periods (pre-1994 
or pre-1996) segmental profits reported from the America segment had the highest 
capitalisation. The domestic operations had the second-highest pricing. However, 
during the more recent economic period (1994-1997) the UK segment was associated 
with the highest relative contribution to firm value. Perhaps the most interesting results 
are those related to the most recent economic period (1998-2002). In this period, none 
of the profits reported from the foreign segments are value-relevant. This time-related 
change is, perhaps, the reflection of the dynamics of the changing economic prospects 
in various parts of the world, and/or investors' sentiments and perceptions. 
Although no direct tests have been carried out, there is some evidence of 
association between the pricing of geographic segments and the degree of popularity of 
specific geographic locations. Across all tests the Middle East & Africa segment always 
comes last in the valuation ranking, and in many tests has a negative association with 
firm value. This segment represents the most rare investment location for the UK 
multinationals. Asia is the second-least priced segment and the second least-popular 
investment location. America and Europe have higher relative pricing and, 
correspondingly, are more popular foreign investment locations. 
7.2.3 Business segment valuation results 
On the firm-level, there is some empirical evidence that the industrially 
diversified firms have lower valuation than the focused firms. These results contrast to 
those of the geographically diversified firms, which are found to be more valuable than 
the domestic firms. The rest of the key firm-level results (such as the pricing of the 
firm-level earnings, book values and dividends, as well as the valuation implications of 
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specific contexts) for the sample of industrially diversified firms are qualitatively 
similar to those of the entire sample. 
There is considerable variation of the value relevance of segmental earnings 
among business segments operating in different industries. Thus, the segments 
operating in the Hi-Tech and knowledge-intensive sectors (e. g., IT, Telecommunication 
services, etc. ) have the highest pricing and relevance to the value of the firm. Segments 
involved in the services-related operations have the second-highest pricing and value 
relevance, after the IT sector. 
In contrast, the `old' or less knowledge-intensive sector segments, such as 
Agriculture, Mining, Basic Industries and Utilities, are associated with the lowest 
relative contribution to the equity market value of the firm. Segments operating in the 
remaining economic sectors are in the middle range of valuation. 
Somewhat interesting is the finding on the valuation of dividends. They are 
positively prised and have incremental information content when the firm-level model is 
used for the business-segment reporting firms. However, when earnings are 
disaggregated into business segment elements, the dividend coefficient loses its 
statistical significance. This, possibly, implies that the segment-disaggregated earnings 
represent a better summary of value-relevant (forward looking) information, which 
overrides the information contained in the dividends. 
Finally, all business segment-level results remain robust to addition test designs, 
where the basic regression has been deflated by alternative scale-proxies. 
By and large, empirical tests suggest that segment-level accounting data 
communicate value relevant information, which is often incremental to the 
consolidated-level data. In particular, segment disclosures have incremental information 
content in situations where on the consolidated level the firm reports losses (which are 
not priced), while on the disaggregated level profits are reported for some of the 
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disclosed segments. Nevertheless, geographic segment reports are, on average, 
relatively more informative (value relevant) than the business segment reports. This, 
perhaps, reflects the relatively higher level of discretion allowed to firms by the 
business segment reporting requirements section of SSAP 25, when identifying, 
grouping and reporting line-of-business operations. 
7.3 KEY FINDINGS 
" The extent of value relevance and the pricing of book value, earnings and dividends 
are dependent upon: the sign of reported earnings and book values: the value of the 
book-to-market ratio; the economic time-periods; the dividend status of the firm; the 
firm's industrial affiliation; 
" Industrially diversified firms have lower valuation than focused firms, while 
geographically diversified firms have higher valuation than domestic firms; 
" Geographic and line-of-business segment data are, by and large, value relevant and 
have incremental information content, particularly when firms report firm-level 
losses. 
" Earnings related to most geographic segments and some business segments have 
differential relative pricing. For example, the Services and IT sector-related segment 
operations are priced statistically higher than other segments. However, neither the 
pricing of specific segments, nor their value relevance remains constant over time. 
" Overall, segmental information, disclosed in accordance with SSAP25 requirements, 
appears to be of limited value relevance, as perceived by the stock market. 
7.4. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS 
The empirical findings reported in the study might contribute to our knowledge 
and understanding of the complex relationships existing between the market's 
408 
perception of the equity value and the specific firm-level and segment-level accounting 
fundamentals. There are several aspects to the contributions of this research. 
First, this study contributes to the academic literature by filling some of the 
gaps in the market based accounting research area. It improves understanding of the role 
and importance of the corporate segmental information to the stock market. On the level 
of segmental analysis this study extends the previous studies (see Chapter 2) in several 
respects. I have investigated both dimensions of the corporate diversification and 
segment disclosures of the UK firms: geographic and line-of-business. In addition to 
testing differential valuation of `domestic' vs. `foreign' operations, I have investigated 
the relative pair-wise valuations across all geographic segment locations (i. e., UK, 
Europe, America, Asia, Middle East and Africa). A similar pair-wise approach is used 
to assess differential value contributions associated with segments operating in specific 
industries. Another feature of this study is that it uses a longer time period and tests the 
impact of a wider range of valuation-affecting contexts. This study also provides 
evidence on the specificity of the value relevance of key firm-level financial value 
drivers of the UK firms, subject to such factors as economic periods, industry of the 
firm and its financial health. 
Second, apart from the contributions to the academic literature, the findings of 
this study might be of practical interest to the UK bodies and institutions involved in the 
process of the development of accounting standards. The study argues and presents 
evidence to suggest that the segment reporting standard, SSAP 25, is not entirely 
adequate for ensuring that the segment-level financial information, disclosed by firms, 
is value relevant (i. e., useful for investors) and is of good quality (i. e., comparable 
across different firms and over time). The Accounting Standards Board might consider 
using the reported empirical evidence on the usefulness of segmental data to make 
further improvements to some of the principles and requirements of the Statement of 
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Standard Accounting Practice no. 25. In particular, the business segment reporting 
section of SSAP 25 could be appended with an additional clause that would require 
firms to report the 2,3 or 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code or the 
FTSE Global Classification System code for each business segment. This would make 
business segment information comparable both cross-sectionally and over time. In 
addition, SSAP 25 could be appended by requiring firms to present the basis for the 
computation of the reported segmental net assets (NAs) and profit before tax (PBTs). 
This will help the analyst to substantiate the quality of the reported NA and PBT 
numbers, making them more informative, hence, value relevant. 
Third, this study might offer the firms' finance officers, who make decisions on 
the content of segmental disclosures, valuable insights into how the segment 
information is perceived by investors and capitalised into the share price. The 
knowledge of the market's perception of the segment-level information and markets 
valuation of specific segments can help the firm's managers tailor the segmental report 
more adequately. The segment information contained in the report might be structured 
and disclosed in such way that it would be positively perceived by the market and 
reflected in the value of the firm. In other words, the reporting of the segment-level 
financial information could be optimised, to minimise the adverse reception of this 
information by investors. 
Finally, both the results and the model development sections of this study may 
contribute to the work of financial analysts. On the modelling level, analysts may find 
some of the modelling tools and approaches, examined in Chapter 3, appropriate for 
factoring them into their own valuation techniques/methods. On the value driver or 
valuation factor-level, the empirical results might be used for determining factors which 
should be given more weight or controlled for (under certain conditions or valuation 
contexts), when developing the value estimates for a company or its segments. In 
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addition, results that expose the dynamics of the changing relative valuation of specific 
geographic locations or lines-of-business, as perceived by the market, might have 
practical implications for decisions concerning portfolio allocation and investment 
management. 
7.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
In an empirical accounting study that uses a valuation model as the major 
analytical tool, the results and conclusions would, by and large, depend on how close 
the employed model reflects reality. From the methodological point of view, more than 
one model class might be appropriate for addressing a given research question. The task 
of model class selection, its development and justification is always a challenging 
exercise. What unites all possible model-based approaches is the lack of universal 
consensus. 
The model employed in this study is not necessarily the only possible pathway 
for addressing the research question. In chapters 2 and 3I have argued that the 
employed basic model is the most adequate, given the specifics of the research question 
and availability of data. Nevertheless, much of the empirical results might still be 
influenced by some choices and assumptions, which are necessary to make when 
operationalising the model. Among the choices which have to be made are: 
(i) the appropriate regression-representation of the analytical model: linear vs. 
non-linear regressions; 
(ii) the regression estimation technique (e. g., OLS, GLS, WLS, rank regressions, 
etc. ), which usually requires knowledge of the loss function; 
(iii) the alternative methods for dealing with the effect of cross-sectional 
differences in scale on the estimated regression parameters. This, for 
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example, might necessitate deflation of the model by a scale proxy, which, in 
turn, would require to decide on the `best' scale proxy; and 
(iv) the definition and identification of over-influential cases and/or outliers, and 
how to deal with the outliers; 
The availability and reliability of the firm-level and, specifically, segment-level 
financial statement data is another limiting factor for this study. Some of the variables, 
required by the analytical model, are not readily available and/or cannot be imputed. In 
addition, the available segment-level data, collected from the Extel database, often 
appear to be inconsistent, cross-sectionally and longitudinally incomparable, and, in 
general, has low quality (i. e., contain multiple errors which are difficult to trace). In 
addition, the implicit ambiguity in the segment reporting standard SSAP 25 contributes 
to these problems, as it is unclear to what extent the disclosed segmental data reflects 
the firm's actual segmental organisation. 
These data-related problems have `bottlenecked' the initial analytical model, 
and, at times, necessitated the use of a simpler model, as has been applied in this study. 
Nevertheless, in the course of this study numerous tests for the sensitivity of the results 
to various estimation techniques, outlier definitions and scale factors have been 
performed, and the main results and findings have been found robust. 
7.6 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In light of the findings and limitations, this research can be extended in several 
directions. 
Work on valuation model: this might include further empirical testing of the 
basic model's performance using different definitions of the loss function, or different 
alternative ad hoc explanatory or dependent variables, scale factors, non-linear model 
specifications, treatment of influential observations and outliers. 
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Work on value relevance of firm-level financial information: 
" empirical analysis of value relevance of additional forward-looking firm-level 
accounting fundamentals, with special attention to specific contexts; 
" further examination of the determinants of the pronounced time-related changes 
in the value relevance of accounting fundamentals, and valuation significance of 
specific firm-level accounting numbers. 
Work on value relevance of segment-level financial information: further 
identification and investigation of the determinants of differential valuation of 
operations reported from specific line-of-business or geographical segments. 
413 
REFERENCE 
1. Ajinkya B., 1980, `An Empirical Evaluation of Line of Business Repotting', 
Journal ofAccounting Research, Vol. 18(2), pp. 343-361. 
2. Akbar S., Stark A., 2003a, `Deflators, Net Shareholder Cash Flows, Dividends, 
Capital Contributions and Estimated Models of Corporate Valuation', Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 30 (9&10), p. 1211. 
3. Akbar S., Stark A., 2003b, `Discussion of Scale and the Scale Effect in Market- 
Based Accounting Research', Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 
30 (1&2), pp. 57-72. 
4. Ali A., Zarowin P., 1992, `The Role of Earnings Levels in Annual Earnings- 
Returns Studies', Journal ofAccounting Research, Vol. 30, pp. 286-296. 
5. Arnold J., Moizer P., 1984, `A Survey of the Methods used by UK Investment 
Analysts to Appraise Investments in Ordinary Shares', Accounting and Business 
Research, Vol. 14, pp. 195-207. 
6. Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR), 1993, Financial 
Reporting in the 1990s and Beyond. Charlottesville, VA: AIMR. 
7. Balakrishnan R, Harris T., Sen P., 1990, `The Predictive Ability of Geographic 
Segment Disclosures', Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 28 (2), pp. 305- 
325. 
8. Baldwin B., 1984, `Segment Earnings Disclosure and the Ability of Security 
Analysts to Forecast Earnings Per Share', The Accounting Review, Vol. 59(3), 
pp. 376-389. 
9. Ball R, and Brown P., 1968, `An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting 
Numbers', Journal ofAccountingResearch, Vol. 6 (2), pp159-178. 
414 
10. Banz R., 1981, `The Relationship Between Return and Market Value of 
Common Stocks', Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 9 (March), pp. 3-18. 
11. Barnea A., Lakonishok J., 1980, `An Analysis of the Usefulness of 
Disaggregated Accounting Data for Forecasts of Corporate Performance', 
Decision Sciences, Vol. 11, pp. 17-26. 
12. Barth M., Beaver W., Landsman W., 1998, `Relative Valuation Roles of Equity 
Book Value and Net Income as a Function of Financial Health', Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 25, pp. 1-34. 
13. Barth M., Clinch G., 2001, `Scale Effect in Capital Market Accounting 
Research', Working paper, Stanford University, (January). 
14. Bartov E., Lynn S., Ronen J., `Returns-Earnings Regressions: A Synthesis 
Approach', AAA Annual Meeting 2001 (Refereed conference paper), American 
Accounting Association, Atlanta, USA, August 2001. 
15. Basu S., Douthett E., Lim S., 2000, `The Usefulness of Industry Segment 
Information', Working Paper, City University of New York. 
16. Bens D., Monahan S., 2002, `Disclosure Quality and the Excess Value of 
Diversification', Working paper, University of Chicago. 
17. Berger P., Ofek E., 1995, `Diversification's Effect on Firm Value', Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 37, pp. 39-65. 
18. Berger P., Ofek E., Swary I., 1996, `Investor Valuation of the Abandonment 
Option', Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 42, pp. 257-287. 
19. Bernard V. L., 1987, `Cross-Sectional Dependence and Problems in Inference in 
Market-Based Accounting Research', Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 
25(1), pp. 1-48. 
415 
20. Biddle G., Seow G., 1991, `The Estimation and Determinants of Associations 
Between Returns and Earnings: Evidence from Cross-industry Comparisons', 
Journal ofAccounting, Auditing and Finance, Vol. 6, pp. 183-232. 
21. Boatsman J., Behn B., Patz D., 1993, `A Test of the Use of Geographic Segment 
Disclosures', Journal ofAccounting Research, Vol. 31, pp. 46-64. 
22. Bodnar G, Tang C., Weintrop J., 1999, `Both Sides of Corporate Diversification: 
The Value Impact of Geographic and Industrial Diversification', Working Paper, 
John Hopkins University, (December). 
23. Bodnar G, Tang C., Weintrop J., 2003, `The Value of Corporate International 
Diversification', Working Paper, John Hopkins University, (July). 
24. Bodnar G., Weintrop J., 1997, `The Valuation of Foreign Income of US 
Multinational Firms: A Growth Opportunities Perspective', Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 24, pp. 69-97. 
25. Brief R., Zarowin P., `The Value Relevance of Dividends, Book Value and 
Earnings', Working Paper, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York 
University. 
26. Brown L., Hagerman R., Griffin P., Zmijewski M., 1987, `Security Analyst 
Superiority Relative to Univariate Time Series Models in Forecasting Quarterly 
Earnings', Journal ofAccounting and Economics, Vo. 9(1), pp. 61-87. 
27. Brown S., Lo K., Lys T., 1999, `Use of R2 in Accounting Research: Measuring 
Changes in Value Relevance Over the Last Four Decades', Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 28(2), pp. 83-115. 
28. Buhner R, 1987, `Assessing International Diversification of West German 
Corporations', Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 8, pp. 25-37. 
29. Burgstahler D., Dichev I., 1997, `Earnings, Adaptation, and Equity Value', The 
Accounting Review, Vol. 72, pp. 187-215. 
416 
30. Capstaff J., Paudyal K., Rees W., 1995, `The Accuracy and Rationality of 
Earnings Forecasts by U. K. Analysts', Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, Vol. 22, pp. 69-87. 
31. Chang J., 1999, `The decline in value relevance of earnings and book values', 
Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania. 
32. Chauvin K, Hirschey M., 1993, `Advertising, R&D Expenditures and the 
Market Value of the Firm', Financial Management, Vol. 4, pp. 128-140. 
33. Chen P., Zhang G., 2003, `Heterogeneous Investment Opportunities in Multiple- 
Segment Firms and the Incremental Value Relevance of Segment Accounting 
Data', The Accounting Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 397-428. 
34. Christie A., 1987, 'On Cross Sectional Analysis in Accounting Research', 
Journal ofAccounting and Economics, Vol. 9, pp. 231-58. 
35. Christophe S., 1999, `The Value of Earnings Surprises from Foreign and 
Domestic Operations: A Non-Symmetric ERC Perspective', Working Paper, 
George Mason University. 
36. Collins D., 1975, `SEC Product-line Reporting and Market Efficiency', Journal 
of Financial Economics, Vol. 2 (2), pp. 125-164. 
37. Collins D., 1976, `Predicting Earnings with Sub-Entity Data: Some Further 
Evidence', Journal ofAccounting Research, Vol. 14 (1), pp. 182-193. 
38. Collins D., Kemsley D., Lang M., 1998, `Cross-Jurisdictional Income Shifting 
and Earnings Valuation', Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 1998, no. 3, pp. 
209-230. 
39. Collins D., Kothari S., 1989, `An Analysis of the Inter-temporal and cross- 
sectional determinants of earnings response coefficients', Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 143-181. 
417 
40. Collins D., Maydew E., Weiss I., 1997, `Changes in the Value-Relevance of 
Earnings and Book Values Over the Past Forty Years', Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, Vol. 24, pp. 36-67. 
41. Collins D., Pincus M., Xie H., 1999, `Equity Valuation and Negative Earnings: 
The Role of Book Value of Equity', The Accounting Review, Vol. 74, pp. 29-61. 
42. Collins D., Simonds R., 1979, `SEC Line of Business Disclosure and Market 
Risk Adjustments', Journal ofAccounting Research, Vol. 17 (2), pp. 352-383. 
43. Comment R., Jarrell G., 1995, `Corporate Focus and Stock Returns', Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 37, pp67-87. 
44. Conover T., Conover J., Karafiath I., 1994, `Equity Market Performance of US 
Multinational Companies, the 1982 Closure of the Mexican FEX Market, and 
Accounting Disclosures of Political Risk', Advances in International 
Accounting, Vol. 7, pp. 145-169. 
45. Core J., Guay W., Van Buskirk A., 2003, `Market Valuations in the New 
Economy: an Investigation of What Has Changed', Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 34, pp. 43-67. 
46. Danbolt J., Rees W., 2002, `The Valuation of European Financial Firms', 
Review ofAccounting and Finance, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 5-24. 
47. Donnelly R, and Walker M., 1995, `Share Price Anticipation of Earnings and 
the Effect of Earnings Persistence and Firm Size', Journal of Business Finance 
and Accounting, Vol. 22, pp. 5-18. 
48. Dontoh A., Radhakrishnan S., Ronen J., `Information Content of Stock Price and 
Earnings: Evidence on Increased Noise in Stock Price Relative to Earnings', 
Working paper, New York University, 2001. 
418 
49. Doupnik T., Robert R., 1990, `Geographic Area Disclosures and the Assessment 
of Foreign Investment Risk for Disclosure in Accounting Statement Notes', The 
International Journal ofAccounting, Vol. 25 (4), pp. 252-267. 
50. Duru A., Reeb D., 2002, `International Diversification and Analysts' Forecast 
Accuracy and Bias', The Accounting Review, Vol. 77 (2), pp. 415-433. 
51. Dye R., 1986, `Proprietary and Nonproprietary Disclosures', Journal of 
Business, Vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 331-366. 
52. Easton P., 1998, `Discussion of Revalued Financial, Tangible, and Intangible 
Assets: Association with Share Prices and Non-Market-Based Value estimates', 
Journal ofAccounting Research, Vol. 36, pp. 235-52. 
53. Easton P., Harris T., 1991, `Earnings as an Explanatory Variable for Returns', 
Journal ofAccounting Research, Vol. 29, pp. 19-36. 
54. Easton P., Harris T., Ohlson J., 1992, `Aggregate Accounting Earnings Can 
Explain Most of Security Returns', Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 
15, pp. 119-142. 
55. Easton P, Sommers G., 2003, `Scale and Scale Effects in Market-Based 
Accounting Research', Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 30 (1) 
2003. 
56. Edwards E., Bell P., 1961, `The Theory and Management of Business Income', 
Berkeley, CA, University of California Press. 
57. Elsharkawy A., Garrod N., 1997, `The Impact of Investor Sophistication on 
Price Responses to Earnings News', Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, Vol. 23, pp. 221-23 6. 
58. Emmanuel C., Garrod N., Frost C., `Segment and Consolidated Financial 
Statements: The Complementary Twins', in S. J. Gray and A. G. Coenenberg 
419 
(eds) International Group Accounting: International Harmonization and the 
Seventh EEC Directive (Croom Helm, 1988). 
59. Emmanual C., Pick R., 1980, `The Predictive Ability of U. K. Segment Reports', 
The Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 7(2), pp. 201-218. 
60. Emmanuel C., Garrod N., 1992, `Segment Reporting: International Issues and 
Evidence', Prentice Hall-ICAEW. 
61. Emmanuel C., Garrod N., 1999, `On Segment Identification, Relevance and 
Comparability', Working Paper, Department of Accounting and Finance, 
University of Glasgow. 
62. Emmanuel C., Garrod N., 2002, 'On the Relevance and Comparability of 
Segmental Data', Abacus, Vol. 38 (2), pp. 215-234. 
63. Emmanuel C, Garrod N, Frost C., 1989, `An Experimental Test of Analysts' 
Forecasting Behaviour', British Accounting Review, Vol. 21, pp. 119-126. 
64. Emmanuel C., Garrod N., McCallum C., Rennie E., 1999, `The Impact of SSAP 
25 and the 10% Materiality Rule on Segment Disclosure in the UK', British 
Accounting Review, Vol. 31, pp. 127-149. 
65. Errunza V., Senbet L., 1981, `The Effects of International Operations on the 
Market Value of the Firm: Theory and Evidence', Journal of Finance, Vol. 36 
(2), pp. 401-417. 
66. Fama E., French K., 1992, `The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns', The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 47 (2), pp. 427-465. 
67. Fatemi A., 1984, `Shareholder Benefits from Corporate International 
Diversification', Journal of Finance, Vol. 39 (5), pp. 1325-1344. 
420 
68. Feltham G., Ohlson J., 1995, `Valuation of Clean Surplus Accounting for 
Operating and Financial Activities', Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 
11,689-731. 
69. Foster G., 1975, `Security Price Revaluation Implication of Sub-Earnings 
Disclosure', Journal ofAccounting Research, Vol. 13 (2), pp. 283-292. 
70. Francis J., Schipper K., 1999, `Have Financial Statements Lost Their 
Relevance', Journal ofAccounting Research, Vol. 37(2), pp. 319-352. 
71. Frankel R., Lee C., 1998, `Accounting Valuation, Market Expectation and 
Cross-Sectional Stock Returns', The Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 
25, pp. 283-319. 
72. Garrod N., Emmanuel C., 1987, `An Empirical Analysis of the Usefulness of 
Disaggregated Accounting Data for Forecasts of Corporate Performance', 
Omega, No. 5, pp. 371-382. 
73. Garrod N., Rees W., 1998, 'International Diversification and Firm Value', 
Journal ofBusiness Finance and Accounting, Vol. 25 (9&10), pp. 1255-1281. 
74. Garrod N., Rees W., 1999, `Forecasting Earnings Growth Using Fundamentals 
and Price', Working Paper, University of Glasgow. 
75. Giner B., Reverte C., 1999, `The Value Relevance of Earnings Disaggregation 
Provided in the Spanish Profit and Loss Account', European Accounting 
Review, Vol. 8, pp. 1-21. 
76. Givoly D., Hayn C., D'souza J., 1999, `Measurement Errors and Information 
Content of Segment Reporting', Review ofAccounting Studies, Vol. 4, pp. 15-43. 
77. Grant R, 1987, `Multinationality and Performance Among British 
Manufacturing Companies', Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 18, 
no. 3, pp. 79-89. 
421 
78. Gray S., `Information Disclosure and the Multinational Corporation', (Wiley, 
1984). 
79. Green J., Stark A., Thomas H., 1996, 'UK Evidence on the Market Valuation of 
Research and Development Expenditures', Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, Vol. 23 (2), pp. 191-216. 
80. Hand J., Landsman W., 1999, `The Pricing of Dividends in Equity Valuation', 
Working Paper, University of North Carolina. 
81. Hayes R., Lundholm R., 1996, `Segment Reporting to the Capital Market in the 
Presence of a Competitor', Journal ofAccounting Research, Vol. 34 (2), pp. 261- 
279. 
82. Hayn C., 1995, `The Information Content of Losses', Journal ofAccounting and 
Economics, Vol. 20, pp. 125-154. 
83. Healy P., Palepu K., 1993, `The Effect of Firm's Financial Disclosure Strategies 
on Stock Prices', Accounting Horizons, Vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 1-11. 
84. Heckman C., 1985, `A Financial Model of Foreign Exchange Exposure', 
Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 16 (2), pp. 83-99. 
85. Herrmann D., 1996, `The Predictive Ability of Geographic Segment Information 
at the Country, Continent, and Consolidated Levels', The Journal of 
International Financial Management and Accounting, Vol. 7(1), pp. 50-73. 
86. Herrmann D., Thomas W., 1997, `Geographic Segment Disclosures: Theories, 
Findings, and Implications', The International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 32 
(4), pp. 487-501. 
87. Herrmann D., Thomas W., 2000, `A Model of Forecast Precision Using 
Segment Disclosures: Implications for SFAS No. 131', Journal of International 
Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Vol. 9 (1), pp. 1-18. 
422 
88. Herrmann D., Inoue T., Thomas W., 2001, `The Relation Between Incremental 
Subsidiary Earnings and Future Stock Returns in Japan', Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting, Vol. 28, no. 9&10, pp. 1115-1139. 
89. Hirschey M., 1985, `Market Structure and Market Value', Journal of Business, 
Vol. 58, pp. 89-98. 
90. Hirschey M., Spencer S., 1992, `Size Effects in the Market Valuation of 
Fundamental Factors', Financial Analyst Journal, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 91-95. 
91. HMSO Companies Act 1985, (HMSO, 1985). 
92. Hussain S., 1997, `The Impact of Segment Definition on the Accuracy of 
Analysts' Earnings Forecasts', Accounting & Business Research, Vol. 27(2) pp. 
145-156. 
93. Kinney R, 1971, `Predicting Earnings: Entity Versus Subentity Data', Journal 
ofAccountingResearch, Vol. 10 (1), pp. 127-136. 
94. Kochanek R., 1974, `Segmental Financial Disclosure by Diversified Firms and 
Security Prices', Accounting Review, Vol. 49 (2), pp. 245-258. 
95. Kormendi R., Lipe R., 1987, `Earnings Innovation, Earnings Persistence and 
Stock Returns', Journal of Business, Vol. 60, pp. 323-345. 
96. Kothari S., 1992, `Price-Earnings Regressions in the Presence of Price Leading 
Earnings', Journal ofAccounting and Economics, Vol. 15, pp. 173-202. 
97. Kothari S., Sloan R., 1992, `Information in Prices about Future Earnings: 
Implications for Earnings Response Coefficients', Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 15, pp. 143-172. 
98. Kothari S., Zimmerman J., 1995, `Price and Return Models', Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 20, pp. 155-192. 
423 
99. Lang L., Stulz R, 1994, `The Tobin's q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm 
Performance', Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102, no. 6. 
100. Lee C. M. C, 1999, `Accounting-Based Valuation: Impact on Business Practices 
and Research', Accounting Horizons, Vol. 13(4), pp. 413-425. 
101. Leftwich R., 1974, `U. S. Multinational Companies: Profitability, Financial 
Leverage and Effective Income Tax Rates', Survey of Current Business, May 
1974, pp. 27-36 
102. Lev B., Zarowin P., 1999, `The Boundaries of Financial Reporting and How to 
Extend Them', Journal ofAccounting Research, Vol. 37(2), pp. 353-386. 
103. Lin Y., Peasnell K., 2000, `Fixed Asset Revaluation and Equity Depletion in the 
UK', Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 27 (3&4), pp. 359-394. 
104. Lins K., Servaes H., 1999, `International Evidence on the Value of Corporate 
Diversification', Journal of Finance, Vol. 54 (6), pp. 2215-2239. 
105. Lipe R., 1986, `The Information Contained in the Components of Earnings', 
Journal ofAccounting Research, Vol. 24 (3), pp37-64. 
106. Lo K., and Lys T., 2000, `The Ohlson Model: Contribution to Valuation Theory, 
Limitations and Empirical Applications', Journal of Accounting, Auditing and 
Finance, Vol. 15, pp. 337-67. 
107. Maddala G., 1990, `Introduction to Econometrics', Macmillan. New York. NY. 
108. Marietta-Westberg J., Sierra G., `Specification Issues for Cross-Sectional 
Applications of the Ohlson Model', Working Paper, Michigan State University, 
2000. 
109. Modigliani F., Miller M., 1958, `The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and the 
Theory of Investment', American Economic Review, Vol. 48 (June), pp. 261-297. 
424 
110. Morck R., Yeung B, 1991, `Why Investors Value Multinationality', Journal of 
Business, Vol. 64 (2), pp. 165-187. 
111. O'Hanlon J., 1995, `Return/Earnings Regressions and Residual Income: 
Empirical Evidence', Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 22(1), 
pp. 53-66. 
112. O'Hanlon J., Peasnell K, `Wall Street' Contribution to Management 
Accounting: Stem Stewart EVA Financial Management System', Management 
Accounting Research, Vol. 1998 (9), pp. 421-444. 
113. Ohlson J., 1989, `Accounting Earnings, Book Value, and Dividends: the Theory 
of the Clean Surplus Equation (Part I)', Columbia University Working Paper. 
Reprinted in Brief P., and Peasnell K., 1996. Clean Surplus: a Link Between 
Accounting and Finance, New York and London, Garland Publishing. 
114. Ohlson J., 1995, `Earnings, Book Values and Dividends in Equity Valuation', 
Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 11, pp. 661-687. 
115. Ou J., Sepe J., 2002, `Analysts Earnings Forecasts and the Roles of Earnings and 
Book Value in Equity Valuation', Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 
Vol. 29(3&4), pp. 287-316. 
116. Peasnell K., 1981, `On Capital Budgeting and Income Measurement', Abacus, 
Vol. 17(l), pp. 52-67. 
117. Peasnell K., 1982, `Some Formal Connections Between Economic Values and 
Yields and Accounting Numbers', Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 
Vol. 9(3), pp. 361-381. 
118. Penman S., 1998, `Combining Earnings and Book Value in Equity Valuation', 
Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 15, pp. 291-324. 
119. Piotroski J., 1999, `The Impact of Newly Reported Segment Information on 
Market Expectations and Stock Prices', Working Paper, University of Chicago. 
425 
120. Prather-Stewart J., 1995, `The Information Content of Geographic Segment 
Disclosures', in T. S., Doupnik (ed. ), Advances In International Accounting, Vol. 
8., (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press), pp. 31-45. 
121. Preinreich G., 1936, `The Fair Value and Yield of Common Stock', The 
Accounting Review, March, pp. 317-329. reprinted in Brief P., and Peasnell K., 
1996. Clean Surplus: a Link Between Accounting and Finance, New York and 
London, Garland Publishing. 
122. Prodhan B., 1986, `Geographical Segment Disclosure and Multinational Risk 
Profile', Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 13(1), pp. 15-38. 
123. Prodhan B., Harris M., 1989, `Systematic Risk and the Discretionary Disclosure 
of Geographical Segments', Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 
16(4), pp. 467-492. 
124. Ramesh K., Thiaggarajan R., 1995, `Inter-temporal Decline in Earnings 
Response Coefficients', Working Paper, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL. 
125. Rayburn J., 1986, `The Association of Operating Cash Flow and Accruals with 
Security Returns', Journal ofAccounting Research, Vol. 24 (3), pp. 112-154. 
126. Rees W., 1997, `The Impact of Dividends, Debt and Investment on Valuation 
Models', Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 24(7&8), pp. 111- 
1140. 
127. Rees W., 1999a, `Influence on the value Relevance of Equity and Net Income in 
the U. K', Managerial Finance, Vol. 25, No. 12. 
128. Reinganum M., 1981, 'Misspecification of Capital Asset Pricing: Empirical 
Anomalies Based on Earnings Yields and Market Values', Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 9 (March), pp. 1-46. 
426 
129. Reinganum M., 1982, `A Direct Test of Roll's Conjecture on the Firm Size 
Effect', Journal of Finance, Vol. 37, pp. 27-35. 
130. Roberts C., 1989, `Forecasting Earnings Using Geographical Segment Data: 
Some UK Evidence', Journal of International Financial Management and 
Accounting, Vol. 1 (2), pp. 130-151. 
131. Roberts C., Gray S., `Segment Reporting' in C. Nobes and R. Parker (eds) Issues 
in Multinational Accounting (Philip Allan, 1988), pp. 103-123. 
132. Sambharya R, 1995, `The Combined Effect of International Diversification and 
Product Diversification Strategies on the Performance of U. S. -Based 
Multinational Corporations', Management International Review, Vol. 35, no. 3, 
pp. 197-218. 
133. Senteney D., 1991, `An Empirical Investigation of Structural Changes in the 
Equity Security Return Generating Process of Multinational Enterprises Relative 
to Geographical Area Disclosures: Some Additional Evidence', Akron Business 
and Economic Review, pp. 78-87. 
134. Senteney D., Bazaz M., 1992, `The Impact of SFAS 14 Geographic Segment 
Disclosures on the Information Content of US-based MNEs' earnings releases', 
The International Journal ofAccounting, Vol. 27, pp. 267-279. 
135. Senteney D., Bazaz M., 2002, `The Impact of Geographic and Business Segment 
Diversification Upon Investor's Perceptions of Earnings of US-Based 
Multinational Enterprises', Review of Accounting and Finance, Vol. 1(2), pp. 71- 
86. 
136. Servaes H., 1996, `The Value of Diversification During the Conglomerate 
Merger Wave', Journal ofFinance, Vol. 51, No. 4., pp. 1201-1225. 
137. Silhan P., 1992, `Simulated Mergers of Existent Autonomous Firms: A New 
Approach to Segmentaion Research', Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 20 
(1), pp. 255-262. 
427 
138. Silhan P., 1983, `The Effects of Segmenting Quarterly Sales and Margins on 
Extrapolative Forecasts of Conglomerate Earnings: Extension and Replication', 
Journal ofAccountingResearch, Vol. 21(1), pp. 341-347. 
139. Silhan P., 1984, `Company Size and the Issue of Quarterly Segment Reporting', 
Journal ofAccounting and Public Policy, Vol. 3(3), pp. 185-198. 
140. Simonds R, Collins D., 1978, `Line of Business Reporting and Security Prices. 
An Analysis of a SEC Disclosure Rule: A Comment', Bell Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 9(2), pp. 646-658. 
141. Stark A., Thomas H., 1998, `The Empirical Relationship Between Excess Market 
Value and Residual Income: Some UK Evidence', Management Accounting 
Research, Vol. 9, pp. 445-60. 
142. Stowe J., Robinson T., Pinto J., McLeavey D, `Analysis of Equity Investments: 
Valuation', Association for Investment Management and Research, AIMR 2002. 
143. Strong N., Walker M., Harding Z., 1996, `Price Models and Earnings Response 
Coefficients', Working Paper, University of Manchester. 
144. Thomas W., 2000, `The Value-Relevance of Geographic Segment Earnings 
Disclosures Under SFAS 14', Journal of International Financial Management 
and Accounting, Vol. 11(3), pp. 133-155. 
145. Tse S., 1989, `Attributes of Industry, Industry Segment and Firm-Specific 
Information in Security Valuation', Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 5, 
no. 2, pp. 592-614. 
146. Verrecchia R, 1983, `Discretionary Disclosure', Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 5 (December), pp. 179-194. 
428 
147. Walker M., 1997, `Clean Surplus Accounting Models and Market Based 
Accounting Research: A Review', Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 27, 
pp. 341-355. 
148. Wilson P, 1986, `The Relative Information Content of Accruals and Cash Flow 
Combined Evidence at the Earnings Announcement and Annual Report Release 
Date', Journal ofAccounting Research, Vol. 24 (3), pp. 165-200. 
149. Wysocki P., 1998, `Real Options and the Informativeness of Segment 
Disclosures', UMBS Working Paper, November. 
429 
